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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework that provides systemic design 
guidance for future interfaces that are to provide effective and cognitively suitable 
information presentation to operators in dynamic and time-critical domains. The 
aerospace domain has been chosen as the focus for this study. 
In the aerospace domain there are numerous reported accidents where contributory 
factors are attributed to pilots’ misunderstanding of automated system configurations, 
and pilots’ misinterpretation of system behaviour. These problems have occurred as 
rapid advances in technology have led to an overabundance of ‘useful’ information 
being presented to the pilot.  Currently, the information presented to pilots is often 
disjointed and distributed across various interfaces where each interface is based on its 
own design rationale. This creates problems where the pilot either cannot locate 
information in a timely manner, or misinterprets the available information. There is a 
need for a systematic design process that deals with meaningfully presenting the 
abundance of features and interactions of the new technology introduced into the 
cockpit through the use of existing domain knowledge, structures and strategies drawn 
from existing pilot training and experience.     
The thesis is a case study. It shows how a new systematic interface design guidance 
process was developed by first identifying effective information presentation directly 
from airforce and airline pilots in their time-critical working environment conducted 
through observational and empirical studies. The studies provided answers for research 
questions that were concerned with finding appropriate information presentations for 
pilots. This resulted in a framework that serves as a guide for the interface designer on 
how to arrive at, structure and present information to an operator in a cognitively 
efficient manner. 
The thesis demonstrates two applications of the design framework, one of which is then 
evaluated by pilots who demonstrate significantly improved speed and accuracy 
performance when compared to conventional alphanumerical displays. The applications 
and limitations of the framework are also discussed. 
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Chapter 1: The root cause of “tricky” cockpit displays 
The subject of this thesis is a new systematic design approach for a modern automated 
cockpit that draws on the natural abilities and professional experience of pilots and so 
helps to deliver information to them in a meaningful way. This thesis aims to inform the 
design process of future systems through examination of how pilots use information in 
current and experimental automated cockpit displays. The aim of this research is to 
develop a framework that uses existing technology and operational practice to inform 
the design of future interfaces for effective and cognitively efficient information 
presentation to the pilot in a dynamic and time-critical domain.  
Increasing levels of automation in modern aircraft and pilots being surprised by its 
actions have been linked to many incidents and several accidents (Funk & Lyall, 1998; 
Billings, 1997). Consequently, it is important and timely to assess the use of 
information and its presentation to the pilot in the cockpit. Despite the fact that Human 
Computer Interaction and Aerospace Human Factors has emphasized the need for the 
primary user of the system, the pilot, to be involved early in the design process 
(Billings, 1997; Preece, Rogers, & Sharp, 2002; Gagne, 1962; Kearns, 1982; Wiener, 
1989), in practice, pilots are still involved late in the design process. Pilots participate 
mostly during evaluation of the finished design, where significant changes are costly 
and unlikely to be implemented (Figure 1.1).  
The initial step towards a new design approach has been to elucidate the source of these 
problems through the examination of pilots’ basic training and operational rules that 
pilots use for rest of their career. Within this step observed and reported problems 
discovered during observation of pilots’ line operation (i.e. in a commercial airline 
operation), in manuals and training material were determined and classified, 
establishing the problem domain. Further, empirical steps then go on to examine pilots’ 
current strategies for dealing with the vast amount of information they are faced with.  
Examination of pilots’ current strategies was accomplished through using a modified 
technique of acquiring information adapted from researchers who gained an insight into 
fire fighters’ cognitive process of decision-making (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 
1997). An evolutionary analysis was developed to reveal from real time data (i.e. pilots’ 
own-point-of-view video) the information required for future interface design. During 
the empirical study the analysis helped to bring to the surface surprising and unforeseen 
existing effective and robust information structures, operational rules and strategies that 
pilots use to acquire and process information in the glass cockpit (i.e. a cockpit 
equipped with Electronic Flight Instrument System, that looks like a panel made of 
‘glass’, containing numerous computer displays, hence it is termed – ‘glass cockpit’). 
The design framework was then developed based on the results of the empirical study. 
The framework considers established Human Computer Interaction design principles 
(Johnson, Johnson, & Hamilton, 2000) and work on task-related principles (Long & 
Dowell, 1989).  Several candidate principles were identified that helped organize and 
structure information, and increase the usability of information for pilots’ in their time-
critical and high workload environment. The framework was used to design two 
prototype interfaces, one of which was evaluated in an experiment run on pilots.  
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 1: The Root Cause 
 
2
This chapter presents the background to this thesis research, identifies the problems that 
the research addresses and how these problems will be tackled. It introduces the 
systematic design approach that the research adopted, presents a brief statement of the 
research results and outlines the remaining chapters of the thesis.  
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Figure 1.1: Missing Step in Aerospace Interface Design Process 
1.1 Background 
Due to fast technological advancements in the last century, aircraft cockpit development 
has swiftly moved from being: 1) designed by an engineer, who was often the test-pilot; 
2) to an engineer who may have never piloted an aircraft. In turn aircraft operation has 
changed from being flown by a pilot, to being largely operated by automation and 
monitored by a pilot. Engineers who are involved in the design of modern cockpit 
interfaces are experts in technological advancements, but are less knowledgeable about 
aircraft day-to-day operation and the cognitive demands on the pilot. This gap in 
engineers’ understanding (Newman & Greeley, 2001b) compromises the cockpit design 
process and affects pilots’ understanding of aircraft operation leading to incidents and 
unfortunate accidents. 
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Information overload, especially during critical stages of flight (Billings, 1997; Dekker 
& Woods, 1999; Wiener, 1989), has become a critical challenge within the modern 
transport aircraft cockpit.  Pilots are being stretched to their limits by the informational 
and computational demands of today’s complex cockpit technology (e.g., Lintern, 2000 
and Wiener, 1989). However, the problem is in poor organization and poor 
representation of information, rather than in the abundance of information that is 
presented to the pilot.  
1.2 Thesis problem statement 
Pilots’ difficulties with automation have been in continuous discussion since the earliest 
implementations of advanced technology in the cockpit (e.g. Wiener & Curry, 1980; 
Wiener, 1989; Billings, 1997; Funk et al., 1998; Demagalski et al., 2002). Various 
studies have shown that the ‘glass cockpit’ (i.e. aircraft cockpit equipped with 
Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) and Liquid Crystal Displays) aircraft can 
induce new types of errors (Sarter & Woods, 1992; 1994; 1995, 1997), but there has 
been relatively meager discussions of how these can be addressed. Clearly, it is not 
appropriate to revert to the old-style, pre-computer systems, but the manner in which the 
power of new technology is implemented into an interface remains a challenge for the 
field of Human-System Integration (Lintern, 1999) and this thesis.  
It is argued that the incidence of errors within the glass cockpit is primarily an issue of 
information presentation and management. That is, a large amount of information is 
needed for the piloting job as a whole and pilots must be able to converge quickly on 
the constellation of information needed at any moment, rather than pilots merely 
requiring a large amount of information at any moment. Currently, information is 
widely distributed and poorly organized in the cockpit and poorly represented on the 
displays. Consequently, it is often very difficult to link information that must be 
associated and to maintain an appreciation of the state of dynamic processes with 
respect to different piloting tasks. 
Although the problem is most visible during pilot interaction with automation through 
cockpit interfaces, the problem is actually rooted in the early stages of the design 
process (Figure 1.2). It is contended that problems start through an incomplete 
knowledge of pilots’ operating practices leading to inaccurate specifications being 
generated the during requirement stage. This, in turn, affects composition of automation 
logic and information structure. Consequently, these flaws compound into the interface 
design stage, where flawed information is then transferred to the cockpit interfaces.  
This research sets out to address these issues (i.e. issues of information presentation and 
management in a glass cockpit), carrying both theoretical and practical contributions to 
the field of Cognitive Engineering. The work reported here promotes the vision of a 
cockpit as a coherent and fully integrated information space. The approach for 
designing such a workspace is outlined using real world glass cockpits and commercial 
and airforce pilots. Further, the progress towards realization of that vision is outlined 
throughout the chapters (Section 1.6), including a description of knowledge elicitation 
techniques with the use of head-mounted-cameras on pilots, development of an 
evolutionary data analysis approach and the formation of the information 
systematization framework. Finally, the framework has a step-by-step description of 
how the two types of interfaces were designed, followed by the experiment where one 
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of the interfaces is successfully tested on pilots. 
1.3 Research questions 
The work reported here was guided by four research questions that capture the 
fundamental concerns of the research. The first question looks at identifying problems 
pilots have with automation:   
DESIGN OF AUTOMATION PHILOSOPHY
PROBLEM
INTERFACE PROBLEM
1
Automation
Philosophy
2
Implementation/
design of a system
and interfaces
5.1.1
Training aids
5.2.1
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5.1
Training
5.2
Operation
4
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7
Tricks and
workarounds
via
through through
for successful
3 and 6
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of system
via
develop
has
transfer
and gain
transfer
and gain
affects
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understanding and
composition
requirements
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philosophy and
logic of operation
CONSISTENCY PROBLEM
ff t
R
O
O
T
 C
A
U
S
E
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affects  
Figure 1.2: Root cause of glass cockpit problems 
RQ1 - What are the root causes of the problems pilots have with 
understanding and operating automated systems?  
In posing this question, the thesis considers how pilots are trained and acquire their 
understanding about aircraft operation and automation. Therefore, subsequently the 
problems that pilots encounter during training and operation are examined and classified 
(Chapter 4). 
The second research question, tackled in chapter 3, is:  
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RQ2 - What is a suitable method for eliciting information about the 
knowledge of how pilots operate in a time and safety critical 
environment?  And further, is there a method that can bring valid 
and reliable reports on pilots’ own experiences?  
The third question asked:  
RQ3 - Is there a conceptual framework that helps designers and 
engineers compose and deliver effective information 
systematization and presentation throughout the glass cockpit and 
on individual interfaces?  
In considering this question, it was necessary to question the sources of framework and 
concept formation (Chapter 5 and 6). 
The fourth research question asks: could there be more effective ways of presenting 
information to pilots than currently used?  In posing this question the consequent 
questions of: 
RQ4 - What can provide more effective information presentation? and 
how can this be arrived at?  
The latter question is described in chapter 6 and the use of the framework developed in 
the thesis to design interfaces is illustrated in chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 8 then examines 
the effectiveness of information presentation on a newly designed interface feature. 
1.4 Research strategy 
Aerospace Human Factors research has suggested several methods for effective cockpit 
interface design (Reising, Liggett, & Munns, 1999) where an eclectic team of 
specialists, ranging from pilots to mission specialist, designers and engineers are 
involved from the initial stages of design. However, (1) it is not practiced to the full 
extent in the industry as reported by several people involved in cockpit design (e.g. 
Singer, 2002). Stages in the design process and analysis are skipped, because a higher 
authority said “we did one once” before (Newman & Greeley, 2001b). (2) Simple 
involvement of future operators, such as pilots in this domain, and the rest of the team 
are not sufficient for a design of effective, cognitively efficient interfaces and automated 
systems. It is contended that, there is a need for a design strategy that can study, 
analyze, understand and translate the needs and wants of the operator to a designer and 
an engineer of the future system.  
The thesis takes an eclectic approach borrowing, modifying and adapting stages from 
approaches that study operator’s in similar environments. The domain is studied using a 
hybrid approach some of which is set in the field of ethnography (i.e. an observation 
study) and yet it has some laboratory-like settings (i.e. empirical study), such as in the 
field of psychology and human factors. The evaluation of the interfaces follows the 
Human Computer Interaction field of study. In addition to the above, the approach uses 
interview techniques often adapted by Human Computer Interaction and Cognitive 
Engineering.  A cued-recall debrief method, based on own-point-of-view footage, is 
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used to prompt pilots during a debrief-interview session to acquire an expert-
knowledge. This method was originally used on fire-fighters to improve their training 
and study decision-making in a time and safety-critical environment (Omodei et al., 
1997). The method had to be modified to suit the needs of this thesis to understand 
pilots’ information needs and information use for the purpose of design guidance, which 
is described in chapter three and five. 
The original data analysis used in the cue-recall debrief method (Omodei et al., 1997) 
was not suitable, as it suggested ‘cognitive processes’ as data categories (McLennan, 
Omodei, & Wearing, 2000). These categories were specific to the study of decision-
making, which were not appropriate, because this was an exploratory study and should 
not have been assigned categories prior to viewing the data. Therefore, an evolutionary 
data analysis was developed. The data analysis is traced in a step-by-step fashion in 
chapter five. It revealed an ‘Evolutionary Information Flow’ used by pilots. This 
concept of information systematization and management was developed further in 
chapter six, using data described in studies (chapter three, four and five) and also using 
existing broader notions, such as metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), frames of 
reference (Pinker, 1997), and visual cues in optical flow (Gibson, 1979) in fields of 
Human Computer Interaction, Sociology, Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors. 
All these inputs were employed in the creation of a ‘Mind Reference Framework’, 
which is later used to guide the design of the experimental interfaces. 
The steps necessary to design an integrated information space are then described using 
some of the Human Computer Interaction, Human Factors and Cognitive Engineering 
interface design principles and guidelines. These are described and applied to design 
two interfaces in chapter seven and eight. One of the interfaces is later evaluated in the 
experiment, where pilots participated (chapter 8).  
In developing an approach to resolve this information presentation and management 
problem, two studies of pilots’ patterns of information use are drawn upon, (1) an 
empirical study of a state-of-the-art military cargo aircraft (Hercules C130-J), and (2) 
an observational study within the pilot training program for a modern, commercial 
aircraft (Airbus 320). The results of these studies are used to help identify the type of 
information pilots need and in what format they need it in order to manage a modern 
aircraft effectively. 
1.5 Summary of results and contributions made 
The problems that pilots reported to have with automation of flight systems are rooted 
in issues that Human Computer Interaction is established to tackle. The problems have 
been uncovered through observation of training, the analysis of documentation, 
empirical study and literature review (e.g., Sarter & Woods, 1994; Billings, 1997; 
Wiener & Curry, 1980; Funk & Lyall 1998). The problems pilots face are embedded in 
an ill-defined system, and interface information presentation is based on ill defined 
requirements (Figure 1.2). In existing systems the pilot, the domain and the nature of the 
operating environment are not studied together comprehensively enough to specify and 
define the final system design. Given the nature of the safety and time-critical operating 
environment in glass cockpit, novel approaches had to be adapted and developed to 
support system design. 
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This thesis represents a case study from examination of the problem to the potential 
design framework for new time and safety critical interfaces. A systematic design 
approach for an integrated information space was developed. The approach consists of 
studying the domain, by applying a novel elicitation technique (i.e. ‘cue-recall-debrief’ 
with use of head-mounted cameras on pilots) to obtain design requirements directly 
from the pilot.  This is followed by the ‘evolutionary’ analysis of the data, which 
defines the Mind Reference framework of information systematization using the expert-
knowledge of the domain. This is followed by practical interface design steps, based on 
the Mind Reference framework, indicating areas for the designer/engineer to examine to 
arrive at an effective presentation of information.  
Finally, the resulting interface feature was tested on pilots, and these evaluations proved 
the resulting interface feature to be more effective than current alpha-numerical 
information presentation. 
1.6 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 1: The root cause of “tricky” cockpit displays. This chapter presents the 
thesis case, showing its’ place in existing research. The second part of the chapter 
briefly outlines the content of the thesis (Figure 1.3). 
Chapter 2: Gaps in the existing cockpit design process. The second chapter presents 
existing design processes, which are currently used in the aerospace domain. However, 
theoretical design processes that claim to be fantastic in application are seldom used in 
the aerospace industry (e.g. Newman & Greeley, 2001a). The frustration of test pilots is 
discussed who are often involved too late in the design process to make required 
changes. This chapter further sets the scene for the thesis, proposing how existing 
cockpit systems and operational practice can inform the interface design process during 
the early stages. The chapter concludes with a strategy of how this research is carried 
out. 
Chapter 3: Identifying a suitable method for extracting and using the domain 
knowledge to inform the design process. The focus of chapter three is to identify a 
suitable method for evaluating pilots’ information needs to inform future interface 
design. The cued-recall-debrief method (Omodei et al., 1997) is identified and justified. 
The preliminary study examined the suitability of the method and modified it for the 
purpose of this thesis. The suitability of the data collected during the preliminary study 
is examined after the data analysis. 
Chapter 4: Defining the problems pilots have with information. Chapter four is the 
statement about refinement of the problem. The chapter describes how the researcher 
acquired the domain knowledge and captured existing problems in the domain. The 
aerospace domain was studied through personal experience and observation of pilots in 
training and during line (i.e. every day airline) operation. The problems observed and 
extracted from the available material, such as manuals, Standard Operating Procedure 
(Ansett Airlines, 2000) and Airlines’ Computer Based Training (Airbus Industrie, 
1997), are later studied and classified. Conclusions are then drawn about the challenges 
pilots’ face in dealing with and understanding a vast amount of information, mainly in 
short periods of time, even during regular line operation, where highly sophisticated 
technology can often keep valuable information hidden or inaccessible to the pilot. 
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Chapter 5: Pilot’s way of dealing with information challenge. Chapter five describes 
the empirical study, where a modified cued-recall-debrief method is applied in the full-
flight simulator with participation of experienced pilots. The evolution of data analysis 
process is described in detail. The analysis process itself is unique and specific to the 
data collected. The remaining part of the chapter describes how the pilot makes sense of 
a vast amount of information in a short span of time. The structures of existing 
information presentation are shown that are currently used by the pilot. The strategies 
that the pilot uses to deal with information are drawn out of the data. Conclusions are 
drawn upon on how this data can be helpful in design of future interfaces. 
Chapter 6: Building a Mind References framework. Chapter six summarises the 
results of the design process investigation that helped in understanding the pilot’s 
information needs in the aerospace domain, such as the observation of pilots in training 
and during line operation, the study of operational material, and the empirical study of 
pilots in a full-flight simulator. The emerging framework for interface design is 
discussed from an ecological perspective.  
Chapter 7: Using a Mind References framework to inform design. Chapter seven 
details how to apply the Mind References framework in the design of an interface. The 
step-by-step development of each feature on the interface is expanded upon. 
Chapter 8: Experimental Study. This chapter describes the experiment that tests the 
interface feature. The interface feature evaluated is designed through application of 
principles based on the Mind References framework established in chapter six. The test 
was run on 40 experienced pilots. Four interfaces are compared, the interface feature 
that was designed through the application of principles proved to be more effective than 
a numerical presentation of the same data. 
Chapter 9: Scope of the Mind References framework. The concluding chapter brings 
the results of observation study, empirical study and the experiment together, showing 
how these results answer four research questions posed earlier in this chapter. The 
results of how the systematic interface design process, the method used, and the 
resulting framework work together are discussed. The applications and limitations of 
the framework are drawn out. Lastly, possibilities for future applications of the 
framework and the systematic interface design process are discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Gaps in existing cockpit design process 
This chapter sets the scene for the rest of the thesis. It starts by examining the problem 
domain, by showing the human factor problems existing in the aerospace industry, 
evident from accident and incident reports. Then these problems are focused onto 
specifically understanding the problems that pilots have with automation in the cockpit. 
It discusses where automation was intended, and designed, to provide support in the 
cockpit. The root of the problems pilots have with understanding automation is then 
discussed, tracing this back to design (Figure 1.2 Root cause from Chapter 1). Existing 
theories of a possible relevant design process are examined, and practices in the industry 
are then scrutinized. The speed and pressure of evolution of the technology is then 
considered as a factor influencing decisions made in cockpit interface design. 
Lastly, whilst referencing the existing design processes, the need for a novel approach 
that informs design, not only on what, but on how the information needs to be presented 
to the pilot, is outlined in a concluding part of this chapter. 
2.1 What are the problems and what evidence exists? 
The introduction of new technology to the cockpit has bought new demands on the 
pilot:  
“…an operator must: 
• Learn and remember all of the available options. 
• Learn and remember how to deploy them across a variety of operational circumstances, 
especially rarely occurring but more difficult or critical ones. 
• Learn and remember the interface manipulations required to invoke the different modes 
or features. 
• Learn and remember where to find or how to interpret the various indications about 
which option is active or armed and what are its associated target values. 
Note that modern technology not only creates these new demands but also holds the potential 
for supporting them effectively. However, this potential has not yet been realized as the ability 
of modern systems to preprocess, filter, integrate, or visualize information for the operator is 
not being exploited. System interfaces tend to be designed for data availability rather than 
observability. In other words, the amount of available data is sufficient and clearly exceeds that 
of earlier systems. However, the way in which data are presented does not match human 
information-processing abilities and limitations, and thus the burden of locating, integrating 
and interpreting these data still rests with the practitioner...” 
 - N. B. Sarter (p. 5, 2000) 
The primary concern for those working in the area of flightdeck safety are the problems 
that pilots have with automation, where pilots are surprised by automation, and have 
difficulties knowing and understanding automation behaviour (e.g., Amalberti, 1999; 
Billings, 1997; Administration, 1996; Funk et al., 1998). This occurrence has been 
termed, an Automation Surprise. This also has been demonstrated by prominent 
researchers in a series of studies and surveys on the state-of-the-art, highly automated 
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commercial aircraft (e.g.,  Johnson & Pritchett, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1992, 1994, 
1995, 1997).  
These problems have been shown to have a number of potential causes, ranging from 
increasing autonomy and complexity of automation (Sarter & Woods, 1997), to the 
huge quantity of potentially relevant data presented throughout a modern flightdeck on 
various systems, screens, dials and switches (Sarter & Woods, 1995).   
Previous studies have shown that, in a time and safety critical environment, such as 
aerospace, the usability and absence of relevant information can lead to undesirable 
decisions and actions on the part of the pilot. A poor understanding of both 
environmental data and automation activity has been a key factor in the build-up to 
major aviation incidents (e.g. Eldredge, Mangold, & Dodd, 1992; Owen & Funk, 1997) 
and accidents (Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport of France, 1989; 
Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 1996; Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990; 
Bureau Enquetes Accidents, 1992). 
“Human failure plays a significant role in incidents and accidents” (Johnson, 2003), but 
as to how much of the reported statistic is actual ‘human failure’ and how much of it is 
induced by poor interface design is even harder to distinguish. It is similarly hard to 
determine how much of it is seeded in poor information presentation or the absence of 
information. Any statistic here counts towads human lives. Leading accident and 
incident investigators report that in aviation accidents between 1996 and 2003, based on 
United States National Safety Transport Board data, up to 44% of probable causes are 
human error (Johnson, 2004). Turning to more in depth studies of automation related 
aviation accidents, incidents and review of other related studies on automated aircraft 
(Funk, 1998): 
23 %  of problems and concerns (out of all problems in automated aircraft) are 
directly associated with “poor pilot/automation interface design”  
14.5 %  of other problems and concerns are associated with information problems 
pilots have related to the operation of the automation, where   
5.1 %  automation behavior is unexpected or unexplained;  
4.2 %  are understanding problems; 
2.7 %  are standardization problems; 
2.5 %  failure assessment is difficult.  
To illustrate the seriousness of the problem and the significance of the statistics above, 
the results are broken down in one study included in the above statistics (Funk, 1998). 
The study (Sarter & Woods, 1997) was conducted by leading researchers in the area, 
Sarter and Woods, as a consequence to previous alarming studies (see Sarter & Woods, 
1992, 1994). These studies revealed a major problem with pilot-automation interaction, 
or more exactly, pilots’ poor understanding of the systems current and future status, the 
behavior of automation and inter-system relationships, which results in pilots being 
surprised by automation behavior, termed Automation Surprise. They devised open-
ended questionnaires to study the notion of Automation Surprise based on specific 
cases, monitoring techniques and pilots’ attitudes towards automation. The 
questionnaires were distributed to 750 line-pilots of the Airbus 320 aircraft (i.e. A320). 
Approximately 170 questionnaires were returned.  The summary of the findings were 
the following:  
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≈ 20 %  Pilots failure to activate the approach (i.e. an automated function pilots 
rely on during last phases of fight); 
≈ 20 % Loss of constraints after entering change (i.e. change to automation 
function can override the limits preprogrammed to protect the aircraft);  
≈ 13 % Indirect mode transitions (i.e. the change of automation function without 
direct manipulation by the pilots);  
≈ 10 % Exceeded an airspeed of 250 knots below 10.000 feet; 
≈  5  % Failure to understand automation strategies in managed vertical 
navigation; 
≈  5  % Failure to immediately detect a failure of the flight management and 
guidance computer;  
≈  4  % Unexpected airspeed during a go-around;  
≈  4  % Decrease in airspeed when leveling off in the “open descent” mode.  
The majority of pilots (80%) in the survey described above responded that they had 
experienced Automation Surprise at least once during line operation. Authors of the 
study reported that other studies on Boeing 757 and Boeing 737-300/400 confirmed this 
result.  
The distressing conclusion about these data suggests that some pilots do not understand 
to the full extent and effects of automation behavior, and at times pilots’ are not aware 
of the automation’s actions and state. Furthermore, the current layout of information in 
the cockpit is not effective in helping pilots use and understand automation. The 
information in the cockpit is presented in a manner in which the pilot receives 
fragmented information about the environment and the aircraft state (Johnson & 
Pritchett, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1995). 
2.1.1  Automation is here to help…? 
From the evidence above it is appropriate to query, why is the automation used in the 
first place? There must be a reason why it is tolerated despite it being a contributor to 
many deaths and problems in everyday operation of aircraft. 
Automation was originally introduced for economic reasons (e.g., Wickens & Hollands, 
2000; Newman & Greeley, 2001), such as the reduction of manpower, cheaper and 
more efficient aircraft operation and flexibility in all weather operation (Figure 2.1 Left 
hand side). Another reason for introduction of automation is to support human 
performance deficiencies (e.g., physical and cognitive limitations). However, according 
to current findings, automation does not necessarily help. It stretches the pilot’s 
cognitive ability to the limits. Billings (1989), Singer (2002), Dekker and Woods (1999) 
assert strongly that automation creates new kinds of cognitive work, that appears to 
increase workload during critical situations and phases of flight, creating the potential 
for new types of errors (Woods et al., 1994). 
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Figure 2.1: Automation Advantages, Costs and Solution 
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Automation comes at a cost (Figure 2.1 Costs) (Wickens & Hollands, 2000; Billings, 
1997). Automation complexity increases. Links, relationships and interdependencies in the 
system (Billings, 1997) become difficult to understand both during training and during line 
operation. Autonomy (i.e. acting without the need of pilot’s input - (Sarter & Woods, 1997) 
of aircraft automation increases to protect the crew, the airframe, and the engines. Who 
should have full authority over stressing or protecting the aircraft is still a debate between 
pilots and manufacturers (Newman & Greeley, 2001). It is debated on the issue that the 
pilot should decide the choice between hitting the ground or stressing the aircraft. However, 
current evidence (NASA and Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems - Newman & 
Greeley, 2001; Airbus - Tarnowski, 1999) suggests the manufacturers are winning, building 
in the protection in the control inputs and limiting the stress that can be exerted on the 
frame and the engines, without pilots being consulted about these decisions. 
With increase of automation complexity and autonomy of automation, the gap of 
communication between the pilot and the automation is becoming greater. The feedback 
about automation actions and states is an area in which improvements can be made. 
Solutions to these problems have been offered at several junctions, pilot training (e.g., 
Lintern, Roscoe, & Sivier, 1990), and changes to operating procedures that create 
workarounds to avoid the problems embedded in the design (e.g., Owen & Funk, 1997). 
However, solutions applied at the level of procedures, training and further automatic 
functions to avoid pilots being caught by flawed design, are not acceptable in the long term 
(Figure 2.1 Bottom), to be exact suboptimal design causes problems (Norman, 1986). For 
this approach has become a viscous cycle, starting at (1) poor design requirement level, (2) 
poor information management and its’ poor presentation on interfaces, (3) training pilots to 
avoid being caught by embedded design flaws, (4) further implementation of modified 
operating procedures to fix recurrent mistakes that pilots make in everyday aircraft 
operation; and repeating it in (1) design of future systems using partial previous design 
requirements or reusing part of the system. 
2.1.2  Design practice 
Despite a variety of researched cockpit design approaches, guidelines and philosophies 
(e.g., Palmer, Rogers, Press, Latorella, & Abott, 1995; Wilkins, 1995; Storey, Rountree, 
Kulwicki, & Cohen, 1994; SAE, 1995; Dinadis, 2000; and Rasmussen, 1999), the design 
process in industry is constrained by: limited resources; regulations and restrictions of time 
and cost. As a result very little experimentation and testing are done to validate a new 
design (SAAB - Singer & Persson, 1996).  
Newman and Greenly (NASA and Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems - Newman & 
Greeley, 2001) discussed and reviewed current practice in cockpit display design processes. 
They state there is a problem of bad design practices due to ‘absence of logical, organized 
design methodology with well-defined requirements’ (p. 10, Newman & Greeley, 2001). 
Manufacturers also report that they are aware of the design process being flawed (NASA 
and Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems - Newman & Greeley, 2001; Saab Aircraft -
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Gideon Singer, 2002).  
“Design decisions regarding cockpit interface have always been made based on subjective 
statements of the test pilot” (p. 16, Singer 2002). This practice is flawed because, although 
test pilots are often the most experienced pilots, they do not operate the aircraft in every 
day operation. Consequently, during test and “evaluation (test) pilots revert to previous 
experience that might not be relevant to the new design” (Singer, 2002). Newman & 
Greeley (2001) stress that test pilots should not be the sole decision makers. Instead they 
should input into an information requirements study to be conducted prior to requirements 
specification. The emphasis should be made on understanding the requirements of potential 
line operating pilots. 
Another design process flaw, which is a common frustration to test pilots, happens during 
final testing phase of interfaces. Commonly, the full future system description is not 
finalized until late in the design process, but full functionality is not visible until final phase 
of testing, where often, despite test-pilots protest, the designs are approved as ‘Good 
enough’. Often to change even a shape of the symbol is too costly in time and money 
(Newman & Greeley, 2001). As a result of flaws in the design process and poor design 
requirements, the cockpit design philosophy∗, and the overall integration of new technology 
and information, is not always addressed due to already established ways of designing, as 
well as due to cost and schedule constraints. 
2.1.3  Cost of ‘good enough’ design during every day aircraft operation 
This chapter has introduced explanations for a range of problems in the automated cockpit 
that pilots have to deal with as a consequence of poor decisions made by manufacturers 
(e.g., poor system and information integration resulting in a pilot workload increase). The 
problems that this thesis is focused on relate to establishing information requirements and 
presentation. These range from missing information that should be available, but is either 
hidden behind several screen steps, or absent, to information integration problems 
throughout the cockpit and on individual screens and panels. 
‘Automated systems have made it really hard for practitioners (i.e. pilots) to pick up subtle 
changes in mode or status’ of the system (p. 12,  Dekker & Woods, 1999). In modern 
cockpits it is no longer possible to visualize the outcome of all automation mode input 
combinations. There are several levels of automation and “even though the primary logic is 
usually defined, many secondary effects might be overlooked” (p. 23, Singer, 2002). 
Supporting the understanding and detection of unexpected automation behavior, through 
automation feedback to pilots, has become a challenge for system designers (Sarter & 
Woods, 1997).  
 
∗ Cockpit design philosophy is the overall application of a design rationale to the whole of 
the cockpit.  For example, the ‘dark cockpit philosophy’ refers to the design of cockpit 
lighting, this philosophy provides significance to the ‘off’ condition as an indicator that the 
aircraft systems are operating normally, conversely only during abnormal conditions is the 
cockpit illuminated, hence, ‘dark cockpit philosophy’.  
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The problems begins when an automated system’s behaviour goes on unnoticed until it is 
too late to change it. “The introduction of FMC (Flight Management Computer – i.e. 
programmable automation behavior) has generated two types of side effects: (1) the 
consequences of errors has been shifted into the future and (2) (automation) aids can turn 
into traps” (p. 177,  Amalberti, 1999). For example, in the Cali accident (Aeronautica Civil 
of the Republic of Colombia, 1996) early during the flight the pilot inadvertently, with help 
of an automated function to select the desired next point of the route, set an aircraft’s 
course into mountainous terrain, which over a period of time led to a collision with a 
mountain. The accident report indicated that the aircraft’s course into the mountain was not 
suspected by the pilots until the sound of an alarm by which time it was too late to safely 
escape from the collision into the mountain.  
In a short description of the accident above both types of side effects are apparent. First, the 
pilot’s selection of the next navigation point in the Flight Management Computer put the 
aircraft on a course for a future collision with mountainous terrain. Second, the automated 
navigation point preselection aid, by only requiring the first letter typed into it for entry 
from the pilot, led to the selection of the wrong navigation point. Here the automated 
function became a trap.  
In the Strasburg accident (Bureau Enquetes Accidents, 1992) the first type of effect 
contributed to the accident, shifting the consequence of the command inputted by the pilot 
into the future. The pilot accidentally selected a high vertical speed of 3,300 feet per 
minute, rather than the intended 3.3 degree flight path angle, which would have been a 
more gradual angle of descent, but instead lead to unsafe high rate of descent. 
The Strasburg accident brings another problem that pilots have to the surface, the sampling 
of information displayed (Bainbridge 1999). Pilots have to monitor preprogrammed 
automation behaviour, but the way the information is presented in the cockpit is not always 
suitable for a monitoring task. This problem occurs when the operator checks information 
less often than the information change occurs (Johnson, 2003), thus allowing information to 
change without their knowledge. In the dynamic aerospace environment, this can lead to 
devastating outcomes, such as in the Strasbourg accident in which the pilot believed a 
slower and less steep descent rate was entered, than actually was and failed to detect this 
through monitoring.  
The pilots not only need to keep sampling information for changes they have inputted, but 
also need to maintain awareness of externally induced automation mode transitions, such as 
system status or behaviour change. Pilot monitoring tasks have become more cognitively 
demanding due to increasing autonomy of automation (i.e. it acts without the need of pilot’s 
input) and automation authority (i.e. it can override pilot’s command) (Sarter & Woods, 
1997). Specifically, a change in automation mode can occur independently of immediate or 
direct pilot commands, it can occur due to a situation factor or protection limits 
preprogrammed in the system (Sarter and Woods, 1994). 
Furthermore, apart from having difficulties understanding and monitoring automation in 
day-to-day operations, when pilots have questions regarding interface or automation 
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functionality, they find it difficult to use manufacturer’s manuals, and instead they revert to 
peer-to-peer network (e.g. the ‘bluecoat’ email group), for practical explanations. A recent 
study showed, that the reasoning in the manuals (i.e. instructing written material) used to 
explain automation logic and behavior is focused on the system states and not on an 
operational knowledge, for example, sequence of mode occurrence (Feary, Barshi, Sherry, 
& Alkin, 1999). Explanations provided in the manuals have an engineering perspective 
(Hutchins & Holder 2000), where data is detail-oriented, system-specific, and presented 
without a context from the broader flight situation (Baxter, 1998). 
Based on the two discussed examples, of the multitude of other examined automation 
related accidents (e.g.,  Billings, 1997), and reviews of incident and research studies (e.g., 
Funk, 1998), it is concluded that there is a need to conduct a study and understand the 
information requirements pilots have. The empirical study within this thesis has to acquire: 
(1) an understanding of how pilots collect and (2) use the information; (3) what makes the 
process of understanding the current and consequential automation states and behavior 
comprehensible for pilots; (4) how to present information in more efficient ways than they 
are currently presented, as stated in the section 1.2, RQ2 and RQ4. 
Consequently, the results of the empirical study are aimed to provide an information 
presentation format to help pilots build and sustain efficient understanding of what the 
systems is, how the system operates, and what is the systems next step going to be.  
2.1.4  Is the root of these problems in design? 
This set of problems appears to be deep rooted rather than superficial (Figure 1.2, Root 
cause). Not only is there evidence that pilots have difficulties understanding automation the 
manufacturers cockpit design philosophy (e.g.  Tarnowski, 1999), by which the automation 
is programmed, is not followed through during the design process (e.g.,  Gideon Singer, 
2002).  This creates inconsistencies in the design of an entire cockpit. 
Currently, there is no systematic design approach to overcome this problem of design 
inconsistency, no established framework to aid following through a coherent cockpit design 
philosophy. Current methods of managing the complex task of data and information 
presentation result in a vicious cycle. New systems do not take into account old problems 
and do not integrate old and new innovative technology. Instead both technologies are 
placed in one cockpit and are not checked if they are compatible or have the same 
philosophy behind their design.  
In September 2004, Boeing proposed a new way of announcing information about 
automation modes. The proposed changes are at the implementation and the interface level 
(see respectively, Figure 1.2 Root cause, level 2 and 5.2.1)  (Boorman & Mumaw, 2004), 
instead of at the cockpit philosophy level. They propose restructured mode presentation on 
the interfaces. First new and old tasks are identified for each mode, then they are organized 
on an interface according to function. If the function or mode is not used often enough it is 
put together with functions and modes that are displayed often. This eliminates the 
possibility that each function has it’s own display that will not be used often and, therefore, 
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the pilot may have difficulty finding the desired function when it is needed.  
This is a good solution to allocate spatial properties to features of the interface, however, 
the initial considerations have to be done at the philosophy level, where functions and 
modes are considered taking into account pilots information needs in a view of dynamic 
aircraft operation, and the allocation of functions in the context of flight situations. It is 
contended that pilots’ strategy of operating automation has to be considered first, during the 
requirements specification stage, which is earlier than the allocation of functions and modes 
to interface. Otherwise, by considering the allocation of functions and modes to the 
interface layout without overall cockpit design philosophy will cause problems later during 
training and line-operation at the level of comprehension for pilots (Level 3 and 6 in the 
Figure 1.2 Root cause). 
Applying ‘cockpit philosophy’, means applying the same principles, rules and logic 
throughout the systems and interfaces from the initial stages of design through to 
implementation. Since the earliest implementations of automation, aerospace human factors 
have recorded a history of interaction problems in the cockpit (e.g.,  Wiener & Curry, 
1980). Eventually, through incident and accident investigation individual problems are 
found and are given the recommendation to be fixed (e.g., Aeronautica Civil of the 
Republic of Colombia, 1996; Bureau Enquetes Accidents, 1992). It is contended that 
specifying and applying cockpit philosophy appears to minimize pilots problems of 
understanding the automation and to minimize the incidents and accidents as the problem is 
tackled at its root, at the philosophy level and consistently throughout the cockpit design 
(Level 1 Figure 1.2 Root cause). 
2.2 What methods are available and useful for the purpose of the thesis 
Solutions to existing problems need to be applied at the requirements definition stages, 
which is evident in the following quote (see the darkest grey in Figure 2.1 Automation 
Advantage, Cost, Solutions)  (Newman & Greeley, 2001;  Amalberti, 1999). “The level of 
dependency between sensors data, logic and display is very high and requires a very 
systematic approach” (Singer, 2002). Currently, there is a need for a systematic design 
approach that will identify the information needs of the pilot. It is emphasized by cognitive 
engineers that human cognition has to be, and can only be, studied in the context of real 
work carried out in a real environment by professionals  (Billings, 1997;  Hollnagel, 1993;  
Rasmussen, 1988;  Reason, 1990;  Woods, 1993). Therefore, this approach should rise from 
information requirement studies using line-operating pilots and the latest technology to 
design for more efficient pilot and system integration. 
There is a need to determine the exact information needs of pilots, how pilots use 
information, how pilots currently identify automation behaviour and states, and identify 
what strategies pilots use to operate automated aircraft. This needs to be based on real-
world observation. It is important to identify the workarounds that pilots’ adapt, and from 
this gain understanding of how best to support pilots’ activities and present information to 
pilots. For example, Hutchins (1995) writes about pilots applying their own strategies to 
create shortcuts in mental calculation, through using features of the display that are not 
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designed for that task  (Hutchins, 1995). If new design logic is applied to automation (i.e. 
rules to which automation complies) without considering the natural strategies that pilots 
already use, we are likely “to design out robust strategies (that pilots use) out of the new 
systems that can also save time for designers and future mental effort for pilots” (p. 343, 
Lintern 1995).  
As previously stated, pilots are involved too late in the design process, when it is too late to 
make any major change that they might require. Despite the fact that one of the perceptions 
among engineers, ‘ask one pilot and you will have three opinions’, there is a need to 
include pilots and subject-matter-experts, in the design process, since they are the operators 
and users. The questions are when in the design process, and how, to elicit knowledge from 
subject-matter-experts in a useful form for engineers and designers. There is a need to 
identify pilots’ strategies and the information that they use to understand automation in an 
environment most close to their real-world operating environment and apply these findings 
in future designs. 
2.3 The real world study 
Chapter three identifies suitable information-elicitation techniques that can be administered 
in a time and safety critical environment, such as aerospace.  The pros and cons of the 
technique are weighed and addressed in a preliminary study on pilots, to identify whether 
this technique is suitable for the elicitation of pilots’ knowledge. Data from a participant is 
analyzed to determine the appropriateness and quality. Finally, this data is used to inform 
an initial display design and preliminary conclusions are drawn about pilots’ information 
needs in preparation for a fuller empirical study. 
The study aims to identify how pilots assimilate information about a forthcoming task, how 
they construct information to perform the task through use of available information. This 
data is required for the development of design principles that can be applied to the design of 
a prototype interface feature. This interface feature will be designed to help the pilots to 
perform the forthcoming task through the effective presentation of information and use of 
automation. It is intended that the interface feature be designed in such way that it will 
enhance human abilities, rather than add work and contribute to error. 
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Chapter 3: Preparation for an Empirical Study 
3.1 Introduction  
As suggested in the previous chapters, there is a step (Figure 3.1) in the current process 
of aviation interface design that is not practiced and it should be. This step is about 
obtaining information prior to the definition of the requirements from the pilots 
themselves about what the pilot needs to have on the interface to use the system 
effectively and with ease. Additionally, it will become apparent that using this step can 
simultaneously inform design, bring ideas of how to present information to pilot, which 
is discussed in depth after the empirical study.  
It has been suggested that design process of pilots’ workstation needs to include the 
crew in the preliminary stages of design (Gagne, 1962). In 1980ies Kearns (1982) 
suggests the order of design stages, and the second stage after mission analysis, is a 
preliminary design stage that should include a team of specialists, including the pilot. 
However, these approaches suggest that the crew will be included as part of the design 
team only, rather than using the crew to systematically elicit information from them to 
inform the design of their displays and panels.   
The cockpit is a dynamic and time-pressured environment, where information, events 
and pilots’ tasks are interwoven and are in constant change.  Gaining reliable design 
data from this environment requires a method that is non-intrusive to pilots thought 
processes and non-interruptive of plots’ concentration and the cockpit information-work 
flow as a whole. 
The data that needs to be acquired from the pilots to inform the design can be 
summarised into the following questions: 
Q1 - What information do pilots obtain from the cockpit environment? 
Q2 - How do pilots use this information? 
Q3 - What do pilots do when the information they need is not available? 
Q4 - What strategies do pilots use to acquire or retrieve non-apparent information?  
The method required has to help us answer fundamental questions to all interface 
designers, what, when and how do pilots need information to complete their work 
successfully and in a timely manner. 
This chapter starts by discussing how the selected information elicitation technique was 
tried out and modified to obtain information directly from pilots whilst taking into 
account the nature of the environment they are operating in. There is a need to obtain 
such information directly from pilots as early as possible in the design process to extract 
the full benefits, such as, (1) prevention of accidents, (2) ease of pilot training, and (3) 
design cost effectiveness. 
There are several benefits to ‘getting it right the first time’: (1) it is more cost effective, 
rather than later detecting problems embedded in the interface at the interface testing 
phase, where changes to the interface become more costly. This is how it is currently 
practiced in the industry (Figure 3.1: Current interface design process e.g., Singer, 
2002).  
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Another benefit is (2) prevention of incidents and accidents, needless to say, saves lives 
and avoids costly replacement of equipment. In several accidents the contributing factor 
was pilots’ misunderstanding of the automated system or misinterpretation of what were 
the system’s intentions (e.g., Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 1996). 
Lastly, (3) learning from the pilots directly and so later being able to support the 
strategies they use to manipulate data throughout the flight will also make it easier for 
pilots to understand during training (Lintern, 1995).  
The search for an appropriate technique included several fields, such as Aviation 
Human Factors (e.g. Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999; and Cognitive Engineering e.g. 
Sarter & Amalberti, 2000). The search was then further extended to include 
organizational development studies, were Participatory Research technique is used 
extensively to understand the underlying processes (Wadsworth, 1998). Aspects of 
these techniques were then fused to create a hybrid technique, the application of which 
is discussed in chapter five. 
For over half a century, the Aviation Human Factors field had an amassing experience 
in designing for pilots and developed techniques for acquiring meticulous statistical 
measures of pilots’ bodies in order to design ergonomic cockpit layouts. However, this 
experience, of designing for the pilot, does not appear to be transferred to the design of 
the information interfaces. For example, in the case of the design of cockpit interfaces 
pilots have only recently, as reported by two aircraft manufacturers (Newman & 
Greeley, 2001 - Lockheed; Singer, 2002 - Saab), started to be involved in design, during 
the testing and evaluation of interfaces. In this case the interfaces have already 
undergone lengthy development, likely without input from Human Factors specialists 
(see the center of Figure 3.1: Current Interface Design). At this late stage in design any 
changes suggested, as a result of pilots testing and evaluating interfaces, are not likely 
to be implemented due to changes being costly and time consuming. 
Ergonomists study the body of the pilot before designing the physical set up of the 
cockpit, in order to support the limitations of the body and take advantage of its’ shape 
and movements; similarly, there is a need to use Cognitive Engineers (Sarter & 
Amalberti, 2000);  Wickens & Hollands, 2000)) to study cognition of pilots to support 
their abilities, limitations and make the most of their natural cognitive processes. There 
is a need to acquire a technique that will study pilots’ cognition in their operating 
environment, and then suggest appropriate designs to support it. 
So what is the environment that pilots operate in everyday? Pilots work in a time-
critical, complex and dynamic environment, which depends on the outcomes and fusion 
of both, the external environment and technological factors. All these factors fuse in a 
continuous multilayered information stream that pilots and automation have to process. 
The challenge here is to gain an insight on intricate details of the processes, both 
cognitive and operational, that pilots have to go through to operate in their working 
environment without interrupting or influencing them or the situation. The data 
collection technique used to support the design of future cockpit interfaces should also 
help acquire information to understand how to support these processes in a real world 
environment. This requires a technique that does not intrude on pilots’ natural thought 
processes, but informs on what happens around pilots in the environment they operate, 
and also on what constitutes information processing that happens in pilots’ minds. 
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Figure 3.1: Current interface design process in aerospace  
Many techniques used  (Figure 3.2) by Human Computer Interaction specialists (Diaper 
& Stanton, 2003) to study people in their working environments are borrowed from 
psychologists, sociologists and ethnographers (Cooke, 1994).  These techniques include 
observations of people performing activities whilst a third person video records the 
activity, and also include verbal protocols and various types interview techniques 
(Helander, Landauer, & Prabhu, 1997). 
Solodilova-Whiteley      Chapter 3: Preparation for an Empirical Study 
 24
Video and audio recording the cockpit environment and pilots’ behaviour during a 
flight leaves subjective interpretation of what has happened. Self-reporting  (Buchman, 
1984) and interviewing pilots with the right set of probing questions brings the 
researcher closer to understanding what happened during the flight. However, not every 
person is able to express or verbalize the processes that are happening while they 
perform their tasks. Moreover, pilots are experts at what they do, but they might take 
some information processing for granted, assuming that it is obvious to everyone. For 
example, it is a second nature for pilots to think ahead and have a contingency plan in 
case of an emergency, but it is not obvious from simple observation or it can be missed 
if the specific question about it is not asked during an interview. 
Laboratory studies that are used successfully by Human Factors specialists to identify 
problems in some interfaces are often too narrow and too specific, due to restricting 
experimental conditions and an environment too far removed from the real operating 
environment. Laboratory studies can identify particular problems or tasks the pilots 
have difficulties with, but do not address underlying design problems, such as the 
absence of an application of a cockpit design rationale throughout the system. It can be 
argued that using conclusions gained from such studies may lead the researcher to lose 
an understanding how pilots deal with the uncertainty of the real operating environment. 
These studies are mostly specific to testing an experimental hypothesis and are not 
exploratory by nature. Laboratory studies cannot inform about where in the real 
environment pilots acquire the information they need if such sources are not provided 
on the test interface.  
Through interpretation of observations, selective analysis of video and audio recorded 
data or by omitting the right question during the interview the valuable information may 
be eventually lost about the key cognitive processes that happen inside pilots’ minds 
while operating in a real environment. 
Additionally, retrospective interviews and structured questionnaires are common 
techniques that are used to inform design (Klein, 1989). However, the interview, for 
example, cannot capture the temporal aspects of the aerospace environment and pilots’ 
time dependent activities. The questionnaire is restricted by the predetermined content 
of the questions, which cannot adapt to the answers of already answered questions by 
the pilot. These techniques, in most cases, look for confirmation of information that is 
already known to the researcher. These techniques are poor at discovering from real-
time observations and pilots’ own interpretations of the information they use, for 
example, the presentation form, frequency, quantity, quality and timing of information. 
These techniques alone disturb, or fail to trace, the inherent dynamics of pilots’ work 
and the complex information flow that needs to be understood to inform interface 
design. In addition, these techniques can miss the implicit knowledge that pilots’ use 
and rely on. 
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Figure 3.2: Methods for acquiring requirements 
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With these data collection issues in mind, the search is extended to cognitive 
engineering, where researchers have faced with similar problems. They too are learning 
about human decision making process in real world settings that cannot be easily 
replicated in the laboratory and are hard to observe in real life due to the hazardous 
environment that operators work in. Omodie, Wearing, McLennan and their team 
developed a ‘cued-recall debrief method’ to study the decision making processes of 
firefighters (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 1997). They studied firefighters in their 
real-world setting. This technique relates to a Critical Decision Making method that 
studies operators’ naturalistic decision making through a retrospective interview that 
uses a set of cognitive probes about a non-routine incident (Klein, Calderwood, & 
Macgregor, 1989). However, the cued-recall debrief method uses video and audio 
footage recorded from a head-mounted camera on the operator for cues for recollection 
of external and mental events that have happened during the recorded incident (Omodei 
et al, 1997).  
Omodei, Wearing and McLennan (1998) developed a cued-recall debrief method to 
systematically investigate human decision making and the underlying cognitive 
processes in a real setting of a command and control environment. This consists of a 
two-stage replay-cued debriefing procedure. The first stage includes video and audio 
recording of the operators work from their head-mounted camera and then, as soon as 
possible, after recording, this video and audio footage is reviewed by the operator and 
the researcher. At this stage the operator takes the perspective of the ‘insider’ and 
relives what happened earlier as he/she watches the video and audio recording taken 
from his/her own-point-of-view. The operator’s comments on the mental events, such as 
thoughts, choices, feelings, are recorded over the original tape. In the second stage the 
operator takes a perspective of the ‘outsider’ while viewing the video and audio footage 
with his/her own comments. Only at this second stage can the researcher ask probing 
questions in order to tap into the operator’s fundamental cognitive processes. 
Omodei et al argue that using head-mounted-camera footage for cued-recall-debrief 
produces valid and reliable reports on operator’s own experience because (Omodei et 
al., 1997; Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 1998):  
• The operator does not take it personally and cannot see themselves; i.e. not 
conscious of themselves when watching a replay. 
• It represents the closest match between the initial and the replayed visual 
perspectives. 
• Accuracy and comprehensiveness of recalled material is greatly enhanced being 
cued from their ‘own-point-of-view’ video and audio commentary 
• It produces a powerful stimulus for evoking recollection based on review of 
cognitive theories (discussed next). 
• It recalls a wide range of cognitive and affective experiences. 
Omodei et al (1997), grounded their argument in cognitive theories, and reported that 
when operators view their own-point-of-view footage, it triggers: 
Through… Recollection of … 
… perceptual cues synchronized in time 
and space 
→ mental events associated with 
decisions 
→ essential temporal aspects of 
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cognitive processes 
… being cued by specific items, rather 
than cued by questions (Cantor et al, 
1985) 
→ retrieval of episodic memory that is 
organized by time, place and 
perceptual characteristics 
… motion of the camera and activity of 
the operator (Neisser, 1976) 
→ perceptual schemata rooted in 
locomotion & activity; recall of 
kinesthetic memories 
… recall of non-verbal cues → motivation, memories and affects 
→ pre-verbal experiences, rather than 
a coherent & logical progression 
story that would be prompted by the 
researcher 
→ non-verbal holistic phenomena, and 
intuitive decisions at the time 
… replay and pause → inchoate experience that can be put 
into words 
These recollections specifically triggered by cues from images taken from operators’ 
own-point-of-view can reveal not only the source of decisions that operators made but, 
more importantly for this research, these images can trigger the recollection of how the 
operator obtained the information to make those decisions. Through perceptually 
synchronized cues in time and space, the operator is able to recall, not only current 
methods of collection of information, but also remember what previous experience the 
operator based these on. It allows retrieval of information sought at the time of each 
action and the thought at the time of each reaction.  
Using this cued-recall-debrief as the main elicitation technique for the definition of 
requirements for this research gives an advantage over commonly used techniques, like 
various types of interviews, questionnaires, task and documentation analysis, 
ethnographic studies and types of participatory design methods that involve users in the 
design process in Aviation Human Factors (Garland et al., 1999) and Human Computer 
Interaction (Helander et al., 1997) communities. Advantages of this acquisition method 
are: 
• Acquires information directly from the operating environment. 
• Places more realistic demands on the operators. 
• Provides cues that are pre-verbal, ‘holistic-intuitive’ (Kuhl, 1985), and temporal. 
• Gives probing cues, like motion, non-verbal cues, and some that operators detect 
and are undetectable to the researcher. 
• Involves the operator in a way that is directly informative to designers in 
understanding what are the needs of the operator. 
• Taps into operators’ implicit knowledge. 
• Traces evolution of information during workflow 
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Using the cued-recall-debrief method temporal and spatial properties of the operating 
environment and temporal and spatial aspect of pilots’ cognitive processes can be 
retrieved. These are of most interest for the purpose of this research, when designing to 
support pilots’ work in a time-critical operating domain. This method allows for 
continuous, non-intrusive, non-reactive, real-time documenting of the events with 
minimal distortion of the complexity and dynamics of the operating environment, 
because it is less likely to intrude or distort the pilot’s experience, being attached to 
pilot’s head and so not visible to the pilot (i.e. ‘out of sight, out of mind’) (Omodei et 
al., 1997). 
This method is the new generation of verbal and retrospective protocol. It allows both 
recording of current actions, such as verbal protocol, and it allows documenting 
intentions of the operator using one method. 
This method will allows the researcher to understand how to better support the spatio-
temporal aspects of cognitive processes that pilots go through while they are searching 
and sorting and consolidating information. It allows pilots to recollect pre-verbal 
experiences and put these inchoate experiences into words through replay and pause of 
the reviewed video and audio footage. It gives a unique opportunity to suspend time 
without interrupting real-time events or influencing the outcome of the pilot’s action 
and gives an insight into pilot’s information processing. 
At this point it is appropriate to highlight the disadvantages of this method: (1) it 
requires the use of expensive equipment, such as a flight simulator; (2) it requires real 
operators, which can be difficult to schedule and generally few are available to 
participate in the study; (3) it requires lengthy transcription of video and audio data 
where an extensive analysis has to be preformed. However, it is argued here the results 
acquired do outweigh the disadvantages, as shown in latter chapters of this thesis. 
3.2 Preliminary Study 
A preliminary study was performed to test whether a cued-recall-debrief method was an 
appropriate information elicitation technique. This study was then used to prepare for a 
further empirical study: (1) to establish the suitability of the method, it was tested and 
refined for the use in further an empirical study; (2) to determine the form of the 
analysis appropriate for the data collected; (3) to test the procedure set out for further a 
study, and in parallel; (4) to test the operation of equipment before taking in it into the 
field. 
3.3 Method: cue-recall-debrief 
The methodology proposed is a modified cued-recall-debrief method based on the 
operator’s own-point-of-view footage, a method that was previously used by Omodei et 
al to study decision-making strategies (Omodei et al., 1997). This method was extended 
to inform the design process. The probing questions were formulated for the purpose of 
this study and the future empirical study to extract information directly from the pilot to 
support the design of future cockpit interfaces.  
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The preliminary study was conducted at Swinburne Computer Human Interaction 
Laboratory (SCHIL) at Swinburne University, in December 2000 to prepare for an 
empirical study of pilots to be run the following year at the Royal Australian Air Force 
base in Richmond, Australia.   
3.3.1 Material and the Experimental Scenario 
In the preliminary study a commercial-of-the-shelf, the Microsoft Flight Simulator 
2000, software was used to simulate a flight from the beginning to the end. 
The scenario was a complete short flight, from engine power-up to power-down. The 
choice of the scenario was determined by the following: 
• To support pilots’ entire work throughout the flight the scenario had to last from 
power-up to power-down. 
• To capture the richness, completeness, and dependency of information between 
tasks as well as the continuity of pilots’ work- and information-flow the scenario 
had to be uninterrupted from power-up to power-down. 
3.3.2 Participant  
The only participant in this study was male in his early thirties. He was an experienced 
computer game player with previous flying experience. The participant will be 
interchangeably referred to as a participant and as a ‘pilot’ throughout this chapter. 
3.3.3 Equipment 
A colour lightweight lipstick camera was used. It was attached to an elastic band that 
was adjusted to fit participant’s head. The head-mounted camera was adjusted to be on 
the left side of the head at the participant’s eye-level. Once worn it was adjusted to point 
in the direction where the participant was looking and the focus was adjusted.  
All audio produced by Flight Simulator 2000 and the participant’s utterances were 
recorded through several microphones positioned in the room. 
3.3.4 Task and Procedure 
Prior to the study the participant was asked to complete an inform and consent form that 
laid out the participant’s right to withdraw at any time, there was also a brief about the 
study and the ethics committee contact details in case the participant had a need to 
discuss the way the study was administered. 
The participant was to fly a short flight, which was recorded on a videotape.  The 
videotape captured what the participant saw from his head-mounted camera during the 
whole flight and recorded the sound produced by the software, simulating sounds, such 
as flaps retracting, engine noise (i.e. accelerating and decelerating), wheels touching 
down on the runway and brakes being applied. 
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After this flight the participant was invited into a debrief room, where equipment was 
set up to replay the flight as the participant saw it, and then record the comments of the 
participant on a separate debrief videotape, which captured the original footage together 
with his debrief comments. 
The debrief consisted of two parts: 1st Free-flow Debrief and 2nd Debrief with specific 
questions. In the first part, called Free-flow Debrief, the participant was asked to answer 
the questions listed below, which were read to him before he watched a replay of the 
recorded flight and gave comments based on those questions.  The participant was not 
interrupted during the whole recollection, in order to observe and document the natural 
flow of information that he experienced while flying the aircraft.  However, the 
participant was told that he could pause the tape at any time if he wanted to explore any 
particular point of the flight. 
1st Free-flow Debrief questions: 
• Walk me through the flight; tell me… 
• What have you experienced? 
• What have you done during the flight? 
• What were you thinking about? 
• For you what were the important points of the whole flight from power up to 
power down? 
• Why were these points important for you? 
While the participant viewed a replay of video and audio footage taken from the head-
mounted camera, he spoke about his recollection of events that were recorded onto a 
separate debrief videotape together with the original video and audio footage. This was 
done to keep the footage and audio recording of recollection synchronized with the 
action captured by the original video and audio footage. 
The second part of the debrief was modified to inform the design process about the 
pilot’s use of and need for information at any point throughout the flight. The 
participant was asked the series of questions below:  
2nd Debrief with specific questions: 
Researcher: “During this debrief I will be putting the videotape on pause and asking 
you a set of questions listed below.” 
(Present oriented questions) 
• What was going on at this point? 
• What were you thinking about at this point? 
• What were you doing at this point? 
• What were you using to achieve that? 
• What was the aircraft doing at this point? 
• What were you doing with the aircraft at this point? 
• What were you looking for at this point?   
• What did you need to consider at this point if anything?  
• What are the constraints upon your actions at this point? 
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(Future oriented questions) 
• What is going to happen next? 
• What would you do next?  … with the aircraft? 
• What do you need to do to achieve that? 
• What will the aircraft do in the next couple of moments? 
• What would you do with the aircraft next? 
• What kinds of information will you want/need to have available in the next 
couple of moments?  
• What do you need to consider next?  
• What will be constrains upon your action next? 
In addition to the present oriented questions that were needed to clarify what 
information processing was happening at any moment throughout the flight, it was 
necessary to uncover if the pilot was considering any information that would effect the 
future of the flight, also at any point of the flight. The decision to ask future oriented 
questions was also influenced by the first flying lesson the researcher had with her 
instructor. The instructor said, “… you as a pilot should always be ahead of the aircraft 
in the manoeuvre that you will be performing. As soon as the aircraft is ahead of you, 
you loose control of the aircraft.” This was the inspiration to set up the questions about 
pilots’ future intentions and see how to support such important activity through the 
flight. 
The questions, both future and present oriented, were asked at an interval of one minute 
throughout the whole flight, while the researcher paused the original videotape and the 
second debrief tape captured both, the timing where the original videotape was paused 
and the comments of the participant. This helped to determine what the participant was 
doing, thinking and what information was being used at a given time of the flight. 
Consecutive one-minute intervals during a debrief were used to continuously trace the 
information flow used by the pilot throughout the whole flight. As the second part of 
debrief progressed, the questions were adjusted to be asked around specific events, such 
as flight stages, which were determined from the first part of debrief.  It was found that 
the information and considerations at one-minute intervals did not change as much as 
they did around the event points. The questions were subsequently changed to be asked 
one-minute before and after the event, rather than using the initial exploration of asking 
questions around consecutive one-minute intervals. For example, events like the 
beginning and the end of climb and turns appeared to be crucial points where the 
participant assessed the situation, using available information, and made decisions that 
affected the rest of the flight.  
3.4 Analysis of real time data 
The analysis strategy adapted here evolved in such a way as not to alter the properties of 
the pilot’s operating environment. The analysis aimed to help identify the information 
that the pilot required at any point of the flight and to help answer questions that were to 
inform the interface design process, including: 
• What information do pilots need to perform their work-flow, i.e. a series of 
information-dependent tasks? 
• What do pilots do when the information is not available? 
• Where do they gain information when it is not available? 
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• Do they obtain this from the surrounding environment? 
• If not, how do they then acquire information? 
• How do they retrieve it?   
• How do they use this information? 
To start the analysis, all videotapes were transcribed. The first tape transcribed that was 
the original audio and video footage from participant’s head-camera together with his 
first uninterrupted comments of events (i.e., 1st debrief). The second tape had the 
original video and audio footage synchronised with the answers to specific questions 
initially asked by the researcher at one-minute intervals, which later changed to being 
asked around the flight stages and events (i.e., 2nd debrief). 
The analysis of the information from the first debrief tape evolved through several 
iteration of tables. While transcribing the audio recording of the participant’s comments, 
a pattern of work-flow started to emerged. The pattern consisted of a recurrence of four 
categories of what the participant did: attended to something, act upon something, 
thought about something or planned for the next event. Based on these categories a 
table was devised that consisted of four columns: attended to, act upon, thought about 
or planned for (see a fragment of the Table 3.1 below and the full table in Appendix 1, 
Table 3.1).  
A B C D E F 
 Attended to Act upon Thought about  Planned for 
1. 
I’m taking a note 
of what time it 
was on the clock 
   
2.  
trying to keep 
my southerly 
heading 
  
3. watching the clock    
4. 
looking for some 
indication on the 
ground of a 
building 
 an indication of how far south I am 
So I know what 
altitude I’m 
going to be at 
for my return 
flight to land 
5.   I’ve realized…  
6.  I’m still climbing 
because I haven’t 
actually got the trim 
set properly 
 
7.   
So I decided not to 
bother with 
changing it (trim) 
 
8.  
put the nose 
down just a 
bit 
 
Need to loose 
that extra 
altitude 
9. 
I see the top of 
the building just 
appeared 
   
T
im
el
in
e 
10.   I’m starting to think how far South I am  
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11.   
I’ve been travelling 
down South faster 
then I normally do 
 
Table 3.1: A fragment of the table ‘Based on 1st Debrief Transcript’ 
The order of the columns captures the work-flow (i.e. participant attended to, act upon, 
thought about or planned for and again attended to, act upon etc.), which are based on 
the participant’s first debrief comments. The first column indicates where, or to what, 
the participant attended to, for example, the participant looked at the clock (see cell 1C 
in Table 3.1). The items in this column were related to a specific piece of information or 
were related to an action that he needed to do next, for example, the participant wanted 
to keep a southerly heading for a minute (see cell 2D in Table 3.1). Hence, the next 
column listed was called act upon and listed the instances where the pilot ‘acted upon’. 
The following column listed thoughts about the effects of his action, for example, the 
participant thought about looking for a landmark that would tell him how far south he is 
(see 4E in Table 3.1). The last in a row, but not in the work-flow, is a planned for 
column, where the participant planned the next manoeuvre (see cell F8 in Table 3.1). 
The end of each row (see column F in Table 3.1) links to the first column (see column C 
in Table 3.1) of the following row. This is repeated until the end of the flight comments.  
The layout of participant’s comments in Table 3.1 established that columns, thought 
about and planned for, were associated with the next manoeuvre of the aircraft. It was 
noticed that the participant collected and processed most of information around the 
aircraft manoeuvres. These were points in flight, where one flight stage changed into the 
next flight stage. Following this finding, Table 3.1 was revised and Table 3.2 transpired 
as a result, where columns were flight stages and rows documented the comments the 
participants made regarding the information he was using during that stage (Table 3.2 
fragment below and the full Table 3.2 in Appendix 1). 
Table 3.2 shows the flow of participant’s thoughts at each flight stages throughout the 
flight. It provides an indication of the kind of information and cues the pilot uses at each 
stage of the flight 
 Flight stages 
 
Initial Climb Climbing Turn Intermediate Climb 
Climbing 
Turn to level 
out 
Concentrating on 
altimeter 
Approaching 
2000 
Focus on climb 
angle Turning 
Keeping direction Turn right (East) & climb to 3000 Focus on altimeter 
Focus on the 
clock 
Keeping airplane 
stable  
Conducting 
steady turn Going East 
Climbing & 
banking 
Rudder movements 
for North direction 
Make adjustment 
in climb & turn Focus on compass 
Concentrating 
on compass 
Check airspeed 
between 60 & 80 Focus on compass
“Check the clock on 
the next turn at 3000 
to travel 3 minutes.” 
Get barring 
South 
T
im
el
in
e 
Focus on altimeter Line up East Look at clock Use joystick & rudder to turn 
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Look outside 
Minor 
adjustments to on 
East heading 
 Keep an eye on the speed 
Table 3.2:  A fragment of the table ‘Analysis of Stages of flight of the 1st Debrief 
Transcription’ 
The first part of the debrief was informative about the flow of events, but lacked 
specific detail about the information processing that the pilot did during the flight. The 
second part of the debrief provided specific detail and gave preliminary insight into 
possible information structures that the pilot used during the entire flight.   
During the second part of the debrief the participant was asked two series of questions 
related to his thoughts and actions about the present and the future, which were asked 
initially at one-minute intervals. However, as the second part of debrief proceeded the 
questions were timed to be asked around the events, rather that at one-minute intervals, 
because this was found to be where most of the information was processed by the pilot. 
It was found that the information flow and the pilot’s considerations did not change 
much at one-minute intervals but did change considerably around the flight stages. 
After transcribing the second debrief, there was an obvious separation of information 
into information about the present and the future events, because of the present and 
future oriented questions asked during the second debrief. This strategy of asking 
questions at a particular time interval had generated two specific types of information: 
(1) the temporal orientation that determined the timing of events throughout the whole 
flight; (2) present and future oriented information that determined the information need 
at any point of the flight. 
The analysis showed the continuity of information throughout the flight, showing that 
the pilot was constantly seeking out information in order to be in control and ahead of 
the aircraft at all times. The full outcome of the debrief analyses is represented in a 
timeline-diagram (Table 3.3, Appendix 1). As this was a preliminary study and was 
aimed to test and further develop a cued-recall debrief method to suit the needs of this 
thesis, the results of this study are not discussed in detail, but are provided in the table 
3.3 and when appropriate discussed throughout the thesis. 
The results in (Table 3.3 Appendix 1) trace the temporal aspects and the information 
flow, based on the activity of the pilot and the timing of events. The table shows what 
information and cues the pilots was processing when achieving present and future tasks, 
or preparing for present or future events. 
Based on the timeline-diagram, a sample of an interface was prototyped (Appendix 1 
Figure 3.1). It was put together to assess whether the information elicited during the 
preliminary study was sufficient and helpful in composing an information interface. 
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3.5 Outcomes: modified cued-recall-debrief method 
The finding suggest that the proposed cued-recall debrief method does not interrupt 
pilot’s work-flow and preserves the continuous flow of information throughout the 
flight. It showed how tasks and information interweave and are dependent on each 
other. The series of questions oriented to present and the future, asked during the second 
part of debrief, helped to continuously trace the information flow and its evolution from 
one point during the flight to another.  
Based on the above information, stages of flight were constructed as the pilot 
recollected them, capturing how the pilot viewed the whole flight. Table 3.3 (Appendix 
1) captures all the analysis of data into one table across a time continuum. The layout of 
information in the table 3.3 (Appendix 1) shows the information and cues that the pilot 
relies on when working on either performing current tasks or planning for the future 
tasks. The elicited information on the timeline-diagram traces the information needed by 
the pilot throughout the flight. 
The two-stage debrief process helped to modify the questions to be used in a future 
empirical study. It helped to identify questions that prompted repetitious responses in 
both debriefs. These questions were subsequently combined and the two-stage debrief 
was modified to a one-stage debrief. The one-stage debrief allows for more efficient 
information retrieval and retains the content of the questions as in the two-stage debrief, 
plus additional questions were used to cue the pilot in order to inform an interface 
design. This shortened the debrief time considerably, but is not likely to effect the 
quality of information being acquired, as the same information and in more detail was 
available in the second part of the debrief.  
3.6 Validation of the insight obtained from the Cue-Recall-Debrief 
method 
To consider validation of a research method, the method should be classified where the 
weaknesses and advantages are taken into account in comparison to other methods. 
Runkel and McGrath break down types of scientific research onto two axes (Figure 3.3), 
the first axis is related to the level of researcher obtrusion; the second axis relates to the 
level of universality of the behaviour of the studied system. Dividing research types 
upon these axes, they highlighted three concerns: the ‘generality of actors’ (i.e., how 
representative is the sample population), the precision of measurement of behaviour and 
the effect of context on research results. The balance, or at least a compromise between 
highlighted concerns, needs to be recognised in analysis and validation of results of any 
research. 
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Sample
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Judgment
Tasks
Laboratory
Experiments
B
A
C
Universal
Behavior Systems
Particular
Behavior Systems
Obtrusive
Research
Operations
Unobtrusive
Research
Operations
  I.  Settings in natural systems.
 II.  Contrived and created settings.
III.  Behavior not setting dependant.
IV.  No observation of behavior required.
A.   Point of maximum concern with generality over actors.
B.   Point of maximum concern with precision of measurement of behavior.
C.   Point of maximum concern with system character of context.  
Figure 3.3: Research Strategies from Runkel and McGrath, 1972. 
This thesis fuses multiple methods to balance the three concerns. The concern over 
generality of actors is addressed in each of the methods used. All research participants 
were pilots with similar experience and were balanced for every instance of the 
research. The results of the studies are not being generalised to other actors. The 
precision of measurement of behaviour is controlled and measured in the experimental 
evaluation of the designed display features described in chapter 8. Lastly, understanding 
the effect of context and consideration of its effect on research results are discussed in 
the observation and participation in the pilot’s training program (Chapter 4) and the 
empirical study (Chapter 5).   
Studying pilots information processing out of context has a detrimental effect on 
research results, as can be seen later in this thesis; the context actually determines how 
pilots understand the information. The pilots’ safety critical and time-dependent context 
and the phase of flight dependency of information are important parameters of how 
information is selected and processed by pilots. The professional pressure of being a 
pilot that can deal with any unexpected event in a competitive environment also needs 
to be considered. For the empirical study a modified Cued-Recall Debrief method has 
been chosen as it has minimal influence on pilots’ operating environment.  
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The validity of Cued-Recall Debrief method can be criticised if these were the only 
results contributing to the outcomes of this thesis. The method uses the real-world 
setting (i.e., highly contextual) and to the greater extent does not intrude on the 
participant’s behaviour. The Cued-Recall Debrief has an advantage over other direct 
observational methods (Rubin, 1994), such as think aloud, where the participant has to 
think (i.e., given extra time to think over his/her action) and verbalise his/her behaviour, 
as these extra processes influence the sequence of actions when performing the task. In 
Cued-Recall-Debrief the participant is left to perform his/her task in the real-world 
setting without any influence from the researcher and only after the event is asked to 
comment on the past events.  
The Cued-Recall Debrief in comparison to other retrospective methods suffers to the 
same extent from subjectivity of interpretations of events and actions that happened. 
However, the findings in this research strongly indicated similar pilot responses, and so 
consequently similar interpretations, when comparing four pilots and their experience in 
two types of flight, automated and non-automated. The results showed a consistent 
result across all participants with reference to the type of information and how all 
participants used that information.  
Cued-Recall Debrief produces reliable reports, as revealed by Omodei, Wearing and 
McLennan (1997; 1998), in comparison to other type of recollection methods using 
video recorded data, which are interpreted by the participant or a researcher. In a Cued-
Recall Debrief the participants are able to immerse into events from his/her point of 
view through a multitude of triggers and cues discussed earlier, which are not available 
from other angle of recoding, where the participant is seeing himself or herself 
performing the action and conscious of themselves. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This preliminary study was conducted to: 
1. Test the suitability and refine the information elicitation technique that will be 
used in further empirical studies. 
2. Assess the suitability of data collected and determine the form of analysis. 
3. Test the procedure set out for the empirical study. 
4. Test the operation of equipment before taking in it into the field (i.e. full flight 
simulator) 
The preliminary study goals were successfully fulfilled. The selected information 
elicitation technique was found to be suitable. It helped to collect data from the pilot in 
an environment close to the ‘real-world’ environment with minimal, to no, external 
interruption of the operating environment and the pilot’s work-flow. The questions 
developed for preliminary study have been tested and modified to eliminate repetition in 
pilots’ answers and to reduce the data collection and analysis time, but not to 
compromise on the quality and quantity of information acquired. 
The data produced as a result was found to be helpful in beginning an understanding the 
information demands of the pilot. 
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Lastly, the equipment used worked well, apart for initial set up problems, which were 
dealt with successfully. If these problems were to arise in the field they could be easily 
fixed. The most important and most difficult problem to rectify immediately is the low 
power battery for the lipstick camera, which has to work for the duration of the flight 
without interruption. To overcome this problem additional batteries were acquired. This 
flexibility allowed at least one battery charging and one ready to supply additional 
power to the camera if required. 
Apart from the above, there are other helpful outcomes in this preliminary study that are 
referred to later in the thesis. For example, in general the stages of the observed flight 
appear to match conventional stages of flight in commercial and military operations. It 
was subsequently found that commercial and military pilots broke down their flights 
into similar but larger chunks when talking about, or briefing for, a flight among 
themselves. Another similarity between the finding in this study and further findings in 
this thesis is that the information layout in the timeline-diagram (Table 3 Appendix 1) is 
similar to how pilots view the whole flight along a time-continuum. The pilots later 
observed, similar to the participant in this study, shift their thoughts back and forth 
along this timeline of the flight in order to assemble the required information to be 
prepared for forthcoming events. This finding also supports the researchers flying 
instructors basic rule ‘the pilot has to think ahead and have a contingency plan in case of 
an emergency’. This is taught during the early stages of training to every pilot. 
Overall, the study was an informative and a useful learning process helpful about the 
problems that are likely to be faced in the empirical study. It gave a glimpse at the kind 
of information the proposed modified method will elicit. The data acquired from this 
preliminary study is appropriate for the purpose of the thesis and produces sufficient 
information to inform the interface design process. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding ‘Pilot Experience’ 
This chapter is written in the first person, ‘I am’, because it is necessary to bring to the 
researcher’s personal experience of acquiring knowledge about what it takes to become, 
and be, a pilot and to operate an automated ‘beast’ which the modern aircraft has 
become. 
This chapter explains why and how I had to prepare for an empirical study: 
1. I learned about what steps pilots take to become pilots, by observing pilots during 
line operation of commercial airlines, which aided me in acquiring terminology, 
commonly used abbreviations and professional jargon. 
2. I outlined the difficulties the pilots face when they are transitioning from a non-
automated to an automated cockpit. 
3. I outlined strategies pilots use in dealing with automated cockpits. 
4. I classified the problems in the current automated cockpit interfaces. 
5. I discuss why there are problems in the automated cockpit. 
6. I discuss what questions should be answered as part of the next step to overcome 
these problems. 
4.1 Systematically acquiring an understanding of pilot experience 
I wanted to have an opportunity to learn basic flying skills and learn about the 
fundamentals of flying that are ingrained in every pilot’s mind. All pilots begin their 
training in the same way for all fixed wing aircrafts. I took lessons to become a pilot, 
the same way that most professionals begin their career in aviation. I logged over 60 
flying hours on two different continents. This enabled me to encounter how my 
conceptions about flying an aircraft were formed. 
Next, to gain experience of the conceptions pilots form about the operation of an 
automated cockpit and how basic flying knowledge is challenged by an automated 
aircraft, I attend a training course for an automated aircraft. With kind permission from 
Ansett Airlines in Melbourne Australia, I was able to participate in, and observe two 
pilots in a conversion course. The pilots took this course when converting from a non- 
or semi-automated aircraft to an automated aircraft, Airbus 320. I also was able to 
observe some of the difficulties that experienced airline pilots face when learning the 
operation of a new type of cockpit.  
I also took a Computer Based Course on a Boeing 777, which is software that takes a 
pilot from a total overview of the aircraft to a detail description of each system, and 
selected scenarios of aircraft operation for each stage of flight, as well as emergency 
situations. This helped me to extend my understanding of modern aircraft across several 
types of aircraft from different manufacturers. It also provided me with a basic 
understanding from which I could compare the design of interfaces, and contrast the 
problems on two different types of automated commercial aircrafts.  
Finally, I needed to learn about the aircraft that I would be conducting my empirical 
study on, an automated military cargo aircraft, C-130J-30 Hercules. I undertook a 
month of a Computer Based Course on a Hercules (similar to a Boeing 777 program), 
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including having access to Training and Operational Manuals at a Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) base, Richmond, Australia1. This course also allowed me to learn more 
of the specific terminology related to this aircraft type, to familiarise myself with the 
cockpit and layout of all the displays and instruments, and to learn the basic operational 
procedures. The training on the Hercules also added understanding of another cockpit 
type designed by Lockheed Martin, a military type, in addition to the two automated 
commercial, Airbus 320 and Boeing 777, aircraft. 
To frame the empirical study, I intended to learn about how pilots search, use and 
manipulate the information presented to them and to identify how they overcome any 
shortcomings of current designs in everyday operations. During all three training 
periods, I had firsthand experience of flying all three aircraft flight simulators and a sit-
in on scheduled flights on Ansett and Emirates Airlines. I also had access to Computer 
Based Training and manuals. All these experiences framed the research and gave me a 
broader view on the types of problems and challenges pilots face when flying and 
converting to a modern automated aircraft.  
All of the above knowledge I discuss in this chapter is fundamental to the thesis and 
when considering the design of a modern cockpit, as concluded at the end of the thesis. 
This is because the advancement of current technology has created a gap in knowledge 
between the pilot, operating an extremely powerful machine that at times may appear to 
have ‘a mind of it’s own’, and the engineer who creates displays, instruments and 
panels that have a huge scope of options through which an aircraft can be flown. This 
gap between the two professions is vast. This chapter identifies the problems pilots face 
and their roots. The thesis itself is an attempt to bridge this gap through an 
understanding of pilots’ needs to operate an automated aircraft, as well as 
communicating this to an engineer in a suitable form, such as design guidelines and 
principles. 
4.2 Learning and understanding pilot experience: step-by-step 
4.2.1 Basic flying tasks, skills and knowledge 
The intention behind attending Private Pilot Licence lessons was twofold. One, it is the 
first step towards a professional pilot career and all pilots follow this route. Two, it 
enabled me to follow through the knowledge steps that pilots take.  
During my first lesson on the ground I learned what makes the aircraft go up and down, 
the elevators; what makes the aircraft turn left and right, the ailerons; how to increase 
and decrease an aircraft’s speed in climb, cruise and descent, the combination of the 
above, and the use of the throttle to add the power required. The aircraft speed can be 
manipulated by pointing the aircraft nose up to decrease the speed of the aircraft, or by 
pointing the nose of the aircraft down to increase the speed and let gravity do the work. 
I learned that the aircraft is steered differently in the air and on the ground. Armed with 
just this basic knowledge I had my first flight, where I tried basic turns, climb, descent 
and even had my first landing. The most remarkable part of the whole experience was 
how easy and how it appeared natural to pick up the basic flying skills. 
                                                 
1 Mark Thoresen and David Martin of the RAAF facilitated the research conducted in Australia. 
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Little did I know a that time that most of the work during my first flight was done by 
my instructor, such as trimming an aircraft to fly straight and level, so I did not have to 
struggle with the control column by pulling hard on it to climb, or by pushing it too hard 
to descend. The instructor adjusted, i.e. trimmed, the elevators by feeling the decrease or 
increase of pressure on the control column to make the aircraft fly the trajectory he 
wanted. Thus flying can be done with minimum effort. My instructor had monitored the 
fuel, any warning signs on the engine instrument panel, while also looking out for any 
air traffic outside. He was constantly assessing where we were in relation to other 
aircraft and the permitted three-dimensional training flying airspace. The instructor had 
to perform the entire list of safety checklists at each phase of flight, before start, before 
take-off, on the runway line up, after take off, after level off, before manoeuvres, before 
and during the approach, after touch down, and before and after the engine shut down. 
Apart from all the work the instructor-pilot was already doing, he had to communicate 
with Air Traffic Control and receive clearance for almost every phase of flight. 
During several months of training I learned in detail what each of these tasks entailed 
and how to combine all the tasks the pilot had to perform to fly an aircraft efficiently. 
The work of a pilot does not begin at take-off and does not end after landing. The flight 
starts with planning the flight, informing the appropriate authorities about the intended 
flight, briefing the crew and passengers, pre-flying the aircraft, going through all the 
checklists before, during and right after the engine is started. In addition to flying the 
aircraft and performing regular checklists, the pilot has to complete special checklists 
such as, for special manoeuvres, or for executing an emergency landing. After landing 
the pilot has to check the aircraft, debrief the flight with crewmembers. The pilot needs 
to report that the flight was successful and the aircraft is on the ground to appropriate 
authorities, otherwise the search and rescue team will be dispatched to search for the 
crew and the aircraft that did not report back. 
Planning the flight is the first step in any flight. Sometimes it can take the same amount 
of time as flying the aircraft. Before each flight the pilot has to plan and draw a route 
he/she will be flying. To calculate the route the pilot has to take into account, where and 
in which hemisphere he/she will fly, to allow for global magnetic variations that will 
affect the instruments in the aircraft. The pilot has to consider the time of arrival and 
departure, because having daylight could be essential to navigate to a final destination. 
The weather and terrain, local, en route, and at the destination have to be considered 
when planning the flight too. The pilot has to account for prevalent winds that might 
affect the course of the aircraft. 
Finally, during planning, the weight and balance of the aircraft has to be considered for 
an entire flight. This will vary for each flight, because the number of passengers, their 
weight and luggage will vary, as may the fuel required, for example, due to adverse or 
favourable winds that could affect flight. This is compounded by the need for further 
compensation for the locations of passengers, luggage and fuel, otherwise it could 
unbalance the aircraft and make it impossible to fly and land. 
Thinking and planning for a worse case scenario is also a part of the planning. This is 
when the pilot considers a possible diversion to an alternative airport, or returning to a 
departure airport due to bad weather or a malfunction. The pilot has to find a suitable 
airport or landing strip. Not all airports are suitable for all types of aircrafts, the length, 
the width, the quality of the runway are only a few considerations among others, such 
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as, whether there is an Air Traffic Control controlling the airport space, the runway 
which may be used, the radio frequency it is at, and whether it will be possible to obtain 
permission to land. The fuel has to be recalculated again for an alternative airport, plus 
additional fuel for possible air traffic or weather delays.  
When the planning is finalised and the appropriate authorities are informed, any crew 
and passengers are briefed, and the pre-flight of the aircraft begins. At this stage, the 
pilot must physically check the aircraft outside for signs of possible cracks or 
abnormalities. This check will also include oils and fuel checks in all tanks. The checks 
continue inside the aircraft by using standard checklists enforced by the aircraft 
manufacturer and the company that owns the aircraft. Most of the checklists are read 
from printed cards, to avoid mistakes and omissions.  
Fundamental rules 
The pilot still has not started an engine, but already a large amount of information and 
work has been undertaken. Once the engine is started, the work of the pilot is dictated 
by the ‘rhythm’ of the flight and not by his/her own pace, in contrast to the pre-flight 
stage. To be successful in being in ‘tune’ with the flight time, the instructor told me a 
fundamental rule, ‘a pilot should be always be ahead of the aircraft in every action, 
manoeuvre and always have a contingency plan.’ If a pilot does not follow this rule, 
then he/she will have no control of the aircraft, instead the aircraft will have control 
over the pilot.  
Aircraft are forgiving to pilots’ mistakes. Even without an autopilot, they are designed 
and built to fly straight and level if they are well trimmed and balanced by the pilot. 
However, it is crucial for the pilot to always have in mind the next step (i.e., action in 
this case) and a contingency plan in mind. This enables the pilot to stay ahead of the 
aircraft, in case disaster strikes. Planning gives a pilot the advantage of not being taken 
by surprise and so having free mental capacity to execute an emergency plan, rather 
then having to catch up with what has just happened and then thinking of what to do 
about it. 
A further fundamental rule of flying embedded in every pilots’ mind is, ‘Aviate, 
navigate, communicate. In that order.’ Once the aircraft is of the ground and safely in 
the air, the most important task of a pilot is to keep it that way. The next major task is to 
navigate the aircraft along the pre-planned route. When the aircraft is flying the flight 
plan, then he/she needs to communicate with Air Traffic Control. In an emergency the 
pilot will follow the same rule, first he/she would fly the aircraft, then navigate it to a 
safe landing, and only then transmit an emergency call. 
Equipped with these fundamental rules, and with the flight plan, the pilot takes off and 
competition with time begins. The pilot has to be very efficient to keep up with the 
flight plan and to be ‘ahead’ of the aircraft. The pilot needs to retain information in 
memory about the flight, using short-term memory when given clearances and local 
information by Air Traffic Control (i.e., local air pressure that would affect the altitude 
reading in the aircraft, next Air Traffic Control radio frequency, altitude, and airspeed 
clearance and restrictions). Pilots are taught to deal with all flying tasks under time 
constraints. Consequently, pilots employ strategies to deal with this large amount of 
information. 
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4.2.2 Information strategies 
For example, when the pilot is flying a route for the first time, he/she uses a mental 
picture that he/she has prepared during a pre-flight planning stage. The pilot would 
expect landscape features to come up at a certain time of the flight and a specific place 
relative to the aircraft route that he/she will have noted when drawing the flight plan. 
For a small aircraft it might be lakes, rivers, even a racecourse or a football field, major 
highways or airports. When the aircraft has gained altitude bigger features will be more 
suitable for orientation purposes, such as the shape of a town, city, mountain, the shape 
of a coastline. All of the features on the ground along the route would be expected to 
come up at the planned time. These are the pilot’s navigational checks. Prior to the 
flight the pilot built a ‘picture’ of what to expect during the flight and now he/she will 
constantly compare the expected picture with what is actually seen. Any difference will 
cause a pilot to check whether he/she is on the right route or has deviated from it. 
Information layering strategy  
The pilot’s mental picture has many layers, the above describes a navigational layer. 
This picture would also have a layer of weather, and also the allowed and restricted 
airspaces. There is also a picture that the pilot expects to see inside the aircraft, for 
example the fuel gauge should indicate the amount of fuel remaining for that stage of 
the flight. Depending in which direction the aircraft is flying, the pilot would expect the 
sun to shine through the cockpit from a specific direction at a particular angle depending 
on the time of day.  
Monitor progress strategy  
All the information that the pilot considers during the pre-flight planning stage is on a 
written flight plan and most of this information is retained in the pilots’ memory. If the 
pilot has previously flown the route, the pilot would have a picture of the flight and 
would anticipate a certain feature of the terrain to come up, such as a small town, a 
river, a major highway, or navigation aids to be on a specific side of the aircraft. The 
pilot will also anticipate the Air Traffic Control calls to be made. The times at which 
these anticipated features occur would be an indicator of the current flight progress. For 
example, a ‘picture’ could be power station smoke rising above the horizon to the right 
of the aircraft heading, ‘…about now’, the pilot will say in confirmation. If the “picture” 
that the pilot is expecting to see, does not match pilot’s expectation, it would be a cause 
for concern. 
Navigation recovery strategy 
The instructor taught me a navigation recovery strategy. If you realise that the time has 
passed but, for example, you have not seen the indications of a power station. First, 
make sure you have the right heading according to the flight plan, then conform that the 
time that has elapsed is calculated correctly. If you still have a problem, then look at the 
ground and find a prominent feature, a mountain or a lake for example, determine its 
shape and find another smaller feature on it or near to it, and then identify your relative 
position to them. Then locate the same features on the map and mark you position on 
the map. This would tell you if you had deviated from the course or not. Generally such 
a situation should not happen, if the pilot is checking his/her position on the map 
relative to the ground at predetermined equal time intervals, which should be marked on 
the map prior to the flight. 
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Scan strategy 
Pilots use a scanning technique that is specific to analogue and analogue-like (i.e., can 
be digital, but still retain an analogue appearance) instruments. The permanent location 
and the type of analogue instruments determine the strategy pilots use to be aware of 
aircraft parameters. When the aircraft is established in a manoeuvre, for example 
straight and level, all of the instruments would remain motionless with a particular 
indication (e.g. see the four columns of engine instruments in the upper-middle of 
Figure 4.1 – Hercules C130-H Analogue instrument cockpit). This is exactly what the 
pilot would expect to see when the aircraft is flying straight and level. The pilot would 
have a picture in his/her mind of how the instruments should look, and with a quick 
glance the pilot will be able to determine if this is the case. If there were a discrepancy 
in what the pilots is expecting to see and what is actually on the display, the problem 
would be evident instantly. The same strategy would be used across all types of 
analogue instruments, such as in the example provided earlier about the fuel remaining 
at each phase of flight. 
 
Figure 4.1: Hercules C130-H cockpit layout (printed with permission from José Jorge).  
There is an additional diagnostic tool in a conventional aircraft, a human sense, for 
example the olfactory sense would pick up if something was burning. The smell would 
tell a pilot what is burning. A vibration type would give away a possible malfunction. 
The change in the sound of an engine would indicate to a good pilot, if something were 
wrong or if the engine is running well. 
The instructor taught me to listen for an engine when changing speed and rely on the 
sound to set the throttles at the right indent, rather then solely relying on eyesight and 
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the setting of the throttle by Revolution Per Minute (RPM) indicator. The reason the 
instructor insisted on teaching me to use all senses as an indication of change in the 
aircraft parameters, is because the instruments have a lag in them and generally catch up 
on indications once the aircraft is established in a particular position, for example, turn 
or descent. Most importantly, this kind of training is necessary if instruments have 
failed to give indications of how the aircraft is performing. For example, I will use cues 
from the outside, such as the horizon and a relative bank to it, rather than using the 
attitude indicator, to establish required aircraft attitude. 
Much of the work the instructor did, is now done by automation and even the flying of 
the aircraft is now done by an autopilot. Most of the preparations for a commercial 
flight is done by airline company staff and the checks are carried out by the ground 
engineers, leaving the bare minimum of checks on the ground to the pilots. Therefore, 
automation takes much of the workload from the pilot, however, why is there still so 
much for the pilot to do? Furthermore, why is there so much room for the pilot to make 
an error? 
Above I described examples of building blocks of knowledge, such as basic flight rules 
and strategies that every pilot has in their professional knowledge. This is the 
foundation for further pilot training, when he/she will be learning to fly an automated 
aircraft. This will be constantly referred to in the thesis. 
4.2.3 Short introduction to modern automated cockpits  
The modern glass cockpit (see Airbus cockpit layout as an example on Figure 4.2 is 
operated by two pilots in comparison to previous non-automated aircraft where a crew 
of five: two pilots, flight engineer, navigator and sometimes even a radio operator, 
operated an aircraft. Therefore, automation has taken over many of the pilot’s tasks, 
replacing tasks previously performed by a flight engineer, a navigator and a radio 
operator. Most current automated aircrafts have a Flight Management Guidance System 
(FMGS) that can be divided into three areas (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5), flight 
management (also called Flight Management System - FMS), flight guidance (i.e., 
includes autopilot, flight director and autothrottle) and flight augmentation (i.e., 
computation and warning systems).  
The glass cockpit crew, i.e. the two pilots, communicate with a Flight Management 
Guidance System (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) through several interfaces. The Flight Control 
Unit (FCU) provides a short-term interface through which an Autopilot (AP), Flight 
Director (FD), Authothrotle (A/THR) and all other modes of automation can be 
engaged. A short-term interface positioned on a glareshield panel allows quick changes 
to automated system modes. A long-term interface, such as on Airbus 320 that is called 
the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU), is generally used to pre-program 
the whole flight and to make major route changes. It is positioned between the pilots’ 
seats on a flighdeck pedestal, near the throttles (see Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.2: Airbus Cockpit Layout (taken from (Airbus_Industrie, 1998) p.2.8) 
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Figure 4.3: Hercules cockpit layout ( printed with permission from Bradley Mortimer).  
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Figure 4.4: Airbus Flight Management Guidance System (FMGS) – Crew Interface (taken 
from (Airbus_Industrie, 1998) p.10.6) 
Generally, a glass cockpit will have a total of six displays, which can be interchanged 
for a redundancy purpose. Each pilot would have two displays directly in front of them, 
one a Primary Flight Display (PFD), which is a dynamic colour display comprising all 
the parameters necessary for flight path control: Attitude, Airspeed, Altitude, Vertical 
Speed, Heading/Track, Flight Mode Annunciations and Automated Flight System 
Status. The second display is a Navigation Display (ND) that contains flight route and 
other related information, such navigational beacons, weather predictions and 
restrictions, for example en route speed and height restrictions. The remaining two 
displays, the Engine and System display, are positioned between pilots on the same 
main instrument panel. 
Throughout the flight the Flight Management Guidance System (see Figures 4.4 and 
4.5) computes aircraft position using stored aircraft performance and navigational data, 
steering the aircraft along the preplanned route, vertical and speed profile. An Electronic 
Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system monitors aircraft systems and warns the 
pilots of any malfunctions. There is also a build-in safety margin, which is called a 
‘flight envelope’, that does not allow overstressing of the airframe. The flight envelope 
Co-pilotPilot Displays
Located on the Centre Pedestal
Located on the Glareshield
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would have margins of maximum and minimum speeds, limitations to manoeuvres, 
such as an excessive ‘bank’ of the aircraft in a turn. When safety margins are reached a 
part of the automated program called mode reversion (i.e., change in the state of an 
automated system) is activated, which returns the aircraft to the safe margins of the 
flight envelope performance.  
 
Figure 4.5: Example of typical Automation structure 
Last, but also important to understand, is the ‘chain of command’ in a glass cockpit. The 
pilot always (almost always, as I will discuss later in this chapter) has control. The pilot 
programs the flight parameters into the Flight Management Guidance System through a 
long-term, Multipurpose Control and Display Unit, or if immediate change is required 
in flight, the pilot uses a Flight Control Unit on the glareshield panel. The Flight 
Management Guidance System in turn tells the Flight Director what needs to be done, 
the Flight Director commands the Autopilot and the Autopilot flies the aircraft (see 
Figure 4.6).  
Much more can be explained about the glass cockpit aircraft, but it is not necessary at 
this stage and as I recall from training I observed, the pilots were also told, “you will 
understand it later…”, as I will be going through practical examples. 
 
Figure 4.6 ‘Chain of command’ in the Glass Cockpit 
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4.2.4 Everyday work of an airline pilot and problems with automation 
During the observation of pilots’ every day work, it became apparent that pilots have a 
routine, starting from driving the same route to work, picking up the flight plan from the 
same office to preparing the cockpit, running through the checklists before and during 
the flight and even landing at the familiar airport that the pilot flew into yesterday. 
Pilots are encouraged to use the same procedures not only operating the flight, but the 
pilots also are encouraged to use the same level of automation at the same stage of flight 
and engage automation modes in the same way. 
This way of operating an airliner is efficient and not likely to be prone to error, 
however, there are two sides to operating this way. The positive side is that when events 
do not proceed as expected or the instruments show not what the pilot is expecting, the 
pilot notices the deviation straight away, but the aircraft has to behave unexpectedly 
first for the pilot to notice. At times this can be too late for the pilots to make 
corrections. A negative aspect to this strategy appears when the pilot has to deviate from 
the routine. This is when errors can occur. For example, as observed in training, when 
Air Traffic Control requests an altitude change that the pilot has not planned for. The 
pilot sets up the aircraft (Airbus 320) to climb to 15000 feet of altitude and whilst 
climbing passing 10000 feet, the Air Traffic Control requests their immediate descent to 
9000 feet due to other aircraft traffic. The pilots follow their usual procedure of 
changing the altitude setting on the Flight Control Unit by dialling the new level-off 
altitude of 9000 feet and pushing the button to engage the mode to descent. However, 
the aircraft does not descend and instead keeps climbing, now without a target level-off 
altitude, because the previous target of 15000 feet was overridden by the new altitude 
setting of 9000 feet. The 9000 feet is below the aircraft’s current altitude of 10000 feet 
and the automation program, due to build-in safety features, does not allow the direct 
transition into a descent if the aircraft has passed that altitude and continues to climb. 
This is called automation mode reversion. It happened, because the pilot’s input 
contradicted the pre-programmed logic (i.e., build-in safety) embedded in the 
programming of automation. 
Meanwhile, the pilot is confused, the automation configuration is not as the pilot 
intended, and the aircraft is flying against the Air Traffic Control’s request. The 
quickest way to correct the situation is to disengage all automation, manually set the 
aircraft as required and then reengage the automation. 
This is just one example where some pilots are surprised by automation behaviour and 
loose aircraft control. However, the problem is deeper then a simple surprise, pilots 
misunderstand automation behaviour and the pre-programmed logic that governs the 
automation. For example, during the airline operation observations, I observed pilots 
being confused by automation often, pilots would ask questions such as, ‘what is it 
(automation) doing now? Why is it doing that?’ A history of well-documented 
automated aircrafts accidents is an even better testimony to this and it also illustrates the 
problems with current interfaces that I would like to highlight here. 
Human factors experts have been aware of this phenomenon of automation surprise, that 
is caused by the gaps in pilots’ knowledge about how the automation system functions 
for many years (see, e.g., Sarter and Woods 1992; 1994). However, from my recent 
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observations of training and line-operation of pilots not much has changed for the last 
ten to fifteen years, since these glass cockpit type aircraft were manufactured. 
Behaviour of automation goes on unnoticed 
There is a chain of events and problem types that could lead us to a root-cause of 
fundamental problems pilots have with automation, where automation behaviour goes 
on unnoticed. The majority of pilots (80%) responded that they have experienced 
Automation Surprise at least once during line operation.  Other studies on B-757 & B-
737-300/400 confirmed this result. (Sarter and Woods 1997) 
Problems begin when the behaviour of the automation goes unnoticed for long enough 
to alter the aircraft position or state significantly, as happened in the Strasburg accident 
(Strasbourg, 1992). In this accident the pilot on an Airbus 320 intended to enter -3.3 
degrees angle of descent for an approach, but instead entered –3300 feet per minute 
vertical speed descent. This was a significantly steeper and faster descent then the pilot 
has intended, which resulted in the aircraft crashing into a mountain. 
In the above accident the aircraft automation setting was entered incorrectly and altered 
aircraft vertical position. In another accident, a minor error in the aircraft heading 
became significant after several hours of flight, altering aircraft position by thousands of 
miles (Degani, 2004). 
Pilot unknowingly effects aircraft behaviour 
Another problem occurs when the pilot unknowingly effects the aircraft behaviour, and 
even worse, tries to work against the aircraft automation. In the case of accidents in 
Nagoya on Airbus 300 (Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of 
Transport Japan, 1996) and Moscow on Airbus 310 the pilots unknowingly triggered the 
TOGA (Take Off and Go-Around) mode. This caused the aircraft automation to add 
thrust and pull the nose of the aircraft up and as the pilots were not aware of triggering 
the TOGA switch the pilots were trying to do the opposite, forcing the aircraft to 
descend, as they planned. This caused the automation to trim the aircraft to keep the 
nose-up, which in turn made it impossible for the pilots to control the aircraft, which 
resulted in the aircraft stall and crash (Billings, 1997). 
In a Bangalore accident (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990) a similar type of problem 
occurred, only in this case the pilots instead of engaging the unwanted mode, did not 
properly disengage the Flight Director. The aircraft struck short of the runway, because 
the pilot disengaged only one Flight Director and unknowingly still had one Flight 
Director on, which kept the aircraft in the Open Descent Mode without an altitude level 
off target.  
The problem in all the above accidents is that the automation had masked the onset of 
the problem and the pilots were unaware that the automation’s ‘intentions’ were 
different to their intentions. From the pilot’s point of view the automation was 
performing as intended and the problem showed itself too late for the pilots to correct it. 
The list of accidents I mentioned here relate to the same problem and are not an 
exhaustive list. It is a recurrent problem that starts when pilots begin their training on an 
automated aircraft. 
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I want to investigate where the problems and inherent contradictions in logic between 
the pilots and automation-assisted flight occur. It would appear appropriate to start 
searching at the level of pilot training. 
4.2.5 What pilots must learn and re-learn when converting to an automated 
aircraft 
Five issues stood out throughout the observation of training conversion courses from a 
conventional analogue instrument aircraft to fully automated glass cockpit (i.e., a 
cockpit that contains several displays that resembles glass surfaces, hence the name a 
‘glass cockpit’) aircraft: 
• Pilots rely and build upon existing knowledge 
• Pilots use of visual scanning techniques 
• Pilots use different operating strategies to the automation  
• The behaviour of automation is masked 
• Reliance on memory, but too many ‘ifs’ and possibilities are pre-programmed 
1. Pilots build on existing knowledge:  
During training pilots struggled to understand the logic and philosophy behind the 
design of automation. Pilots constantly were asking, “what is it doing now; why is it 
doing that?” To relate to and to better understand the new automated aircraft pilots were 
trying to relate the new information about the operation of the automated aircrafts to the 
operation of the aircrafts they had flown previously. Training experts also observe this 
during conversion courses (Baxter, 1998). Additionally, they repeat that pilots with 
extensive experience on conventional type aircrafts try to understand and even operate a 
new automated aircraft by analogy to a familiar aircraft. From my observations of 
training, pilots would even resort to the very basics of flying, if they could not find a 
similarity with the operation of an aircraft they had previously flown. 
Unfortunately for pilots, the operation of modern automated aircrafts has little 
resemblance to the operation of a basic aircraft (Billings, 1997), as I observed during the 
training. At times during the conversion course, it seemed that the instructor was 
teaching about a new breed of craft, rather than a more automated conventional fixed-
wing aircraft. 
2. Pilots use of visual scanning techniques: 
Pilot were trying to use previous knowledge in the new automated cockpit, and also 
trying to use instrument scanning techniques that they used in conventional cockpits 
with analogue displays. The instrument scan used in a conventional cockpit is an 
efficient method for being aware of any changes because all, or most, instruments are 
‘analogue’. This allows instruments to be scanned like one picture rather then reading 
each individual instrument. For example, engine indications are presented in columns 
with various indications in rows, such as oil pressure and oil temperature, where each 
column shows indications for a specific engine (see Figure 4.7 Analogue engine 
indications).  
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Figure 4.7: Analogue engine indications 
In a conventional scanning technique, the direction and rate of pointer movement for all 
instruments is checked at regular intervals in order to quickly detect any undesirable 
changes. This allows pilots, at a glance, to confirm that all pointers are at their expected 
positions, and changes are occurring as predicted. The figure shows the third instrument 
in the second column having a distinctly different reading to the other instruments, 
prompting the pilot to investigate further (see Figure 4.7).  
However, the problem with this type of scan in an automated cockpit is that the 
information is presented mostly in an alphanumerical form. Hence, a simple glance is 
not sufficient to detect change or abnormality, further reading and interpreting of data is 
required. 
In an automated aircraft the pilot needs to monitor and verify any changes in the system 
by reading data. For example, a mode annunciation is represented by an abbreviated 
selection of letters, which establishes what the aircraft automaton is doing, at this point 
the pilot has to read at least three abbreviations to check where the data is being taken 
from by the automation, and then put it all this data together in his/her mind.  
The conventional scan is not effective when pilots need to deduce the state the 
automation is in. There are generally three possible types of modes, autothrottle, vertical 
and lateral (see the top of the Primary Flight Display Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.8), plus 
annunciation that the Autothrottle, Autopilot and Flight Director are engaged or not. 
Each mode is announced in an abbreviation of two to six letters, divided by a vertical 
line. A conventional scan of analogue instruments will not help a pilots deduce the state 
the automation is in, because a simple glance will only tell how many modes are 
announced and possibly how long is the name of each mode. This would have been 
sufficient in an analogue instrument scan, where the pilots would determine the position 
and direction of each indicator, possibly relative to other instruments indicator 
positions. When the pilot scans, the conventional way, the names of automation modes 
(see Primary Flight Display Figure 4.4), there is a possibility that the pilot would not 
capture the meaning of each mode or even make mistakes for modes with similar 
abbreviations, for example those that begin with the same latter and have similar 
number of letter. 
In the first case, when scanning analogue instruments a pilot is looking for a pattern; in 
the second, a pilot is problem-solving using the available data, which takes more 
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processing time. For example, pilots in training that reverted to using an analogue 
instrument scanning were missing important information, on automation mode changes. 
Airbus philosophy suggests its own strategy for monitoring automated aircraft, “A 
proper monitoring of FMGS (Flight Management and Guidance System) requires a 
minimum understanding and to always keep in mind two questions: What do I want the 
aircraft to fly now? What do I want the aircraft to fly next?” (p.40, Airbus Industrie, 
1996). This is a more effective strategy in an automated aircraft than the scan pilots’ use 
in a conventional cockpit, because it allows the pilots to search for answers in the 
available instrument data, rather than for patterns. Patterns are not obvious in an 
automated aircraft and so need to be ‘generated’ in the pilot’s mind and only then 
compared. 
This technique (Airbus Monitoring Strategy) resembles a ‘rule’ that pilots are taught to 
follow early on in their flying lesson, ‘a pilot should be always be ahead of the 
aircraft’. However, there is a problem with Airbus’s suggested strategy, it is difficult to 
implement.  The design of automated cockpits does not allow pilots to answer these 
questions easily. Pilots have to scan relevant instrument readings, identify and read 
annunciations about the automations state from several locations (Flight Control Unit 
and Primary Flight Display for example), recall the flight plan and restrictions 
associated with the current stage of the flight, and then deduce the answer to the posed 
questions. There is minimal pilot support for this type of monitoring that requires 
problem solving in a current automated cockpit. 
3. Pilots use different operating strategies to automation: 
According to human factors experts, to avoid the common problem of automation 
surprise on automated aircrafts, the pilot should be alert to any changes in the automated 
system (Sarter and Woods 1997). From the discussion above on scanning and 
monitoring strategies this appears to be difficult to achieve this in a current automated 
cockpit. Additionally, this is also compounded by another set of problems that makes 
these tasks even more challenging. 
The behaviour of automation, although presumed in the ‘philosophy’ (Tarnowski, 1999; 
Airbus Industrie, 1996), in many ways does not resemble the actions of a pilot. That 
automation does not behave or respond like another crew member, is a crucial piece of 
information and was not emphasised enough during the conversion course I attended. In 
fact, the reverse was true.  During observation of the conversion course training there 
were three major issues about the automation behaviour strategies that stood out as 
being different to pilots’ strategies. Several examples are discussed in this section.  
The core of these issues is that pilots use different strategies to those of the automation 
to deal with the same problems: 
(a) The activation of automation functions may be in an awkward or unnatural order. 
(b) Automation may not respond in the same way as a pilot would respond. 
(c) Automation may fly the aircraft differently. 
 
(a) The activation of automation functions may be in an awkward or unnatural 
order, for example, pilots found it difficult to remember the location and the sequence 
of pages that they had to follow in order to bring up a specific page during a particular 
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stage of flight from the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit on the Airbus 320. The 
Multipurpose Control and Display Unit is a computer that consists of several electronic 
pages, specific to phases of flight and system state. An associated problem is that the 
information that the pilots would be looking for, would change place, for example the 
information would be moved to a different page and a different location on the page, 
depending on the phase of flight. The trick to bringing up a secondary flight plan page 
in flight on the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit is to switch to HDG (i.e. 
heading) mode from NAV (i.e. navigation) mode in order to have a prompt to activate 
the secondary plan in the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit. The pilot needs to use 
a different control panel, the Flight Control Unit, to switch to HDG mode and see the 
annunciation of the mode on the Primary Flight Display before brining up the secondary 
flight plan on the MCDU (see problem 80, Appendix 2, Airbus). 
(b) Automation may respond differently than the pilots would. Good examples are 
the mode reversions that exist on Airbus 320 as a part of the flight envelope protection. 
Ordinarily, if the pilot is manually flying the aircraft and observes that the aircraft 
cannot maintain the desired speed in a climb, the pilot would either select to fly at a 
slower speed or reduce the angle of attack. However, when the automation cannot 
maintain the speed during SPEED mode and is in V/S (i.e., Vertical Speed) mode with 
armed ALT (i.e., altitude) mode, the automation reverts to two new modes, the THR 
CLB (i.e., Thrust Climb) mode and the OP CLB (i.e., Open Climb) mode (see Airbus 
Industrie, 1996 and Ansett Australia, 1997 for further examples). In this new mode 
configuration the automation changes not only behaviour, but also the aircraft’s climb 
trajectory, and disregards the pilot’s commanded vertical speed and will not reach a 
given altitude by a previously requested distance. It could violate a restricted airspace or 
in the worst-case scenario, it could be heading for another aircraft or the terrain.  
The problem with this type of mode reversions is that the automation tells the pilot after 
it has changed itself and only with the bare minimum of information, ‘I am maintaining 
speed during climb.’ It does not tell the pilot why it changed it or that it is deciding to 
change it. The pilot now has to remember, which modes the automation was originally 
flying in, what has caused the change and then consider the effect of a new change, 
meanwhile possibly heading towards a collision. 
A similar scenario could happen in descent, but produce an even more surprising 
behaviour on the part of automation. For example, if the ALT (i.e., Altitude) mode is 
not armed, the automation would not only change the aircraft’s behaviour in the manner 
and trajectory in which the aircraft is descending, i.e. from maintaining a vertical speed 
to a specific speed on throttles, but it will in fact make the aircraft go into a climb. 
These are just two examples of where pilots can be surprised by automation behaviour. 
However, the problem is deeper then a simple surprise. Pilots misunderstand the 
behaviour and the logic that govern the automation, because it is different and does not 
resemble what pilots do. 
The observations of training showed that pilots do not find ‘automation logic’ intuitive. 
Pilots find that automation does not follow the same logic as pilots when operating the 
aircraft. When confronted with unfamiliar situations, such as described above, they do 
not know what to expect, and are genuinely confused by responses and actions of 
automation. 
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(c) Automation would fly the aircraft differently and does not take responsibility. 
A good example (see problem 68, Appendix 2, Airbus), from an Airbus 320, of 
automation operating an aircraft differently is when the pilot would like to increase the 
rate of descent, he/she would use the speed breaks. However, when flying with an 
automated aircraft pilots are advised not to use speed breaks to increase the rate of 
descent, because when automation is engaged in a V/S (i.e., Vertical Speed) or a FPA 
(i.e., Flight Path Angle) mode this action would only lead to an increase in thrust, which 
is exactly what the pilots want to avoid (Also, see the same type of problems in the 
Appendix 2, problem 96). 
Another example that makes the automation flying the aircraft fundamentally different 
from how pilots fly it, comes again from the Airbus 320 (see problem 72, Appendix 2, 
Airbus). The automation has a different strategy to the pilot during descent, the pilot 
controls speed by pitch (i.e., this implies no change to thrust), but the automation 
controls speed by changing thrust. 
Pilots’ conversion course did not stress enough the fact that the automation does not act 
as a pilot, and it should not be relied on as another member of the crew. It is only a 
piece of programming that has the limitations of a program, i.e. it only has the logic that 
the programmer put into it.  
The program does not posses human qualities, such as a responsibility to tell the pilot 
that it would only do the task partially, or that under these circumstance it can not 
perform the required task well, such as in an accident. Further, it does not have sense of 
responsibility to complete the task and save the crew from a disaster. Yet when pilots 
engage the automation in a particular mode it is with the assumption that it would 
imitate the behaviour of another pilot flying. The pilot engaging the automation would 
transfer not only the action, but also the responsibility to the automation. As a result 
misunderstandings, surprises and something similar to ‘betrayal’ happens. For example, 
(see problem 33 in the Appendix 2) if the pilot is to tell a co-pilot to conduct a Go-
Around procedure on a Hercules aircraft, the pilot would engage full throttle, point the 
aircraft 7 degrees nose up, wings level and keep a runway heading. However, when the 
automation is engaged in Go-Around mode, it would do the bare minimum only. The 
Flight Director would give a cue for 7 degrees nose up and wings level, but instead of 
engaging, the Autopilot it would disengage it and all other FD modes. This is also not 
the only the case that the automation does not take the responsibility. It does not do the 
action the pilot expects, it also disengages all previous automation settings at a critical 
point of the flight and it does not explicitly tell the pilot about its actions. 
The problem with this kind of a situation is the assumption, on the part of the pilot, that 
it is the same as passing on the responsibility to the automation to conduct a go-around 
as if passing this to another member of the crew.  The automation is limited by the 
program and the automation does not have responsibility, this feature is not 
programmed. The problem is not only the fact that the automation failed to take the 
responsibility, but that this is not communicated to the pilot. 
This problem begins when automation modes are named after the action that the pilot 
would otherwise have done differently, and in most cases significantly differently. From 
my observations pilots converting from a conventional aircraft were often confused and 
did not understand why the automation did not finish or did not perform, a part of the 
procedure that they as pilots certainly would have done in a given situation. 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 4: Understanding ‘Pilot Experience’ 
 
56
Probably out of frustration and difficulties of teaching pilots the many ways in which 
the automation can be made to perform the same function, and under which conditions, 
the instructors would tell pilots the most terrifying response, mostly as a last resort, “Do 
not worry, it will become clear when you will start operating the aircraft as a line-pilot.” 
This is in fact a common practice to teach pilots during a line operation, a ‘hands-on’ 
experience, but in earlier generation of aircraft perhaps pilots had no problem reading 
the displays or pushing corresponding buttons. Today pilots have difficulty 
understanding the philosophy behind the aircrafts operation and the logic behind 
operation of these aircrafts, which as it was observed are crucial to safety in line 
operation. 
One of the pilots on the course used to fly an Airbus 320, but even though he was a 
captain on this aircraft for several years, two years prior to this refresher course, and had 
flown a different aircraft since, he had been caught by automation surprises during this 
conversion training program. The interesting fact here is that none of the pilots had 
forgotten the fundamentals of flying learned ten to twenty five years ago, but this 
experienced pilot had forgotten something learned about a glass cockpit aircraft just two 
years ago. This issue is discussed in chapters 6 and 7, on how some information is 
easier to remember and recall than others.  
4. Behaviour of automation is masked 
Automation behaviour is not always announced to the pilot. This does not help pilots 
learn about the automation while they are operating it on line. For example, during an 
Autoland, LAND3 mode, if a crosswind is present, the runway alignment starts at 500’ 
to 200’ radio altitude and the automation is compensating with a rudder adjustment for 
any wind blowing across the runway, the correction to a crosswind is not announced to 
the pilot (see problem 40, Appendix 2, Boeing 777). In a situation where the pilot has to 
takeover from the automation into a manual operation the pilot would not be aware of 
all the actions (e.g. amount of rudder pressure) that the automation was performing. 
Consequently, the pilot does not apply the right amount of pressure to the rudder pedals, 
the aircraft could make a violent manoeuvre from which it may not recover, if it is too 
close to the ground. 
5. Reliance on memory 
A fundamental problem with the above issues is that pilots have to rely on their 
memory, which is not a human strength (Wickens and Holland, 2000; Billings, 1997; 
Amalberti, 1999) and possibly is an area where pilots should have help from 
automation. 
Like any program the automation works on conditions, also called, if – then – else rules. 
Although the program works perfectly following these rules, the pilots find it difficult to 
remember all the Ifs influencing conditions, while operating the aircraft. There are 
several categories of ifs that I came across in manuals and during training.  
One category relates to the operation of the same switch under different conditions that 
would give a different response in various situations. A TOGA (i.e., Take Off and Go 
Around) switch for example (see problem 36 and also see problem 43, Appendix 2 
Boeing 777) can have different actions and responses. During take off if LNAV (i.e., 
Lateral Navigation) or VNAV (i.e., Vertical Navigation) modes are armed, the push of a 
TOGA switch will disarm LNAV and VNAV, leaving the pilot without the navigational 
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data for the automation to follow in order to continue the flight. The same switch will 
not disarm itself (see problem 37, Appendix 2, Boeing 777) if the speed is not lower 
than 80 knots, and if FD is on and LNAV and VNAV are armed, pushing the TOGA 
switch would disarm the LVAN and VNAV. To confuse matters further if the TOGA 
switch is pushed twice it will set the throttle at full thrust.  
In the same example there is yet another problem that of the consistency (i.e., discussion 
in full later) of a function across the function of all buttons, this is discussed later in this 
chapter. The problem is that generally the second push of a button would disconnect the 
function of a button, but in this case it will do the reverse, setting the thrust to full.  
Another category is when the automation can or cannot be engaged or disengaged If a 
particular condition is present or absent. For example, (see problem 39, Appendix 2, 
Boeing 777) if the automation is in an approach mode, the APP (i.e., Approach mode) 
button cannot disconnect the APP mode, if the LOC (i.e., Localiser mode) and G/S (i.e., 
Glide Slope mode) is engaged. To disconnect the approach in this situation the pilot first 
has to disconnect the Flight Director and only then will the APP button disconnect the 
approach mode.  
In other cases the APPR (i.e., Approach mode) will also not engage if the pilot engages 
it too late. A survey of forty-six experienced pilots responded that 28.3% of themselves 
and 30.4% saw another pilot ‘tried to engage APPR too late so that it failed to capture’ a 
signal from navigation aids (Demagalski, J. et al 2002). 
A further problem on Airbus 320, falls under the same category (see problem 70, 
Appendix 2). If the pilot did not enter specific data prior to take off, the FLEX TO mode 
will not engage during take off even if the thrust levers are in FLX TO/MCT detent 
provided. To operate correctly, data such as, a FLX temperature, has to be entered 
through the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit prior to take off in order to activate 
this mode. 
The conditions under this ‘if category’ are countless and too many to remember or 
probably even to name during training. They can appear in everyday operations, for 
example (problem 71, in the Appendix 2), if the Flight Director is off the pilot cannot 
manage the airspeed apart from if in the APPR mode. Pilots have to rely on their 
memory to remember the conditions under which the automation will or will not engage 
and, in an emergency situation the correct recollection of the ‘if conditions’ could be 
crucial. 
A bigger problem is that the ‘if conditions’ become crucial to recall and understand the 
reasons behind the automation’s behaviour. This is especially so in a deteriorating 
situation, for example loosing altitude (see problem 89, Appendix 2, Airbus 320). For 
instance, during climb if the ATHR (i.e., Autothrottle) is engaged the aircraft will come 
back to an approach speed, which will generally be too low and stall an aircraft. This 
can cause a critical situation if this happens during a go-around where there is not 
enough altitude to recover from a stall before crashing into a runway. 
The above examples illustrate the challenge pilots face when converting from a 
conventional to an automated aircraft. The pilots not only have to learn a new way of 
operating an aircraft, but they need to be aware and remember that the automation does 
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not always respond like their fellow crewmembers under similar conditions. Pilots have 
to largely rely on their memory, to recall the various ways to set up (i.e., prepare an 
aircraft) for a particular manoeuvre and, know the effects that this manoeuvre can have 
on the aircraft automation, whilst being aware of the flight envelop protection laws and 
not breaking them. Pilots have to remember how to exit from an automated mode of 
operation correctly, otherwise it could result in an accident, as in the case of Bangalore 
accident (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990), where the pilot failed to disengage one of 
two Flight Directors. To add to the challenge, pilots have to do all this with minimal or 
no help at all from the displays. 
4.2.6 ‘Tricks of the trade’ from Instructors and Experienced Pilots 
Instructors come up with ‘tricks’ to give pilots in training to help them remember some 
of the ‘if conditions’ or the sequences of executing a procedure on an automated 
aircraft. The instructor suggests an easily remembered abbreviation, such as ABCD, 
where each letter is the first letter of an action to be executed for a non-precision 
approach, where A is for requesting weather from ATIS (Airport Terminal Information 
System) plus a set up of the Flight Management and Guidance Computer, B is for 
Briefing the crew for an approach, C is for Checklists, and D is for a Descent scan of 
instruments. Problems exist with activating an approach, which is a critical issue, as 
according to a survey of pilots flying Airbus 320, there is approximately a 20% chance 
that the crew will fail to activate an approach (Sarter and Woods, 1997).  
However, as witnessed during the conversion training in which I participated, the ‘trick’ 
of abbreviation did not work well. Pilots forget to set the Flight Management and 
Guidance System because it is not a part of the abbreviated letters and came under the 
letter A, after calling for ATIS. This, is the step that pilots forgot to set, and it is 
precisely this step that is the reported problem in the survey of Airbus pilots mentioned 
above (Sarter and Woods, 1997). 
Some pilots invent their own ways of using glass cockpit displays to help them with 
either monitoring or controlling the aircraft. However, these are not the intended 
practices of the interface design engineers. One Boeing pilot stated that he uses Vertical 
Speed Indicator on the Primary Flight Display as an indicator of the descent angle 
during an approach, even thought it is not designed to show this. 
There are so many tricks that are used in operation of current automated aircrafts, that 
one can write a whole manual. There is even a web community (www.bluecoat.org) that 
is dedicated to the exchange of problems that pilots face in everyday operation. Pilots, 
that belong to this community, exchange several emails a day sharing problems and 
suggesting solutions to each other. 
4.3 Identification and Classification of problems   
The scope for research and investigation of the problems related to new types of 
automated aircraft is vast, especially when two types (i.e., commercial and military) of 
aircraft and from three different manufacturers (i.e., Lockheed Martin, Boeing and 
Airbus) are involved. The comparison discussed in this chapter between the cockpits 
show how one manufacturer solved problems that exist in a competitor’s cockpit, and 
the common traits of problems exist among all automated cockpits. 
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There are several problem areas, as can be seen from a problem table (Appendix 2), 
although important, I have not focused on all of them, such as the use of colour in mode 
annunciations. This may be part of future research. 
The vast number of problems on automated aircraft that I came across while conducting 
this research can be classified into a well know classification system or taxonomy that 
was suggested by the team of researchers that undertook the important task of bringing 
together all currently known problems in automated aircraft by analysing research 
literature, questionnaires, incident and accident reports (Funk and Lyall, 1998). For the 
purpose of scoping my research I used their ‘Alternative Taxonomy of Flightdeck 
Automation Problems and Concerns’. It shows the type of problems I was interested in 
and how they are distributed across three different automated cockpits. 
The Alternative Taxonomy is divided into five sections, Automation-Centered, Pilot-
Centered, Crew-Centered, Organization-Centered and Other Problems and Concerns 
(http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/phase1/phase1alttaxonomy.aspx). Each section 
is further divided into several categories. The first two categories are the most relevant 
to the problems identified, but not all subcategories were used, for example, under the 
Automation-Centered category, the subcategory, Automation Failure, was not used. 
This category is not the focus of my research, as I am more interested in how to make 
pilots aware of when the automation fails. Similarly, the section Pilot-Centered was not 
used, for example ‘underconfidence’ and ‘overconfidence’ categories, because this was 
not the focus of this research. 
Funk and Lyall’s descriptions of each category were followed as closely as possible, 
however, some problems could be classified in several categories depending on the 
point of view taken on the problem. Some subcategories can include other 
subcategories, depending upon what is seen as a problem. For example, the subcategory 
‘automation behaviour may be unexpected and unexplained’ can also belong to the 
‘automation awareness’ category in the main section of the ‘pilot-centered problems and 
concerns’. In this classification scheme it is not important or at least not helpful to 
classify the problem differently as it will not help to solve the problem. In contrast, the 
matrix that I suggest in chapter six and seven may help with a solution to the problem 
once the problems are ‘classified or identified’ and related to a specific category.  
It is considered that the classification of problems, such as the taxonomy described 
above should also be helpful in identifying the root of problems, but in fact is not in all 
cases. This is evident in the Alternative Taxonomy (Funk and Lyall 1998), which can 
show that problems at pilot-centered level have roots at the automation-centered level. 
For example, a total of 18.7% (out of all flightdeck automation problems) of all the 
problems that pilots face, which include understanding (4.2%), use (2.8%), automation 
awareness (6.5%) and situation awareness problems (5.2%) can be solved at the 
automation level under the category of pilot/automation interface. However, the 
category of pilot/automation interface only accounts for 12.9% according to Alternative 
Taxonomy problems. This category, pilot/automation interface, should also account 
18.7% of pilot-centered problems, because this is where the problems are rooted, as we 
already observed in discussion of problems at the beginning of this chapter. 
For the reason mentioned above, that some problems could fit under more than one 
category, and because I had an interest in specific problems, I had placed more 
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problems in some categories than others. This biased classification, according to my 
research focus, shows where the problems of interest to me are located in a well-
recognised taxonomic format. The volume of problems differs between the three 
aircraft, but these are mainly because I had more access to the documentation of the 
Airbus and Hercules, than to the Boeing documentation. This is not an indication that 
one type of aircraft has more problems than the other. The problems classified here are 
from training that I observed and participated in, from the airline operations, and from 
manuals on all three aircrafts. The full taxonomy can be seen in the Appendix 2. 
4.4 Consistency as a category in listing automation related problems 
I have already discussed examples of problems from each of the categories in this 
chapter, but for further information on, or to have a more comprehensive view of 
existing problems in information presentation in a glass cockpit, please refer to 
Appendix 2. The most common problem across all cockpits as observed in line-
operations, during training sessions and from reference to manuals, which is not a part 
of category in the Alternative Taxonomy, was related to consistency issue in design on 
several levels: the use of buttons; the spatial location of information across panels and 
similar displays; the format of information presentation; the behaviour of automation is 
not consistent with pilots’ behaviour; and in the application of philosophy throughout 
the design. 
There are strong cases both for (e.g., Shneiderman, 1987) and against (e.g., Grudin, 
1989) consistency as a design principle in an interface design. Grudin (1989) argues that 
as more user tasks, and more of the user’s environment are understood, the further away 
from consistency the interface design shifts. For example, in a safety-critical domain, 
locating the appropriate command to activate or deactivate the system is time-critical. 
An example of a consistent ‘activate/deactivate’ interface design might be considered as 
the established menu structure in Microsoft programs that dictates that an ‘exit’ (i.e. 
deactivate) function appears toward the end of the drop-down menu entitled ‘File’.  
However, if this design approach were to be taken in a time critical system it would be 
seen that to use the exit command takes several steps (i.e. several seconds). In such a 
system a split second saved by a ‘deactivate’ function being a separate selection, and 
accessible instantaneously no matter where the user is in the program, may have priority 
above consistency. In this case, rigidly following a rule of consistency of menu structure 
may not be appropriate. However, consistency of information layout that minimizes 
user’s time spend searching is also safety critical. Hence, “consistency and other design 
rules are best seen as guidelines that may have to be violated for the benefit of users” (p. 
103, Grudin, 1992). 
In this part of the chapter, the consistency as a design guideline in a glass cockpit is 
assessed as being useful or disadvantageous. 
4.4.1 Poor consistency in the use of buttons and knobs 
There is poor consistency in the use of buttons and knobs for functions. The push of a 
button generically means putting something ON. In the Airbus 320 cockpit it could 
mean three things: arming (i.e., on, but not active), engaging (i.e., on and active), 
disengage (i.e., completely OFF) and some buttons, as discussed earlier (similar 
problem (43b, Appendix 2) on Boeing) in Boeing 777 cockpit need to be pushed twice 
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to set its function at a maximum (for example a full thrust). A similar problem also 
exists on the Airbus (see problem 92 ‘similar buttons have contradicting functions’, 
Appendix 2 Airbus). In a time-critical situation this could become a problem, for 
example, if the pilot is attempting to disengage the Autothrottle he/she could instead set 
the Autothrottle to a full thrust. This would do the opposite to what the pilot intended, it 
would surprise the pilot and put an aircraft in an undesired state. 
When considering a design of switches for operations of safety critical functions there is 
a need for consistency in operation. For example, if selecting a pushbutton for activation 
and deactivation of the system, the two opposite states (i.e., pressed and depressed) 
should only be used. These two states give a tactile and visual feedback of the system’s 
state. If any deviations in operation of the pushbutton occur, such as pressing the button 
when the system is in a specific state that result in other then active and deactivate state, 
or pressing the button for a longer periods, it has to be clearly indicated to the operator 
prior the selection of the state. For example, the menu with current and the following 
state can be shown or a three-position switch with clearly marked selections can be used 
instead of a pushbutton. 
To complicate matters further in a modern cockpit, the knob on the Mode Control Panel 
can select the desired value by rotating the knob, then the pilot can arm or/and engage 
either the managed mode (i.e., derived from Multipurpose Control and Display Unit) by 
pushing it or by pulling it to activate a selected mode (i.e., derived from the pilot’s 
entry). In the survey by Demagalski and collegues (2002), forty-six pilots responded 
that 26.1% of themselves or 26.1% saw another pilot ‘having entered the desired 
airspeed pushed or pulled the switch in the opposite way to the one that you wanted’. 
There are also buttons with a similar label that appear to have the same function, but 
actually they do not follow the same operational logic. Similar switches work 
differently on the Mode Control Panel. The ALT (i.e., Altitude) switch can be switched 
to ‘AUTO’ or to ‘1000’. The ‘AUTO’ indication means that the switch has a rate 
sensitive rotation, a slower rotation will increase altitude by small increments, and a fast 
rotation will increase altitude in higher increments. However, the ‘AUTO’ position on 
the BANK switch means the bank of the aircraft (as an action) is limited by the 
Autopilot, plus the same switch also sets the bank angle (see problem 45, Appendix 2, 
Boeing 777).  
In the above case the label ‘AUTO’ is not used consistently. In two cases, ALT and 
BANK, it represents two different things, the ‘automatic’ switching between fast and 
slow increments in the value and ‘autopilot’ function of limiting the angle of bank, 
respectively. The abbreviation selected to describe the functionality needs to be more 
accurate, representative and not clash with other generalised abbreviations that can be 
interpreted in several ways. Consistency in the labelling of buttons and switches is 
essential in this case, as it reduces the need for unnecessary memorisation of the varied 
meanings behind the same abbreviation. 
In addition, the ALT button has other contradicting functions. Pushing the ALT switch 
on the Mode Control Panel executes the altitude entered, but the same button also 
deletes the altitude restrictions entered in the Flight Management Computer (Problem 
48, Appendix 2 Boeing 777). The only difference in the outcome of an action (i.e., 
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press) is the different conditions under which the button is pressed, which again have to 
be remembered by the pilot. 
The selection of appropriate function is also difficult when the pushbutton labels are 
inconsistent on the same panel, for example on the overhead panel. The Air Bleed 
overhead panel has two rows of buttons. All buttons are divided into two parts and each 
part of the button is illuminated to show the current selection. The top row has the 
‘AUTO’ lit up on the top part of the button. The bottom row however, has the ‘ON’ sign 
at the top on the two buttons, and one button has the ‘AUTO’ sign. Moreover, although 
the top of the buttons are not consistent, all of the buttons on the second, lower part of 
the button, have an ‘OFF’ sign, which is consistent across all the buttons on this panel. 
A problem is that the pilot can only see the illuminated selection and cannot see the 
other half, because it is not illuminated. If the pilot would choose to follow the sign’s 
logic on the rest of the buttons, the pilot can mistake between an ‘AUTO’ sign for an 
‘ON’ (problem 51, Appendix 2 Boeing 777). 
The overhead panel buttons are made dark with the intention to maintain ‘the dark 
philosophy’ cockpit, which means if nothing is illuminated there are no problems. This, 
however, as it can be seen from the above example, can make the selection of the 
correct function difficult, because it does not allow the alternative selection to be seen. 
In this case consistency in assigning functionality to the pushbuttons is safety critical. 
For example, all functions need to be consistently positioned either at the top or at the 
bottom of the pushbutton or if consistency cannot be applied in this part of the panel, 
they need to be clearly labelled in both states, an illuminated and a non-illuminated 
state.    
4.4.2 Name on the button is not consistent with the selection name 
To add to the confusion the pilots already have a lot of information to commit to 
memory about how the automation operates under various ‘if’ conditions. There are 
buttons in the cockpit that have names that do not reflect the selection of their function. 
For example, some buttons on the REF/SET mode panel do not always correspond the 
annunciation on the Mode Annunciation Panel and Primary Flight Display (Solodilova, 
Lintern, & Johnson, 2005). The selection of a button ‘NAV ON’ on the REF/SET panel 
announces ‘NAV ARM’ (i.e., Navigation Armed mode), but the button ‘APPR ON’ on 
the REF/SET panel announces ‘GS ARM’ (i.e., Glide Slope Armed mode) on the 
Primary Flight Display. Similarly, the selection of the ‘SEL ON’ button brings up an 
‘ALT SEL’ (i.e., Altitude Select) mode on the Primary Flight Display (problem 24, 
Appendix 2, Hercules). Although, the consistency in the corresponding annunciation on 
the Primary Flight Display when selecting ‘NAV ON’ and ‘APPR ON’ are not as 
ambiguous as the ‘SEL ON’ mode, which does not provide any cues to what mode it 
will select. This type of labelling is not consistent with other modes labels rationale, and 
again leaves the burden on the pilot to memorise the corresponding function through 
vague abbreviation. 
4.4.3 Information layout is not consistent 
Information layout is not consistent across all panels and displays. The layout of 
information on the Primary Flight Display is not consistent with the layout on the Mode 
Control Panel. The instrument layout on the Primary Flight Display is in the following 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 4: Understanding ‘Pilot Experience’ 
 
63
order - Autothrottle, Heading, Altitude and Vertical Speed, but the order on the buttons 
on the Mode Control Panel is Autothrottle, Heading, Vertical Speed and Altitude, i.e., 
the last two selections are in reverse order (problem 38 in the Appendix 2, Boeing 777). 
This inconsistency can cause the pilot to select an incorrect function on the Mode 
Control Panel. In a survey of forty-six pilots 78.3% responded that they themselves or 
65.2% saw another pilot ‘adjusted the heading knob instead of the speed knob’ 
(Demagalski, et al 2002). These incidents of erroneous selection can potentially be 
reduced through promoting consistency of order of annunciations on displays (i.e., 
Primary Flight Display) and panels such as the Mode Control Panel. A similar problem 
exists on the Hercules (Problem 6, Appendix 2, Hercules) and Airbus (Problem 65, 
Appendix 2 Airbus 320) interfaces. 
 
Figure 4.8: Airbus Primary Flight Display (taken from (Ansett Australia, 1997) 1.22.20 
p.17) 
The order of information presented also differs on the same display. On the Primary 
Flight Display (see Figure 4.8) the automation mode annunciation is in the following 
order: Speed, Vertical and Lateral (heading) mode; however, instruments on the same 
display are in a different order: Speed, Heading/Attitude, Altitude and Vertical Speed. 
This means that the related instrument is not located directly under the name of the 
mode within the same display (problem 64, Appendix 2, Airbus 320). 
In this case the consistency in the order of instruments and corresponding mode 
selection on the panel and the display is appropriate and will save pilots’ time to locate 
the information required, as well as training time. 
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Figure 4.9: Tape and Analogue format of Speed and Altitude presentation 
4.4.4 Consistency in the format of information presentation 
There is also inconsistency on displays of the same type, in this case a Primary Flight 
Display (Problem 28 in the Appendix 2 Hercules). The same information, the altitude, 
speed and compass are presented in different formats. On the Head Down Display 
(Figure 4.9) the altitude and the speed are presented in tape format, but on the Head Up 
Display (Figure 4.9) it is in an analogue format. However, the compass information is 
presented in an analogue format on the Head Down Display compass, but on the Head 
Up Display it is in a tape format. The Primary Flight Display contains information that 
is crucial for the operation of the aircraft. It serves as a constant reference for pilots 
throughout the flight, therefore, presenting the same information in a different format on 
displays that the pilot is likely to switch between due to a malfunction of a display for 
example, can be mentally taxing.  
4.4.5 Consistency in application of philosophy 
Problems of inconsistency extend further to the way the automation design philosophy 
is intended and used throughout the cockpit, for example the use of philosophy for the 
Flight Director sign, on the Airbus 320’s Primary Flight Display, which is ‘Fly to’ or 
‘Fly towards’ philosophy. The Flight Director in this case indicates the required aircraft 
flight path to follow, i.e., ‘fly to’. The figure (4.10) provides an example of Flight 
Director presentation on the Primary Flight Display. The Flight Path Vector shows the 
aircraft’s current path and the Flight Director indicates the required flight path to be 
achieved. The pilot needs to fly aircraft towards the Flight Director to achieve 
commanded path (i.e. required path). Alternately the pilot can engage the Autopilot and 
the Autopilot will follow Flight Director.   
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Figure 4.10: Airbus Flight Director (taken from (Ansett Australia, 1997) 1.22.30 p.3) 
The directions by the Flight Director are given to the pilot for ease of flying precise 
trajectories, or for the Autopilot to follow. However, other signs on the same display do 
not follow the same philosophy, which can create confusion and incorrect actions on the 
part of the pilot. For example, the ‘bouncing ball’ sign on the speed tape indicates that 
the speed is too high and needs to be reduced. However, if the pilot would follow the 
‘Fly towards’ philosophy, the pilot can interpret this sign as the need to increase speed 
instead of decreasing it. This action would give rise to further problems. The increase in 
speed would lead to breaking the Flight Envelop protection and would set off either 
alarms or even a mode reversion in some cases (problem 56, Appendix 2, Airbus 320). 
The same, ‘Fly Towards’ philosophy, is applied to the Hercules’ Flight Director signs, 
but the philosophy is not followed on the same display throughout the features. For 
example, the Flight Path Indicator and the Glide Slope Deviation Indicator comply with 
the ‘Fly Towards’ philosophy, but the Speed Error Tape, Acceleration Cue and CAPS 
Distance tape do not comply with it. For example, if the Speed Error Tape is below the 
Climb/Dive marker it means the aircraft has deviated from the required speed. However, 
if the pilot interprets this as a ‘Fly Towards’ philosophy, the pilot would decrease speed 
even further (problem 14, Appendix 2, Hercules; also see problems 11, 12 and 13), 
making the opposite speed correction to the required. 
In these examples the consistency in applying the same ‘Fly towards’ philosophy is 
beneficial, as the pilot is expected to respond to cues provided instantaneously and 
having cues providing contradicting information on the same display can setup the pilot 
for making a mistake. 
4.4.6 Misplaced consistency 
There are also cases of misplaced consistency. For example, there are actions performed 
by automation that are not consistent with the same actions executed by pilots. I have 
already presented an example problem earlier when discussing differences in strategies 
between automation and pilots. This causes the pilots’ confusion when automation does 
not perform an action as the pilot would, especially if the action has the same name, as 
the pilot traditionally calls it. 
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There are also cases of misplaced consistency when a different format of information is 
used for similar information. The Hercules C130J has two Primary Flight Displays, a 
Head Down Display and Head Up Display (see Figure 4.9), both of which carry the 
same type of information. The format of information presentation is different, partially 
because a Head Up Display is a monochrome display that allows the pilot to see through 
it to the outside. For this reason the information on the Head Up Display is presented in 
a minimalist fashion. However, this has made the presentation of the Airspeed Data and 
the Altitude Data indicator look similar on the same display (see Figure 4.9). It is 
presented as a circle of ten points with the reading in the middle. The problem occurs 
when the indications in the circles are the same, e.g. for a speed of 180 knots and a 
height of 180 feet. Pilots, especially new to the aircraft, tend to fail to differentiate 
which reading is decreasing, as reported by the flying instructor. If the pilots misread 
that the speed is reducing instead of altitude the pilot would think the aircraft is about to 
stall. The pilot would respond incorrectly and put the aircraft into an incorrect attitude 
very close to the ground, at which point there is no margin for correcting the error.  
Caution needs to be exercised in using the consistency principle as guidance in the 
design of information presentation. Every case needs to be examined in both, helpful 
and misleading, instances, specifically to assess whether, how and under which 
conditions it will help or mislead the operator in information presentation before it is 
applied. 
4.5 Concerns that did not fit in the existing taxonomy 
During the classification of problems there was a cluster of concerns that did not fit into 
the current taxonomy, as on the surface these concerns do not appear to be problems. 
These can be categorised as problems of a lesser degree that are not obvious, but can be 
improved on. This category at first sight can be seen as weakness in pilots’ ability to 
find and to associate information and to memorise and recall it at the appropriate time. 
Not all of these problems are listed in the problem table (Appendix 2). I will take a few 
examples of these problems to show what they are and what they have in common.  
4.5.1 Semantic problems 
There were less obvious problems of a semantic nature and these would not appear to be 
a problem if the pilot would memorise by heart the meaning behind each symbol or 
word. However, if the pilot forgets the symbol’s meaning and would think of a possible 
logic behind each symbol, to establish what it means, errors would occur. For example, 
the Non Directional Beacon symbol is represented as a triangle. Although this beacon 
does not provide the direction, the triangle can be interpreted as an arrow and the 
symbol can be thought of as a Directional Beacon. However, the Directional Beacon 
can provide a direction, but it is represented in a circle, and it is difficult to ascertain 
direction from a circular symbol (problem 63, Appendix 2, Airbus 320). 
There is a similar problem related to the semantic interpretation of signs on the Hercules 
Head Up Display. The Pitch recovery symbol, called the ‘Chevron pairs’, looks like this 
^^ and indicates that the nose is high. This again, as discussed earlier, contradicts the 
‘Fly towards’ philosophy featured on the same display, which can be interpreted as an 
indication to ‘recover in this direction’ by following the arrows. A problematic issue 
with ‘Chevron pairs’ is that there is the same symbol, but as a singular Chevron ^ that 
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indicates that the nose is low and shows the direction in this case that the pilot should 
recover the aircraft.  If the pilot misinterprets one of these chevrons, the aircraft would 
be recovered in the wrong direction, both of which would result in the unusual attitude. 
(problem 1, Appendix 2 Hercules). 
Therefore, the meaning behind symbols or icons can be ambiguous due to variety of 
factors, for instance user skills (McDougall & Curry, 2004). Meaning behind words can 
also be misinterpreted. Such instances arise as mode annunciations are shown as 
acronyms or shortened words. This is open to pilot misinterpretation, such as in problem 
47 (problem 47, Appendix 2 Boeing). Consider a case, during a take off run the 
Autothrottle cannot be changed until the aircraft reaches 80 knots per hour, the 
Autothrottle then goes into HOLD mode, which is annunciated on the Primary Flight 
Display. At this point the Autothrottle can be altered, however, the word 'HOLD' may 
be misinterpreted as the Autothrottle is 'on hold' and cannot be altered. The pilot who 
reviewed the problem and concern table (see Appendix 2) explains how he remembered 
the correct meaning behind this mode annunciation: 
#47: “… a reasonable interpretation of the HOLD annunciation. It merely means the 
throttle servos have "let go" and the throttles will remain where they are with no action 
needed by the pilot.” 
From the pilot’s interpretation, above, it is unclear, does this word ‘HOLD’ refer to 
what the automation is doing or what the pilots should be doing? Mode annunciation 
per se has to explain the automation’s action, but from this pilot’s explanation, the mode 
is telling the pilot what to do. This notion returns to the previously discussed problem of 
consistency, only in this case it is consistency with respect to the assignment of names 
to mode annunciations and their double meaning. 
4.5.2 Poor location of related information and function (environment related) 
Poor location of related information and function refers to situations where, the 
locations of important related information are located apart from each other and are not 
associated. For example, on the Hercules Head Up Display the barometric pressure 
information is remote from altitude information, even though the altitude reading may 
be correct, the barometric pressure setting may be incorrect meaning the altitude reading 
will be incorrect. Related information that is positioned apart from each other may be 
not cross-referenced. Nearly half of the pilots surveyed reported such an incident, when 
the pilot set the wrong barometric pressure. The survey of forty-six pilots responded 
that 45.7% of themselves or 45.7% saw another pilot ‘had an incorrect barometric air 
pressure set’ (Demagalski, J. et al 2002). 
The DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) information is similarly remote from other 
related navigational data (problem 32, Appendix 2, Hercules). If the pilot reads the 
navigation information correctly, but from the wrong source, the information is of no 
use.  
4.5.3 Poor location of related information and function (behaviour related) 
The button that activates automation behaviour is located apart from other automation 
selection associated with the same behaviour. The Mode Control Panel layout has a 
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FLCH (Flight Level Change mode) button located under the IAS (Indicated Air Speed 
mode) button, which are not related. In fact, the associating and activating button, the 
ALT selection knob is located apart from each other (problem 35, Appendix 2, Boeing 
777). 
4.5.4 The relationship that limit the behaviour are not represented: 
The pilot often does not know, unless he/she has memorised, all the conditions, that 
modes will activate under, and also can’t recall all modes that will limit the aircraft’s 
behaviour. For example, if the pilot uses the ALT* (i.e., altitude capture mode) in 
descent, the aircraft will become locked until the altitude is captured.  The mode cannot 
be changed until the aircraft exits ALT* mode (problem 86, Appendix 2, Airbus 320). 
4.5.5 Tolerance boundaries of the automation operation are not presented:  
Automation has operational boundaries that are pre-programmed into the system called 
the flight envelope. Some of these boundaries are important for pilots to know. For 
example, during climb the selected NAV (i.e., Navigation) or ALT (i.e., Altitude) mode 
may not capture course (NAV) or altitude (ALT) respectively, if there is a deviation. 
The altitude will only be captured within 10% of the rate of climb and the course will be 
captured only within 5% of the target course. This information is not announced to the 
pilot, and the pilot may not be aware why the automation did not accomplish the 
operation (problem 15, Appendix 2, Hercules). 
4.5.6 Automation dependencies are not represented to the pilot 
Automation design is complex and comprises many interactions between the various 
automation functions in various combinations, which again the pilot has to know and 
recall at the appropriate time to engage automation and to avoid any surprises. For 
example, ATHR (i.e., Autothrottle) will not engage below 100 feet, if a Flight Director 
and an Autopilot is disengaged (problem 90, Appendix 2, Airbus 320).  
4.5.7 Understanding automation intentions 
There are a multitude of problems that can fit under several categories in the Alternative 
Taxonomy, but these are the most applicable in helping pilots to answer questions, such 
as, ‘What’s it (automation) doing now?’ This is often asked during line operation. The 
Airbus philosophy is based on a strategy to help pilots fly the plane effectively, 
provided they always can answer the following question, ‘What do I want the aircraft to 
fly now? What do I want the aircraft to fly next?’. If the pilot can answer these questions 
it will help pilots fly an aircraft safely and follow the most fundamental rule, ‘a pilot 
should be always ahead of the aircraft’. 
These problems have been discussed in part in the previous categories mentioned in this 
section and in details in the sections, ‘behaviour of automation goes on unnoticed’, 
‘pilots unknowingly affect aircraft behaviour’. Poor interfaces and displays contribute to 
these problems, but are not the only cause of pilots misunderstanding of automations 
intention. Already mentioned ‘automation surprise’ can also fall under this category. 
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Pilots’ misunderstanding of automation intention appears to be a result of several 
factors, such as, a missing piece of information that influences or contributes to the 
automation behaviour; not understanding the logic behind automations behaviour; or 
pilots’ assumptions that an action was preformed and completed, but it did not, or did 
not happen in an excepted manner, such as in the Strasbourg accident. Another related 
example, as reported in the preliminary finding of the newly developing human factors 
certification criteria (Demagalski, J, et al 2000), is where the pilot assumed that the 
mode was activated, but in fact, 34.8% of pilots ‘entered a heading on the Flight Control 
Unit and failed to active it at the appropriate time’.  
Pilots’ misunderstanding of the automation’s apparent intentions can be caused by, and 
result in, mode reversion, which at length is discussed in this chapter in various 
categories. For example, 15.2% of pilots themselves or 17.4 % of pilots know of other 
pilots who ‘entered the wrong altitude on the Flight Control Unit and activate it’ 
(Demagalski, J, et al 2000). This action can lead to an altitude mode reversion, 
discussed earlier (i.e., cause aircraft to ignore the pilot’s entry and keep descending or 
revert to climb), which in turn causes the ‘automation surprise’ phenomenon. 
All of the above problems were observed during training and line operation and 
although the pilots tended to memorise how to avoid these problems, they were still 
often caught by surprise by them. 
From my training and observations, it appears at times pilots were being trained to 
avoid making mistakes and learn the instructors or colleagues’ tricks on how to avoid 
automation traps, instead of learning of how to operate an automated aircraft. Partly, as 
it transpired through the course of research, it is because the philosophy, although 
having a great foundation behind it, is not followed throughout in the cockpit design. 
The very things that the automation is good at and can be helpful at, such as, retaining, 
calculating, analysing information and highlighting when information is needed, is in 
fact not used to the full extent. 
4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 What is the problem in the cockpit interfaces? 
At this point it is appropriate to ask the question: how can it be so easy and natural to 
pick up basic flying skills, but it be so challenging to learn, operate and understand an 
automated aircraft? The fundamentals of flight have not changed since we first started 
flying and the basic rules of flying, i.e., assessing the ‘health’ of the aircraft, navigating 
according to the flight plan and communicating with the Air Traffic Control are still the 
same. The only new step in the operation of an automated aircraft is monitoring. 
Automation was designed to offload work from the pilot, by giving the automation the 
tasks that we as humans are not efficient at, such as repetitive tasks, leaving pilots with 
higher order decision making and problem solving (Billings, 1991). 
The pilot needs to constantly monitor the system, retrieve the required information from 
the system, recalling the conditions under which the automation would or would not 
work. Although the automation is intended to offload pilots workload, it is arguable that 
the time pilots spend on contending with automation, cancels out the time pilots gain by 
having the automation at their disposal.  
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During my training, through observation of pilots in training and in line operations the 
major contributor to problems pilots have with automation appeared to be their poor 
understanding of automation systems. Pilots were observed to struggle to understand 
how to operate an automated aircraft, more often than not making mistakes, and were 
surprised by the automations behaviour. Pilots found it difficult to learn and to follow 
the philosophy applied in the design of the displays, and the logic that the aircraft’s 
automation followed during the operation.  
It transpired that the problems of pilots’ understanding the automation, observed during 
training, continued through to line operation. Pilots were gaining an understanding of 
the automation philosophy through training by means of training aids. Their further 
understanding of automation was gained during operation, where pilots were using the 
automation systems through the variety of interfaces. Pilots often exchanged tricks and 
applied workarounds to successfully operate the aircraft. However, neither training, 
exchange of tricks, nor line operation actually increased their understanding of many 
aspects of the automation system. Pilots were still confused about automation 
operational logic and struggle to understand its philosophy (Figure 4.11). 
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Figure 4.11: What is the problem? 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 4: Understanding ‘Pilot Experience’ 
 
71
One part of the problem in pilots’ understanding of the philosophy is the 
implementation of it inconsistently throughout the design of the system. 
As I discussed in the example problems in this chapter, pilots have numerous 
opportunities to misinterpret the automation mode annunciation, to select the wrong 
mode of operation, to loose track of automation actions after mode reversions, and to 
miss crucial parts of information that in turn effect how the automation responds. Pilots 
had to largely rely on memory to recall the ‘if conditions’ when interacting with the 
automation system and were surprised when the automation did not respond as 
expected. 
Automation dependencies are not represented to the pilot 
Automation design is complex and assumes interactions between automated subsystems 
in various combinations, which again pilots’ have to remember and recall at the 
appropriate time to engage automation and to avoid any surprises. For example, ATHR 
(i.e., Autothrottle) will not engage below 100 feet, if a Flight Director and an Autopilot 
is disengaged. 
To validate the example of problems and concerns in the Appendix 2 that are discussed 
in this chapter the table (see Appendix 2 for table of problems and concerns) was given 
to experienced pilots on each aircraft type to be reviewed. One pilot’s response to a 
problem (problem 90, Appendix 2, Airbus 320) described in the section ‘Automation 
dependencies are not represented to the pilot’, related to relying on pilots memory to 
operate the automation, was:  
“#90: Yes, that is true with the following caveats: Although I can not find this in my 
airline's AFM (i.e. flight manual), I believe the following is correct: Below 100 ft AGL, 
SRS ("speed on elevator") is only available if at least one F/D is ON; however, ATHR is 
available below 100 ft if in "speed on throttle" mode as is normal with G/S engaged 
during an instrument approach;”   
This is a good example of a concern that questions the design philosophy. Every rule 
and condition that the pilot has to remember has an exception that applies to this 
specific rule and condition. From reviewing the manuals, it appears that there are many 
rules and exceptions and it becomes evident that ‘a rule’ applies to only one situation. 
This is demanding on a pilot’s memory and is a skill that, compared to automation, 
humans are poor at. This cognitive human ability should not be challenged by 
automation, like it is now, but instead supported. 
4.6.2 Why is there a problem in design of interfaces?  
Levels of automation have increased in the cockpit, but the information presentation has 
not significantly progressed in several areas. The basic flying instruments have been the 
same ‘T configuration’2 for the last century only. Analogue displays have been changed 
to digital so, information is now presented in an alphanumerical form. Checklists 
                                                 
2 “The basic T-configuration is defined as an arrangement where the airspeed and altitude data are 
centered, respectively, directly to the left and right of the attitude data, with the direction data located 
directly below the attitude data.” (p. 17, FAA, 1999) 
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became electronic, but still are in a text format. Boeing added a new feature to 
checklists, where the completed actions are automatically checked. The only really new 
displays is a Navigational display with a map, weather and terrain information, but then 
it is very similar to conventions from a paper version used for over a century. 
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Figure 4.12: Why is there a problem? 
The information that the pilots need to have about the automation, is poorly, or not 
presented at all (Figure 4.12: Why is there a problem? see Problem areas). Airbus 
philosophy states that the pilot needs to understand the system, in order to effectively 
monitor its progress. Therefore, pilots need to know the answer to two questions: What 
do I want the aircraft to fly now? Where do I want the aircraft to fly next?” (Tarnowski, 
1999). Yet, this information is not readily available to the pilot, the automation does not 
help consolidate or present this type of information. Apart from the Navigational 
Display, where the course of the aircraft is presented, but there is little information 
about the automation behaviour. 
A contributor to the pilots’ poor understanding of the system is a ‘consistency problem’ 
(Figure 4.12). Throughout the cockpit there is a poor or misplaced consistency in the 
implementation of the philosophy behind automation and the operational logic. The 
problems in implementation of consistency in design stretch from the information 
presentation, to the use of buttons, to inconsistencies in the application of philosophy in 
design of individual features. 
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This problem of maintaining consistency throughout the implementation of the cockpit 
design feeds into the manuals and training aids that in turn require pages and pages of 
explanations justifying these inconsistencies which results in all the ‘if conditions’ that 
pilots need to memorise. This makes training cognitively demanding and does not 
improve pilots’ understanding of the system during line operation.  
As a consequence, both pilots and instructors have come up with coping strategies to 
help pilots memorise all possible ‘if conditions’ and automation procedures. They 
invented workarounds where they did not understand the system’s behaviour and 
performed the action in a more familiar and convenient manner. 
One type of problem in pilots poor understanding that lead to several accidents, was 
observed during the conversion training, and in line operation and also reproduced 
during experiments (Sarted and Wood, 1994) and consequently is of special concern. It 
is when the onset of the problem is either masked by automation, or not evident from 
the displays. The pilots are consequently blind to problems and are unaware of the 
automation’s intentions, or cannot deduce the automation’s intentions from the available 
information. 
In majority of instances the information that will lead to understanding the intention of 
automation is available somewhere, but in text format manuals or from a search through 
the Flight Management Systems, however this is generally not an option in a quickly 
deteriorating situation. A conventional scan of instruments will also not help deducing 
this information, because the information has to be read and processed. The 
alphanumerical presentation of modes makes it difficult for pilots to construe the 
automation’s intention out of the hundreds of possible combinations of ‘if conditions’.  
From accident reports it can be seen that flights that lead to accidents were, where pilots 
misunderstood automation’s behaviour in one form (Bangalore, one Flight Director left 
switched on) or another (Strasbourg, V/S entry incorrect). However, the way 
automation behaviour is presented to pilots has not changed much since these accidents 
apart, for example, from adding a couple of digits to a V/S window after Strasbourg 
accident. The problems begin when the behaviour of automation goes on unnoticed until 
it is too late to change it. Generally, the problem can be avoided provided the 
information is available and the pilot can see the information in the first place, such as 
seeing the effects of the actions they are performing or selecting a mode of behaviour to 
be performed by automation. 
All the examples that were discussed in the section on pilots training have common 
problems, that the philosophy, the logic and the rules are not visible to pilots. They are 
hard to remember, because they do not reflect any common operational rules the pilots 
would ordinarily follow, or are taught to follow early on in their flight training. 
Additionally, none of this crucial information, that pilots need to know at various stages 
of flight, is reflected on displays. 
4.6.3 Classification can helps understanding of the problem 
As discussed in the ‘Classification of problems and concerns’ section of this chapter, it 
was found that the current taxonomy could not fit some categories of problems and 
concerns, such as those that require a semantic and information relationship category for 
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example. Existing taxonomy was helpful in showing the scope of the problems  
observed in this research, but not helpful in its classification for the purpose of 
identifying and helping to solve the root of the problems in an automated cockpit. It is 
also not designed to trace and identify the links between problems, which is crucial to 
resolving them. 
Several trends in problems were discussed that are helpful in identifying leads to roots 
of problems. An alternative view on the problems in the cockpit is suggested that will 
help to classify problems according the root of the problems. 
There are three possible categories of information that pilots did not follow or 
understand, (1) physical form (appearance i.e., configuration of the aircraft), (2) 
behavioural (i.e., combination of modes leads to a specific behaviour) and (3) 
environmental (i.e., navigation, weather related problems). 
Categories of problem 
information Description 
PHYSICAL FORM Information related to physical appearance i.e., configuration of the aircraft 
BEHAVIOURAL 
Information related to behaviour, i.e., 
combination of modes that leads to a specific 
behaviour 
ENVIROMENTAL Information related to navigation, weather and terrain 
Table 4.1: Categories of problem information 
There are also three levels to the problems pilots have in understanding these type of 
information, (a) perceptual (i.e., straight representation on the display, for example 
position of flaps or amount of fuel left or available), (b) semantic (i.e., the form of 
representation that is open to interpretation, such as an example of Directional and Non-
directional beacon representation) and (c) contextual (i.e., surrounding conditions that 
would determine the situation; context would determine conditions of operation, for 
example ‘if conditions’ or nature of the situation) (see Table 4.2). 
Levels of understanding Description 
PERCEPTUAL Relate to presentation of information 
SEMANTIC Relate to meaning behind the representation 
CONTEXT Relate to interpretation of information under various conditions 
Table 4.2: Levels of understanding 
All of the problems in understanding automation, whether perceptual, semantic or 
contextual in nature were related to information about either the state of the aircraft, the 
behaviour it is exhibiting, or about to be exhibited, under specific conditions in the 
surrounding environment. 
Pilots constantly connect information, draw parallels and connections between 
dependent pieces of information, but this is not reflected on the display, apart from the 
Navigation Display, where the route is presented with some related information, such as 
altitude restrictions. Disconnected information effects how pilots interpret information. 
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Therefore, after the problems are classified into three categories and three levels of 
understanding, there is a need to establish if there are possible relationships and links 
among the pieces of information that are dependent on each other, such as for example, 
altitude information being dependent on the altitude pressure. The links in information 
are later determined through a study discussed in the next chapter five.  The 
classification of problems can help resolve design problems as will be shown in chapter 
seven. 
4.6.4 The problem is deeper than it appears 
For purely the presentation of information upon the interfaces to be the cause of the 
problems that pilots have with automation this would assume that the automation 
philosophy is correct and has no flaws. It follows then that the root of the problem lies 
in the implementation stage of design where the system and the interfaces are created. 
However, through the training and observations discussed in this chapter, it was 
established that the pilots had problems not only in understanding the information 
presented on the interfaces, but also that the automation used different strategies to 
pilots. Pilots misunderstood, and were surprised by, the automation’s behaviour. It was 
evident that automation responded differently and performed sequences of actions not in 
the way pilots expected. This leads me to reconsider whether the assumptions behind 
the design of automation philosophy is partially responsible for problems that pilots 
have with automation. 
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Figure 4.13: Where is there a problem? 
From the figure 4.13 it can be seen that the root cause of the problems lies in both parts, 
the assumptions behind automation philosophy and the implementation stage of design. 
The philosophy of automation needs to reconsidered. It appears to have major 
differences between how pilots actually think of aircraft operation and the way 
automation is designed to operate the aircraft.  
Poor conceptualisation of automation philosophy has a direct affect on pilots 
understanding of the system, because the design and the implementation of the system 
and the interfaces would be based on the philosophy that does not reflect pilots’ 
understanding of aircraft operation. It appears that the automation philosophy does not 
accurately reflect pilots operational experience, where pilots use strategies, basic 
operational rules and any natural means of sensing and reading information. 
4.6.5 What may be done about it and how? 
The problem of pilots’ poor understanding of automation should be attacked at the root 
cause, at the level of design of automation philosophy and the operational logic (Figure 
4.13 above). There is a need to improve the understanding of the domain and help 
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conceptualise the philosophy of automation. We (i.e., the designers with Human 
Factors, Human Computer Interaction and Cognitive-Engineering background) need to 
go to the source and learn from observing how pilots operate an aircraft. During the last 
century pilots have gained experience and developed skills in operating aircraft. 
Through observation and analysis of collected data understanding of the domain can be 
improved that will help to acquire a set of requirements that in turn will help improve 
the automation philosophy.  
The areas of concern and difference between pilots and the automation have already 
been established. The next step would be to explore and gain a deeper understanding of 
how pilots view the operation of the aircraft. This would help to form an improved 
model of future automation philosophy. 
Areas of concern:  
(where pilots have problems) 
Areas of investigation: 
(where pilots need support) 
Differences in strategies Identify strategies and techniques pilots use 
Differences in operational logic Establish pilots’ operational logic 
Fundamental rules are not supported Identify rules pilots use 
Poor presentation of information Identify information pilots use during operation 
Poor understanding of information, 
relationships, links, dependencies 
Identify relationships, links, 
dependencies in information 
Table 14.3: Concerns and areas of investigation 
The table (14.3) above summarises, in the left column the areas where pilots have 
problems, and the right column areas where pilots need support. This table indicates 
directions for further investigation. From observations of line operations and conversion 
training, it became evident that pilots build on and draw on prior knowledge and 
experience. There is a need to systematically observe and learn about pilot experience if 
pilots are to help in informing the design at the root cause level (Figure 4.13) 
The pilot and the cockpit are equipped with abundant opportunities to inform design in 
a form sympathetic to pilots’ fundamental rules, strategies operational logic and the 
various types of information they need. Designers can explore how pilots use a 
conventional cockpit and the automated cockpit. The designers can take advantages of 
both types of technologies and use it to pilots’ operational advantage. For example, 
successful strategies that pilots use in operation of automated and conventional aircraft 
need to be utilised. The types of instruments pilots embrace or avoid using in the 
automated cockpits need to be known and the new instruments assigned accordingly.  
In the systematic empirical study there is a need to address the points listed in the table 
of concerns and areas of investigations (see table 14.3). These pieces of information that 
would help develop and to form improved automation philosophy, that will account for 
pilots’ strategies and rules, at the level of the root cause of problems pilots have with 
automation. During the design and system/interface implementation stage there is a 
need to take into account the problem of consistency and answer the questions that 
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pilots have regarding automation (Figure 4.13). The questions have to be answered in 
terms of three information problem categories (i.e., physical form, behavioural and 
environmental) and they should be clear to pilots at three Levels of Understanding (i.e., 
perceptual, semantic and contextual) 
Currently, new ways of piloting have been imposed on pilots as have new ways of using 
information in flight, maybe there is not a need to invent a new way to present 
information here but a need to go back to the basics and see how pilots collect and use 
information in a ‘conventional’ flight and with this use new technology to offer the 
presentation of information to pilots based on what they ‘require’. There is a need to 
learn how they collide and refer to information they know or would like to know about 
the aircraft systems and its’ behaviour.  
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter in preparation for an empirical study I learned about the steps trainee 
pilots take to become a pilots; how pilots form basic knowledge, gain experience as a 
line operationing pilots in commercial airlines. Meanwhile, I have been able to learn the 
terminology, such as commonly used abbreviations and professional jargon that are 
typical to the aerospace domain. 
I outlined the difficulties pilots face when they are transitioning from a non-automated 
to an automated cockpit. I showed that automation and pilots have different strategies in 
operation of the aircraft. I discussed the types of problems pilots have in dealing with 
automated cockpit.  
I classified the problems and concerns in the established Alternative Taxonomy (Funk 
and Lyall, 1998) that I experienced while conducting training myself, observing pilots 
in training, during line operation in the current automated cockpits, plus further 
problems uncovered from manuals were discussed. 
I identified several levels of problems that lead to pilots’ poor understanding and 
suggest steps to resolve these problems in the automated cockpit. I suggest questions to 
be answered in the systematic empirical study which is described in the next chapter. 
The problems that pilots have with automation appear not to originate in training or 
arise because of poor operational practice, or because pilots have poor memories or poor 
use of displays. The problems originate from fundamental assumptions at the beginning 
of the design on which the automation philosophy and design of systems and interfaces 
is based. 
By comparison, the training and operation of the non-automated (i.e., conventional) 
cockpit is easy and intuitive, while in the automated cockpit it is challenging to pilots. 
Pilots during regular flights use ‘tricks’ and workarounds to fly an automated aircraft 
and more often than not are surprised by automation’s actions and outcomes that are 
different to pilots’ intentions. 
Basic flying skills are natural, however flying an automated aircraft, that is supposed to 
make pilots’ work easier, is in fact challenging. The proposal is to observe pilots at 
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work and to learn from them how to support their work in a more effective, natural and 
efficient way; and to learn to support their strategies and rules and to answer the 
questions pilots constantly ask about the automation, while operating an automated 
aircraft through the design of future interfaces.  
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Chapter 5: The Empirical Study 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the description of ‘pilot experience’ in chapter four, it appeared that pilots have 
difficulties transferring knowledge used previously in non-automated aircraft to 
automated aircraft. Observation of pilots, both in training and during operation on-line, 
showed that pilots attempt to use the same strategies, and apply the same rules that they 
used in non-automated aircraft in the automated aircraft.  As a result more often than not 
pilots are surprised by automation response and behaviour (Sarter and Woods, 1997).  
Further investigation of a ‘pilot experience’ leads to the view that the user-interface is 
not a primary cause of pilots misunderstanding of the system. As a result of these 
observations, there is an assumption that the user-interface is not the root problem in 
pilots misunderstanding of operation of the automated aircraft. The root cause of pilots 
misunderstanding lays in the basic structure and implementation in the automation 
‘philosophy’ during design. It appears pilots, and automation, have major differences in 
how they operate the aircraft.   
This chapter describes an empirical study that systematically discovers the information, 
structure of information and strategies that pilots use to understand and operate the 
aircraft. The aim is for these elements to be the basis of a design philosophy for 
automated aircraft, and that displays should also be developed to support and comply 
with pilots’ strategies and rules of aircraft operation. 
It was observed in an observation and participatory study (chapter 4) that pilots used 
various strategies when collecting and using information in the automated and non-
automated cockpits. Consequently, it was decided to study pilots operating the aircraft 
both using automation to the full degree and not using automation at all. Both settings 
were set up on the same aircraft, flying the same route. The only difference was the 
extent of automation used. This detailed study allowed the observation of: how pilots 
collect and use information; the strategies pilots use when they do not have access to 
required information; the use of well-ingrained flying experience (which is argued later 
in chapters six and seven should be the basis of design). 
A cue-recall-debrief method was chosen as the basis for this enquiry. The method was 
modified after the preliminary study (chapter 3) to suit the purpose of this empirical 
study, to systematically investigate the information, structure of information, and 
strategies that pilots use to understand and operate the aircraft. The suitability of method 
is discussed and an evolutionary (‘evolutionary’ because the investigation of dynamic 
environment requires a dynamic and adaptable analysis technique) analysis techniques 
described here in details as it developed.  
Finally, the results of the analysis are presented in steps to help the reader follow the 
researcher’s process of uncovering the information, the information structures and 
strategies that pilots use. The chapter concludes by revealing the information structures 
and the strategies that pilots use in everyday operation, focussing on the pieces of 
information that pilots generate themselves, and identify on the display and outside in 
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the environment, to operated the aircraft efficiently.  
5.2 METHOD 
This study used a knowledge elicitation method, called cued-recall-debrief, inspired by 
the method developed by Omodei (Omodei 1997). This original method was tested and 
specifically modified during a preliminary study on pilots, which is summarised in 
Chapter three. This method was chosen as it highlights how experts retrieve information 
in complex, time-critical and dynamic environments. The main advantages of this 
method are:  
a. it does not disturb pilot’s continuous operation of the aircraft;  
b. it allows pilots to relive the flight during a debrief session; 
c. it cues pilots to recall inner processes at any point of flight; 
d. it allows  the researcher to ask all the questions required for the study without 
interrupting pilots operational environment.  
The advantages and modifications to this method have been described in Chapter three, 
however, for a shorter summary see Figure 5.1 below. 
This knowledge elicitation method, complemented with a naturally evolved analysis, 
(also described in Chapter three), allows the capture of pilot’s natural thought processes 
and tracks pilot’s needs for certain cues and information vital during all stages of flight. 
This whole method was modified to a one-stage-cue-recall-debrief, which is suitable for 
the purpose of this study and it shortens the debrief time. 
The questions asked during the debrief were adjusted to be cued on ‘flight events’, 
because pilots’ mostly assess a situation by flight events and the information they assess 
does not change much apart from when a particular stage is entered, i.e. climb, cruise, 
descent, finals. This was confirmed during a preliminary study and through 
observations, reported in Chapter four. Details of questions asked are given later in this 
chapter in the section on ‘task and procedure’ and a form with the questions given to 
pilots is provided in Appendix 3. 
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The pilot viewed a replay of a video footage taken with his/her head-mounted camera throughout the flight and spoke about his/her
recollection of mental events associated with his/her decisions and choices that were made based on information he/she had. Pilot spoke
about recollections that were recorded (audio only) onto a new video tape together with the original flight video footage. The audio recording
of recollection were synchronized with the action captured by original flight video footage.
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Modified to a one
stage process i.e. re-
playing only once
Operators’ real-world observation
Observation takes place in a realistic
environment that places realistic demands on
the operators in comparison to any laboratory
observations, retrospective interviews and
questionnaires (Omodei [1])
Head-mounted-camera on the operator as
methods of collecting information
Less likely to distort subject’s experience,
i.e., ‘out of sight, out of mind’
- Continuous
- Non-intrusive
- Non-reactive
-In real-time
Minimum distortion of the complexity and the
dynamics of these experiences (Omodei [1])
Recollection of:
(a) perceptual schemata rooted in locomotion & activity; recall of
     kinesthetic memories (giving additional cues to recall)
(b) non-verbal phenomena/holistic/intuitive information at the time
(c) put inchoate experience into words (hard to acquire such
     information through questions or just external video footage)
(d) motivation, memories, affects
(e) recall of pre-verbal experiences (rather than a coherent & logical
     progression story prompted by the interviewer)
(f) retrieval of episodic memory that is organized by time, place and
     perceptual characteristics
Omodei at el [1] argue through the review of cognitive theories and literature that perception of own point-of-view footage
triggers:
 - recollection of mental events associated with decisions/information made at the time of original recording
 - recollection of essential temporal aspects of cognitive processes (i.e. important for interface design)
Through:
(a) motion of the camera and activity of the
      operator (Neisser [7])
(b) perceptual cues synchronized in time and
      space, i.e. visual, audio & recollection of
      previous knowledge used in the action of
      taped events.
(c) replay and pause
(d-e) recall of non-verbal cues
(f)  cued by specific items, rather than cued by
      questions (Cantor [8])
Use of head-mounted-camera footage for cued-recall-debrief:
Operator does not take it personally because he/she cannot see and
not conscious of him/herself when watching a replay
The closest match between the initial and
the replayed visual perspectives
Powerful stimulus for evoking recall,
based on review of cognitive theories (Omodei [1])
Recall a wide range of cognitive and affective experiences
(Omodei [1])
Accuracy and comprehensiveness of recalled material is greatly
enhanced being cued from ‘own-point-of-view’ video replay
(Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan [])
Valid and reliable reports on participants own experience
(McLennan, Omodei, & Rich [9]
Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan [10])
This study uncovers information cues that pilots
use to help them operate in the complex
environment hence the adjustments in the
approach
Refined questions
directed at
information use
Omodei et al [1] study a decision making
process in dynamic, safety and time-critical
environment; This study focuses on information
that helps pilots to make decision and operate
in a similar demanding environment Method
extended
to inform
design of
future and
current
systems
The aim is to identify cues and information pilots need
at any point and throughout the flight to operate the
aircraft effectively.
During the aircraft operation the footage captures cues
that are pre-verbal, intuitive and holistic
The goal is not only capture visual cues, but capture
sufficient sensory cues to help pilots recall their inner
information processing, in order to cue pilots during a
debrief session, capturing the way pilots work with
information during operation.
This method helps to capture the reality without altering
information or course of events. During a debrief pilots
relive the flight again from their ‘point of view’.
From original two-stage to a modified cued-recall-debrief procedure
with the use of head-mounted camera on the pilot
 
Figure 5.1: Rationale for the use of a modified cued-recall debrief method 
5.2.1 Experimental Scenario: 
The participant pilots flew a simulated full motion regular flight from Sydney to 
Richmond, which lasted between 15 to 20 minutes. Pilots were briefed to take off from 
the assigned runway at Richmond Air Force Base, to climb to 5000 feet, and to navigate 
to an assigned runway in a busy Sydney International Airport. Halfway through the 
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flight the Air Traffic Control was to switch a runway. Pilots flew one flight with full use 
of automation and the second flight with the minimum possible use of automation.  
The flights for all pilots were identical. There were three conditions repeated on all 
flights to assist in collecting the required data.  
First, half way through the flight a runway change in Sydney was announced by Air 
Traffic Control. This aimed to increase pilot’s workload before and during a landing 
phase. This condition helped to create a situation where pilots had to deal with new 
information and had to make changes to cockpit set up accordingly.   
The second condition included the simulation of other air traffic, displayed and 
communicated through the radio. This was done to add realism to the flight.   
The third condition related to the weather. A cloud base between 1500 to 25000 feet 
was simulated to prevent pilots from seeing the ground at the top of climb. 
Consequently, pilots’ had to rely on instruments in the cockpits and only during take-
off, approach and landing had good visual conditions. This allowed the observation of 
pilots switching between instrument and visual operation of the aircraft. All other 
weather parameters were identical for all flights, such as head and cross wind, air 
pressure and temperature.  
5.2.2 Participants: 
The study involved observation of two crews (two pilots in each crew) in a C-130J 
simulator. All participants were male military pilots. Pilots had on average 1600 (SD = 
663) total flying hours and had extensive experience (on average 825 (SD = 415) flying 
hours) on the Electronic Flight Instrument System, which is another way of referring to 
a cockpit equipped with automation. All pilots had recently transitioned to a new 
generation Hercules C-130 a J model, which had recently been introduced to the fleet of 
the Royal Australian Air Force. Pilots also had similar previous flying experience on 
both types of aircraft, the C130J with, and the C130 without cockpit automation. 
Further details are given in Table 5.1 below. 
Flying hours 
Pilot 
Total Electronic Flight Instrument System 
Type of aircraft flown 
1 1700 400 PC9;  C-130 model E and J Crew A 
2 1100 800 PC9; MACCH1;  C-130 model E, H and J 
3 2500 1500 PC9; F900;  C-130 model E, H and J Crew B 
4 1100 600 PC9;  C-130 model E, H and J 
Mean of flying 
hours 1600 825 
All pilots had similar 
flying experience 
Table 5.1: Flying experience 
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A sample of observations were selected, from the participant population, which 
included both junior and senior personnel, i.e., two captains and two first-officers. The 
researcher made no discrimination, all pilots that were available participated in the 
study.  
5.2.3 Equipment: 
This study took place in three settings, a general briefing room, a full motion level five 
Hercules C130-J flight simulator and the debriefing room. The debriefing room required 
separate set up and equipment. 
5.2.3.1 Briefing room 
The briefing room had a simple set up of four chairs, an oval table and the briefing 
board. This is where all regular flight briefings take place and was chosen (Figure 5.2) 
in attempt to make the study as similar to regular operation as possible. 
Researcher
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Co-pilotPilot-flying
B
rie
fin
g 
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Figure 5.2: Briefing room setup 
5.2.3.2 Full flight simulator 
All flights took place in a full motion level five (i.e., closest to reality, the highest level 
of simulation) Hercules C130-J flight simulator. The simulator set-up was not altered in 
any way, with the exception of a head-camera on the head of a Pilot-flying. The 
researcher and the instructor were situated at the back of the simulator. The researcher 
monitored the progress of flight in accordance with the study’s conditions. The 
instructor ran the simulator manipulating weather conditions, simulating Air Traffic 
Control and simulating communication of other air traffic on the same radio 
frequencies. The setup of the simulator is illustrated in Figure 5.3, below. 
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Figure 5.3: Flight simulator setup 
The following equipment was used during the flight simulator sessions: 
1. Sony DXC-LS1P ‘lipstick’ Colour Head Camera on a plastic band mounting 
2. Camera Control Unit 
3. Three batteries and a charger 
4. Flight simulator TV and VCR 
5. Pilot’s headset with a microphone 
A lightweight colour ‘lipstick’ camera was used, the same as during the preliminary 
study. It was attached to a plastic band that was adjusted to fit a pilot’s head. The head-
mounted camera was worn on the side of the head at the pilot’s eye-level. Once the pilot 
donned the camera, and it was confirmed that the pilot was comfortably sited, the 
camera was adjusted in the direction of pilot’s field of view. The pilot’s field of view 
was monitored through a TV monitor visible only to the researcher during the flight. 
5.2.3.3 Debrief room 
The debrief room was set up in the same way as in the preliminary study. The set up 
(Figure 5.4) allowed the pilot to view and hear the same cues, as experienced during the 
flight. Such cues are discussed in detail as part of the preliminary study in chapter three 
and summarised in Figure 5.4. The master videotape recording of the flight was played 
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back to the participant pilot on the TV monitor, and the pilot’s comments from the 
debrief session were recorded on to a new ‘debrief’ tape. This debrief videotape 
captured the original image, plus any pauses that the pilot made in the video playback to 
make comments. All debrief comments were recoded in parallel to the original flight 
audio. The master videotape tape was paused when recording the pilot’s detailed 
comments and answers to the researcher’s questions. Consequently, this extended the 
duration of the debrief video recording to one and half hours. 
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Figure 5.4: Debrief room setup 
The following equipment was used for the debrief session: 
1. Headphones. 
2. Microphone. 
3. Monitor. 
4. Master VCR – Sony Hi-Fi Hi8 VCR and power plug. 
5. Recording VCR – professional VCR with an Audio Mixer. 
6. Various cables (4 twin RCA cable, 1 single RCA cable, BNC to RCA converter, 
6mm to 3.5mm converter). 
5.2.4 Task and Procedure: 
All pilots were similarly instructed on, and taken through, the three-stage experimental 
procedure, consisting of the flight brief, the flight and the subsequent debrief of the 
flight. The flight brief consisted of informing pilots about the simulated flight, and 
additionally provided an opportunity for pilots’ to ask questions, to read and to sign an 
informed consent form. The session in the flight simulator proceeded without researcher 
intervention, with the exception of adjusting the head-camera at the beginning of the 
session. The last part of the procedure was carried out in a debrief room, and consisted 
of a modified version of a cued-recall debrief (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 1997) 
and a small questionnaire about pilot’s flying experience (Appendix 3).  During the 
flight, the flight crew consisted of two pilots only one of which wore the head-mounted 
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camera. Only this pilot participated in the subsequent cued-recall debrief part of the 
experiment. All instructions and consent forms given to pilots were identical 3). This 
allowed consistency in the way pilots were informed about each stage of the study. 
The information and consent session familiarised all pilots with the study and informed 
them of their right to withdraw and where to address questions after the study was 
completed. It also enabled them to ask questions before signing and agreeing to 
participation. 
The flight brief briefed the crew on a routine flight from Richmond to Sydney, and 
included information on the weather, the airports and the route to take. After the head-
camera was adjusted the researcher sat at the back of the aircraft simulator beside the 
simulator instructor. Each flight proceeded without interruption.  
Each debrief session began with the researcher providing the pilot a ‘Debrief Overview 
Sheet’, which the researcher waited for the pilot to read. The recall session began with: 
Researcher:  “Now, go back to the beginning of the flight and walk me through the flight. As 
you recall things, you can start talking and I will pause the tape if you start 
talking.”  
The videotape was played for a short duration…  
Researcher: “… you are just about to start, what kind of things are in your mind?”  
At this stage the pilot would view the tape and start recalling events. The researcher 
would also prompt the pilot, if clarification were needed. 
The debrief session would end with three additional questions: 
Researcher:  (1) Now that you have watched the tape through… what, if anything, stands out 
most about the way you handled things?  
(2) If we could magically turn the clock back, what, if anything, you do 
different and why?  
(3) Suppose someone else less experienced than you had done this flight what 
mistakes would he or she been most likely to make? 
For each separate experiment both pilot crew-members were observed during two 
flights; one with full use of automation, and another with minimal use of automation.  A 
total of eight flights were observed and subsequently debriefed (Table 5.2).  
 
Pilot Automated Non-Automated 
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Flight Debrief Flight Debrief 
1 20 min 1 hour 30 min 20 min 1 hour 30 min Crew A 
24 October 2001 2 20 min 1 hour 30 min 20 min 1 hour 30 min 
3 20 min 1 hour 30 min 20 min 1 hour 30 min Crew B 
25 October 2001 4 20 min 1 hour 30 min 20 min 1 hour 30 min 
Table 5.2: Empirical / Observation Study set up 
5.2.4.1 Rationale behind automated and non-automated flight  
From primary observation of pilots in training, and in their on-line operation of aircraft, 
it became clear that there are differences in how automated and non-automated aircraft 
are operated. Additionally, during informal interviews of experienced and retired pilots, 
it was noted that whilst they reported that the introduction of the first automated 
features, such as an autopilot, which performed one or two functions (for example a 
constant climb or a constant speed), and this freed their time and effort spent on 
operating an aircraft; they reported as more automation was introduced to the cockpit, 
the pilot had to become more attentive in monitoring the automation’s progress. Further, 
they added that as the automation became more complex, less transparent and had less 
resemblance to a ‘pilot-like’ operation, pilots less understood it and more operational 
problems were encountered. Consequently, it was considered appropriate to study pilots 
operating both automated and non-automated aircraft.  
It was observed that pilots have difficulty operating automated cockpit systems; 
particularly in acquiring the required information they need from the displays, the flight 
management system, and also in understanding ‘decisions’ made by the automation. 
Additionally, it was considered that merely observing an automated flight might only 
highlight the workarounds that pilots have invented to deal with the recurrent problems 
with the automation. It is a well known fact in aviation that the Standard Operating 
Procedures that pilots use in flight are devised to help pilots to overcome such problems 
of poor automation design, which are also referred to as ‘an indirect admittance of poor 
design’ (Demagalski et al., 2002). Consequently, it was considered that observing an 
automated flight might only show one side of the story, that of pilots dealing with the 
shortcomings of current automated designs. Therefore, to avoid only observing the 
automation induced errors of pilots’, from overly complex automation (Heymann & 
Degani, 2002), it was decided to observe pilots’ operating aircraft with minimal (for 
aircraft type) to no automation. 
Chapters three and four discussed how it was observed that trained pilots’ appear to fly 
non-automated aircraft in an effortless and ‘natural’ manner. Additionally, in these 
chapters it was observed how initial pilot training provided the foundation for the way 
pilots’ operate the aircraft; and how pilots’ transfer previously learned knowledge to a 
new aircraft type. This is what is referred to as ‘natural to pilots’, ‘pilot-ways’ of use of 
information, and ‘pilot-like’ operation of non-automated aircraft. This contrasts with 
‘automation-induced’ use of information and ‘automation-like’ aircraft operation. 
Observing a non-automated flight enables the manual retrieval of information to be 
studied. In addition, by observing non-automated flights pilot-ways of dealing with the 
information and pilot-like operation of the aircraft may be deduced. It is argued that this 
is the type of operator behaviour that needs to be supported with use of automation. 
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It could be asked, “why not just observe a non-automated flight?” However, it is 
contended that observations of both automated and non-automated aircraft operations 
are necessary, because pilots’ adapt and use different strategies of operation and 
different methods of collecting information in the different aircraft environments.  
Therefore, it is important to learn how pilots deal with the shortcomings of both 
settings. It is not claimed that automation does not help in the operation of the aircraft, 
but it is essential to learn where pilots use automation effortlessly or perform aircraft 
operation effectively with help of automation and where difficulties are experienced. 
The reason behind this work is to inform the design of automated cockpit systems. This 
study was set up to learn about pilot’s methods of obtaining and merging information 
from the cockpit and how this information is used throughout the flight. It is considered 
that this knowledge can then be translated in to design guidelines to help cockpit 
designers support pilots’ needs in their future designs of displays and interfaces for 
automated systems. With the aim that future displays and interfaces will be effortless 
and ‘natural’ to use. 
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AIM OF STUDY:
Inform design about
pilots’ natural/effortless methods of
information collection, use and
management of information,
in the context of natural operational
strategies
Existing design
PROBLEMS
Standard
Operating
Procedures
Design induced
ERRORS
Workarounds
Need to overcome
Poor
UNDERSTANDING
To overcome
AUTOMATED
FLIGHT
NON-
AUTOMATED
FLIGHT
Observation of
the same type
aircraft operation
Effected by ...
to a greater degree
Effected by …
to a lesser degree
‘Pilot-ways’ of
information use
and
‘Pilot-like’ operation
     Current ways of dealing with AUTOMATION
Standard Operating
Procedures not
affected by use of
automation
NATURAL
 
Figure 5.5: Rationale for observation automated and non-automated flight 
The non-automation flight operation focused on pilots’ use of basic levels of 
information available in the environment and the cockpit. In comparison, full use of 
automation in aircraft operation focused on how pilots’ obtain information about aircraft 
state and the environment through maximum use automation. 
5.2.4.2 Rationale behind observation of the whole flight 
It was decided to observe the whole flight from power-up to power down, because the 
aircraft environment is time critical, dynamic and evolving, where current events are 
affected by past and present events and will affect subsequent events. Consequently, the 
information presented to, and sought by pilots’ is also dynamic, constantly changing 
and dependent on evolution of all events. It is difficult to separate this information flow. 
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Pilots’ deal with forthcoming situations that are full of information and these situations 
are dependent on the progress of the flight. However, it is argued that the study of only 
these isolated stages of flight will not show how pilots build on and construct 
information; or how information evolves and how having or not having specific piece of 
information affects the rest of flight stages.  
5.2.4.3 Rationale behind questions present and future oriented 
The information flow to be captured in the aircraft environment is dependent on 
evolution of past, present and intended future events. Asking only present-oriented 
questions only captures momentary strands of information. As it was showed in the 
discussion of training and on-line observations, pilots’ constantly manipulate and use a 
continuous flow of information to support their work-flow in the constantly evolving 
flight.  
There is a need to find what information pilots’ use during the present to construct 
information about their future actions, and also a need to establish where they obtain 
any piece of information. Therefore, there is a need to ask, at any time, both present- 
and future-oriented questions to build up a continuous, evolving ‘picture’ of the flow of 
information. Consequently, the questions prompted by the researcher in the cued-recall-
debrief method in the ‘preliminary’ study were oriented to finding pilots’ present and 
future information needs.  
The analysis looked for:  
A. The information pilots use to identify the aircraft’s state. 
B. The information pilots use to anticipate the aircraft’s  next manoeuvre. 
C. The sources of information pilots use to identify the aircraft’s  state. 
D. The sources of information pilots use to anticipate the aircraft’s  next 
manoeuvre. 
E. The method pilots use to assemble above collected information to identify the 
aircraft’s state. 
F. The method pilots use to assemble the above collected information to anticipate 
the aircraft’s next manoeuvre. 
Present-oriented questions examined what information pilots’ required at that instant. 
Future-oriented questions were asked for the two following reasons. Firstly, the 
questions were asked to understand how and if pilots follow the fundamental rule of 
flying ‘the need to stay ahead of the aircraft’. Therefore, there was desire from the 
researcher to know how far do pilots do stay ahead of aircraft, and what information do 
they need to collect and assess in order to be head of the aircraft in their mind. The 
second reason for asking future-oriented questions mirrors the rationale for observation 
of the entire flight, i.e., at any time of the flight the information pilots used was affected 
by current events and had an effect on future events. This was noted by the researcher 
during observation of pilots in training, in on-line operation, from the researcher’s 
personal piloting experience (chapter 4) and, in the ‘preliminary’ study reported in 
Chapter three. 
The form that the questions were presented to the pilots is in Appendix 3. 
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5.3 DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Results of any kind of study rely on the population it samples from. Once the sample is 
determined, the specific measurements are applied, and the data is collected and 
analysed. The data then is broken down further to be studied, either one small part of it 
is studied or all parts are studied separately. This is a reductionist approach, where the 
initial material/sample is broken down onto smaller and even smaller pieces as analysis 
progresses. However, the drawback is, that once all parts are analysed and put together 
to produce the studied entity or a system, it is never quite the same as where the 
material was taken from (Kugler, 2005).  
There are several factors that influence the result of using the reductionism approach, 
three applicable to this study. Firstly, the sample is very small and therefore it is 
difficult to assess how representative it is. Secondly, the traditional statistical analysis of 
collected data eliminates outliers, (i.e. apparently extreme data points). However, these 
instances and properties of these causal factors may be significant (Bogatyreva & 
Shillerov, 1998). By eliminating such factors these are not analysed and consequently 
these cannot be reproduced. Finally, the methods used to capture, measure and analyse 
are not sensitive to capturing the instances and properties that are significant, and/or 
causal to the state of the system.  
Additionally, the analytical method applied needs to take into account the unique 
property of the environment, i.e., the dynamics (please see the Box 5.1 for exploration 
of the property). Second, the method needs to be able adjust to study the whole system, 
complete with its parts, with minimal possible separation of the parts from the context 
and the environment.  
DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS: Internal and External. 
For example, the dynamic environment affecting nuclear plant operation is different to the dynamic 
environment that affects the aircraft. The dynamics of the nuclear plant environment are largely within 
the plant environment. In contrast, the dynamics largely affecting the aircraft are external to the 
aircraft. 
The aircraft is affected by the current external environmental weather conditions it operates in. The 
weather dynamics in everyday operations are mainly unpredictable, but forecastable. The affects of the 
weather on the aircraft have to be compensated for by the effects of the pilot upon the aircraft.  
The operation of the nuclear plant is affected by factors within the plant environment, where the fission 
reaction takes place. The operators have to maintain the dynamics of fission. If the dynamics of the 
fission reaction are not critically controlled and maintained, the results may be catastrophic.  
To have a desirable outcome in aviation the operator has to make effects to compensate for external 
dynamic affects upon the aircraft, but the dynamic affects within the nuclear plant have to be critically 
controlled, and arguably only become unpredictable, like aviation dynamics, in a crisis situation.  
Box 5.1: Dynamic environment 
The information used by the aircraft pilot is dependent on their evolving workflow.  The 
information sought, and used, by the pilot is influenced by, amongst other factors, 
interaction of data, their previous knowledge, the current context of the flight and the 
external environment. Therefore, analytical methods that comprise the fluidity of the of 
the workflow, or separate the workflow, will surely show an affect on the information 
needs of the pilot. Hence, in the investigation and analysis of the information needs of 
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the pilot, throughout this thesis, there is a search for an approach to preserve the quality 
of the original environment (its fluidity, its dynamic properties, and its complexity). In 
the following paragraphs a naturally evolving approach to analysis is described. Using 
this approach the aim was not to analyse data without reference to its context  
It is argued that the data acquisition and analysis has to be conducted by the same 
researcher. The possibility of another researcher undertaking the analysis was 
considered. However, due to sensitivity, confidentiality and unfamiliarity with the 
original study this option was abandoned.  It is argued that in research of this kind it is 
vital that the same researcher conducts the data collection and sees the process of 
analysis, including the transcription, through to the end, where notions are crystallized. 
As O’Neill (p.113, 1998) noted “the process of transcription itself helps the analyst to 
become immersed in and familiar with the data.”  
The researcher found that in the process of transcribing each previously observed flight, 
the act of transcription acted as a ‘zoom control’ enabling minor details to be noted, 
details that otherwise, just from watching the tape and conducting the analysis from the 
video footage, would not have been obvious. For example, such details came from, 
listening, and rewinding each recording and logging different types of data, such as 
‘what triggered pilot to look for specific information at this point; where did the pilots 
acquire this information; what equipment did he use, if any?’ This in depth approach 
gave a greater understanding to each piece of footage, an understanding that otherwise 
was difficult to capture. It helped to focus further analysis of each subsequent 
untranscribed video and audio record on more detailed information needs. 
5.3.1.1 The Naturally Evolved Data Analysis 
A conventional way of capturing video material is a view of an outsider (i.e., a fixed or 
moving camera) capturing participants’ behaviour. However, the video and audio 
footage recorded in this study is of a different nature. The footage here is collected from 
the pilots ‘own-point-of-view’ with additional comments of the footage by the pilot. 
This contrasts to both, the recoding of footage by the subject of the footage, where they 
observe themselves in the footage; and also to the general recoding of footage by the 
researcher. The video and audio footage here is captured during the flight from very 
close to the pilot’s ‘own-point-of-view’ consequently provides cues in the correct 
temporal order for “a high level of psychological re-immersion in retrieved memories 
associated with performing the original task” (McLennan, Omodei, & Wearing, 2000). 
This permits the pilot to recall every detail of what was going though his/her mind 
during the flight, at any point of the flight. This results in a second recoded audio stream 
(referred to as the debrief audio stream), which is recorded for the investigators benefit 
and analysis.  
Omodei and colleagues (Omodei et al 1997) developed the head-mounted video 
technique to research psychological aspects of decision-making in real-world 
environments. To systematically analyse the cued-recall audio material they developed 
a cognitive process categorisation scheme (McLennan, Omodei, & Wearing, 1996) that 
focuses on tracing the detailed decision making processes of the subjects. This study, on 
the other hand, focuses on tracing information retrieval processes, and the use of 
information by pilots during a flight. Hence, McLennan et al’s (1996) original coding 
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scheme is not suitable. This study also required a different approach to analysis because, 
whereas McLennan et al (1996) only used a single audio stream generated by a cued-
recall debrief for their analysis, this study required analysis of two audio streams. These 
are the original audio data, and the debrief audio, and also the original video footage. 
The original flight audio stream was valuable in obtaining pieces of information that the 
pilot acquired in a conversation with Air Traffic Control, or with a co-pilot, or acquired 
through other audio signals, such as Morse code (for navigational beacon 
identification). Additionally, the original audio was valuable in obtaining cockpit audio 
signals, such warning and caution alarms and engines sounds. The debrief audio stream 
is of importance on two levels. One is where the pilot recalls events and triggers that 
prompted the recollection of required information for that moment of flight. The other 
level is that this highlights specific cues themselves on the original footage, therefore 
associating a specific cue to a specific information need and recollection of further 
information. 
The video footage, although primarily recorded for the benefit of a pilot to help their 
recall of information processing, also generates an enormous quantity of data for the 
researcher. This data can be used to shed light on what information a pilot uses, where 
he/she obtains it, and what visual cues trigger recollection of a need for specific pieces 
of information. The data from automated and non-automated flight, and debrief was 
transcribed in separate tables with the anticipation of using the naturally evolved 
analysis developed and used in the preliminary study (Chapter 3). Examples of each 
flight footage and debrief (transcribed from beginning to end) can be found in Appendix 
3. These transcriptions account for one-forth of all footage. 
Initially, from all the transcribed footage, it was proving difficult to capture effectively 
the sensory cues that pilots were sensitive to, and those cues that triggered recall or need 
for specific information. However, these cues became obvious from watching 
repeatedly the original video footage of the flight and listening again to the audio 
recording of the debrief. O’Neill (p.109, 1998) states that ‘encoding tend overly to 
simplify the raw data and thereby to lose richness and contextualised meaning.’ This is 
exactly the difficulty that was found here using solely transcribed footage for analysis. 
In the absence of a predetermined theory on which to base the coding and analysis, it 
was considered appropriate to avoid developing a coding scheme in advance of gaining 
data. Arguments such as those of O’Neill (1998) who stated, “what remains after 
filtering through a theory, encoding and applying statistics is far removed from the 
interaction data recorded on videotape, still further from the recorded event.” It supports 
the need for the development of a coding scheme here considerate in preserving all 
aspects of the original data. Here, the aim of conducting an empirical study was to 
develop a notion of pilots’ collection and use of information, without preconceptions. 
Hence, arriving with predetermined theory, notion or coding scheme it was considered 
would constrain the openness to the outcome of the analysis. However, once the data 
was analysed, the outcomes were grounded in existing notions and theories (Chapter 6 
and 7). 
Although the experience of conducting the preliminary study helped to evolve the 
method used in the empirical study (cue-recall-debrief), the results of the preliminary 
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study did not influence the analysis of the empirical study. This was consciously done 
as it was considered that otherwise there was a danger that researcher would bring 
preconceived notions to the new study and so merely arrive at results that reinforced 
these notions. Following this reasoning the data analysis strategy is discussed below. 
5.3.1.2 The data analysis strategy 
The data analysis took an iterative progression through four stages listed below: 
1. Search for answers to posed questions 
2. Search for commonalities and patterns 
3. Properties transpire/emerge and are identified 
4. Search for transpired and identifies properties 
The initial run through the stages of the analysis was similar to trying to spin a heavy 
wheel that took time to gain a momentum. However, with each subsequent run through 
the four stages the analysis became easier.  
The first stages of analysis were tedious, as it was not clear exactly what is transpiring, 
seeing only the edges, but not understanding what it was forming in the analysis. This is 
the down side of this approach but also an advantage, because this allowed the 
researcher to have an open mind to what might transpire out of the data.  
(1)
Search for
answers to posed
questions
Information
(2)
Search for
commonalities /
patterns
(3)
Qualities transpire/
emerge and
identified
(4)
Search for
transpired and
identified qualities
Information
Structure
Information
Source Strategies
 
Figure 5.6: Strategy for data analysis 
Given that the researcher had extensive domain knowledge this strategy avoided the 
distractions of being unfamiliar with terminology and the general layout of the 
information in the cockpit. However, if the researcher did not know the layout of 
information, it could also be helpful, giving a fresh outlook on the information structure. 
It would help to identify problems and concerns that transpire quicker because 
everything is questioned. This was certainly the researcher’s experience when beginning 
the project with an immediate need to acquire an understanding the domain. This is 
when the research questions were formed and refined to become more specific as more 
understanding of the domain took place.  
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A set of questions identified in the problem statement chapter (Chapter 4) was used to 
begin the search at the first stage of the analysis. Each question, as discussed in the 
previous section, was both oriented to the future and the present.  
Present-oriented questions: 
i. What information do pilots use to identify aircraft state? 
ii. What sources of information do pilots use to identify aircraft state? 
iii. How do pilots assemble the above collected information to identify aircraft 
state? 
Future-oriented questions: 
i. What type of information do pilots use to anticipate aircraft next maneuver? 
ii. What sources of information do pilots use to anticipate aircraft next maneuver? 
iii. How do pilots assemble the above collected information to anticipate aircraft 
next maneuver? 
The questions were deliberately general at the beginning of analysis. They were 
designed to point in the direction if interest, but not to limit the field of search too early. 
As the progress through four stages acquires more understanding, the questions become 
more specific and the mode is refined with every cycle through the stages (Figure 5.7).  
To provide an example of how the analysis process refined the questions, let’s examine 
the first question, “What information do pilots use to identify the aircraft state?” After 
the initial data analysis the information appeared to be in many forms. Therefore, this 
led to the subsequent questions that require more definition, such as, “Are there 
similarities among the information that pilots use?”. Between stages three and four the 
similarities from the data in terms of groups or types are sought. Consequently, the next 
question becomes, “What type of information do pilots use to identify the aircraft 
state?” Approaching stage three, the groups/types become more refined and properties 
of each group become more distinct. Then the following question is formed, “Is there 
more information that match the identified qualities?” 
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Figure 5.7: Refining the search 
Each consecutive cycle through the four stages refines the questions further, for 
instance, following the previous example; the researcher would identify whether there 
are further information subgroups/categories and identify their similarities and 
properties. The data analysis continues through the four stages until the data cannot be 
broken down any further or additional analysis is not deemed to be required at this time.  
The data analysis would continue by investigating the next general question posed, i.e., 
”What sources of information do pilots use to identify the aircraft state?” This question 
is then refined through the four stages of the analysis in the same similar manner to the 
example shown in Figure 5.7. The analysis continues until all the posed questions are 
answered in detail.  
As a final stage of the analysis all the gathered answers to the questions posed were 
organised in corresponding figures and tables. Each table had a definition of the group, 
a description of its properties and listed examples. 
5.4 RESULTS 
Sixteen videotapes were analysed (14 hours of audio and video material). Eight master 
videotapes consisted of four automated and four non-automated flights, including 20 
minutes of flight footage from pilot’s point-of-view for each flight, plus eight tapes of 
one and half hour debriefs corresponding to those 20-minute flights with comments 
from each pilot, whose footage was on the tape. These cued-recall debrief videotapes 
had the original video footage of the flights together with an additional audio stream 
that contained pilots debrief commentary. 
Initially, the data was transcribed. First the master tape was transcribed with the original 
audio/video and only then the debrief section was transcribed, which is a second audio 
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stream on the debrief tape. The debrief audio stream transcription was synchronized 
with the original footage transcription, i.e., pilot’s comments were inserted in the 
original footage transcription to match the original flight timeline (Table 5.8). That is, 
the original footage formed an initial column of flight ‘events’ for the table and then 
significant points from the debrief transcription were added as an additional column to 
match the flight events from the original audio/video footage) A sample of both, 
automated and manual flight transcriptions are in the Appendix 3. 
It was noted in the ‘preliminary study’ that there is a need to maintain traceability of the 
workflow. This traceability is a desirable aspect that it taken forward for this data 
analysis approach. Traceability requires that the data are analysed in relation to its 
acquisition context. Further, when analysing parts of the data there is a need to keep in 
mind the properties and interdependencies of the context the data is acquired from. 
Some task analysis (Diaper and Stanton, 2004) techniques break down a workflow into 
tasks, goals, subsequently associating the information with particular tasks and goals, 
however, for this study this techniques may miss the important factor of the dynamic 
operating environment, the flow. It has been noted during the preliminary study that the 
uninterrupted, dynamic flow of information is crucial for pilots to perform effectively. 
The information is changing and evolving from the beginning of the flight to the end, 
from one task to another. No single piece of information exists on its own. The analysis 
strategy and the transcription table structure support this finding. 
The master tape transcript was put into a table format (Table 5.9).  From listening and 
watching the footage this approach appeared appropriate.  In fact, a similar approach 
was taken in the transcription of the preliminary study; however, in these transcripts the 
column headings were different, except for the common ‘TIMELINE’ column.  
The data analysis transcription table is organised with respect to the timeline (see left 
hand column).  All the events, the dialog, the information flow is represented as it 
happened and annotated with against the corresponding timeline. This prevents 
disturbing the properties, the fluidity, dynamics and interdependencies of pilots’ 
operating environment and the workflow. The sequence of all data is traceable and the 
evolution of information can be deduced. Other information of interest was also noted, 
such as goals, who is speaking to whom (FROM-TO column), Action-Planning-
Monitoring (i.e., abbreviated as A-P-M column) tasks and objects used. 
TIME 
LINE 
SEQUIENCE 
OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG GOALS: FROM
-TO 
A-
P-
M 
DOING/ MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECTS 
USED: 
00:00 FLIGHT 
PREPARATION 
(Setting up the 
cockpit) 
 Displaying 
reference 
maps 
 A Locating, folding & placing 
maps for good accessibility 
during the flight 
Paper location 
reference maps 
   Displaying 
T/O charts 
 A Locating & placing charts on 
control column 
Paper charts  
01:10 Airplane Forms: 
Data Entry 
 Data entered 
for the whole 
flight (as 
much as 
possible) 
 A
P 
Programming the system 
from T/O to landing 
CNI 
02:10   Radio data 
entry 
  Programming radio 
frequencies 
AMU 
… … … … … … … … 
Table 5.3: Fragment of the table 
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5.4.1 Data analysis – manual flight 
The data analysis of empirical study was undertaken to: 
• Trace the information pilots require for effective workflow; 
• Trace whether and if pilots apply structure to information; 
• Understand how pilots structure and use information to support the workflow; 
• Trace whether the structure that a pilot apply to information is similar to observed 
during the training and operation (Chapter 4);  
• Trace whether pilots use rules, techniques and strategies that are established in 
early flying experience. 
5.4.1.1 Question (i): ‘What information do pilots use to identify aircraft state? 
The analysis began with identifying and collecting data to answer the first posed 
question, (i) ‘What information do pilots use to identify the aircraft state?’ which 
explored the area of ‘Information’ in Figure 5.6. For the purpose of the investigation the 
aircraft state had a broad definition, and refers to the general physical state of the 
aircraft (i.e., internal ‘health’ of all systems), aircraft performance and also aircraft 
position in a navigational space and time.  
The first run through the data was with question (i) in mind, and showed that pilots 
often used information that they ‘referenced to’ or ‘referred to’. Consider the following 
example comments, all from the same flight:  
Pilot 04:42 M: …also just quickly referencing in for the airspeed for our rotate. 
Pilot 04:53 M: …All I am doing is getting my attitude & heading set on the PFD, so I’m 
concentrating on putting the climb-dive marker where I want it. …so I am 
just looking at the reference, the pitch ladder. 
Pilot 04:53 M: …is looking down at the compass card and quickly referencing and having a 
look at the level on there as to what heading I am flying. 
Pilot 06:42 M: …Just checking that generally set the right height, above the altitude tape 
there, checking the cyan figure …all of the reference number in a different 
colour, that they are the same, any reference figure is all in cyan.  So if you 
see a blue reference number anywhere, that’s it.  That’s a reference number.’ 
Pilot 08:11 M: Just checking in the Reference Set panel again the brief altitudes & the 
approach there 
Pilot 10:42 M: …I wanted to reference the VOR to give me tracking information & needle 
pointer around the compass rose on the bottom… 
Pilot 14:32 M: …TACAN means DME, so that I can have a reference to the outermarker 
check-height, when I am likely to incept the glide slope… 
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Pilot 14:32 M: …So I was just referencing down to the distance there at the bottom of the 
PFD to give me an indication so as to when I was going to intercept the finals 
course in the glide slope. 
Pilot 17:55 M: … but mainly still just referring to those things I was scanning, CDI bar, GS, 
rate of descent, Climb Dive marker, airspeed. So it’s all an internal scan on 
the PFD there… 
An initial scan through the above comments shows the pilot referencing specific 
information, related to aircraft behaviour. It can be seen pilots reference several 
instruments either to verify current aircraft behaviour, or use the referencing 
information to identify the time to active next behaviour, such as in pilot comments on 
the 14:32 minute of the flight.  
This leads to the second stage of the analysis (Figure 5.6) where the pattern of 
commonalities in the data begins to emerge. The pattern is related to timing – from the 
beginning of the flight, every two minutes throughout the flight the pilot references 
instruments to establish aircraft behaviour. The commonality among the information 
referenced by the pilot is summarised in the Table 5.4 below. Information, surrounding 
the word ‘reference’ relate to each other in a particular manner. The pilot appears to 
have identified specific pieces of information on individual instruments as references to 
determine aircraft behaviour. This can be defined as a property of referenced 
information.  
The above paragraph also illustrates the fluidity and interdependent nature of the 
analysis and the difficulty of separating each stage of analysis from each other. The 
fluidity of analysis is similar to the dynamics of the workflow in the environment of the 
study itself. The dynamics of the environment are maintained in the analysis, as shown 
in the Table 5.4 below, where the researcher can trace specific information data, 
referenced by the pilot, without interrupting the flow throughout the flight. 
Time Flight Stage Referencing For 
04:42 Take-off run Airspeed Rotate (i.e., taking off the ground) 
04:53 After take-off climb Climb-dive marker Attitude 
04:53 After take-off climb Compass card Heading 
06:42 Initial Climb  Cyan figure/number above the altitude tape Set the right height 
08:11 Level-off Reference Set Panel Briefed Altitudes 
10:42 Cruise 
VOR (i.e., Very-high-
frequency Omni-
directional Radio range) 
Tracking information 
14:32 Descent DME (i.e., Distance Measuring Equipment) 
(Indication) when to 
intercept the glide slope
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14:32 Descent Distance 
An indication when I 
was going to intercept 
the finals course in the 
glide slope 
17:55 Final approach 
CDI bar, GS (i.e., Glide 
Slope), rate of descent, 
Climb Dive marker, 
airspeed 
An internal scan 
(NEXT LEAD to 
STRATEGY) 
Table 5.4: Referenced Information #1 
The third stage of analysis involves identifying the properties of already established 
information (Table 5.6). The transpired properties of the referenced information are:  
• The information is referenced throughout the flight at similar intervals of time; 
• The information is required to verify current aircraft behavior;  
• The information is used as a reference to identify the moment of activation for 
the next behavior.  
The last of these properties leads to two further questions, which, although apparently 
out of sequence presented here, is in fact how, in practice, the questions transpired. The 
first question is, ‘What is it in a reference that signifies the next 
behaviour/action/event?, this intends to identify more detail about the information, and 
is the question for the second iteration  through the four stage of analysis. The second 
question, ‘How and when do pilots identify the reference for the flight?, intends to 
explore pilots’ strategies of assembling information. This is also a part of the analysis 
(Figure 5.6), but given the fluidity of the analysis, the strategy is connected to specific 
information and can be observed throughout the flight around the referenced 
information. These questions will be expanded on in detail at more appropriate juncture 
later in this section. 
The fourth stage involves searching for more information that matches the described 
properties examined during stage-three. Running through the data for the second time, 
the word ‘constantly’ appears in the data on several occasions. This is the first property 
identified, i.e., ‘information referenced throughout the flight at similar intervals of 
time’. To make sure this is the same type of information, two further properties have to 
be present in these pieces of information. Consider the following transcript: 
Pilot 06:28 M: …he is constantly watching, if I haven’t bust a height (i.e., pilot jargon for – 
to break Air Traffic Control altitude restriction), airspeed or a heading or 
whatever… 
Pilot 11:10 M: …I’m watching the speed caret come up and go above the wing, because we 
want to accelerate, but as to how much that go before you get to 210 knots 
it’s something that I had to constantly monitor… 
Time Flight Stage Referencing For 
06:28 Initial Climb Height, airspeed or heading 
Watching (i.e., 
monitoring) for not to 
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break Air Traffic 
Control restrictions 
11:10 Cruise Speed caret To signify acceleration 
Table 5.5: Referenced Information #2 
The timing of pilot’s comments again falls in to the two minute intervals of the 
transcript. The property of information is also relevant to aircraft behaviour, for both 
verifying current aircraft behaviour (see comment 06:28) and for identifying the 
moment of activation for the next behaviour (see comment 11:10).  
Two new words arise in the data that are relevant to this type of referenced information, 
‘watching’ and ‘monitor’.  The word ‘monitor’ appears to be more a strategy, and this 
will be explored in the strategy search section of analysis. However, merely identifying 
a word, such as ‘watching’ or ‘monitor’, does not immediately signify that all 
information surrounding this word will match the searched properties. The information 
surrounding the word must be compared against the properties established at this point 
(i.e. an already established property here is ‘information referenced throughout the 
flight at similar intervals of time’) before considering the surrounding information with 
data collected already of that type. However, the information surrounding the word may 
match several, or all, the properties, and it may also   elucidate new properties or even 
refine already established properties. The word ‘watching’ does exactly that, generating 
new properties, which can be seen to transpire when the pilot’s full comment is 
reflected upon: 
Pilot 11:10 M: …Just putting the power up there, obviously I’m watching the speed caret 
come up and go above the wing, because we want to accelerate, but as to how 
much that go before you get to 210 knots it is something that I had to 
constantly monitor, once I got to 210 knots, then I had to pull power back to 
make sure the caret was on the wing.  So it did not raise the workload a great 
deal, but it did a little bit. There is nothing that really tells you after 210 knots 
at this height you need to set this power. 
From this reflection the new property of ‘referenced information’ transpires. The 
reference for the information appears to be ‘compared to some other feature’, assessing 
this comparison establishes the information’s correct or wanted/required position. It is 
shown in the two comments, ‘I’m watching the speed caret come up and go above the 
wing’ and ‘then I had to pull power back to make sure the caret was on the wing’. The 
referenced information is the speed caret symbol and it is compared to a stationary, or 
relatively unchanging, reference of the wing symbol on the display. In the first instance 
of this property, ‘…the speed caret come up and go above the wing…’, the pilot was 
anticipating aircraft behaviour, ‘…because we want to accelerate…’. The pilot was 
expecting the speed caret symbol to move above the wing symbol. The wing symbol 
was chosen because it was stationary and did not change its position relative to the 
speed caret symbol. In the second instance, ‘…make sure the caret was on the wing…’, 
the pilot was monitoring aircraft speed performance, which had to be kept  constant, ‘I 
had to constantly monitor, once I got to 210 knots’. In the same way as in the first 
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instance, the pilot here monitored the aircraft performance against the same feature, 
because it was unchanging relative to the speed caret. Hence, in both instances the 
referenced information would have no significance if not referenced against another 
feature that was constant and unchanging relative to the monitored symbol. 
The discussed property of  ‘referenced information’ is now established, however, to 
make sure it is not only specific to this piece of data, a subsequent run through the 
already collected data is required. Following this, all the data has to be analysed again 
considering all the established properties. This is done, as there is a possibility that the 
formerly established properties are dominant in the collected data, but the latter property 
is weaker and so not as pronounced. 
While establishing properties of referenced information a problem was noted evident in 
the following transcript sentence, “…There is nothing that really tells you after 210 
knots at this height you need to set this power…”. To keep the fluidity and to maintain 
the flow of the analysis, the problems are noted with the timestamp (M 11:10) and later 
investigated if they are related to the property studied. If the problem is related to it, the 
problem is systematically analysed through the four stage of the analysis, for similar 
problems, commonalities and properties.  
The question posed earlier for further detailed analysis, ‘What is it in a reference that 
signifies the next behaviour/action/event?’, appears to be related to the latest established 
property, i.e., the referenced information is always located relative to a constant and 
unchanging symbol. The only difference between the question and the property is that 
the posed question refers to anticipated aircraft behaviour and the property refers to both 
anticipated and current monitored aircraft behaviour. In other words, the latest property 
is the answer to the newly posed question. That is, the constant and unchanging symbol 
relative to a moving symbol is a reference that signifies the moment for the pilot to 
execute a new behaviour/action/manoeuvre/event.  
The table below shows all of the established references against all of the pilots 
comments listed previously (Table 5.6).  
Time Flight Stage 
Referencing/ 
Watching/ 
Monitoring 
References –  
constant and 
unchanging 
For 
04:42 Take-off run Airspeed 
Rotate Airspeed  
Indicator on speed 
tape 
Rotate (i.e., taking 
off the ground) 
04:53 After take-off climb 
Climb-dive 
marker Pitch Ladder Bars Attitude 
04:53 After take-off climb Compass card Heading Marker Heading 
06:28 Initial Climb 
Height,  
Airspeed or 
Heading 
Altitude Caret, 
Airspeed Indicator 
and Heading Marker 
Watching (i.e., 
monitoring) for not 
to break Air Traffic 
Control restrictions 
06:42 Initial Climb  
Cyan 
figure/number 
Digital Altitude 
readout and Altitude Set the right height 
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above the 
altitude tape 
Caret  
08:11 Level-off Reference Set Panel 
Set Altitudes, 
reflected as a Altitude 
Carets 
Briefed Altitudes 
10:42 Cruise VOR Needle (or Bearing) Pointer 
Tracking 
information 
11:10 Cruise Speed caret Wing symbol To signify acceleration 
14:32 Descent 
DME (i.e., 
Distance 
Measuring 
Equipment) 
Stationary beacon on 
the ground, signified 
by a sound, when the 
aircraft passes over it 
(Indication) when 
to intercept the 
glide slope 
14:32 Descent Distance 
Navigation 
Source/Data, 
generally specific 
coordinate 
An indication 
when I was going 
to intercept the 
finals course in the 
glide slope 
14:51 Descent 
Height,  
Airspeed and 
Compass Card 
Horizon Bar,  
Digital Speed 
Window and 
CDI (i.e., Course 
Deviation Indicator) 
Staying level,  
monitoring speed 
and intercepting 
finals course 
17:55 Final approach 
CDI bar, GS (i.e., 
Glideslope), rate 
of descent, Climb 
Dive marker, 
airspeed 
Stationary symbols 
on the Primary Flight 
Display  
An internal scan 
(NEXT LEAD to 
STRATEGY) 
Table 5.6: Established Information  
As with previous analysis, the data in the above table (Table 5.6) went through a four 
stage analysis cycle to search for further patterns, commonalties and new properties 
within the data. A new property emerged; in all the references the pilot used not only 
these references, which were constant and unchanging relative to monitored symbols, 
but they always associate/relative to/relate to some other symbology on the display. For 
example, the Pitch Ladder Bars are positioned relative to the Horizon Bar. 
The data analysis was concluded for the first posed question, ‘What information do 
pilots use to identify aircraft state?’, by extracting all the comments surrounding the 
words ‘watching, looking, checking and concentrating’, as these words arose during the 
analysis of the data against this question. This remaining data was then put directly in 
the above table if it matched the identified properties. However, during this final cycle 
of the analysis it was found that previous cycles were so thorough that there was only 
one more specific comment to include from the data into the table. 
The comment (14:51 M) from the data contained combinations of referenced 
information that extended the established properties; consequently it was considered 
that the comment required more detailed analysis. In the comment the pilot says that he 
is concentrating on “…quite a few things…3 to 4 different things…”. The more detailed 
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analysis indicated that all of the referenced information appeared to have conditions or 
boundaries defining it, which are not obvious on the aircraft instrument display. The 
table below (Table 5.7) further breaks down the comments into three columns, (a) what 
the pilot is concentrating on, (b) conditions or boundaries that the pilots has to consider, 
and (c) specific referenced information. 
Concentrating 
on… Conditions/Boundaries 
Specific Referenced 
Information 
1. Staying level 
(a) I cannot leave 3000 feet 
until I intercept that 
glideslope; 
(b) and established within 
tolerances for the approach  
(a) Predetermined condition 
defined by a position in 
space; 
(b) and a space within specific 
boundaries 
2. Decreasing 
airspeed 
(a) So that we can get the 
landing gear down; 
(b) but not keep washing the 
speed off 
(a) Restricted safe for landing 
gear airspeed; 
(b) Specific lower and upper 
margin of the airspeed to 
remain within 
3. The compass 
card 
I am seeing that the Course 
Deviation Indicator (CDI) 
which is that bar in the center 
of that white thing to intercept 
my correct azimuth there 
Expecting referenced 
information to cross and become 
a complete symbol 
(FEATURE/PROPERTY) 
Table 5.7: Conditions and References 
From analysing the data further it was apparent that when the pilot is concentrating on 
‘staying level ’(Table 5.7- row 1), he appears to have a predetermined point in space, 
which is not represented on the display, and therefore, it was reasoned, he is probably 
referencing a ‘mental’ representation. By similar reasoning it was considered that the 
same is true for the comment, “…within tolerances…” (see 1b in Table 5.7- row 1); 
only this time it is a space within specific boundaries that is not clearly on the displayed 
on the aircraft instruments, but, is represented in the pilot’s mind. In order to stay level 
the pilot has to satisfy both referenced information, and all conditions and boundaries. 
Also, when the pilot is concentrating on ‘decreasing airspeed’ (Table 5.7 – row 2), it is 
reasoned, he appears to have a specific speed in mind that is set between boundaries  
For example, below this speed the landing gear can be safely lowered, but once this 
speed is achieved the speed cannot be allowed to decrease further, as this could result in 
the aircraft stalling (i.e., a condition when there is not enough air passing over the wing 
and as a result the aircraft cannot maintain the altitude). Additionally, when the pilot is 
concentrating on the ‘compass card ’(Table 5.7 - row 3), he appears to have a picture in 
mind of how the referenced information should align before he can initiate the next 
event. In this way the pilot appears to be expecting the display to match the picture in 
his ‘mind’. This use of information by pilots can also be describe as a strategy and is 
discussed in the Strategies section of this chapter. 
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Pilot 14: 51 M: …I’m watching the compass card and seeing that the Course Deviation 
Indicator (CDI) which is that bar in the center of that white thing to intercept 
my correct azimuth there...  
In all of the ‘Concentrating on…’ cases listed in the above table it is reasoned that the 
pilot had a mental representation of the referenced information.  It is argued that the 
aircraft instrument display only then provides the space where the pilot ‘places’ (i.e., 
places mentally) his referenced information, such as altitude and speed tolerance 
margins.  
In the ‘Concentrating on…’ cases of ‘staying level’ and ‘decreasing airspeed’ the 
referenced information was concerned with maintaining conditions and boundaries.  In 
the case of the ‘compass card’, referenced information was a condition to be reached to 
trigger the next event. To summarise this, a new property of the referenced information, 
is that it can be either a reference to maintain aircraft behaviour (by using aircraft 
performing characteristics, such as airspeed), or it can be a reference to do something.  
Comment (14:51 M) helped to identify another new property of referenced information, 
that, referenced information can be linked to create specific conditions and boundaries 
for aircraft behaviour. The comment also helped to differentiate between all the 
referenced information identified prior to this comment. All previously identified 
referenced information was displayed in the cockpit, however, referenced information 
identified in the this comment (summarised in the table above) was represented in the 
pilot’s mind and was ‘placed’ on the display by the pilot to define conditions and 
boundaries. This is referred to here as, information of an internal type (i.e., in pilot’s 
mind), the converse being, information of an external type (i.e., information depicted on 
a display). These last findings led to the second posed question  ‘What sources of 
information do pilots use to identify aircraft state?’. For example, two possible sources; 
external i.e., visible on the display, and internal, i.e., in the pilot’s mind, have just been 
discussed. However, prior to proceeding to the next posed question, it is necessary to 
group referenced information and summarise the identified properties.  The pilot used 
referenced information that can be put into three groups: aircraft configuration; aircraft 
behaviour; and outside referenced information. What is included in these groups of 
referenced information is tabulated below.  
Referenced Information related to …  
Aircraft configuration Aircraft behaviour Outside 
Engine performance Airspeed Turning points 
Flap position Climb/descent rate Air Traffic Control contact points 
Landing gear position Angle of climb/descent Altitude 
Aircraft bank Rate of turn Distance 
 Heading Runway dimensions/ gradient/ perspective 
 
Specific lower and upper 
margin of the airspeed to 
remain within 
Navigational points 
  Glideslope 
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VOR (Very-high-
frequency Omni-
directional Radio range) 
  DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) 
  Space within specific boundaries 
Table 5.8: Referenced Information related to 
These are the properties of referenced information identified to this point of analysis:  
• Referenced throughout the flight at similar intervals of time 
• Required to verify current aircraft behavior  
• Required to maintain aircraft behavior 
• Used to identify the moment of activation of next event/behavior/maneuver 
• Connected to other feature/or relative to them 
• Compared to other features on the display  
• Expecting referenced information to cross and becomes a complete symbol 
• Constant and unchanging a Reference (i.e. unchanging) and Referenced 
Information (i.e. changing) 
• Linked to create specific conditions and boundaries 
• Pilots have a picture in mind of how the referenced information should align and 
manipulate the aircraft to accomplish that  
The last point in the list above can also be considered a strategy that pilots use to 
manipulate information and is referred to in the section, Strategies. 
5.4.1.2 Question( ii): ‘What sources of information do pilots use to identify aircraft 
state? 
The same four-stage analysis used for the previous question was used to search for the 
sources of information that the pilots use (Figure 5.6) Through the analysis at least two 
distinctive sources of information that pilots use were identified. These two information 
sources contrasted in that some information used by the pilot had an obvious visible 
source, whilst the other type did not have an obvious source, and appeared to come from 
the pilot himself. Visible sources of information were labelled as an external, and the 
latter as an internal source of information. 
The properties of internal and external the information sources began to emerge as 
individual examples were considered (Figure 5.6). From the transcript and video data 
analysis, the external source of information included information visible on displays or 
visible on paper, such as on maps, navigational plates, and manuals.  
Pilot 03:08 M: All that is just interpreting what’s on the plate there & by briefing it, it’s 
actually putting into, right in to our minds, instead of always refer to it, some 
of it can be done from memory. 
In comment (03:08 M) above, the pilot is looking at the departure plate for a planned 
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runway. The plate is a piece of paper that contains navigational information for a 
specific place, such as an airport, and details, such as, the navigational point for an 
approach or departure from a specific runway. The pilot is briefing both himself and the 
co-pilot (i.e. the crew) on the next several steps they have to complete during a 
departure. The pilot is using an external source of information and, “…putting right into 
their minds…” the points for them to remember to complete. This then becomes an 
internal source of information for the crew (Figure 5.8) 
There were also other sources of information that came to the cockpit from outside 
sources, for example the radio, navigational beacons (i.e., Morse code) or from the Air 
Traffic Control, these too are considered external sources. Below, in comment (ATC 
07:32M), is an example of Air Traffic Control (ATC) being an external source of 
information. 
ATC 07:32 M: ‘Roger, Sydney terminal information Alfa, Runway 07, wind 120 degrees, 10 
knots, QNH (i.e., air pressure) 1022, temperature 15, expect ILS (i.e. 
Instrument Landing System) approach.’ 
Comment (ATC 07:32 M), illustrates the pilot obtaining information from the Air 
Traffic Control, about the weather at the destination airport and the announcement of 
the new runway change due to the mentioned weather change. This external source of 
information would also include information that the pilots obtain by looking out of the 
cockpit.  
External
Readily available
Inside the
cockpit
Outside the
cockpit
Obtained
earlier from
Obtained
before the flight
Internal
Information Source
Pilot originated
 
Figure 5.8: Information sources 
Internal sources of information refer to information that the pilot has obtained during or 
before the flight, and such an example is described the above comment (Pilot 03:08 M). 
In this comment the pilot ‘internalised’ some information by memorising several pieces 
of information to recall at the appropriate time during the flight. Internal sources of 
information also include information that was not provided in the cockpit, but which is 
pertinent to the flight. One example of such information was when the pilots ‘placed’ on 
the airspeed tape lower and upper limits for the aircraft to remain within. The limits 
were not physically displayed on the airspeed tape, the pilots had ‘placed’ the limits 
there in their minds. An example of this can be seen in comment (Pilot 14:51 M) below. 
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Pilot 14:51 M: …The other thing I am looking for my airspeed to be decreasing, now so that 
we can get the landing gear down, but not keep washing the speed off …  
From the above comment it is not obvious where the pilot has obtained the information. 
This comment is typical of those from the data and demonstrates a general technique of 
the data analysis. To ascertain the unknown information source, the source of the 
information was queried by the researcher at the debrief. The pilot’s response would be 
then guide the attention of the researcher, possibly to a past moment in the flight 
whereupon this would be investigated and questioned further.   For example, a note 
would be made by the researcher during the debrief, questioning how did the pilot know 
and store this information, and also, how was he able to pull out, or access, this 
information at the correct moment in the flight. This type of approach, of collecting and 
analysing data, is an example of how an analysis can be flexible enough to divert and 
adapt to pilots search for information; permitting the researcher to note appropriate 
areas of further investigation, to note links that the pilot has made in the information, 
and also to what ‘triggers’ the pilot has, or relies on for their stored information access. 
This flexible and adaptive data analysis, following pilot’s search, also permits the 
maintenance of the fluidity of the dynamic environment in which the operation of the 
aircraft happens. This is an advantage of this naturally evolving analysis. 
5.4.1.3 Question (iii): How pilots assemble above collected information to identify 
aircraft state? 
As the data analysis progressed it became clear that the pilot had strategies for 
collecting information, but also that referenced information already had structures that 
assisted pilots in assembling information. Both structure and strategies are discussed 
next. 
5.4.1.4 Structures 
As the analysis proceeded through the same four stages, structure became evident in the 
referenced information. Structure in this context is referred to as specific information 
that is ‘linked’ by pilots. 
It was found that most of the external type information had structure. The structure was 
either observed as imposed by physical aspect in the cockpit, such as a display 
information layout, or that of the navigation plate, or it was imposed by an operating 
procedure, such as making an Air Traffic Control call.  During the Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) procedure ATC first mentions to whom the call is addressed, because everyone 
on the transmitting radio frequency hears the call. This attracts the attention of the 
appropriate crew. Next ATC inform the crew which runway and type of departure they 
are expecting the crew to follow, ‘Glenfield (navigation point) One (referrers to the 
runway number and direction 010) departure (expected action)’, followed by instruction 
for the crew to execute, ‘climb and maintain 3000’ and clearance instruction. The 
pilot’s response to ATC is also structured. First, the pilot acknowledges their location 
and intended departure via Glenfield, then acknowledges the Air Traffic Control 
instruction by repeating the instructions back, stating their clearance for take-off, and 
finishing with their call name (see comment ATC 04:17 M).  
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ATC 04:17 M: Call Name 123, Glenfield 1 departure, climb and maintain 3000, clear for 
take-off. 
Pilot 04:23 M: Glenfield 1, 3000 clear for take-off, Call Name 123. 
The comments below are of interactions between the crew and ATC. Occasionally, the 
pilot initiates these interactions; for example, when they have reached a reporting point 
or require a clearance. However, generally the Air Traffic Control initiates the 
interaction; for example in the comments below ATC give a speed restriction (comment 
ATC 10:55 M), but other interactions may be initiated by ATC, such as the need to 
indicate relief of a restriction. The structure of the call and the acknowledgment of the 
understanding the instruction by pilots follow the same structure. Pilots already had a 
communication with this ATC station, therefore there is not the introduction of who is 
speaking, but rather to whom the call is addressed, followed by the request, instruction 
or restriction. The reply by the pilot is the response or acknowledgement and again each 
comment finishes with their name. 
ATC 10:55 M: Call Name 123, report airspeed. 
Pilot 10:59 M: 200. Call Name 123. 
ATC 11:01 M: Call Name 123, if you could increase to 210, thanks. 
Pilot 11:04 M: 210, Call Name 123. 
However, this structure is altered when there is change in the weather, or the change of 
operating runway.  In these cases the ATC broadcasts the call to all aircraft on that 
frequency (see ATC 09:51 M). The acknowledgement in this case is not required if it 
does not affect the crew immediately. In the example of comments below the aircraft is 
close to the airport, and so the ATC follows the general call with a specific call 
addressed only to this aircraft, positioning them third in the queue of aircraft to land in 
the new operating runway. 
ATC 09:51 M: All station in bound Sydney, Sydney terminal information BRAVO is about 
to be recorded duty runway 16R, switch now, 140 degrees, 15 knots, QNH 
1022. 
ATC 10:09 M: Call Name 123 we will make you number 3 in the sequence, turn left heading 
045 to intercept the 12 mile arc for 16R ILS. 
Note that in the above example the Air Traffic Control announces a special 
announcement, called ATIS (i.e., Automatic Terminal Information Service), which also 
has a specific structure. The ATIS contains information about active runway/s, wind 
information, such as direction, ‘140 degrees’ and wind velocity ’15 knots’, an altimeter 
setting, ‘QNH 1022’ (i.e., air pressure), followed by more detailed information about the 
weather, such air temperature, cloud level, visibility and any additional significant items 
on local weather. Without knowing the structure of information and expectation of 
specific information the words, ‘140 degrees, 15 knots’, have little meaning, but in the 
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context of ATIS announcement it is information about the wind on the corresponding 
runway. 
The following example, taken from the analysis, demonstrates two ‘information 
structures’ that are interdependent. The first structure is that which is physically 
imposed by the layout of the navigational information printed on the departure page of 
the relevant airport, termed in aviation the ‘plate’. In preparation for the departure pilot 
and co-pilot brief each other with this information using the structure it is presented on 
the layout of the plate. The second ‘structure’ is that of the encompassing procedure that 
the pilot and co-pilot follow to commit this information to memory.  This ‘structure’ 
involves the pilot reading the required navigational information out loud from the plate, 
whereupon the co-pilot confirms that he has heard, and agrees with what is termed in 
aviation the ‘departure plan’.  Therefore, during this structure pilot and co-pilot need to 
submit this departure information to memory (i.e., internalise the information), because 
once the aircraft is rolling and during the initial stage of climb their time is limited, with 
events happening very quickly and consequently there is little time to for rereading the 
plate.  
The table below provides details of the surrounding events related to the ‘information 
structures’ discussed above. In the table the ‘dialog’ column contains the original flight 
transcript and the ‘comment’ column provides the pilot’s comments. The pilot’s 
comments detail how the pilot memorised the information in a specific order that was a 
combination of the specific order provided on the ‘plate’ combined with the operating 
procedure. 
TIME 
LINE 
SEQUIENCE 
OF 
EVENTS: 
DIALOG COMMENTS BY THE PILOT DURING THE DEBRIEF 
03:08 TAKE-OFF 
briefing 
‘Glenfield 1 departure out 
of here runway 10; plate 
stated 4 October 2001, no 
amendments; gradient 
required 3.3%, which we 
can do; track 095 and 
1TAC or 1000 feet, 
which ever is later, turn 
right, track 170 to 
intercept 144 for 
Richmond NDB, track to 
Glenfield then as 
cleared.’ ‘Copy’ 
‘All that is just interpreting what’s on the plate there & 
by briefing it, it’s actually putting into, right in to our 
minds, instead of always refer to it, some of it can be 
done from memory. And usually what I will do with 
departure, some of the departures would be quite long 
and complex. However, you really cannot keep all of 
that information in your head, so what you do is brief 
the First (i.e., First Officer – the co-pilot) or you just 
remember two to three instructions, so like maintain 
heading 095, 1000 feet or 1 TAC.  Next what I’m going 
to do is turn, right turn on TACAN distance.  TACAN is 
…a type of DME (i.e., Distance Measuring Equipment). 
Table 5.9: Transcript extract – Information Structure. 
The original dialog begins like that of the ATC call, with information communicated to 
confirm that the source of the information is correct, ‘Glenflield One departure… 
runway 10’ and then the date is stated to assure the particular ‘plate’ is the current 
document. Next the information proceeds in a sequence that would match the unfolding 
events during take off. First, the physical properties of the runway are established, 
‘gradient required 3.3%’ (the slope of the runway), followed by the direction of the 
flight, next a point in space is established which would mark the beginning of the next 
manoeuvre, i.e., ‘the right turn’. At this point the order of information repeats itself, 
with the direction of the flight communicated then the next point in space to mark the 
next manoeuvre communicated. The pilot’s comments show that the pilot memorises 
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(internalises) only the first sequence of information until the first manoeuvre, before the 
structure of information starts to repeat itself. Following the original transcript, dialog 
and comments, along the timeline of events shows where the pilot obtains the 
information he uses, and that the structure of both the ‘plate’ and procedure dictates 
how the pilots memorises (i.e., internalises the information) the information. 
5.4.1.4.1 Operating Procedures and Checklists 
Other examples of ‘information structure’ found from the data analysis were in 
operating procedures and checklists. For example, in the after take-off checklist 
‘information structure’ can be observed in the caption below (caption: Pilot 05:21 M).  
The spoken checklist structure here matches the order of the executed actions listed on 
the written checklist.  
Pilot 05:21 M: … Landing gear up, flaps up, after T/O checklist.’ 
5.4.1.4.2 Structured information beneficial to memorising and recall 
From the data analysis instances were found where the structuring of information 
appeared to be helpful to pilots in enabling them to better recall and execute actions. For 
example, this type of structuring of information happens during briefings, such as the 
brief before the flight (i.e. ‘take-off brief’).  However, this structuring does not, from the 
data, appear to be confined to formal briefings, it appears a more general strategy that 
pilots employ to help them remember information at crucial points during the flight. 
Below is an example of a pilot briefing the approach at 11:16 minutes that uses 
information structure as a strategy to help the pilot to recall it 7 minutes later in the 
same flight at 17:55. Again, the information is structured along the timeline of the 
flight, announcing the events in the order, as they would happen later in the flight. 
Pilot 11:16 M: 212 NDR MINIMUS radar set to 212. Outermarker check height 1295 at 4.7 
I’ll give you localiser frequency when you are turning…  
Pilot 17:55 M: I am also, next thing I’m looking at validating the ILS by that outermarker 
check height again. And PNF (i.e. Pilot-Not-Flying) briefed a little bit before, 
as to what the height (i.e. 1295 feet), distance (i.e. 4.7 miles) we were looking 
for, so that’s a next step. 
5.4.1.4.3 Internal and External Information Structures 
In a similar manner to sources of information, structures can be classified as external 
and internal (Figure 5.9). External information structures are based on procedures, like 
in the examples above of the ATC communication, and also the example where the pilot 
briefs the crew of the departure plan. These are classed external information structures 
as they are  ‘imposed’ or ‘given’ structures either inherited from the equipment layout 
(e.g. Flight Management System), or from documentation structure, such as the plate 
introduced earlier as an example.  From the data, it appears that most of the internal 
information structures, i.e. those generated by the pilot, appear to originate from the use 
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of external structures, training and prior pilot training and experience. 
5.4.1.4.4 Information Structures Relating to Time 
There is also a special category of information structure relating to time (Figure 5.9). 
This information structure is the most often used structure throughout the flight, 
featuring in most operating procedures, such as in the example above (see examples 
03:08; 05:21; 11:16). It generally follows the order in which the tasks are executed (i.e. 
the pilot briefs all stages of flight and also during debrief using a timeline).  
External
Imposed structure Pilot originated
Equipment and
document related
Procedure
related
Obtained
earlier from
Obtained
before the flight
Internal
Information Structure
Time related
 
Figure 5.9: Time related Structures 
The timeline structure appears helpful for pilots in their recall of the required 
information, such as in the example below, where the pilots is referencing information 
to identify the time to activate the next behaviour. The timeline appears to play an 
important role in the pilot’s use of strategies and it is discussed later in the strategy 
section.  
Pilot 14:32 M: …So I was just referencing down to the distance there at the bottom of the 
PFD (i.e. Primary Flight Display) to give me an indication so as to when I 
was going to intercept the finals course in the glide slope. 
External and internal information structure properties are different (Table 5.10). From 
the data it is apparent that pilot’s internal information structures are recalled more 
easily, more flexibly, are more easily adaptable and are less restricted than external 
information structures. For example, when pilots received information about the runway 
change, the pilot discarded the old runway information and immediately started to brief 
for a new runway. However, the information entered in the systems for the approach to 
the new runway had to be changed (such as radar information), and new approach plates 
needed to be found, even through in reality it was the same location, Sydney airport, 
just referenced by different navigational points. 
Properties External Structures Internal Structures 
Based on a timeline Mostly, yes Yes 
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Based on existing 
structures Not always 
Yes, but can be specific to 
an individual 
Recalled easily 
Often used structures are 
(i.e., ATC calls), but can be 
difficult to recall, if not 
structure presented to 
reference 
Yes 
Evolves Mostly unchanged Yes 
Flexible Not Yes 
Adaptable Not easily Yes 
Unrestricted Not Yes 
Based on the flight 
sequence Mostly, yes Yes 
Multidimensional Rarely Yes 
Table 5.10: Information Structure properties 
From the data it appears that within the limits of a ‘normal’ flight the internal 
information structures are more robust because they rely on an adaptive ‘human’ system 
for their maintenance. It appears in the internal structuring of information new 
information, or a new piece of information, will not be linked to the structure if it does 
not fit well with the rest of the data. In the example below, the co-pilot receives new 
instructions from the ATC, but mishears the new heading. The Captain, preoccupied 
with other tasks, does not hear the ATC instruction. When the co-pilot reads a new 
heading to be executed, the Captain doubts that the heading is correct, because it does 
not fit with their previously briefed approach plan. Consider section of the transcript 
below:   
ATC 10:09 M: Call Name 123, we will make you number 3 in the sequence, turn left heading 
045 to intercept the 12 mile arc for 16R ILS. 
Co-pilot 10:18 M: Left heading 060, to intercept 12 mile arc for ILS 16R, Call Name 123 
(reading back to Air Traffic Control) 
Co-pilot 10:26 M: 060 (saying to the Captain) 
Captain 10:28 M: I think it was 045 was he or was it us? 
Captains comment during a debrief: PNF (i.e. Pilot-Not-Flying, the Co-pilot) misheard what 
the ATC gave us. He gave us heading 045, but he read, he actually initially 
give us 060 and then came back again and said left heading 045 and PNF 
didn’t respond and that’s when he call him back and said, yep turn left 
heading 045. 
Co-pilot 10:33 M: Sydney, Call Name 123, just confirm that heading was 060. 
ATC 10:37 M: Call Name 123, negative, Magnetic 045. 
In the case of the Cali accident (Box 5.2) the crew entered a new navigation point to the 
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Flight Management System and consequently changed the heading of the aircraft to the 
wrong direction. The aircraft system accepted that change to the information structure 
without question. In the example above from the observation study the pilot did not 
accept similar information, because it did not fit with the rest of the flight plan, i.e., his 
internal information structure. 
CALI AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT (Aeronautica Civil, 1996) 
American Airlines Boeing 757-223 was on approach route to the airport in Colombia on 20 December 
1995. The approach path was taking place between two mountain ranges. Pilots planned on approach to 
runway 01. However the runway was changed to 19 and the pilot had to fly a different approach, 
ROZO 1. This meant changes had to be made in the Flight Management System and a new approach 
route had to be entered.  
To input the new coordinates the pilots had to enter the initial letter of the navigation point and then the 
system would bring up navigation points that begin with the letter entered. However, there were other 
navigation points in the area that began with letter ‘R’. The pilots selected the navigational point 
ROMEO, and the autopilot put the aircraft in the left turn. The aircraft shortly after collided with the 
mountain.  
Several events contributed to the crash of Cali flight. Here is list (not exhaustive) of events that lead to 
the accident. 
→ A serious flight delay and pilots fixation on making up time 
→ Localized rain, reduced visibility 
→ Communication failure between the ATC and the crew 
→ The aircraft could not be seen on radar by the ATC 
→ Change of runway and lack of time to prepare adequately for a new runway  
→ The pilot did not identifying navigational points by their coordinates and did not verify 
navigational points amongst themselves 
→ Poor conventions for navigation data charting 
→ Unretracted spoilers during the escape maneuver 
Box 5.2: Cali Aircraft Accident Summary 
Information structures have a dynamic property, just like the environment that they exist 
in. The information structures evolve and change and the pilot has to keep up with these 
changes and new pieces of information that may need to be linked to them. 
Restructuring or adding information to an existing structure also requires some sort of 
strategy. From the data it is apparent pilots tend to use a timeline as a baseline for 
structuring information related to the flight events. Below is the transcript that shows 
how the pilot builds up the initial structure and then has to change it due to a new 
runway assignment at the destination airport.  
Pilot 09:00 M (debrief pilot comment): ‘At this stage all I am doing is just flying Glenfield 1 
departure, so all the minor navigation aid selection up there are still the same 
as what I selected before take off.  The only thing that will change, once we 
get that change of runway.  You will see me manipulate that.’ 
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ATC 09:51 M: ‘All station in bound Sydney, Sydney terminal information bravo is about to 
be recorded duty runway 16R (i.e. change of runway), switch now, 140 
degrees, 15 knots, QNH 1022.’ 
Pilot 10:42 M (debrief pilot comment): ‘…What I did there on the glare shield, the first 
button press I did, which is just a little back from there, I highlighted one of 
my pointer selections there, because I knew once the runway has changed I 
wanted to reference the VOR to give me tracking information & needle 
pointer around the compass rose on the bottom, but at that point in time we 
did not have the VOR selected because we had the ILS frequencies in there 
for runway 07, so I was just waiting for PNF to swope those aids across.  
Once he did that you saw me there, you saw me there, I selected the VOR to 
give me some navigation information as to the 12-mile arc intercepting finals 
for 16R. Around the compass rose there wherever the tale of the pointer is 
that’s where you are.  That’s the rule you use. Once you’ve got that you can 
actually work out heading just by transposing your finger onto that compass 
card is to where you want to be to intercept a distance or a radial.  That’s sort 
of stuff the aircraft can’t tell you.’  
5.4.1.5 Strategies 
So far the data analysis has been considered with regards to the information pilots use; 
the sources of pilot’s information; internal information structures that pilot’s use and 
external information structure that are available to pilots in the environment. While 
conducting this analysis there are several instances where the pilots were observed 
employing strategies to assemble, organise, memorise and recall information for the 
right moment in the flight. Building from the existing data findings this is the point to 
answer the third posed question, (iii), ‘How pilots assemble above collected information 
to identify aircraft state?’. Additionally, this question is in line with another question 
that arose early in the analysis, ‘How, and when, do pilots identify the reference for the 
flight?’. This latter question is a more detailed version of the initially posed question. 
Perhaps the most obvious technique pilots’ use for identifying aircraft state information 
was a scanning technique. It was observed that pilots used this routinely to collect and 
update what they already know about the state of the aircraft. The word “…scan…” 
appears in pilot’s comments over ten times in just a single flight transcript. The pilot 
uses this technique throughout the flight.  
Pilot 04:53 M: All I’m looking for there on the PFD (i.e., Primary Flight Display), now my 
focus has come in inside once we are far away from the ground.   All I am 
doing is getting my attitude and heading set on the PFD, so I’m concentrating 
on putting the climb-dive marker where I want it.  Obviously we don’t have 
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any reference information there now, so I am just looking at the reference, the 
pitch ladder. So that’s all.  How many degrees I want & I was looking for 
about 7 degrees nose up there.  That’s usually a good figure to remember.  As 
accelerating at a nice rate, but not to quick, so you are not going to over 
speed the gear or anything like that. The other part of my scan is looking 
down at the compass card and quickly referencing and having a look at the 
level on there as to what heading I am flying. 
5.4.1.5.1 Scanning Techniques and Referenced Information 
The scanning techniques pilots routinely use to identify aircraft state has an affect on 
their already assembled referenced information. The scanning technique is used 
throughout the flight at regular time intervals to maintain and to verify aircraft 
behaviour (see below example Pilot 05:12). In the example the pilot’s scans the 
instruments to maintain the airspeed (i.e., Referenced Information) to avoid stalling the 
aircraft (i.e., maintain and verify aircraft behaviour).  
Pilot 05:12 M: So this is just my side scan there.  Looking at the airspeed there, making sure I 
have enough airspeed there, to sacrifice there, we are not stalling. 
Therefore, scanning is a strategy involving constantly updating the key referenced 
information to maintain and monitor the appropriate aircraft state throughout the flight. 
The example below (Pilot 05:49 M) shows how the pilot uses the scanning technique to 
take in many pieces of information from the instruments.  
Pilot 05:49 M: has to monitor a lot more… constantly watching, if I haven’t bust a height, an 
airspeed or a heading or whatever, so the workload increases significantly… 
In the following example (Pilot 16:26 M), whilst in the process of scanning, the pilot 
explains how he is using this strategy to align new information to referenced 
information in order to maintain aircraft track (i.e., direction of travel). This alignment 
appears similar to aspects, described in the first section of the data analysis, where the 
pilot is using stationary/unchanging symbols as references to be aligned with another 
moving symbols to make a complete symbol.  In the current case it is deduced that the 
pilot has a ‘mental picture’ of how ideally the referenced information should look.  The 
pilot manipulates the aircraft to accomplish the alignment of referenced information to 
agree with this mental picture. When the references are aligned, this indicates to the 
pilot that he has accomplished the task successfully. The display features in the diagram 
below aid the pilot to in using the scanning strategy in the maintenance of the aircraft 
track. Another similar example, Pilot 13:16 M can been seen in the flight transcript in 
Appendix 3 
Pilot 16: 26 M: So to maintain your track, you need to come left of your heading by 5 
degrees and that’s what little cross tells you to do.  So once I centralise that 
bar, next thing I look for is getting that cross on the tip of the needle.  Once 
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I’ve done that I know that bar is not going to move any more.  And that’s 
something I was letting out of my scan.   
It was also noted that pilots also employ strategies to construct information before the 
entire flight, during each briefing, and before each significant part of the flight. 
Unfortunately, the briefings for the flights were not captured on tape, but copious notes 
were taken for the purpose of analysis. Before each flight, pilots were given the basic 
information about the flight including, departure and destination airport by the 
researcher, then the pilots conducted a full briefing of the flight between themselves. 
They requested, weather reports for both airports at the corresponding departure and 
arrival times and ATIS (Automated Terminal Information Service) information 
containing information about active runway and the type of departure via specific 
navigation points. They drew the flight on the board, marking and discussing major 
events, such as, marking any turning points throughout the flight and ATC contact 
points and discussing any non-flight zones, height, speed and noise restrictions. It 
appeared that the pilots were mentally registering the sequence and timing of events on 
the flight route.  
From general observations these briefings appear crucial in establishing that the crew 
are ‘on the same page’, i.e. their flight plans are aligned/synchronised with each other 
before they conduct the flight. This is supported by the previous examples from the 
transcript data above (Co-pilot 10:26 M and Captain 10:28 M). Another good example 
of this can be seen from the transcript when pilots brief each other about take-off, and 
the next significant event. From this data it may be deduced that the pilots are 
constructing and aligning their view on how the flight would proceed from this moment 
on, by using major references either in the environment or on the displays. The 
references (i.e., track 015 and 1TAC or 1000 feet) are identified and the actions (i.e., 
turn right, track 170) to be executed are associated with these references are stated. For 
this example further evidence is provided by the pilot’s debrief comment stating, ‘…by 
briefing it (i.e., take-off), it’s actually putting into, right in to our minds…some of it can 
be done form memory’. 
Pilot 03:08 M (flight brief): Glenfield 1 departure out of here runway 10; plate stated 4 
October 2001, no amendments; gradient required 3.3%, which we can 
do; track 015 and 1TAC or 1000 feet, which ever is later, turn right, track 
170 to intercept 144 for Richmond NDB, track to Glenfield then as cleared. 
Pilot 03:08 M (debrief comment on above): ‘All that is just interpreting what’s on the plate 
there & by briefing it, it’s actually putting into, right in to our minds, instead 
of always refer to it, some of it can be done from memory. And usually what I 
will do with departure, some of the departures would be quite long and 
complex. However, you really cannot keep all of that information in your 
head, so what you do is brief the first or you just remember two to three 
instructions, so like maintain heading 095, 1000 feet or 1 TAC.  Next what 
I’m going to do is turn, right turn on TACAN distance.  TACAN is what we 
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use in the military – Tactical Air Navigation, type of DME. 1TAC is one 
DME essentially, i.e. 1 mile upwind and then make your turn onto 170.  They 
are sort of thing I remember… 
A couple of minutes into the flight the pilot recognizes the reference established during 
the flight brief and commands the associated action (see 05:42). 
Pilot 05:42 M (pilot is saying to a co-pilot): TAC1, turn right 170. 
Pilot 05:42 M (debrief comment on above): So in that, when I said there to myself that was 
just from memory.  That’s what I briefed before we took off.  So I knew once 
we got to 1TAC that’s what I am going to do.  That takes a little bit of a brain 
space away of trying to read the next step from your approach plate. 
In the example above the pilot used a strategy to help him to recall the required 
information by constructing future references using a timeline-sequence structure and 
later in the flight this reference triggers the recollection of the required action. 
Below is an example of pilots briefing each other about ‘the approach’ and establishing 
that they are both in agreement about the upcoming event. From this it may be deduced 
that they were constructing references that would indicate that they are on correct path 
and where are the locations of the execution points of their next actions (see Co-pilot 
11:16 M below). In the example below the reference is an outermarker, when it is 
reached, indicated by the sound as ‘BIP, BIP, BIP’ in Morse code, the pilot is satisfied 
that they are on the right course and it gives him an indication whether they need to 
make any adjustments. 
Co-pilot 11:16 M: 212 NDR MINIMUS radar set to 212.  Outermarker check height 1295 at 
4.7 (i.e. distance in miles) I’ll give you localiser frequency when you are 
turning… 
Morse code 17:55 M: …BIP, BIP, BIP… 
Pilot 17:55 M (debrief comment on above): Right now, I am interested in getting a landing 
clearance, so I am waiting for that come through.  I am also, next thing I’m 
looking at validating the ILS (i.e. Instrument Landing System) by that 
outermarker check height again. And PNF (i.e. Pilot-Not-Flying, co-pilot) 
briefed a little bit before, as to what the height, distance we were looking for, 
so that’s a next step. 
5.4.1.5.2 Calculating References  
However, not all references that pilots use during flight are necessarily established 
before the flight or during a briefing. Pilots have strategies to calculate references. 
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These references generally can be calculated in the same way for any flight. In the 
transcript below the pilot explained the technique of calculating a ‘3-degree flight path 
to the runway, also called a glideslope. The calculations generate points in space that the 
pilot can later reference to make sure the aircraft is on the required glideslope. The 
starting point of the glideslope is an important event during last stages of flight. 
Depending on the terrain, time of the day and weather the correct identification of the 
starting point of the glideslope along with precise calculations of checkpoints (i.e., 
references) can be critical.  
For the pilot to keep and maintain the 3-degree glideslope requires; first that its starting 
point is correctly identified, then several references at intervals on the glideslope need to 
be checked to verify whether he is maintaining the slope all the way to the runway. At 
example Pilot 14:32 M the pilot explains how he identified the point, ‘10 miles out I 
should be 3000 feet’ where he will start the descent to the runway. The references to 
check the maintenance of the glideslope is then, for every one mile is a descent of 300 
feet, ‘at 5 miles out I should be 1 500 feet, 10 miles out I should be 3000 feet’. At 15:40 
the pilot recognises the proximity of the reference, an ‘outermarker check-height’, 
which is ‘an intercept… at 10 miles… on glide slope’. The co-pilot confirms at 15:46. 
At 15:49 the pilot reaches the top of glideslope and initiates the descent.  
Pilot 14:32 M (debrief comment): …And again TACAN means DME (i.e. Distance 
Measuring Equipment), so that I can have a reference to the outermarker 
check-height, when I am likely to incept the glide slope.  So things I look for 
that is, just as a check I always calculate, when I am going to intercept my 
glide slope, because my style is designed to enter a 3-degree slope, you can 
calculate that every mile you need to be 300 feet.  So at 5 miles out I should 
be 1 500 feet, 10 miles out I should be 3000 feet.  We are at 3000 feet, so we 
were going to intercept the glide slope at 10 miles.  So I was just referencing 
down to the distance there at the bottom of the PFD to give me an indication 
so as to when I was going to intercept the finals course in the glide slope. 
Pilot 15:40 M: ‘We should expect an intercept in about 10 miles, there on the glide slope.’ 
Co-pilot 15:46 M: ‘Quite close in.’ 
Pilot 15:49 M: ‘And leaving 3000 for the minimum of 220.’ 
Pilot 15:40 M (debrief comment): That’s what I was telling you before.  I calculated that in 
my head.  Pretty much as you see 10 miles click over, glide slope right in the 
center.  Ready to go. 
Numerous calculation techniques are taught to trainee pilots from their very earliest 
flying experience, which has been primarily experienced by the researcher. These 
techniques are routinely used by pilots in manual aircraft, and also as a means of cross 
checking the automation in aircraft with automated systems. Consequently, these 
techniques are considered important in the analysis. Such calculations often occur when 
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the pilot goes through mental processes to establish references, such as a mental 
reference for the assessment of when does the pilot need to start levelling off, i.e. a 
mark at ‘10% of your rate of climb’ to the level off altitude. Another mental reference 
that pilots need to calculate, but is also unavailable on the display in the example below, 
is a mark on 7 degrees prior the required roll out heading. This is when the pilot will 
have to begin to come out of a ‘banking turn’ to ‘roll out’ on the required heading. The 
pilot calculates mental references using referenced information, such as ‘height… rate 
of climb…turning rate’. All the calculations in the given example below are measured 
in relation to a time, such as a rate of turn in seconds or a rate of climb in minutes.  
Pilot 05:49 M: ‘I will just explain something here.  That might look like a fairly benign thing. 
All we are doing there just climbing & turning, but my workload is really 
increasing there, … what rate I am climbing at, when I will need to start my 
level off and also when I will need to start my roll out from a turn.  … how 
many degrees per second I am rolling at; how many feet per minute I am 
climbing at … so what I’m looking for.  I am having a look at my rate of 
climb.  I am doing about 2500 feet/min, so 10% of your rate of climb is what 
you use to level off at for your height so 250 feet before 3000 feet and that’s 
when I’ve got to start my level off.  And they are the things I am thinking 
about when I am doing that.  Obviously approaching about 7 degrees at the 
rate I was turning at – rate 1 (i.e. 3 degrees per second or turn at the rate 1 is 
when the aircraft turns full 360 degrees in two minutes), is when you start 
your roll out.   
Ye, looks simple, but that what we do a lot of practice for instrument flying, 
doing coordination exercises, turning and climbing at the same time, 
descending…’. 
All references in the above example are against a scale. The position on that scale gives 
an established reference a significant and a meaningful point relative to a new reference 
to the pilot. In the above calculation, the pilot uses three different scales; the altitude 
scale in feet and in minutes; the compass gradation in degrees, and the time in minutes 
and seconds. For example, in calculations to make the correct ‘roll out’ on a heading, 
the pilot uses two references; one existing reference on the compass gradation scale 
(i.e., the heading), and a new reference he has calculated to assist him to begin the 
rollout (e.g. in this case 7 degrees prior to the required heading). Therefore, it can be 
seen that once the pilot has established references they are meaningless unless they are 
represented on some kind of scale and relative to another reference. 
The same is true with other references that pilots use. From the analysis it appears that 
references have to be used; either in relation to other features (i.e. display features, wing 
symbols); against other references, and when assessed against one another, each 
reference be at the appropriate scale. In the example below (Pilot 20:12 M), the pilot 
talks about navigational aids, i.e., outside physical references, as points of reference to 
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help him in a strategy to maintain course. Here, the pilot uses navigation aids as 
references to compare his position relative to them, to establish the position of aircraft, 
and identify the next point of an event, such as ‘level off’ or turn. 
 Pilot 20:12 M: …margins you have to anticipate – level off, turning on heading. That sort of 
thing.  Manually thinking, where you are with regards to navigation aids and 
just things like that increase the workload slightly. 
Re-examining the flight as a whole, it can be seen that, calculated references and 
established references (e.g. navigational aids), all become a part of the flight path. The 
references are effectively ‘strung together’ to construct a desired flight path, where 
references exist to mark a point of execution or completion of the next action, as 
discussed in strategies earlier.  However, the references used in strategies are not only 
calculated, or established during a brief (e.g. a navigational point), but they also come 
from previous experience, such as described in the subsequent example. 
The comment below shows that the pilot knew from previous experience, not just from 
the earlier briefing, that they are approaching a significant point on the flight path, i.e., a 
reference initiating the start of a descent where ATC would contact them shortly. From 
the researchers previous flight experience it appears that ‘flight stages’ are a 
fundamental concept of flight training. Flight stages are important points that all flights 
have, i.e.; taxi, take-off, climb, top of climb, cruise, top of descent, descent, approach, 
final, landing and taxi. Reviewing the data, flight stages are evident in all the flights. 
Considering the flight stages concept, it is reasonable here to deduce that the pilot had a 
plan of sequenced events/stages of flight for the entire flight and was ‘expecting (a 
command to descent to a specific height) to come up’.  
ATC 12:52 M: ‘Call Name 123 descent to 3000.’ 
Pilot 12:54 M: ‘3000, left 5000. Call Name 123’ 
Pilot 12:54 M: The ATC gave us descend down to 3000, which is the starting height from 
which you make the approach, so that’s something we were expecting to 
come up soon anyway.  
5.4.1.5.3 ‘Backbone’ Strategy  
Another aspect that arises from the data is that pilots also have strategies to adapt to 
changes in the flight plan. Scrutinising data around changes to the flight plan in the 
observed study shows that, the pilot used the most stationary/unchanging reference of 
the flight as a ‘backbone’ or ‘stationary reference’, such as flight stages. It is reasoned 
that pilots use the flight stages as a stationary reference as this is very unlikely to 
change.  Using the flight plan as a stationary reference provides a structure onto which 
‘less stationary’ or interchangeable references, i.e., the airport of departure, route via a 
specific navigation aid/point, further navigation aids and associated headings, approach 
route, planned runway and destination airport can be assigned.  These interchangeable 
references then hold variable, or dynamic references, such as height, speed and airspace 
restrictions. When a change to an element of the flight plan occurs the pilot only needs 
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to address and then change minor points, using this hierarchy. The example below (Pilot 
09:00 M) shows this in action as change of runway that is about to take place. 
Pilot 09:00 M: ‘At this stage all I am doing is just flying Glenfield 1 departure, so all the 
minor navigation aid selection up there are still the same as what I selected 
before take off. The only thing that will change, once we get that change of 
runway.  You will see me manipulate that.’ 
5.4.1.5.4 Mental Extrapolation Strategy 
One more strategy that is vital to mention, are pilots’ meticulous considerations of 
future outcomes. Pilots throughout the flight perform mental extrapolations of future 
outcomes based on current observable and known parameters. Similar to the example 
below, the pilot considers the result of staying on the selected course, which he thinks 
was commanded by the Air Traffic Control. When the pilot mentally puts on the 
navigational display the extrapolated path based on current trajectory, he notices that 
this will take them off required course and will not bring them to the next point in 
space. 
The use of this strategy is always necessary to cross check aircraft systems performance 
and execution of navigational plan. In the case below the use of the mental extrapolation 
strategy helped the pilot to identify the course entry error, that was initially mishear and 
incorrectly entered by the crew. 
Co-Pilot 10:33 M: ‘Sydney, Treasure 123, just confirm that heading was 060.’ 
Pilot 10:33 M (debrief comment): ‘PNF misheard what the ATC gave us. He gave us heading 
045, but he read, he actually initially give us 060 & then came back again & 
said left heading 045 & PNF didn’t respond & that’s when he call him back 
& said, yep turn left heading 045.’ 
ATC 10:37 M: ‘Treasure 123, negative, Magnetic 045.’ 
Co-Pilot 10:41 M: ‘045, Treasure 123.’ 
Pilot 10:42 M (debrief comment): ‘And the reason I query that is because I had a look at the 
compass rose there & thought that 060 is gonna put us fairly close to the 
finals course there, by the time we intercept the 12 mile arc, so I thought we 
really need to come further left there. And that sounds reasonable to me, so I 
better check & that just worked out that it was what he said anyway.’ 
The mental extrapolation strategy helps pilot identify the onset of navigational errors 
and system performance. This also helps pilots to monitor automation performance and 
provide pilots with ample time to correct undesired flight outcomes. 
The preceding examples are taken from the analysis of a manual flight that represents 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 5: The Empirical Study
  
 
125
one-eighths of the empirical data. This flight is used as it is both: representative of the 
findings for the manually operated aircraft and examples from the single flight provide 
an element of continuity to the narrative of the chapter. The discussion part of this 
chapter includes the results of the same data analysis on the rest of the data, i.e., three 
more manual flights and four automated flights. 
5.4.2 Data analysis – automated aircraft operation 
The analysis of automated flight was conducted using the same evolutionary four-stage 
cycle. The results of the analysis are similar to those of the manual flight data analysis. 
The only differences occur in some of the structure of information and that Standard 
Operating Procedure is extended to include activation of automated functions. The 
discussion part of the chapter includes the results of both automated and manual flight 
operation. The differences are highlighted. 
One significant point to note here is that, in observing the comparison of pilot activity 
between automated and non-automated aircraft, the pilots appeared similarly occupied. 
Additionally, the strategies and references that the pilots were observed using were the 
same in both types of aircraft operation, with the difference that the calculation of 
references that pilots would later use in flight is done by automation in the automated 
aircraft. However, pilots do crosscheck all the data against the charts and their manual 
calculations before the flight, even for the automated flight, as in the example below 
(Pilot 04:00 A). 
Pilot 04:00 A: ‘Checking the Take-off and landing data is correct. You might actually see me 
flip trough my book see if my Take-off and landing data, check the speeds, 
for what weight we are at and that way it’s checking the calculation of the 
CNI (i.e. Communications, Navigation, and Identification Management Unit) 
to insure that’s correct.  Then I will check the route that we have, put in the 
box and that way we check that against our navigational charts to make sure 
that distances and tracks we have on those match up to what the 
COMM/NAV (i.e. Communication and Navigation) interface gives us.  That 
way we will know when we engage the automation will give us the correct 
path for us. 
 …The landing data includes threshold speeds and approach speeds per flap 
setting.  So if I was with 0 (zero) flap there will an approach speed and a 
threshold speed and what I will be looking at for are those on finals is to try 
and aim to hit those speeds (i.e. Behavior reference). The approach speed 
(i.e. Behavior reference) I will fly all the down until I get close to the 
threshold (i.e. Environment reference) and then I pull a little bit of power off, 
have the speed dribble back until I hit my threshold speed (Behavior 
reference) over the threshold 350 feet (i.e. Environment reference); and then 
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from there I pull my throttles back to flight idle and speed will decay to a 
touch down speed (i.e. Behavior reference). Those speeds are already pre-
calculated in the CNI and by me doing it I’m checking that they are correct, if 
they are not correct, we are possibly flying slower then we are required to be 
for that weight. 
The above example also illustrates that pilots use the same information for references, 
such as speed and height references, in the automated flight as they do during a manual 
flight. 
An example of automation failure, which was not planned, is worth mentioning here. 
The Integrated Navigation (INAV) failed and pilots lost navigation support on the 
display. This was a good example to observe how pilots coped when the automation 
failed to provide the required reference information (see Pilot 16:51 A). In this example 
the pilot is calculating the required references with the help of the following; a ‘heading 
bug’ (a manually set indicator concentric with the dial), the dial needle, and his 
recollections of information he acquired before the flight (see Pilot 17:36 A). 
Pilot 16:51 A: ‘For some reason my INAV posses, ‘stuffing up’ (i.e. not working properly).’ 
Pilot 17:36 A: (debrief comment): Flight Director is not doing anything for me apart from 
keeping me on heading. But what I’m doing, which (Flight Director heading) 
I just selected.  I had to manually think of: ‘I’m coming around to this radial, 
there is 2 degrees lead on the NDB (i.e. Nondirectional Beacon) now, because 
we are about 20 miles away from it, therefore if I turn now, I’m gonna roll 
out on the heading inbound to the Glenfield NDB of 144. That’s the 
calculation I’m doing mentally. And all I’m doing is manipulating the 
heading bug to give me what I want from that needle, but the Flight Director 
is not helping me.’’ 
Researcher: Where did you acquire the distance that you just calculated?  
Pilot: I didn’t (…acquire that information…).  I knew, because I looked on the chart before 
we left.  It’s about 25 miles is the profile between the Glenfield NDB and 
Richmond. And I know we hadn’t been flying for more then 2 or 3 minutes at 
that stage so we gain 5 miles or 10 miles may be, so we still had 15 to 20 
track miles to the NDB to go and that’s just a piloting skill.  That’s what you 
keep in the back of your mind I guess.  That’s what good about 
NAV/RADAR (i.e. Navigation and Radar) display because of the range ring 
on it as well. 
The last comment from the pilot illustrates how the pilot strung and structured, 
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information together when it was not available from the automated display. Here, the 
pilot uses the range rings, the distance between which corresponds to a pilot selectable 
distance.  These concentric rings were then used by the pilot as a reference for distance 
to estimate the aircraft’s position relative to both, the departure and destination 
runways. The pilot also used time, as another reference for the distance travelled, by 
calculating the distance travelling in each minute. The pilot used both references in 
combination to establish accurately his position relative both departure and destination 
airports.  
It can be seen from the last debrief comment that pilots use the same references, 
strategies and structures either, when automation fails, or to ‘double check’ that the 
automation has given them the correct information. During automated flights pilots 
appeared to have used more often a monitoring strategy, which consisted of the pilots’ 
knowing in the first instance what to expect, or ‘look for, watch for’ in specific 
references and trends. The references were either selected on the display or pre-
calculated mentally. Therefore, the trend, appearing on the display needs to be initially 
‘visualised’ in the pilot’s mind, in order that the actual reference confirms his 
expectations of the aircraft’s behaviour. See the comment below as an illustration of this 
argument (see Pilot comment 29:54).  
Pilot 29:54 A: ‘You can hear the beacon coming through  … the outer marker, which is that 
sound.  All it is just a radio beacon underneath (i.e. Environment reference) 
and that particular point, at that distance from the runway (i.e. relative to 
another Environment reference) that give us an accurate check at 1295 feet 
(i.e. Environment reference), that we are right on the glideslope.  It validates 
the landing instrument system for us (i.e. double check) and by us checking 
we know that the glideslope is good and it checks out and then I look at the 
Primary Flight Display then and make sure the glideslope indicator is right on 
the center.’ 
In the above example the pilot had already mentally assigned a position for the 
glideslope indicator on the display and that is where he is looking for it, to confirm the 
position of it is where he expects it. This strategy of expecting, and then looking for ‘IT’ 
(i.e., the reference - the ‘picture’ in the pilot’s mind), is used frequently by pilots 
throughout the entire automated flight. The same was observed in manual flights, but 
because pilots had instantaneous manual control of almost all of the aircraft’s 
performance, pilots’ expectation and monitoring behaviour was seen less frequently.  
It was observed that some of the information structures provided by the automation 
create confusion, and it is argued that this is because they are not solely based on the 
information structures pilots use already. One example observed was structure of 
information in the Communications, Navigation, and Identification Management Unit 
(CNI-MU).  The structure of the CNI-MU does not follow any of the structures pilots’ 
use as deduced from the analysis, or indeed, any from already established aircraft 
instrumentation. During the observations pilots had difficulty finding, and so 
questioned, the location of a specific ‘pages’ of information in the CNI-MU. The 
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immediate location of system pages in the CNI-MU can be crucial, especially in change 
of runway situation, where access to the right page is required to change the required 
navigation data.  
Moreover, the structure of the page changes as the flight progresses. For example, 
different pages come up if the system is accessed in the air or on the ground. One 
example of page structure change is when the aircraft is powered up, at this point the 
initiation page would comes up. However, this page cannot be brought up later in the 
flight, and the information initially entered on this page is distributed through other 
pages.  This was observed to cause confusion, and made it difficult for pilots to learn 
the structure of information in the CNI-MU while operating the aircraft. 
Last, but not least, of the important results from the automated flights was the confusion 
pilots have with applied the philosophy of automation presentation. The instrument 
symbols in the manual aircraft represent the actual position of the aircraft in relation to 
all other symbology. However, during the automated flight, the information is presented 
as means to guide the pilot on the correct path. The philosophy of the automated 
information presentation is ‘Fly to’, or ‘Fly towards’, meaning if the pilot follows the 
symbol it will lead him/her on the correct path. This means that the same information 
will be presented differently in the manual and automated aircraft.  For example, during 
manual flight the pilot would see the symbol above one symbol, where during the 
automated flight the pilots would see the symbol below one symbol.  
Confusion of this nature is exactly what happened during the observed flights where, in 
one instance, one of the experienced pilots confused such an annunciation on the 
Primary Flight Display (see below: Pilot 31:19 A). Observation of pilot training, and the 
study of aircraft operation manuals reinforced that the philosophy of ‘Fly towards’, 
when applied to cockpit design, actually contradicts what pilots’ are familiar with when 
the automation is not engaged. 
Pilot 31:19 A:  Just glancing on the Primary Flight Display there, just to make sure that 
everything is still right. Can see that I’m relatively on glideslope, just a little 
bit above, actually just a little below, because it’s fly to (i.e. the pilot is 
referring to the philosophy of design).’ 
5.4.3 Data analysis prior to the observation flight and during training 
In preparation for the flight:  
At the beginning of the analysis of the master tape footage the pilot is requested to 
recall their actual observations on the flightdeck. The pilot then gives distinct 
consideration to their preparation for the flight and their setting of things right. At this 
point the pilot is aligning existing visual references in the cockpit to their ‘accustomed 
to’ position. 
These preparations proceed in a set order, first, before aircraft power up, the pilot 
adjusts his seat height and its proximity to the pedals. This may appear trivial, however, 
it accomplishes a number of key ergonomic requirements, such as physical comfort 
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(vital for a long flight), that all the dials on the overhead panel are within adequate 
reach, that he is positioned close enough to the radar/brake pedals, and also that he is 
high enough to see over the instrument panel ahead. The latter is of key importance as it 
forms the primary resource for the future alignment of visual references and their 
relative position to the outside references, such as the horizon. The pilot’s visual 
perspective from his seat carries implications on how references are aligned, and how 
the pilot perceives the information in the environment outside the aircraft (i.e., a view 
over the instrument panel), where the top of the panel acts as a ‘relative to’ reference to 
the outside reference (e.g., the runway view on approach).  
The pilot’s eye-level position over the instrument panel, becomes important when the 
pilot has to fly without constantly referring to the instruments that indicate his position 
relative to the horizon, i.e., nose up, nose down, or when turning right or left. If there is 
good visibility the pilot constantly refers to both the outside horizon and the instruments 
while turning or climbing to check for four unwanted effects: over or under ‘banking’ 
the aircraft, and too great or too small ‘climb’ or ‘dive’. This can happen due to a lag in 
instrument readings (both manual and automated) that interpret the aircraft position. The 
lag in the instrument readings makes the pilot ‘chase’, as it commonly referred to, the 
intended position. To avoid the chase the pilot should learn to keep a constant angle 
between the top of the instrument panel relative to outside references, such as, the 
horizon in the desired bank angle, climb or decent, and then maintain that position 
during the manoeuvre. 
The pilot’s review of the flight deck and these aspects reminded the researcher of 
similar experiences during pilot training where the instructor insisted on correct seat 
adjustments before each flight so that eye-level over the instrument panel was the same 
on every flight. 
This eye-level position relative to the view over the instrument panel is also important 
during the approach and landing flight phase. The pilot’s eye-level needs to be in its 
required and accustomed position for the pilot to place relative to references against the 
top of instrument panel. If the pilot has too high, or too low, an eye-level position the 
implication would be either too high or low angle of attack during a descent. This effect 
is due to the relative distance between the top of the instrument panel and the horizon. A 
similar effect can be seen in the example from the pilot’s comment from the automated 
flight below (Pilot: 30:19 A).  In this example the pilot finds it important, and helpful, to 
establish his references from the outside environment relative to the window frame of 
the cockpit 
Pilot: 30:19 A: ‘Now what I’m trying to do is to establish the frame of reference within that 
window, where the runway is, what my instruments are telling me, so that I 
can...  if you’ve been starring inside and when they finally look outside and 
that’s when you got to flare and land, it doesn’t give you enough time to 
adjust to a new visual environment.  So I’m trying to establish the visual 
environment again and get my eye in for where I’m aiming on the runway.   
Reviewing the data analysis of this section in completion, it appears that all the 
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information pilots used was connected, either relative to another reference (i.e., 
instrument reading), or relative to an external reference (e.g. the horizon, relative to the 
top of the instrument panel). The information pilots used were constantly evolving, but 
relative to references were used to maintain a steady flight path. In the next section, the 
discussion – in retrospect of data analysis, the spiral analysis shows of how pilots 
acquire and use information, how information evolves and how pieces of information 
relate to each other. 
The analysis used in this thesis can be described as similar to tracing a web of 
information and no matter where the researcher starts until he/she runs through most of 
the routes that make the picture complete the analysis is not finished. There may be 
gaps where information is missing, but these gaps will be filled when designing an 
information display for a specific task in the same domain. However, despite the gaps if 
there are all links present and complete, there are no missing links in extracted data. 
5.5 In Retrospect of data analysis… 
As the analysis progressed the diagram of how pilots use information began to emerge. 
This emerging diagram is based on the four-stage iterative analysis progression (Figure 
5.10) used in the data analysis. Both the data analysis diagrams, and pilot information 
use diagram, are concerned with information collection, analysis and use. The pilot 
information diagram required intermediate stages to explain in detail how information 
evolved before, during and after the flight. The resulting diagram has an octagon shape 
representing eight stages of pilot information use. The octagon diagram evolves into a 
spiral at each progression through eight stages, representing pilot’s progression in 
acquiring information for the flight, knowledge and experience. 
The first stage of the information progression represents the pilot’s existing experience 
based knowledge. Such knowledge includes: the stages that each flight consists of, the 
structure of information, (e.g. Air Traffic Control calls and flight briefs), and the 
strategies that the pilot has acquired through training and ‘on-line’ operation. This stage 
would also include a request for a new flight, which will build on existing knowledge 
and experience. The request itself will create the movement into the second stage.  
The second stage represents the acquisition of all new information related to the flight. 
All information regarding this flight will be introduced during this stage, the brief, the 
planning of the route, and route related weather and restrictions. The second stage is 
also the beginning of information acquisition and the processing of new information 
that lasts four stages. 
The third stage of information acquisition involves identifying for transpired alternative 
airports and all the related information to alternative arrangements required for the 
flight, such additional route calculations, relevant weather and restrictions for the 
alternative destination. New regulations that are relevant or have been introduced will 
also be introduced in this stage. 
Stage four is the ‘selector’ of information acquisition, where new solutions are 
identified, and where separation of work, tasks and problems are assigned. This stage is 
where new information is generated from all the acquired information and from the pre-
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existing knowledge of the pilot. The calculation of relevant flight references also occurs 
at this stage. If this stage were associated with a flight stage, it would be a brief before 
take-off, or a brief before a significant event or a brief due to a change in original flight 
plan. 
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Figure 5.10: Evolution of Information Flow 
Stage five involves organising information. This is where pilots group and align 
references that they later used in flight. At this stage the information becomes sorted in 
structures to assist pilots in implementation of strategies.  
Stage six is the end of information acquisition and the beginning of information use and 
the flight execution stage. All newly acquired information references and information 
structures are compared with existing references and structures. This stage then holds 
the outcome of these comparisons. Additionally, all information is connected and 
information dependencies and links are established. Consequently, information 
references find their relative position on the display, relative to each other, or relative to 
already existing references. This is the point of clarity. At this stage the information is 
not likely to change its position, unless a change in flight plan or situation occurs.  
Flight execution happens at stage seven. All the strategies, i.e., maintain, monitor and 
scan, extrapolate, that pilots use to fly the aircraft are implemented here, on the basis of 
the information collected from previous experience and newly acquired and organised 
information. 
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Stage eight involves turning all newly attained information, such as references and 
structures, in to knowledge and experience. The cycle then spirals on to a new level at 
this stage, the pilot having attained additional knowledge and experience. The new 
cycles is triggered by a new flight or a change to flight plan. 
5.5.1 What is reference and how is it used? 
References possess specific properties. They are constant, reliable and unchanging. This 
can be distinguishes them from other information and so makes them good pieces of 
information to rely on. For example, references would remain in a specific location or 
maintain their shape, size, or weight. Consequently, these can be used to compare them 
to other objects or pieces of information to establish their relative position or to 
represent a new piece of information or object.  However, a reference on its own has no 
meaning. The reference is usually established among a large amount of information to 
differentiate the ‘value’ of the information that is required. The reference would show 
where a person or navigation appoint is in relation to a bigger picture, a map of a town, 
or a position in the airport. This makes a reference reliable to mark the onset of another 
event, for example a ‘level off point’ would be a reference in space and time.  
Every reference pilot use has a connection either to previous references in time and 
space or is relative to other internal or external type of reference. The pilot needs a 
reference system that is connected in order to be able to trace information throughout 
the flight. The pilot ties the information together using references alignment, to keep 
continuation of information. This also helps the pilots to retain and recall information. 
References either can already exist in the environment, or on the display, and these are 
visible references that pilots use to establish the relative position of other symbols or 
features. References can also exist in the pilot’s mind. These types of references can 
either be professionally acquired, such as during the basic flight stages of the any flight, 
or acquired through common human life experience, not necessarily related to 
professional experience. These ‘human references’ are common or recognisable to 
humans, such as horizon, which in common experience has the properties of being 
constant and unchanging. The table below shows four groups of references and their 
source (Table 5.11). 
HUMAN or 
PROFESSIONAL 
References 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL 
EXISTING 
The reference that exists 
outside and is visible against 
which other visible objects 
can be compared to or 
related to, such as the 
Horizon 
The reference is a construction 
that exists in person’s mind. 
This reference is not always 
obtained through external 
visual representation; for 
example, representation of 
Time as a picture or as a 
moment i.e., a minute or a 
week, but it also can be a face 
of a clock for a position 
representation of 3 or 11 
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o’clock.  
ACQUIRED 
These references can already 
exist in the environment, but 
they are recently acquired, 
but new to the person, for 
example navigation points or 
significant buildings in town. 
These references can either 
be created by the pilot or a 
person to accomplish the 
work required, such as 
glideslope check points in 
space and later can become 
internal if they are used 
frequently.  
 
The reference has been 
acquired through experience 
professional or human/personal 
and have been internalised to 
have a presentation, for 
example basic flight stages 
would be such a references for 
pilots 
Table 5.11: Type of References 
Based on the data analysis, the references pilots used can be further distinguished in to 
three categories (Table 5.12). The second to top horizontal row divides references in to 
three columns, corresponding to types of references; physical description, appearance, 
behaviour related and environment related references. The third row provides the 
description of each reference category.  
REFERENCES for 
Physical 
description/appearance Behaviour Environment 
Reference representing a 
physical constraint, this 
will also include a 
constraint in the 
environment, such as a 
runway length for example
Reference either 
representing current or 
future behaviour or the 
limitations of the 
behaviour/performance 
Reference established in 
the environment, either 
has to be maintained or 
signify the next event 
Flap 50 position Flying straight (heading 015) 1000 feet 
Landing gear 
down or up 
Turning at rate 1 (i.e., 3 
degrees per second) 
Glideslope:  
10 miles out at 3000 feet 
and 5 miles out at 1 500 
feet 
Fuel level Climb at 7 degrees Outermarker  (navigation point) 
Engine power level Climb at 2500 feet per minute Cloud base at 1500 feet 
Trim of the aircraft Airspeed of 120 knots 12 mile arc 
Table 5.12: Description and examples of references in three categories 
Within the table the references are not necessarily compared only to each other within 
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the category. For example, on the navigation display the environment reference, such a 
navigation point ROMEO, can be compared against the behavioural reference, marked 
on the compass card as a heading, to establish whether the aircraft is on the correct 
course.  
Different category references can also be connected to indicate that an event, for 
example, the environment reference (i.e., 1000 feet), can be the trigger for a behavioural 
reference to be executed or maintained (i.e., 60 degree bank). The pilot connects 
references, not only in previously reported structures, but also from alternate behaviour, 
the environment and physical references, in order to execute of the flight plan. One 
further example is given below (Pilot 14:39 M) of two references that through their 
connection and alternation trigger an action. In this example on reaching a speed of 180, 
is recognised as a safe speed to reconfigure the physical structure of the aircraft, by 
lowering flaps to 50. 
Pilot 14:39 M: ‘…Below 180, flaps 50.’ 
References can be used, and are used by pilots, to mark present and future events. All 
references in Table 5.12, above, can, for example, mark current position and identifying 
future position of the aircraft against a new altitude reference. To identify present from 
future, or even past references, pilots use structures that align references relative to each 
other, or along an established parameter, such as distance and time. 
The references used by pilots on automated flights did not significantly vary from those 
used in the manual flights. Automation modes represent aircraft behaviour references, 
for example a ‘VS –2000’, represents the aircraft descending at 2000 feet per minute. 
One further example of combined references involves use of the Flight Director. Flight 
Director is an aspect of automation combines several references in to one, with the aim 
to ease pilots workload. The example below (Pilot 05:49 M) shows a pilot’s comments 
on the Flight Director:  
Pilot 05:49 M: Like the Flight Director works out what rate I am climbing at (i.e. Behavior 
reference), when I will need to start my level off (i.e. Environment reference) 
and also when I will need to start my roll out (Environment reference) from a 
turn.  It calculates how many degrees per second I am rolling at (i.e. Behavior 
reference); how many feet per minute I am climbing at (i.e. Behavior 
reference) and gives me a nice solution there, so that ball eventually just 
comes down on to the horizon and smack-bang on my heading.   
One of many fascinating strategies that were observed in relation to references is that 
pilots’ appear to know what they are looking for at all times. Further, the pilot appears 
to know what to expect on the display, or in the response of the aircraft to the 
environmental or to physical changes. The pilot’s were observed to look for these trends 
and changes to appear as references on their displays at specific instances.  From these 
observations it was determined that the pilots always appeared ‘mentally’ ahead of the 
aircraft’s current situation, and so their expectation and monitoring strategies are 
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deduced as them waiting for the actual events to catch up with their ‘mental 
movie/picture’ of how the events should evolve.  An example of this is given below 
(Pilot 19:33 A). 
Pilot 19:33 A: …and the next thing I was looking at once I’ve made that speed change to 
210, I was looking for that the speed tape was increasing… 
It was observed that when the expected references are not reached, or missed, the pilot 
questions what has happened, or what has influenced the resulting aircraft behaviour.  
Lastly, references also can be identified due to the context they are used in, even when 
full information is not given about them. For example, when ATIS information was read 
to the pilot, the Air Traffic Control mentioned only numbers, but because the number in 
that information structure can only represent the wind direction, i.e., ‘140 degrees, 15 
knots’, see below (ATC 09:51 M).  
ATC 09:51 M: ‘All station in bound Sydney, Sydney terminal information bravo is about to 
be recorded duty runway 16R, switch now, 140 degrees, 15 knots, QNH 
1022.’ 
In the case above, although the information was not complete, the context of where the 
reference was used and the structure of the information gave definite clues to the pilots 
to what the Air Traffic Control was referring too.  
Comparing the physical actions of pilots on both the manual and automated flights it 
appeared that they were similarly busy. The amount of time it took pilots on the 
automated flight, in setting references in to the automated systems, appeared to 
correspond well with the time taken to pilot the aircraft manually. The pilot’s debrief 
comments, below, provide some detail about how the pilot attempted to use the 
automation to reduce his workload. In the example it shows how the pilot offloaded all 
the references he needed to hold in his own memory to the automation, so the 
automation could then follow the references and this meant that he now only needed to 
check that the references were correct, and that the resulting aircraft configuration, 
behaviour and flight path matched the flight plan in his mind. For a long flight 
offloading the basic flying to the aircraft, can put less strain on the pilot.  However, on a 
short flight this automation can be counterproductive, as it commonly entails the pilot 
programming and reprogramming the automation.  The pilot notes this in the debrief 
comment below (comment Pilot 21:52 A).  
Pilot 21:52 A (debrief comment): …I’m going: ‘How am I going to intercept 12 mile arc, 
when I don’t have the VOR needle up’, because we have selected the ILS 
frequencies in there.  You saw me glancing across the NAV radar display 
there.  I’ve already had a look at the range rings there, when we got that radar 
vectored heading …that increases our workload even more, because now I’ve 
got to think about getting us back on track before we can start the approach.  
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So I’m looking at distance and then I’m thinking at what distance do I want to 
turn to incept the arc to get back on profile again to where I can intercept 
finals. 
Researcher : … and all of that you are thinking in your head?  
Pilot (debrief comment): Yes, the Flight Director can’t help me, because the ILS is selected 
up there at the moment.’  
Researcher : … you can’t change that? 
Pilot (debrief comment): We could change that, but it would be more work for us to seat 
down or to look into the CNI quickly change the VOR needles and then by 
the time… The other thing I was thinking, we are very close to the finals 
course, but the time we select the VOR needles up, I will be on my 12 mile 
arc and then all over sudden we’ve got to select the ILS frequency again 
anyway.  So that the CDI bar is going to give me information on the 
intercepting the finals course. So it wasn’t worthwhile changing over for that 
long, it would have increased our workload more.  So what I’m looking at is 
the distance on the bottom of the PFD there and working out at what distance 
I have to turn into the 12 mile arc. 
5.5.2 What are the Structures? 
One of the several outcomes of this study is that the analysis of the data helped to 
preserve the dynamics of the environment that pilots operate in. This preservation 
enabled many findings about the structuring of information to emerge. Earlier, it was 
discussed that the evolution of information appears to occur in a spiral manner, before, 
after, and throughout the flight. Additionally, it was found that there are stationary 
structures (i.e., the basic flight phases) that never change and serve as a ‘backbone’ for 
more interchangeable structures (i.e., such as flight plan and route), which can change at 
any moment. However, given that both stationary and interchangeable structures co-
exist the flow and exchange of dynamic information (i.e., altitude, route and heading) 
must be ordered so that this can proceed without creating chaos in the information 
structure. 
All the pre-existing information structures have evolved over the relatively short period 
of aviation development, roughly 100 years. These include the information structures 
such as; ATC calls, ATIS information delivery, navigation plates, flight checklist, flight 
briefs and procedures. All these information structures have developed both, through 
pre-considered design, but also through trial and error. This has resulted in robust 
information structures that appear very suited to the event they order. For example, the 
flight checklist is performed in the order that the actions should be executed during the 
flight; flight briefings of the entire flight are similarly ordered, with the flight stages 
briefed in order also. Additionally, the ATC calls have a structure suitable for audio 
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information, where the first sentence addresses the attention of the appropriate crew, 
and then their instructions follow. Also, in a pilot response call, to compensate for 
humans relatively poor ability to memorise, the pilot first reads the instruction that the 
crew just received and lastly repeats their ‘call name’. History documents it took a lot of 
thought, trial and error and lives to establish these effective in human-machine 
operation information structures in this domain (for examples see (Billings, 1997) and 
(Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999).  
Without performing the detailed analysis it is not apparent just how large an amount of 
information pilots’ have to deal with through their senses in flight. Using the results of 
this study may assist in structuring information to support pilots’ workflow. Information 
structure can be supported through interface, and cockpit design. If implemented in the 
correct manner this may help pilots use information more efficiently as the information 
will be presented in familiar structures, at the appropriate instances seemingly fluidly as 
they conduct the flight.  
During the preliminary study it was established that pilots use virtually the same 
information about the future and the present aircraft states. The same was confirmed 
during this study. However, as it was noted during the observation of training, and 
confirmed in this study, current displays do not have much information to facilitate 
pilots need to plan ahead for each manoeuvre, and so ‘stay ahead of the aircraft’ or see 
the immediate and future effects of the aircraft’s current configuration. 
Current displays also provide minimal to no time related information, which as it was 
observed plays a crucial role in monitoring aircraft performance and behaviour.  Seeing 
the effects of the aircraft’s current configuration and behaviour will support the pilot’s 
need be ahead of the aircraft. The pilot may then be able to recognise potential problems 
early, and so may be able to take corrective action, or even preventative actions prior to 
the activation, or just upon an activation of an automation mode.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
An important finding from this data analysis is that pilots’ already have existing 
information structures and pieces of information that are significant to them. These 
information structures and strategies have been developing and evolving over a 100 
years of iterations. There are apparently fundamental reasons behind the fact that even 
recent automation has not greatly influenced, and in fact, has not greatly changed the 
way pilots use information, as it was observed in this study. It would appear timely to 
use the results of this study, on how pilots use the information (i.e., references), 
structures and strategies, to inform and support designers and engineers of the new 
generation of automated glass cockpit information space. 
The results of this study also confirms initial assumptions made in the observation of 
the pilots in training and operating on-line, that pilots attempt to use the same strategies, 
and apply the same rules, that they are familiar with in both manual and automated 
aircraft. This study shows problems occur when automated interfaces present familiar 
information to pilots’ in a different manner to the pilot’s expectations of that 
information’s structure. This especially apparent in relative to visual references where 
conventions are effectively reversed in the manual and automated aircraft. These 
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findings may also represent part of the explanation in previously conducted studies 
(Sarter & Woods, 1992; 1994; 1995), where pilots were surprised by automation 
response/behaviour. 
The root cause of pilots’ misunderstandings with automation presentation appears to be 
in assumptions and grounding of information structure philosophy on which the design 
of displays and the cockpit information layout are based. 
5.6.1 Lead to chapter 6 and the Experiment  
It appears an interesting finding that pre-existing common, or everyday ‘human 
experience’ feature in the pilots’ information structures and strategies. From this finding 
it appears that there is possible further work that could be done to elicit more apparently 
familiar information structures appropriate for aerospace from everyday experience. The 
next chapter will focus on the review of existing theories of how we use similar 
information in everyday life and concluded with how it is applicable in design of the 
aircraft displays. 
Humans have a natural ability, and practice lifelong, comparing and estimating instead 
of measuring and doing time-consuming, not always necessary, calculation. Estimating 
saves us time and cognitive effort, when other important tasks have to be attended to. 
Pilots have to perform constant and vital calculations to monitor and estimate aircraft 
performance. For example, by using our natural ability to compare two parameters on a 
display, rather than by relying on the need to perform a two-step calculation (i.e., 1. 
target altitude minus current altitude; 2. altitude to climb/descent divided by current 
vertical speed equals time to altitude), pilots’ workflow may be assisted by saving them 
time and cognitive effort.  This discussed further in Chapters six and seven.   
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Chapter 6: Mind Reference Framework 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to bring the results of all three studies: the preliminary (chapter 3), 
the observation study of training (including the description of existing problems in the 
cockpit (chapter 4), and the empirical study (chapter 5) together in a coherent manner, 
making a statement about how pilots use information. Existing theories will then be 
considered to establish the grounding of the statement with a proposal of using these 
assumptions in design of information space in a glass cockpit. 
6.2 Bringing results together 
In chapter 4 it was established that pilots have problems understanding and using 
information on three levels: perceptual, contextual and semantic. The Perceptual level is 
concerned with visual representation of information on the display. The Contextual 
level is concerned with interpretation of information according to both its situation of 
presentation and its surrounding conditions. The Semantic level deals with the meaning 
behind the information that is available for pilots’ to interpret. 
All of the problems concerning understanding of information in the cockpit, whether 
perceptual, contextual or semantic were related to information about either the state of 
the aircraft, the behaviour it was exhibiting, or about to exhibit under specific conditions 
in the surrounding environment. In the preceding chapters four and five, where the 
results of the empirical study were discussed, it appeared that pilots also used specific 
pieces of information that can be classified in the same three categories: physical (i.e., 
aircraft state), behavioural and environmental.  
However, the three information categories (i.e., physical, behavioural and 
environmental) discussed in chapters four and five have different properties. The 
properties of information discussed in chapter four were related to pilots experiencing 
problems using information, such as understanding the current aircraft configuration 
(i.e., physical), aircraft behaviour and aircraft position in the environment, as well as 
understanding the effects from the environment either on the aircraft state or behaviour. 
The properties of information discussed in chapter five dealt with how pilots made 
sense of information in flight operation. Figure 6.1 below shows the how pilots’ 
assembled such information. Information on the left side of the figure shows how 
information is spread out in the operating environment. The information on right side of 
the figure shows how pilots organise this information into usable structures in order to 
operate the aircraft effectively. 
The stars in the figure 6.1 below symbolically represent pieces of information that pilots 
organised into structures to make sense of vast amount of information available in 
flight.  Pilots referred to these pieces of information as references that were in their 
mind. Hence this concept has been termed Mind References. Mind References were not 
explicit on displays or in the environment, but were meaningful pieces of information 
obtained by the pilot and manipulated in his/her mind. All Mind References were 
identified in the empirical study and through observation of training. 
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study
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INFORMATION
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Figure 6.1: Information Space 
Mind References are pieces of information that are relatively, or completely, 
unchanging and are chosen by pilots because they are considered reliable. A good 
example of human Mind References was suggested by Gibson, “the terrestrial horizon 
never moves. All optical motions have a reference that of a horizon. It is an invariant of 
ecological optics” (Gibson, 1979). Mind References use prior knowledge that can be a 
general to human or acquired by an expert in his/her domain, in order to make sense of 
information space and navigate in it.  
Pilots identified these Mind References as specific and meaningful pieces of 
information in the environment and on cockpit displays and panels, which referred to, 
the physical state of the aircraft, the aircraft’s behaviour and the environment. For 
example, a physical reference for the aircraft state might be the position of the flaps. 
The behavioural references determine current aircraft behaviour, or rather, the combined 
effects of the physical aircraft’s state and external environment on the resulting 
behaviour of the aircraft. The environmental references are specific points in space, or 
on the ground, which establish the aircraft’s path or the aircraft’s position relative to 
them.  All references were time-related or could be represented against a timeline. 
From the empirical study (see chapter 5) it was concluded that none of the Mind 
References existed independently. Each reference was related to another reference or 
was relative to something already existing in the information space. References related 
to each other representing constraints, limitations and possibilities, such as a required or 
aimed position for the pilots to avoid or achieve.  For example, the command pilots may 
use in operation, ‘flaps to 50%’, where ‘50%’ represents a value out of total available 
100 percent extension of the flaps. This example reference shows the aircraft structural 
limitations (i.e., physical), this limit being 100 percent of possible extension, and values 
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between representing a measure of relatively how far the flaps need to be extended, i.e., 
half way equals 50 percent. The pilot in this case uses a meaningful reference to identify 
where (‘flaps 50’) is, and that the current flaps position is within the constraints (out of 
the 100 percent available). For behavioural references there would be speed and bank 
limitations marked at the outermost sides of the instrument.  
An example of an environmental reference may be a specific section of airspace that 
needs to be avoided (or stayed within), which can be marked by several navigation 
points and/or and height restrictions.   
Two or more references, from either of three categories of information, can be set as 
constraints. For example, flaps or gear extension (i.e. physical references), can limit the 
speed, which is a behavioural reference. In this case, setting of the flaps and gears 
would limit the speed to avoid structural damage, which is a constraint that pilots have 
to be aware of and maintain. 
All Mind References that pilots select and set have information structures either 
determined or influenced by instruments, equipment and procedures. As is symbolically 
represented in the figure 6.1, above, pilots use Mind References to establish and 
structure the required information for efficient operation of the aircraft. 
The pilot goes through a cognitive process when processing information during aircraft 
operation. The information processing observed during the studies is closely related to 
the Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Klein, 1989). Klein’s model (Figure 6.2) 
represents a process of the operator recognising the situation through ‘cues’ (which may 
be considered similar to Mind References) that lead the operator to recognise ‘patterns’ 
(i.e., information structures) against a particular context (i.e., contextual level of 
understanding). These cues and patterns activate a ‘mental simulation’ (i.e., in the time 
dimension) using prior experience and understanding of how the systems works, then 
the operator arrives at decision of how to proceed. The cues and patterns in the 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model are similar to the Mind References that pilots use 
to make sense and navigate through the multitude of data available in a glass cockpit. 
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Figure 6.2: Recognition-Primed Decision Model from Klein 2004, p. 26 
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It was established during observation of training that pilots had problems with three 
types of information. Subsequently, during the empirical study it was determined that 
the pilots use these same types of information for the operation of the flight. To 
understand the information, pilots identified Mind References that helped them to 
perform their work more efficiently. Most of the Mind References the pilots established 
themselves, either from the display, the environment, or from their previous knowledge. 
The problems that pilots’ experienced in flight were mostly related to poor presentation 
of related of pieces of information (i.e., Mind References). In the problem definition 
(chapter 5), it was also established that pilots had difficulties on three levels of 
understanding: perceptual, contextual and semantic. The perceptual level concerns how 
information is presented; the contextual level concerns how information may be 
misinterpreted given its context; and the semantic level concerns how information can 
be misinterpreted ambiguously, or associated with unrelated information to provide 
incorrect information.  The contextual level is broad in its definition, and includes the 
aircraft’s physical configuration as this effects the activation of specific behaviours (for 
example, a button that would activate or not activate a function given present 
behaviour).  Additionally, the absence of contextual information can give the incorrect 
meaning to the information presented.  
The above three information levels, on which pilots have difficulty understanding, were 
present in all information categories: physical, behavioural and environmental. This 
gave rise to a three-by-three table classifying all three information categories with the 
three levels of understanding that were observed during pilot training and the empirical 
study (Table 6.1). The columns represent Mind References (i.e., WHAT … ) pilots used 
to make sense of the information space in the three categories: (1) the physical 
references that represent the constraints of the aircraft; (2) the behavioural references 
that represent set targets, limitations and the performance envelop for the aircraft; and 
(3) the environmental references that represent significant points in space, or on the 
ground, related to weather or navigational information. The columns of the table 6.1 
represent (HOW…) the pilot interprets information, perceptually, contextually and 
semantically.   
Representing 
Information 
Categories 
WHAT…  ? PHYSICAL BEHAVIOURAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
Levels 
HOW… 
? 
Description 
Reference 
representing 
a physical 
constraint 
Reference either 
representing 
current or future 
behaviour or the 
limitations of the 
behaviour/ 
performance 
Reference 
established in the 
environment, either 
has to be maintained
or signify the next 
event 
PERCEPTUAL What the pilot sees 
Flaps 50% 
position Speed below 183 
Crossing 10 miles mark 
and at 3000 feet intercept
the finals course and 
start on the glide slope 
CONTEXTUAL 
Why is it 
different given 
the conditions 
Final approach 
configuration 
vs. take-off 
configuration 
Restrictions on 
behaviour due to noise 
pollution in the 
neighbouring airport 
area 
Weather conditions, 
obstacles, or physical 
configuration 
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SEMANTIC What it means to the pilot The representation should not be open to misinterpretation 
Table 6.1: Information Representation categories and levels  
As can be seen from the example in the table 6.1, the information that the pilot used in 
both automated and manual flights (dialog Pilot M 14:32-14:51 and the same 
information was used in the automated flight) was linked and interdependent across 
three categories of information (i.e., WHAT…). The example from the above 
referenced dialog is placed in the perceptual level row in the table 6.1. This shows how 
the information extends across all three information type categories that the pilots used 
during the same flight stage (i.e.  the final approach stage). The final approach had to 
start at a specific point in the environment, the behaviour was restricted by the 
configuration and the context was determined by the previous flight, the descent stage. 
The same applies during take-off, where the aircraft flaps are extended (i.e., physical) 
and the speed (i.e., behavioural) is restricted. All three levels are interdependent and can 
be influenced just by one category, such as environmental constraints.  For example, 
environmental constraints might extend to acceptable noise pollution levels, which is a 
common factor in metropolitan areas. In this case, the descent point might be closer or 
further away from the airport, speed and flap extension might be restricted as well.  
Apart from information dependencies observed during the preliminary empirical studies 
the information is also structured based on operation procedures, called Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs).  SOP’s include procedures such as; Air Traffic Control 
calls, ATIS information delivery, flight briefs, navigation plates and checklists. 
Information structure is also influenced by instruments and equipment, such as the 
Flight Management Computer. All these structures follow the pattern of the flight. 
Based on their experience pilots adapt these information structures and constantly use 
them in flight to organise, and make sense of, the vast amount of information they need 
to cope with. In the data analysis it was found that pilots constantly connect information 
and draw parallels between dependent pieces of information. However, disconnected 
information effects how pilots interpret it. The links and dependencies shown in table 
6.1, above, are important for the pilot, and must be accounted for in the information  
presented if is to be comprehended unambiguously.  
6.3 Time as a dimension in the information representation matrix 
The information representation table (6.1) above is missing one important dimension for 
pilots in the aerospace domain, time. Throughout the observations of pilots in training, 
operating on-line, in the empirical study, and through the researchers personal flight 
training, pilots always considered their actions related to time. The empirical study and 
the problem definition chapter show pilots constantly use the dimension of time to 
understand the effects of: the current aircraft physical configuration, the aircraft’s 
behaviour, and the environment.  An example of the aircraft’s physical configuration 
over time affecting performance might be that of extended landing gear increasing drag 
and consequently slowing the aircraft.  An example of aircraft behaviour over time 
might be too low a initial speed at a low altitude, during final approach, which can stall 
the aircraft without allowing recovery from the pilot by increasing speed and lift.  An 
example of the environment over time affecting the aircraft might be strong winds 
causing the aircraft to drift off-course.  In all the above examples the effects are 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 6: Mind Reference Framework 
 
144
exacerbated with the passage of time if the pilot doesn’t take corrective actions. Basis 
flight skills teach the pilot to  ”think ahead of the aircraft at every moment of the flight.” 
This enables pilots’ to account for effects that are happening over a period of time. 
Therefore, ‘effect in time’ has to be added as another dimension in the information 
presentation.   
The ‘effect in time’ also happens in three instances: prior to any event, during the event 
(i.e., current), and as a result of the event (i.e., consequence and intended). To 
accommodate the ‘effect in time’ the above table (6.1) has been supplemented with this 
extra dimension to create the Matrix of Information Presentation figure 6.3, below. It 
shows the combination of all the dimensions of information presentation. Each 
dimension represents an area of information that pilots had difficulty understanding. 
The dimensions WHAT and WHEN deal with information that the pilot needed, and 
searched for, either on the display or in the environment. The dimension HOW deals 
with the way information was misunderstood by the pilot.   
The information representation now has three dimensions: WHAT information a pilot 
uses, HOW this information is represented and consequently understood, and the 
dimension WHEN represents the ‘effect in time’. In this way the Matrix possesses a 
time effect dimension necessary for the time-critical cockpit environment.  Using this 
method of presentation shows that time as a dimension can influence every level and 
category of information.  Throughout many flights pilots were observed to repetitively 
consider the effects of their current automation ‘set up’ on the future behaviour of the 
aircraft. Therefore, presentations providing reference with respect to past, present and 
future are considered particularly important for the behaviour information category.  
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Figure 6.3:Matrix of Information Presentation 
Time property is poorly represented, or not represented, on current cockpit displays, but 
dependence on time is an important aspect in the pilot’s dynamic operating 
environment.  Appropriate ways to represent time in system design is an ever-present 
problem and yet the predominance of Human Computer Interaction literature centres on 
displays that represent current events (Howard, 1999). Whilst existing literature reflects 
that the property of time may not be vital for systems that are not dynamic, in 
aerospace, however, time is a vital part of aircraft operation, and effects that happen 
with respect to time are complex and diverse.  A variety of means of representing time 
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are discussed below.  
The figure 6.3 shows the aspects of time that need to be addressed and is based on the 
results of the studies discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  These aspects include; what time 
properties need representing, what and when does information need to be presented, and 
then in relation to what. The dimension of time will be examined in this section and also 
in the following discussion in chapter 7 (i.e., how to represent the time properties of 
information).  
Presenting information that represents effects taking place over a period of time 
provides vital information for any operator controlling, using, or monitoring a dynamic 
system or operating in a changing environment. This has been stressed by several 
researchers before. To name a few recent proponent researchers, Wiener and Curry 
talked about the operators’ need for trend information about potential failures in one of 
the first comprehensive reviews of cockpit automation problems performed by NASA 
(Wiener, 1980). Woods (1994) stressed the need to visualise the dynamic behaviour of 
the system, and Billings (1997) pointed out that automation needs to be predictable, and 
the pilot not only needs to know about its behaviour in the present, but also its effect 
throughout the flight. 
There are two aspects of the effect-in-time (i.e., figure 6.4 in the WHEN dimension) that 
need to be emphasised and reviewed. One aspect of the effect-in-time is the dynamic 
property of the environment and it is an important property for pilots’ to be able to 
track, as this was observed and discussed in the empirical study (chapter 5), and 
problem chapter (4).  The second aspect, in existing literature Woods (1994) discusses 
this issue related to real-time visualisation of dynamic behaviour and in Howard (1999 p 
65) it is stated that ‘little work done on real-time visualisation of dynamic behaviour’. 
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Figure 6.4:Required time-dependent information presentation 
When considering the representation of any information the following questions need to 
answered; what needs to be represented, when, and for how long, and how should this 
be represented (Figure 6.4 above). Chapter seven will consider issues of how to 
represent time related information, and this section will consider the combination of the 
two questions, what and when. 
From previously discussed studies it was elucidated that pilots want, at all times, to 
know and understand effects relating to aircraft state and behaviour, especially if the 
aircraft is being controlled through automation. This answers the question, what to 
represent (i.e., the aircraft state, behaviour and the effects on both). The question when 
looks not only at when to show the information to the pilot, also about which of the 
states, behaviours and the effects over time. There are three aspects of time that matter 
in a dynamic and rapidly changing environment; these are the prior, current and future 
aspects of the system and the environment.  
From the empirical study it was obvious that pilots mostly consider the effect on the 
aircraft in the near future and on the next major event, such as an aircraft turn or a 
change of altitude. Fixed-wing aircraft have to maintain lift at all times during flight, 
which means constantly moving forward, this greatly affects information needs.  
Consequently, information regarding past events play a minor part in aiding the pilot in 
flight deal with future events.  Two notable exceptions are; in monitoring the trend of 
fuel consumption this maybe beneficial to future events, and when navigation the 
reference can be behind this will help to maintain a specific heading and time from that 
navigational reference this can help the pilot to reorient himself/herself. However, even 
in these examples the focus of attention of the pilot is with what is ahead.  Examining 
past information, as above, provides input to the pilot’s concerns about the current 
aircraft state, behaviour and the effect in the future, i.e., what to do about it given 
current resources and how these may affect future flight stages.   
The focus of this section is the current and future presentation of information, the figure 
6.4, above, goes into more detail about what future information the pilot wants to know.  
From the studies reported in the previous chapters, it was found that pilots’ often 
enquired about three different types of information about the future (whether flying with 
help of automation or without); these information types are the resultant, the intended 
and the constraints. All three types of information require some information extracted 
from current events to calculate the future information. Current information is also 
important as it provides a baseline, i.e., something to compare it to.  Later in this chapter 
the comparativity-relativity of information will be seen to become a key principle. It is 
vital for the pilot to see the transition between current and future, for example, how 
presented information changes as aircraft transitions are made from one state to another. 
This information can be crucial to safety, for example, when making a turn en route 
from point A to B, the bank angle should not exceed safety performance limitations. 
In slower dynamic systems, such as process control, presenting past information can be 
useful.  For example, past trend and change information has been shown to be beneficial 
in situations where rate of change is low and so the visible effect on the interface is 
similarly low (McLeod, 1976; Wickens, 2000). Another example is that of historical 
strip-chart displays that show past and present information to help the operator mentally 
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extrapolate future trends from past trends (Woods, 1981; Wickens, 2000). However, this 
approach is not appropriate for the aerospace domain as the cognitive effort required 
defeats the purpose of offloading mental work from the pilot to the automation.  Indeed, 
in a discussion that follows it will be seen that the pilot rarely has all the information 
immediately available on which to mentally extrapolate, but the automation does. 
6.3.1 Presentation of information about the future 
In order to discuss the presentation of information about the future, first, current 
definitions of information about the future need to be established. Secondly, results and 
experience from previous studies about what information the pilots wants about the 
future need to be ascertained; and thirdly, these findings need to be presented in context 
to the body of existing relevant literature. 
There is ample evidence that displays presenting some element of the future are 
beneficial to the operator (Wickens, 1989; Lintern, 1990; Trujillo, 1997).  In fact, it has 
been previously stated, that in the aerospace domain it is vital and safety critical for the 
pilot to have a proactive position, where the pilot can plan and anticipate his/her own 
actions and the actions of the automation, rather then being in a reactive position 
(Amalberti, 1997). However, although this need is recognised, how to present 
information about the future, and what aspects of it will be helpful are questions 
researchers have been looking to answer for over half a century.  The following 
paragraphs build on existing research, and the findings of this study, to suggest 
appropriate ways of representing information about the future.  
Existing literature indicates that presenting time related information, especially about 
the future can be problematic.  One issue related to this is perceptual failure, which 
occurs when operators’ prior beliefs provide bias about what are the correct and salient 
information sources to sample to ascertain the current situation (Johnson, 2003).  
Perceptual failure is considered to have been a factor in a rail incident where train 
operators’ perception of a previous sign influenced their late sampling of the next sign 
(Johnson, 2003).  Therefore, it can be seen that as there is the potential for the operator 
to perceive the present situation incorrectly, through bias, providing future forecasts 
based on this may be similarly incorrect and misleading.   
Similar problems exist in the cockpit, where the pilot thought they entered the correct 
information, but in fact the interface accepted erroneous information. In such a case by 
projecting this information into a future forecast aircraft set-up can show the pilot if, in 
fact, what he intends to happen is the correct action or not.  However, although this 
might help to prevent the entry error from happening and becoming part of the aircraft 
set-up, it can also provide a false sense of security and let the operator sample the 
information less often, where the correct action would be to keep checking the current 
developing situation. 
There is an existing body of literature on the presentation of information about the 
future; however, the terms describing this type of information vary from one researcher 
to another. To unify and present this existing knowledge in context an ‘uncertainty 
scale’ (Figure 6.5) is suggested.  This measures the presentation of various information 
and definitions about the future, and so endeavours to aid the following discussion. The 
scale has five definitions of information about the future ranging from, the extrapolated, 
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as information most certain about the future, to the most uncertain, the probable, as a 
definition where too many possible factors (i.e., probabilities) that can influence the 
outcome of the future event. Relevant to all five definitions is the fact that the further 
into the future the information is specified the more uncertain it becomes.  
   UNCERTAINTY  SCALE ...
Extrapolated ForecastedProjected ProbablePredicted
CERTAIN,
unless sudden
change occurs
UNCERTAIN,
too many ‘ifs’
to consider
“To estimate a value
that lies outside  a
known range of
values.”
“To forecast
something from
present trends and
other known data.”
“To estimate in
advance.” “To prophesy, foretell.” “Likely to happen.”
Definitions from
Chambers Compact Dictionary, 2000
 
Figure 6.5: Uncertainly scale for definitions about the future  
It is necessary to provide a level of certainty to the information presented about the 
future to the pilot. Hence, from the above (Figure 6.5) the appropriate future 
information to present needs to be within the areas of extrapolated and projected 
information. There are two considerations behind this; (1) automation should provide 
the pilot with information that is otherwise time consuming to calculate; and (2), in 
order to have a level of useful and constructive certainty the information should be 
based on current trends and any known changes that are programmed into the system. 
Any further projection beyond this is indefinite speculation, which the pilot can image 
himself/herself without too much mental workload. Hence, in this section the focus is 
on extrapolated and projected (Figure 6.5) information about the future.  
6.3.2 The Resultant, the Intended and the Constraints information 
As previously stated there is ongoing research, which began over half a century ago, on 
various forms of predicting systems to assist operators to have better control of systems. 
Consequently, there is a vast body of literature about displays that present future 
information, however, few concepts have reached actual operation. The figure below 
(Figure 6.6) graphically illustrates how samples from existing research and this thesis 
research can fit on to two important parameters about the presentation of information 
about the future. The horizontal line represents the uncertainly scale discussed earlier, 
and the vertical line represents time from the current moment to the far future. This 
graph illustrates issues such as, the uncertainty of information, how far into the future 
the projection is useful, and also the useful length of a future projection (i.e., for a single 
parameter, to track its progress and development).   
The uncertainty scale, below, shows the degree of uncertainty in information about the 
future that is addressed by existing concepts and concepts formed this research. The 
uncertainty of information increases the further it is projected into the future, as is true 
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for any display communicating information about the future (Wickens, 2000).  
Problems can arise due to erroneous information entered in the present (Johnson, 2003) 
and due to the consequent unreliability of future-related information presented to the 
operator (Wickens, 1999). 
Based on the studies conducted in this thesis, there are three types of future information 
the pilots were concerned about and constantly enquired about; the resultant, the 
intended, and the constraints (Figure 6.6). 
The figure 6.6 illustrates relative placement of the three types of future information (i.e., 
the resultant, the intended and the constraints) among current research that examines 
pilots reported problems understanding their aircraft’s automation future-behaviour and 
‘intentions’. The resultant, the intended, and the constraints information are located on 
the ‘certain’ side of the scale, which can be guaranteed because it is programmed (i.e., 
the automation knows). The resultant future information presents automation behaviour 
that can be calculated from its programmed parameters, i.e., even if the parameters of 
the automation behaviour were wrongly programmed the outcome is predictable.  This 
predictability is another strong reason for this information to be shown to the pilot in 
relation to its current operating parameters. There are, of course, circumstances where 
uncertainty exists, for example, if the aircraft’s safety envelope is breached.  In such 
cases the automation will have to change behaviour, but then the pilot can, and should, 
be warned about it (i.e. Pilot says, “…if I stay programmed on this course we can 
encounter a terrain and I will take these evasive actions”). 
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Figure 6.6: Margins of information about the future 
The resultant-future is information about the outcome of current state, behaviour and 
environmental effects over a relatively short time-span in to the future (Figure 6.6). The 
resultant future representation is limited by either the next event or the next transition of 
aircraft state (note, the aircraft state includes a change of automation modes, it also 
depends on whether the aircraft is operated through use of automation or manually 
operated). Resultant-future information includes: the calculated path based on the 
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current aircraft configuration, the automation state and aircraft behaviour. Additionally, 
resultant information has to be relative to the previously discussed categories of 
information, such as, the current aircraft state and behaviour and also the external 
environment. This also applies to all information categories.  For example, if the aircraft 
were too close to the terrain the automation would present a warning and alter the 
aircraft’s path.  
Resultant-future type information, similar to that above, is discussed in existing research 
which is referenced in the two ovals at the top and bottom of the resultant outline in 
(Figure 6.6). The outline reference to the right also describes the representation of 
similar aspects of information to that of the resultant-future. Termed predictive 
information, Trujillo described and tested information represented in an alpha-
numerical abbreviated format (Trujillo, 1996; Trujillo, 1997). This representation dealt 
with the warning indication of a single abnormal future-parameter and the time until 
that value was reached. Trujillo performed experiments with the warning indication 
occurring at 1, 5, and 15 minutes before the future event was to happen. These results 
showed that the warning alert did increase pilots’ vigilance, through an increase in their 
scanning activities; however, this was at the expense of adding to their workload.  Also, 
the length of advance notice provided by the alert warning was not found to greatly 
change pilot behaviour. However, resultant-future information, defined here, presents 
all (i.e., not only abnormal) known and relevant parameters about the current aircraft 
state and behaviour. All of these parameters are projected into the future, and the 
interaction and evolution of this information may provide a useful level of certainty to 
the pilot, rather than just an arbitrary timed alert (i.e., 1, 5, and 15 minutes). 
Birmingham referred to the resultant-future type of information as quickened 
information (Birmingham, 1954).  Birmingham’s research used the presentation of 
future tracking position based on current velocity, acceleration and position.  However, 
this research did not display the current tracking error and so did not provide any 
information about the current time, on which to correct the current track (Wickens, 
2000). In this way this aspect, i.e., presenting the onset of the error, is similar to 
Trujillo’s work, but in this case in a graphical form.  In comparison, the presentation of 
resultant-future information, from the empirical analysis in this study, suggests that 
presenting current information relative to future information in a continuous fashion 
may be beneficial even if there is no error in current parameters.  As during the 
empirical study it was noted that pilots’ were mentally calculating the future position of 
the aircraft throughout the flight from its current parameters, and monitoring the 
development of these parameters throughout the flight (see Appendix 3, Pilot debrief 
comment 10:33 and 10:42 manual flight).   It was reasoned that in this way pilots’ were 
assessing whether these parameters were developing correctly, or otherwise. By 
providing this type of resultant-future information on the interface the pilot can compare 
his/her view of how the flight should proceed with an outlook of the flight in the near 
future on the interface, thus relieving pilots from constant mental calculation. 
This description of resultant-future information is closely related to the Total Energy 
Reference Profile described by Amelink (2003). The similarities between the Total 
Energy Reference Profile and resultant-future information are that in both cases the 
information produces a newly generated profile from existing data as a reference for the 
pilot.  In the Total Energy Reference Profile information is given about the energy-state 
of the aircraft and this is represented in relation to the intended track. The differences 
are that the Total Energy Reference Profile represents only a few single parameters, i.e., 
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the energy calculated out of speed and altitude deviation. 
Some of this type information is already available in the cockpit from navigational 
displays, as in the trajectory projection, which displays the ‘intended future’. The 
navigation display allows the pilot to project the route before it is executed, however, 
based on studies in this thesis it is considered essential to project the automation’s 
future state and behaviour in relation to the aircraft’s position on the map. 
Presenting intended-future information aims to project the automation’s intentions 
before they are executed, showing the pilot the outcome of newly programmed 
automation states and behaviour before they are activated. The intended representation 
of the future supports the pilots’ need to understand the automation’s intention, which 
was observed in pilot training and in the empirical study (see chapter 4) and is also a 
widely reported problem (Billings, 1997; Sarter, 1997; Sarter, 1995). Accident reports 
also provide evidence for pilots’ need for this type of future information. For example, 
in the Bangalore Accident the pilots were confused about the behaviour of the 
automation and were preoccupied with trying to understand the nature of the problem, 
which diverted their attention whilst the aircraft flew into the ground short of runway 
(Ministry of Civil Aviation 1990; Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 
1996).  In accidents reported in Cali and Strasbourg the information pilots’ entered into 
the automation altered the automation behaviour against the pilots’ intentions 
(Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia, 1996; Pan American World Airways, 
1990; Bureau Enquetes Accidents, 1992). In situations similar to these accidents, it is 
apparent that providing representations of the future intended actions of automation can 
help the pilot understand whether this is what they intend before they request the 
automation to execute the program. 
The need for information of an intended future also coincides with assumptions in the 
Recognition-Primed Decision model by Klein (1989). When the operator goes through a 
decision making process, he/she considers one decision at a time starting with that 
which is closest to the situation.  Relating this to the cockpit, if the consequence of the 
situation is mentally ‘played out’ by the pilot and does not provide a suitable outcome, 
the pilot projects the next possible action until a suitable outcome is ‘visualised’ in the 
pilot’s mind, then this action is executed with the desired outcome. Therefore, providing 
a display representation of the intended projection of the future may provide the pilot a 
possibility to examine in detail the consequences of his/her actions before executing 
them.   
Furthermore, existing research shows that information about the future, such as a 
preview, (e.g., display of the desired course in the form of a journey-path tunnel), is 
useful in systems that have a long system lags and time lags on feedback when 
responding to the operator’s input (Wickens, 1986). This happens, for example, due to 
processing of the steering input effects and the water currents when steering a large ship 
in a channel. In order not to over-steer the ship a preview of the input effect is helpful to 
the operator. This specific type of information was not found to be essential to the pilot 
in our observations, mostly due the fast changes that occur in this kind of operating 
environment, as the controls provide very little lag in feedback to the pilot. However, 
the desired course displayed through a flight path-tunnel can be useful in military 
operations, when the pilot has to manoeuvre the aircraft at low altitude through 
mountainous terrain; but then, in this case, the display becomes a representation of the 
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system and mountainous terrain constraints, rather then a feedback on the input.  
The path-tunnel may also be useful during a landing approach to help the pilot see the 
margins of operation with reference to the glideslope that needs to be followed. In other 
relevant research on pursuit displays (i.e., path-tunnel), it was found that having one 
reference point to follow is more successful, rather then a compensatory display 
(Roscoe, 1968; Roscoe, 1981), which shows the difference in the input and desired, i.e., 
showing the error in the direction opposite to where the correction should be made. 
Here, evidence from the studies suggests this argument be extended to convey that the 
precision of pilot performance during landing would not necessary improve through the 
introduction of a four-sided reference tunnel-like display; as this provides the pilot a 
relative reference to the tunnel, but not an absolute altitude position reference to the 
runway. 
The constraint future information that pilots appeared to search for in the studies 
described does encompass some features of the desired flight path-tunnel, however, the 
tunnel needs to be supplemented too to show the flight envelop protection parameters 
and the route restrictions, such as altitude and speed. Supplemented with this type of 
constraint information this type of display may help the pilot be aware of operating 
margins and how far he/she can take the aircraft and still remain within the flight safety 
envelope.  To facilitate these extra features the relevant information about route 
restriction might be entered into the system; either through datalink by Air Traffic 
Control, or preprogrammed by the aircraft company, or programmed by the pilot; whilst 
the information about flight envelope protection (i.e., performance limitations) can be 
programmed by the manufacturer as a default settings. 
6.4 Towards a theory of how Mind References fit into the design of 
interfaces and systems  
There are various perspectives that can be used to explain how to transfer Mind 
References concepts to the interface. An Ecological approach (Gibson, 1979) has been 
chosen as fundamentally the Mind Reference concepts are in accord with assumptions 
behind Ecological Interface Design, that is well summarized by Lintern  (2004): 
‘Ecological Interface Design results in a virtual world (i.e., a cockpit interface) that 
reciprocate the structure of the cognitive work’.  
It was observed that pilots in several ways do attempt to restructure information in the 
environment to suit their existing knowledge. Pilots use existing information structures 
provided by the domain environment to help them to manoeuvre in the vast world of 
constantly evolving information. Pilots come up with strategies to overcome the 
shortcoming of information provided (for example, pilots use the length of a wing on 
the display as a measure of distance from the runway during circuits practice). The table 
(6.2) below shows the similarities identified between the Ecological perspective on 
interface design and how, from analysis, this study understood pilots’ needs for a 
purpose designed aircraft information-space. 
Interface Design 
 Ecological perspective (Lintern, 2004) 
Based on studies of pilot’s information 
need (see chapter 3, 4 and 5) 
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Why Human action is constrained by the work domain 
To operate pilots have to know about the 
surrounding environment and the 
limitations of the aircraft 
What 
Interfaces are mediated 
environments that can reveal the 
work constraints 
Pilots search for information about 
aircraft limitations and the environment 
inside and outside the cockpit 
How 
Information can be depicted in a 
manner that supports direct 
perception of those constraints 
Pilots develop strategies and use 
structures that separate masses of 
information into pieces by identifying and 
rearranging specific pieces of information 
to minimize cognitive workload and to 
operate the aircraft efficiently 
Table 6.2: Similarities in Ecological Interface Design and the results of our studies 
An Ecological Interface Design approach identifies and transfers the work domain 
constraints to the interface. (Lintern, 2004; Neekar, 2002). This approach is normally 
informed by the methods of Cognitive Work Analysis (Rasmussen, 1994; Vicente, 
1999), however, here a purpose designed methodology has been used in the 
examination of the pilot’s information processing.  From the studies detailed in previous 
chapters it was found pilots’ use specific pieces of information (referred to here as Mind 
References) to apparently observe constraints effortlessly. It was reasoned that to 
effectively/successfully make the transfer of constraints to HCI design guidance these 
specific pieces of information, or Mind References could be used. This new method is a 
departure from Cognitive Work Analysis, however, the new method is viewed as 
appropriate and complementary to existing methods in identifying how to structure, 
represent and transfer information on to the interface. A full Cognitive Work Analysis 
requires considerable time and resources, whilst the new methods present an economical 
means of levering into the problem of the transfer acquired knowledge from the 
analyses on to the interface. 
There is a large body of specific literature and strict standards that govern the visual 
representation of information in the cockpit, for example industry design standards (e.g. 
UK Defence Standard for Large Aircraft 00-970). However, concepts are presented here 
that may help to provide guidance and choices, during the cockpit design stages, to 
determine what and how information should be, and can be, represented to enhance 
pilots’ understanding of information. Providing concepts for guidance on the design of 
appropriate information structures and representations at this stage of development, 
rather than retrospectively, may also help pilots’ to manage information better and so 
improve their overall flight efficiency. The next section in this chapter looks in detail 
how Mind References are use to guide cockpit design. 
6.5 Mind Reference framework for information systematization and 
presentation 
The concept consists of a matrix that comprises the definition of a set of Rules, 
Structures, Strategies, and Relationships (Figure 6.7). The concept helps to organise 
information throughout the information-system, as well as to help identify and explore 
possible presentation modes. The concept uses analysis from the previously discussed 
studies (explained in chapter 3, 4 and 5) using data, such as, the pilots’ interpretations of 
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their mental representation of information (from pilots’ debrief comments), and through 
their experience knowledge (in part gained from the researcher observing and following 
parallel flight training).  These inputs are recorded in the matrix and may be used on 
demand as a source for inspiration on guidance for appropriate information-organisation 
and presentation for cockpit design.  It is stated that representations permit the 
complexities of the real-world to be simplified with limited risk (Amalberti, 1997), 
however, these representations must be appropriate. Domain Rules, Structures and 
Strategies may be extracted from matrix to guide such cognitively efficient 
representations.   
It is intended that during the design/composition of a new information-space ‘step-
principles’ are followed. The step-principles seek to streamline the process of design 
and help avoid missing stages. The steps also indicate the appropriate time to use the 
matrix and Rules, Structures and Strategies. Iterations through the step-principles may 
help to fine-tune the final information-space design, comprising the interface(s) 
composition, and the whole layout.  
6.5.1 Mind References framework ‘step-principles’ 
To use of the Mind Reference framework in design as it is intended the ‘step-principles’ 
need to be followed in the sequence shown below (Figure 6.7). 
The first ‘step-principle’ is concerned with the format of information displayed to the 
pilot so that it is consistent with the cognitive demand, through use of the Skill Rule 
Knowledge principle (Rasmussen, 1994). This is important because it is known that the 
format of the presentation of information can change the nature of the problem, and 
further, it has also been suggested that an appropriate format of presentation can be used 
to solve information problems (Woods, 1995). However, this latter and more general 
claim has yet to be accepted and applied in the aerospace industry (Diego Castano, 
personal communications, Boeing, Seattle, 19 May 2005).   
The first step towards finding an appropriate format is to match the task-type with the 
operators’ abilities.  In this way the form of the presentation should be determined by 
the evident nature of the cognitive demands in conjunction with the nature of the 
information to be represented.  Following the Skill Rule Knowledge principle for 
information supporting skill-based behaviour (e.g., the perception-action elements of 
flight control), this should be represented in graphical forms that can be recognized 
intuitively through appropriate visual parallels, either innate (through common-life 
experience and language, e.g., land and sky separate with a horizontal line) or through 
skill specific engrained coding (e.g., an ‘X’ symbol is used to close Microsoft files).  If 
rule-based behaviour is to be presented it should follow a logical sequence, whilst 
knowledge-based behaviour should be presented using references to specific instances 
of this information. 
Alphanumerical presentations, although often providing precise values when compared 
to pictorial and graphical presentations conveying similar information, leave the 
cognitively demanding task of determining the information’s significance through 
calculation and comparison (through searching for other relevant alphanumerical 
display) by an operator. Additionally, alphanumerical displays may be chosen for their 
relative cost and compact spatial properties. Since the alphanumerical presentation often 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 6: Mind Reference Framework 
 
155
can be overlaid on pictorial information, it may be argued that, if required, a precise 
element can be supplemented to a pictorial/graphical display without much additional 
cost.  However, it is argued here that comparison to, or presentation in terms of, other 
vital performance parameters of the aircraft presents more meaningful and efficient 
information then numeric information. In other words, through graphics, schematics and 
pictorial displays information from currently spatially diverse instruments may be 
integrated to convey simple significant information. This argument agrees with 
established literature in cognition indicating “Pictures tend to display information in a 
meaningful way that is compatible with mental models of the world condensing 
information into readily recognised gestalts in which relationship are clear” (Stokes and 
Wickens 1988).  
Consequently, most of the presentation solutions suggested later are pictorial and 
graphical solutions overlaid with alphanumerical characters. Another reason for 
choosing a graphic display is that an aerospace display should be considerate to the 
fundamental instrument scanning techniques pilots’ are taught. The scanning technique 
originated in parallel with analogue instrument technology and the previous generation 
of analogue instruments technique permitted the pilot to ‘pictorially’ scan all the 
instrument indicators, knowing roughly where all the dial indicators should be 
positioned (e.g. all engine instrument point in the same appropriate for a phase of 
flight).  From scanning these instruments if one instrument indicator was at an 
unexpected angle, it stood out, and showed quickly there was likely to be an anomaly 
(e.g. lower or higher indication on one engine than the other). It has already been found 
that some recently introduced digital displays are incompatible with this technique and 
so have had to be modified. Moreover, pictorial representations were observed to be 
used by the pilots’ themselves in training where the pilots’ used blackboard and chalk, 
and pen and paper to communicate and synchronize among themselves their views and 
concerns of their forthcoming flight. 
The second step-principle is used to identify Rules, Structures and Strategies, that are 
relevant to the tasks performed by the pilot. For example, when designing for a task 
where the pilot will be monitoring information one of the relevant rules, established 
during the empirical study, is that ‘the pilot needs to stay ahead of the aircraft’. 
Therefore, if the pilot is monitoring recently briefed information, the information 
structure needs to reflect the briefed structure on the display, so that the pilot can 
compare the actual flight progress with the briefed flight stages.  Also, should the pilot 
need to monitor the aircraft’s relative distance from navigational references, the 
strategies observed already in use by pilots in the empirical study again indicate 
appropriate presentation modes that may be used formally to assist in the presentation of 
this type of information in a new display. For example, pilots in flight were observed to 
use the size of the ‘wing’, presented on the Navigational Display (ND), to measure their 
relative distance away from the runway during a circuit turn. This indicates similar 
comparative, or relative, types of information presentation are appropriate to display 
information of this nature. 
The third ‘step-principle’ is to organize the existing relevant information rules, 
structures and strategies that have emerged through proceeding through the first two 
step-principles. This step-principle involves examining the nature of the information to 
be presented against the existing Set of information Rules, Structures and Strategies and 
to note where information needs display commonalities and where the differences are 
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distinct.  In this way the existing rules, structures and strategies can be preserved in the 
new display.  This stage is important not only when considering the display of exactly 
the same information in a new way, but also when considering presenting additional 
information in an appropriate manner. 
Like the third step–principle the fourth step-principle relates to the organisation and 
assessment of information needs, however, in the forth step-principle the information is 
assessed in relation to the pilot.  In this way the information needs are systematically 
worked through the Information Matrix to identify the most effective way to represent 
information in accordance with pilots’ previous experience, knowledge, abilities and 
task requirements. Here the matrix acts as a framework for the designer to explore 
possible representations, rather than a formula to present the designer with a single 
definitive ‘correct’ representation. Rather, working through the matrix helps to define 
and then refine an information   representation, by first permitting the generation of a 
possible representation and then using the matrix to narrow and focus this down into an 
appropriate format.   
Appropriate information representations that fit with pilots’ information perspectives 
can be arrived at from first identifying appropriate Mind References (see discussion 
earlier) from the matrix. The Mind reference concepts introduced in this thesis fit within 
other current research that highlight that problems exist in the aerospace domain due to 
communication not being made from the pilots’ perspective. For example, Hutchins and 
Holder commented that pilots’ training difficulties could be overcome if training 
materials were communicated to pilots’ in pilots’-concepts.  (Hutchins, and Holder, 
2000). From the previously reported studies in the thesis it was ascertained that to 
understand how the automation controls the aircraft behaviour, pilots use their own 
information structures, comprising Mind References. Pilots’ use Mind References, and 
structures constructed from Mind references, to orientate themselves in their 
information-space.  To identify the appropriate Mind References for design guidance, 
the information matrix needs to be followed, as described below:    
• Identify which out of three elements in the CONTENT dimension (i.e., What: 
Physical-Behaviour-Environment) are to be represented; 
• Ascertain between which, or with which, of three elements in this dimension 
relationships exist, and determine the nature of these relationships, such as 
dependent, complementary, facilitating or obstructing; 
• Move on to the dimension TIME (When… ) to establish, whether or, which 
aspect of time needs to be represented, i.e., prior, current and/or future; 
• Move on to the dimension UNDERSTANDING (How… ) to determine the 
appropriate presentation.  Reference the presentation against the perceptual, 
contextual and semantic levels to avoid misinterpretation. To do this the 
following questions are suggested as guidance:  
Guidance Questions to Support Appropriate Information Presentation along the 
UNDERSTANDING Dimension of the Matrix 
1a.  Is there an existing perceptual representation in the domain or operator’s 
experience?  
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1b. Is it an appropriate perceptual representation for this task, for this interface? 
2. Is there a human known perceptual presentation, such as a metaphor?  
Note. This question originates from findings in both the observational study, and the 
empirical data that indicate pilots commonly use metaphors (e.g., pilots communicate 
directions as hour numbering on the clock face – “traffic eleven o’clock”).  These 
findings are in agreement with the statements written by Larkoff and Johnson such as  
“human thought processes are largely metaphorical”, and further more “the human 
conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined” (p. 6) (Lakoff, 2003).  
Consequently, it was considered as pilots’ were observed to use information in the 
forms of metaphors, applying similar metaphors in the interface may help associate 
information faster and more intuitively. 
3. Does the context dictate how the information should be represented?  
Note.  This question can also be phrased in another way; can this information be 
interpreted or misinterpreted in different way given the context? If the information can 
be misinterpreted, then the presentation has to be adjusted.  Context is a widely 
discussed area in the field of Human Computer Interaction, and has been examined in 
Ubiquitous Computing which concerns the availability of information on demand in a 
specific context.  However, here the issue of context is approached from another angle, 
where the context provides supplementary meaning, or aids interpretation. A body of 
literature (e.g. Woods, 1995; Wickens, 2000) stress the importance of putting data into 
context for ease of interpretation and better understanding.  The findings of the 
observational and empirical studies also point to this, indicating the use of context to 
add to the meaning of information, where context can influence the interpretation of the 
available information (e.g. present information with use of context - if we present key 
numbers at key location, such as 180 at the bottom and 90 on the right of the circle on 
the display, given the context of a cockpit and Primary Flight Display it will be read by 
the pilot as compass indications). 
References can also be identified by the context they are used in, even if only partial 
information is given about it. For example, in the empirical study, when ATIS 
information was read to the pilot, the Air Traffic Control mentioned only numbers, 
however, the numbers in that information structure can only represent the wind 
direction, i.e., ‘140 degrees, 15 knots’ (see dialog ATC 09:51 M).  In the above case, 
although the information was not complete, the context of where the reference was used 
and the structure of information gave definite clues to the pilots to what the Air Traffic 
Control was referring too (e.g. ATC 09:51 M: ‘All station in bound Sydney, Sydney 
terminal information bravo is about to be recorded duty runway 16R, switch now, 140 
degrees, 15 knots, QNH 1022.’ 
This section also includes and uses the concept of a ‘frame of reference’ (Pinker, 1997; 
Wickens, 2000). In order to access information accurately, quickly and also avoid 
misinterpretation, there is a need for a perspective on information. The requirement for 
a relative perspective comes from our innate experience of our own body, this provides 
us a point of reference to determine, the up and down, behind and ahead. Similarly, 
Gibson (Gibson, 1979), although not discussing frame of reference directly, (i.e., the 
observer) examined optical flow, which must have a frame of reference, either 
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suggested on the display (e.g., the view from the pilots seat given a set position in 
space) or the pilot himself/herself looking out of the cockpit window creates a frame of 
reference. More relevant to aerospace, this concept is later discussed as Global Optical 
Flow (Larish, 1990), where the frame of reference is determined by pilot’s velocity and 
height.  Moreover, the information to be presented in context, or using a context to add 
meaning, has to be presented relative to an already existing object, which again presents 
parallels to the situation described earlier where our body provides us with a relative 
association to the objects surrounding us. This, relative to quality allows three 
characteristics to the interface: 
 (i) All things presented will be relative in size to each other and allow pilots to use a 
strategy they were often observed to use (e.g. wing size relative to the distance to the 
runway).  
(ii) The meaning is clearer if it is based on comparison, or contrast, against a known, or 
established fact/figure/parameter, such as Woods describes “meaning lies in contrast” 
(p. 174, Woods, 1995).  
(iii) If all pieces of information show relationships between one another, all information 
will be connected on the interface and throughout the system, allowing pilots for a 
potentially easier and swifter quicker search. 
When considering the relative to step it is also important to highlight changes and 
transitioning events.  Providing emphasis to the operator at these points has been 
stressed by previous researchers (Woods, 1995).  Additionally, during the observational 
study it was noted that pilots’ used events, such as natural turning points in flights - 
cruise or top of descent, as cues to assimilate the information around them, whilst major 
expected changes, and events, were used as Mind References around which the 
information was grouped and linked.   
Complementary to the above considerations, is the matter of providing the pilot enough 
time to be able to sufficiently sample the interface to detect the changing events.  As 
was stated by Johnson, “forms of perceptual failure arise from the difficulty of correctly 
sampling many different items of information. This is not simply a problem in using 
foveal and peripheral vision to scan a large number of displays, it also relates to the rate 
at which information changes over time” (p 67, Johnson, 2003). 
The context part of the matrix also deals with a vital part of current interfaces designed 
for time-critical environments.  This is the problem of buttons, or keys, changing 
function dependent on their context, or configuration of the system (e.g., aircraft buttons 
may possess different functions dependent on whether the aircraft is in take-off or 
landing mode).  In such cases, it is important that designs indicate change of context and 
change of mode, so that problems and anomalies do not arise.  This situation is referred 
to by Woods who states “Context, change and contrast, (are) key features for 
discovering process anomalies, are rarely present. ‘Disembodied’, digital readouts show 
a current value for some aspect, without reference to ‘normal’ ranges, or the greater 
process they sample. ” (Woods, 1994). 
The last level of the Matrix, the semantic level helps the designer to ascertain whether 
the meaning behind the information presented is open to misinterpretation. The 
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semantic level of the Information Matrix urges the designer to consider questions such 
as, what is the meaning of the emergent presentation?; and which out of emergent 
presentations are the most suitable? The latter question deals with the overall 
development of the presentation. It is important for the designer to make sure that the 
information associated with the presentation cannot change the meaning of already 
established presented information, unless it is intended (i.e., it might be necessary that 
newly introduced information reflects upon the meaning of surrounding information).  
Considering the risks of information misinterpretation, presented information should not 
be associated with non-related information. 
The fifth step-principle considers the incorporation of additional relevant emergent 
information that has arisen from the use of matrix. This is where a variety of situations 
where information will be used need to be considered. It is anticipated that to complete 
this step will require additional runs through the matrix questions to blend-in and merge 
appropriate information together. 
The sixth step-principle requires the grouping of complementary relevant information, 
to minimize the need for searching. There is a need to merge information because, as is 
stated by Wickens, “humans can process a small number of information-rich stimuli 
more efficiently than a large number of stimuli of small information content: decision 
complexity advantage” (p 532, Wickens, 2000). From the above, it may be to the 
advantage of the designer to consider computerised systems that provide the potential 
for a single indication for a set of connected input ‘symptoms’, rather numerous discrete 
annunciations for each symptom. At this step-principle relevant information will have 
emerged, however, the links the information might possess with context and situation 
(i.e., buttons and keys changing functions whether the aircraft in in take-off or landing 
phases) needs to be determined.  
The seventh ‘step-principle’ recommends to link information on the interface and 
throughout the system to other relevant information using defined relationships that 
have emerged through the set of Rules, Structures and Strategies, and the established 
relationships determined from using the matrix.  
The eighth step-principle requires the designer to establish and to indicate meaningful 
connections, associations and interdependencies between the information in order to 
show relationships between the displayed  parameters and the whole system (i.e., speed 
is dependent to time and distance, so meaningful links between these parameters in a 
representation may be helpful).  This is suggested as this may aid pilots existing 
problem-solving strategies enabling them to determine the exact information they need 
more easily. 
The ninth ‘step-principle’ requires for all measurements to be represented in 
comparison and relative to either the absolute limits (e.g. performance parameters) or 
capacities.   
The tenth step-principle recommends representing information in meaningful units 
related to the parameter, such as a timeline (in minutes or hours), height (feet or 
metres) or distance (miles or kilometres), to help the pilot to associate and assimilate the 
information. 
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The eleventh step-principle involves minimizing routine computations by associating 
related information and representing information in a form that pilots commonly 
reference it in. The assumption behind this step-principle is that ‘a pilot can only focus 
on a few parameters and the fact that automation was initially designed to offload 
repetitive calculations (Billings, 1997). Currently, computational demands on the pilot 
might be replaced by recognition demands (Hutchins, 1995) in this case the pilot needs 
to be supported by computational sub-systems. Not only pilots but all humans have a 
natural ability, and a lifetime of constant practice, comparing and estimating instead of 
absolutely measuring and performing time-consuming calculations.  In the correct 
context estimations save time and cognitive effort, especially when other important 
tasks have to be attended to. Pilots’ have to perform constant vital calculations to 
monitor and extrapolate aircraft performance. By providing displays that permit the 
pilot to utilise this natural ability, by providing a means of comparison and estimation of 
vital parameters on the display, designers can assist pilots in their task by saving them 
time and cognitive effort.  For example, currently pilots need to perform a two to three 
step calculation to determine level off altitude; (1) target altitude minus current altitude; 
(2) altitude to climb/descent divided by current vertical speed equals time to altitude. It 
is proposed this might be an appropriate feature that could presented in a manner to 
support pilots estimation abilities.  
The twelfth step-principle advocates providing a whole overview for ease of information 
integration and association. 
The thirteenth step-principle urges the designer to provide detail in this overview to 
enable the pilot to easily convergence, or zoom in, on information when needed. 
The fourteenth step-principle suggests to the designer to provide relevant information 
on future aircraft states.  Although this is the last step-principle, it is not the least 
important as it represents information that the pilots’ appeared to constantly search for 
(see Empirical study – chapter 5).  Additionally, it was apparent that often in the 
absence of displayed information pilots’ would ‘construct’ information to provide 
reasoning for the automation behaviour.  It was a constant message throughout the 
observation and empirical studies that pilots required information to aid them to comply 
with a fundamental rule of flying (i.e., ‘the pilot needs to stay ahead of the aircraft’). 
Pilots need ,and desire, to ‘see’ the future of the flight development, in one form or 
another, this is widely recognised and has been extensively discussed in previous 
research(Sarter, 1997; Amalberti, 1999; Billings, 1997; Endsley, 1995) 
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Figure 6.7: Mind Reference Framework 
6.4.3 Fundamental rules for application of Mind Reference framework in design 
It was established through the observation of pilot training, and also through the 
systematic analysis of aircraft operational manuals and design material, that the lack of 
consistency in the application of  design principles was a key contributor to pilots’ 
confusion. Lack of consistency, apart from being a widely reported problem in critical 
environments (‘lack of consistency’ p. 518-519 Wickens, and Hollands, 2000 and 
Woods, et al 1987), was also a major part of problems observed in training (see chapter 
4) and the empirical study (see chapter 5). One of the two fundamental rules in the 
application of the Mind References framework is to apply it consistently throughout the 
system and interface design. 
Rule One: Consistency in application of step-principles throughout the system design, 
in colour, symbology, location, meaning behind symbology.  Consistency is vital to 
clear and unambiguous design.  
Rule Two: All pieces of information, either on the interface or in the system, have to be 
connected to other related pieces of information on the interface, and represented in 
related terms  (i.e., see relative to, contrast, change step), as well as connected 
throughout the systems via meaningful links.  Conversely, information that is presented 
in isolation should be avoided, as this requires additional processing, and often requires 
searches for associated relevant information to determine its significance. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the step-principles to be taken when formulating the presentation of 
information have been established. The next chapters provide the design of two types of 
displays on the basis of these steps, and Chapter 8 describes the experiment conducted 
to test the efficiency of one of these displays. 
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Chapter 7: Using Mind References Framework in 
design 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will illustrate how to apply the Mind Reference framework to two types of 
displays, one designed to help manage the automated systems of the aircraft, and the 
other designed to conduct basic flying tasks on a Primary Flight Display.  Part of the 
second display will be evaluated and tested on pilots in chapter 8. 
7.2 Appling Mind References framework in design – designing 
around a strategy 
Throughout the empirical study and observation of pilots in training the pilots’ asked 
constant questions about the automation; i.e., “What is it doing now, what is it going to 
do next, why is it doing that?”  These questions were reasonable, because if the pilot 
were to fly the real aircraft him/herself, he/she would certainly be asking the same 
questions. Therefore, the question for designers in this instance is, can the pilot be 
shown what he/she wants to see?  
According to several researchers currently pilots’ have information presented to them in 
terms and concepts they cannot not manipulate (Hutchins, 2000). Rather, the 
information presented to pilots’ is more suited to a communication to engineers. This 
point is succinctly made by Feary, “There are many possible reasons for the difficulties 
with pilot understanding of automated aircraft systems. It appears anecdotally, that one 
of these reasons may be a difference in perspective between the engineers who designed 
the system and the pilots who use it” (Feary, M., et al 1999).  Based on the analysis 
conducted in this thesis attempts have been made to overcome these problems and 
present information to pilots, by using the Mind References framework developed (see 
Chapter 6 for detail).  This framework is based on the analysis of pilots’ basic training, 
operational flying, cognitive theories and theories of ecological design. 
Existing research, and findings from this research suggest the most fundamental 
problem that pilots face is that current displays do not have much information, or the 
interface facilities, to support the pilot’s need to plan ahead for each manoeuvre, or stay 
ahead of the automation and airplane in general.  Through this omission one of the most 
fundamental rules of piloting, ‘be ahead of the aircraft’ is overlooked. The technology 
used in contemporary interface displays provides the possibility of helping this 
situation, however, currently the management of automated systems have now become 
an extra task for the pilot, even though the original intent of automation was to reduce 
some of the pilots’ workload (Billings, 1997).  
During flight pilots’ must maintain situational awareness, part of which is defined as 
having an accurate view of the current and evolving situation.  Despite the scientific 
vulnerability of this concept (Flach, 1994), it is considered an appropriate concept to use 
here to describe the capturing of significant elements of an important experiential 
phenomenon. To expand on this concept, in other areas of work, operators may speak of 
being in the bubble or of having a mental model. These terms capture the same sense of 
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being able to visualize, conceptualize or anticipate and project the unfolding of events 
prior to actually experiencing them, and also of being aware of how events proximal in 
time and space can influence what is happening in the current time and position.  
It has previously been established in this thesis that pilots use strategies, such as 
scanning, to help them deal with vast amount of information they need to operate an 
aircraft effectively. For example, to establish the aircraft position, pilots expect certain 
features to appear on displays or in the environment as time passes.  In this way pilots’ 
compare their mental flight plan with external references. Later in this chapter details 
are given on a proposed display that aims to present future-information to the pilot, such 
as intended and resultant, this will potentially permit the pilot to scan and compare their 
mental plan with the plan calculated by the automation. 
7.2.1 Time Dependent Operations: The Mental Movie 
Terms that are intended to stand for this form of mind’s eye visualization have a long 
history of use, and abuse, within behavioural science, possibly because these terms have 
never received a formal definition. This is particularly true for the term Mental Model, 
which has a multitude of meanings in the scientific literature. Consequently, provided 
here is the reasoning for the use of the chosen terminology Mental Movie.  
The term Mental Movie has been arrived at through combining the generic notions 
behind the term Mental Model, and the temporal aspects of Movie.  It is argued that, in 
common usage, Mental Model refers to a form of mental visualization that allows one to 
trace through the sequence of steps or states of a process prior to the actual event. 
Therefore, upon this definition it can be seen that Mental Model captures much that is 
important in piloting. It permits visualization and mental projection of how one event 
leads to another, how events are interdependent and how they intertwine, and how 
informational resources must be accessed as events unfold.  It does not, however, 
capture a critical element that became apparent through the analysis of the studies 
reported in this thesis, that being the time dependency of pilot expectations and actions. 
The studies revealed that pilots structure information, and their ensuing expectations, 
with time dependent relationships. Consequently, to include the temporal aspect in the 
terminology, the term Mental Movie is used. 
It is reasoned that the pilot forms his/her Mental Movie of the flight during the planning 
stage of the flight. The Mental Movie is structured along a timeline, integrating key 
information profiles (distances from and to navigational points, turning points, flight 
level restrictions, speed restrictions, flight level changes with relevant speeds attached, 
points of contact with Air Traffic Control, time for checklists, etc.) against the timeline 
(Box 1). This Mental Movie then provides the basis for the pilot to confirm the progress 
of the flight as their expectations are compared with the actual unfolding events of the 
flight.  
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Therefore, a key use of this Mental Movie is in the confirmation of expectations. For 
example, one expectation within the scenario of Box 1 is a level off at 5,000 feet. Where 
this is under automatic control, failure to level off as expected will trigger action.  Pilots 
also use these expectations as triggers, or cues, to prepare for significant events, such as 
landing or arrival at a waypoint.  It is argued here that these expectations are an 
important structuring and monitoring strategy for the pilot and present a good basic 
strategy to support with automation.  
Some forms of support are already in place and are successful on modern automated 
aircraft, such a PLAN mode of the Navigational Display, where all or most of the route 
is displayed on one display.  This display enables the pilot to compare ‘mental notes’ on 
what the flight should look like from a view above, showing a lateral prospective of 
events.  
However, a fundamental problem in the existing cockpit layout is that information is 
hidden and does not allow an effective comparison to be made, especially due to several 
influencing conditions, such as ‘if conditions’ that influence automation behaviour. 
These strategies are not working on existing displays. In light of the potential of current 
interface technology it is timely to take a new perspective on means of announcing 
aircraft state change to the pilot and presenting information in a manner considerate to 
pilot-like information strategies.  For example, an interesting outcome from 
observational studies of pilots during flight operation is that pilots use a pictorial 
comparison strategy to see if the information they ‘scan’ (see chapter 4 for detail) 
matches up to their plan.  
In the following paragraphs the Mind References design steps (see chapter 6 for detail) 
are used to conceive a display to help pilot operate the aircraft on the basis of the 
Mental Movie. 
7.2.2 Applying Mind References step-principles: 
The following paragraphs follow the development of the proposed display against the 
guidance put forward by the Mind Reference step-principles. 
Step-principle 1: Format the information to be displayed in a manner consistent 
with the cognitive demand. 
The Skill Rule Knowledge principle offered by Rasmussen can help the designer follow 
the guidance of the first step-principle (Rasmussen, 1994). This principle indicates that 
task types should be matched with natural human abilities, and that the form of 
representation should be determined by the nature of the cognitive competency that is 
Box 1: A Plan Fragment as a Mental Movie 
A pilot visualizes the following: 
 
While in climb, fly 19 miles from navigational point A, then turn left to 230 
degrees, level off at 5,000 feet, advise Air Traffic Control we have reached the 
requested position. Once established at the altitude, maintain speed of 210 knots 
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deployed in conjunction with that information. Therefore, from the above principle, 
information in support of skill-based behaviour (e.g., perception-action elements of 
flight control) should be represented in graphical forms that can be recognized instantly.  
Supporting pilots’ manual flight skill-based behaviour, was the focus of the proposed 
design, consequently, a graphical display was considered appropriate.    
The proposed graphical interface can be seen in figure 7.1.  It can be seen that this is a 
comprehensive graphical representation of the aircraft’s flight-path. The aircraft’s 
flight-path is depicted in four-dimensional space, with a pictorial timeline depicting the 
4th dimension of time.  The pictorial display of the flight-path supports the skill-based 
behaviour required for manual operation of an aircraft, and so fits with the Skills, Rule 
Knowledge framework of Rasmussen et al (1994).  The proposed display also provides 
the pilot a holistic overview of aircraft systems through the development of the flight, as 
shown along the Timeline. Additionally, the pilot can ‘zoom in and out’ (see later 
description) for a detailed view at any point on the timeline.  It will be detailed later that 
both these facilities are important Mind Reference principles.  
The timeline provides a way of structuring information about flight progress that is 
similar to the way pilots’ structure information in their Mental Movie of the flight. The 
timeline serves as a common Mind Reference to aid pilots’ recognition, association and 
assimilation of information. Key information is provided along the timeline to help the 
pilot see the functionality of the aircraft’s systems at any moment of the flight, whether 
in the present, future or past. This graphic layout helps the pilot to manage the changing 
states of the aircraft’s automation. 
The proposed display includes a ‘snapshot’ capability to support pilots’ to be able to 
convergence on more detailed information they need. This proposed snapshot, feature 
would suspend the display in time to permit the pilot to examine it in detail, so that for a 
problem with any system, the pilot could use this capability to converge on the problem 
and formulate an appropriate corrective strategy.   The step-principles 2 and 3 that are 
detailed below and explanations of how this guidance was used in the display are given. 
Step-principle 2: Identify Relevant Rules, Structure and Strategies.  
The rule that the proposed interface supports is ‘to be ahead of the aircraft’s current 
position, state and behaviour’. The structure that the interface supports is the pre-flight 
brief.  The relevant strategies supported are, pilot’s information scanning techniques 
(chapter 4), and how pilots’ compare their Mental Movie of the briefed flight to actual 
flight events, which has already been discussed, above. 
Step-principle 3: Organize Basic Information that has emerged through examining 
the relevant Sets of Rules, Structures and Strategies 
At this stage it is necessary to add any further information needed to conduct the whole 
task (i.e., in this example the whole task might be defined as the entire flight, or 
progress along a significant flight stage) onto a single interface along relevant 
parameter commonly referred to by operators in the task (e.g. pilots often refer to a 
timeline whilst progressing through the flight).  Therefore, in the proposed display the 
timeline is used to organize the basic information.  
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Step-principle 4: Represent information in accordance with the Information 
Matrix.  
It may be recalled from chapter 6 that the Information Matrix is comprised of three 
dimensions; CONTENT (What… ); TIME (When… ); and UNDERSTANDING 
(How… ), and each of these dimensions is further divided into three levels.  These 
dimensions and levels will be considered in detail in the following paragraphs, starting 
with the first dimension of the Information Matrix, CONTENT (What… ). This 
dimension comprises the information levels Physical, Behaviour, and Environment and 
the designer’s first action it to consider the significance of these three levels on the 
information to be represented.  Given that this interface is to help pilots stay ‘ahead of 
the automation throughout the flight’, all represented information will be about 
controlling automation or seeing its ‘intentions’ and actions. In this, probably 
exceptional case, information on all levels is effected, such as: on the Physical level 
(e.g. the aircraft’s take-off configuration is different to that in level flight); the 
Behavioural level (e.g. as the aircraft transitions from take-off to level flight automation 
states and functions change); and the Environment level (e.g. terrain information, which 
may trigger activation of the automated flight-envelop protection routine).  
Next the designer is required to ascertain between which, or with which, out of three 
levels of information do relationships exist, and what is the nature of this relationship, 
dependent, complementary, facilitating and obstructing. Although, there are many 
relationships relevant to the proposed display, appropriate examples include; Behaviour 
is dependent on Environment (e.g. where changes in terrain instigate the flight envelope 
protection routine); Physical is facilitating to Environment (e.g. changing the physical 
aircraft configuration through trim facilitates a straight course in a cross wind).   
The next dimension of the Information Matrix to consider is TIME (When… ).  This 
dimension helps to establish, whether, and which aspect/s of time need to be 
represented.  Since in the example display the pilot’s need ‘to stay ahead of the aircraft’ 
is being supported, the information related to the future is important, however, as will 
be discussed in a later step-principle, all information is connected and should not be 
presented disjointedly unnecessarily. Consequently, the layout of the interface allows 
the pilot to view continuously the result of past actions, the effects of Physical-
Behaviour-Environment influences on current, and the future developments of the flight 
according to that programmed form the pre-flight brief.  Additionally, through 
highlighting key information along the timeline of the display, the pilot is made aware 
of changes in functionality of the aircraft’s systems at any time of the flight, whether at 
present, future or past. 
The next dimension of the Information Matrix is the UNDERSTANDING (How… ) 
dimension.  This is composed of the levels, Perceptual, Contextual and Semantic. The 
overall purpose of this dimension is to help the designer to determine the appropriate 
presentation and later avoid misinterpretation in context and meaning.  In chapter 6 it 
was suggested that the designer use specific questions as guidance to help to identify 
appropriate presentation in this dimension.  These questions are as follows:  
• Is there an existing perceptual representation in the domain or operator’s 
experience?  Is it appropriate for this task, for this interface? 
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The observations and empirical studies suggested an appropriate representation within 
the domain.  During the pre-flight briefings pilots’ were observed drawing two or three-
dimensional pictures of how they considered the flight would unfold.  Consequently, 
this type of representation was considered appropriate to depict the flight. Additionally, 
depending on the operation pilots were communicating they used either distance or time 
or both as a parameter/s along which the rest of the information was placed.  
• Is there a human known perceptual presentation, such as a metaphor?  
The answer to this question again came from the empirical data. There is a ubiquity of 
maps and drawn directions in the aerospace domain, however, these are, of course, not 
exclusive to aerospace they are a widely understood perceptual presentation. 
Whilst the preceding questions were to inform the designer on the perceptual level of 
understanding, the following questions are to inform the designer on the contextual 
level.  
• Does the context dictate how the information should be represented?  
This question may also be rephrased as follows: 
• Can this information be interpreted, or misinterpreted, in different way given 
the context?  
Considering the proposed display example the visible information presented along the 
timeline cannot be misread, since it applies to the whole flight, and there is no other 
context, other than the flight.  However, what is needed on the proposed display is a 
need for a perspective on the information, i.e. a ‘frame of reference’. 
This contextual question was again answered from observing pilots’ communicating 
with one another at the pre-flight briefs.  Observing the drawings produced by the 
pilots’ it was evident that the perspective on the information was chosen on the basis of 
the how pilots drew the flight, where the majority chose a left-most position to indicate 
the beginning of the flight, and depicted the progression of the flight rightward. It was 
considered at the time this maybe based on the fact that the aviation world 
predominantly communicates using the English language and English is written from 
left to right. 
Additionally, the information to be presented in the context or using the context, needs 
to be presented relative to already existing object, such as a scale. For example, 
considering a human known example, outside the aerospace domain, this might be 
considered as our own body that gives us a relative association to our surrounding 
objects. With respect to the proposed display, the representation of the aircraft is 
presented relative to both the timeline and the route.  
Also related to context is the need to highlight changes and events. This need was 
identified during the observations and empirical studies, as it was established that pilots 
highlighted major events and flight stages as points, where change or modifications 
occurred (e.g. Air Traffic Control contact resulted in change of altitude). Further, during 
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flight major expected changes and events were used by the pilots’ as Mind References 
around which the information was grouped and linked.  On the example display changes 
an events are highlighted as marks on timeline, and anomalies and unforeseen events 
(i.e. those that differ from the flight brief), are highlighted on the timeline as soon the 
system has calculated them.     
The last level of the Information Matrix is concerned with semantics and it raises the 
following questions: What is the meaning of emergent presentation? Which out of 
several emergent presentations is the most suitable? The meaning behind the 
information presented should not be open to interpretation.  
Once the designer has progressed through the step-principles to this stage a prototype 
can be tested on pilots’ for exploratory purposes.  And may then consider the next step-
principle below. 
Step-principle 5: Consider the addition relevant information that has emerged 
through the use of Matrix to needs to be incorporated.  
This is the stage where the variety of situations where information will be used need to 
be considered. Additional runs through the Information Matrix questions might also 
elucidate further information that is required to be blended-in/merged together with 
information already retrieved.  For the example display reassessment of the CONTENT 
dimension (What…) and its three levels (physical, behaviour and environment) 
identified that it was important be able to show the effects of these levels on one another 
on the request of the pilot.   As it was recalled that during the brief pilots often 
discussed the level and combination of automation modes they would use and the 
automation modes demonstrate information relationships between the levels physical, 
behaviour and environment.  Therefore, the need to show the effect of automation mode 
at the request of the pilot, both in time and with respect to the environment was 
considered. Since, at this stage, the metaphor of a ‘movie’ on this interface had already 
been established, showing the automation set up of a system at a given point in time 
during flight as a ‘snapshot of a moment’ was considered appropriate.  After some 
refinement of this idea, the facility for the pilot to preview the effect of automation 
setup against the flight profile would be helpful so the pilot could consider the effects of 
specific automation mode combinations (Figure 7.2). 
Step-principle 6: Group complementary task relevant information, to minimize the 
need for searching. 
On the example flight progress display, complementary information is structured along 
a timeline.  
Step Principle 7: Link information on the interface and throughout the system to 
other relevant information using defined relationships that have emerged through 
a Set of Rules, Structures and Strategies, and established have relationships 
established from progressing through the Information Matrix.  
In the example display relevant information is linked by, the overview perspective, and 
the reference to a common timeline and route.  In this display additional relevant 
information can be sought by the pilot using the defined structure of the ‘flight-plan’; 
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whereby if data is entered about a specific point on the flight-plan, all relevant 
information surrounding that point may be retrieved.  
Step-principle 8: Establish and indicate meaningful connections, associations and 
interdependencies of information to show relations of systems and parameters to 
assist in problem solving. 
One of major problems reported during studies recorded earlier in this thesis (chapter 4)  
and also in aviation research over the last decade (Sarter, 1995; Billings, 1997; Lyall, 
1998) is pilots’ understanding of the effect of automation on aircraft performance, and 
the interaction of automation modes.  Therefore, step-principle 8 points that providing 
indications of which part of the automation mode is effecting what part of aircraft 
performance would be helpful to pilots.  In the example display interaction of 
automation modes with aircraft behaviour, performance and the environment is reported 
to the pilot at the snap-shot instances, as described above (step-principle 5). 
Step-principle 9: All measurements to be represented in comparison and relative to 
either the limit (e.g. performance parameters) or capacity. 
In the example display all the information is represented relative to the timeline, while 
altitude information is shown against the absolute lower-limit of the ground. 
Step-principle 10: Represent information in meaningful units related to the 
parameter to help associate and assimilate information. 
On the example interface display the primary parameter is time, where increments are 
shown along the timeline.  To establish meaning to these increments, during a shorter 
flight these units may represent smaller units of time, whilst on a longer flight similarly 
greater spans of time. However, this aspect of the proposed display would have to be 
tested, as the rate at which information changes over time can influence the sampling 
rate of information by the pilot (Johnson, 2003).   
Step-principle 11: Minimize routine computations by associating related 
information and representing information in a form that pilots reference it in. 
For the example this display might include an automated estimated arrival time 
calculator can be given at major event points along the flight-path, as this is a routine 
calculation that currently the pilots’ do. 
Step-principle 12: Provide a holistic overview of for ease of information integration 
and association  
The proposed display is an overall management interface and allows the pilot to see the 
effects of the automation setup and aircraft configuration, rather than individual pieces 
of information separately. 
Step-principle 13: Provide a detailed overview for ease of convergence on 
information needed. 
In the proposed display the detail view of automation mode interaction can show the 
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effects of it on the flight-path in a unit of time (Figure 7.2 Snapshots).  For example, 
during the degradation of the navigation system, the detail view can show how other 
systems compensate and where the information is taken from to support this 
compensation. In case of part of automated system degradation, the pilot can view how 
many autopilots are functioning and how the workload is distributed in the automated 
system and, by zooming out, can view the effect on the flight-path.  The facility, on the 
proposed interface, for snap-shots can be supplemented by a feature enabling the pilot to 
‘zoom in and out’ to gain a detailed view at any point on the flight-path. The zoom-in 
feature is important for pilots, for example, to enable them to converge on the 
information they need in the event of system degradation (e.g. engine failure, etc.) 
enabling them to be able to consider the whole system functionality given the 
malfunction.  More generally, the zoom-in facility permits the pilot a detailed 
examination of a problem, with any system, and pilots may use this capability to help 
converge on the problem and formulate an appropriate corrective strategy. The zoom-
out facility, in contrast, gives a possibility to view the larger effect of specific changes 
to parameters on flight performance and ultimately the whole flight-path.  
Step-principle 14: Where relevant provide information on future projected aircraft 
states.  
This is an important function of this interface. As mentioned above, the display is of the 
overall flight including a timeline and route information.  Depending on the increments 
used for the timeline the flight may be projected into the future as far as the screen and 
time increments chosen permit.  This feature uses the current system parameters and 
settings and using these as a projected dotted line (i.e. the projected course) ahead of the 
current position.    
The figure 7.1 represents a model that encapsulates Mind References step- principles. 
 
Development of the ‘Mental Movie’ 
along the Timeline 
 
Purpose
Priorities & values
General Functions
Physical functions & 
effects
Physical form
Snapshot of a current 
aircraft systems 
STATE in CLIMB 
 
Take off run 
Restricted level-off by ATC to 15000 feet 
Climb 
Initial climb
Take off 
Turn to 275’ 
Flight path in 4-D Space  
(3D plus 4th dimension of TIME)
Cruise at 31 000 feet 
Level off 
After Take off checklist 
 
Change of ATC
Snapshot: Meaningful aircraft 
systems structure 
Y system 
W system 
X system 
Z system 
CWA Abstraction Hierarchy 
Terrain 
(THRCLB;CLB;NAV) 
Snapshot: Aircraft 
system state including 
various modes
Figure 7.1: Prototype of a multi-dimensional, information-action workspace for an 
automated cockpit 
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Figure 7.2: Snapshots of multi-dimensional, information-action workspace for an 
automated cockpit 
7.2.3 Supporting a calculating technique through an interface feature 
To cross check whether the automated system flies the aircraft precisely, or when the 
automation is not available the pilot goes through mental calculations to establish 
required references to monitor the progress.  An example of this mental calculations that 
pilots performs to establish when to start levelling off, i.e. a mark at ‘10% of your rate 
of climb’ to the level off altitude. This technique is taught to pilots at very early stages 
flying and is used throughout the flight. 
Another mental reference that pilots need to calculate, but that is also unavailable on the 
display, is in the example below, it is a mark on 7 degrees prior to the required ‘roll-out’ 
heading. This indicates when the pilot will have to begin to come out of a ‘bank’ to roll-
out on the required heading. The pilot calculates mental references using referenced 
information, such as ‘height… rate of climb…turning rate’. All the calculations below 
are measured in relation to a time, such as a rate of turn in seconds or a rate of climb in 
minutes.  
Pilot 05:49 M: ‘I will just explain something here.  That might look like a fairly benign thing. 
All we are doing there just climbing and turning, but my workload is really 
increasing there, … what rate I am climbing at, when I will need to start my 
level off and also when I will need to start my roll out from a turn.  … how 
many degrees per second I am rolling at; how many feet per minute I am 
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climbing at … so what I’m looking for.  I am having a look at my rate of 
climb.  I am doing about 2500 feet/min, so 10% of your rate of climb is what 
you use to level off at for your height so 250 feet before 3000 feet and that’s 
when I’ve got to start my level off.  And they are the things I am thinking 
about when I am doing that.  Obviously approaching about 7 degrees at the 
rate I was turning at – rate 1 (i.e. 3 degrees per second or turn at the rate 1 is 
when the aircraft turns full 360 degrees in two minutes), because when you 
start your roll out.   
Ye, looks simple, but that what we do a lot of practice for instrument flying, 
doing coordination exercises, turning and climbing at the same time, 
descending…’. 
The design process to support this calculating techniques using Mind References step-
principles is described in the next chapter, where the design is also tested on and 
evaluated by pilots. 
7.3 Next step 
The following chapter (chapter 8) presents the results of the evaluation of displays 
features that are based on the Mind Reference principles, and have been implemented 
using the Mind Reference framework as described in this chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Designing and Evaluating Display Features 
based Mind References 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter describes the design and evaluation of a display feature that was designed 
using the Mind Reference framework. The evaluation of this display feature was performed 
against the following hypothesis: 
Using guidance from the Mind Reference framework in the design of displays results in 
display designs that can significantly aid pilots in their routine flight tasks, by reducing 
their time spent performing the task, and also by reducing their number of errors made 
while performing tasks.  
In order to explore the information presentation issues discussed earlier in this work, and to 
gain a deeper understanding of the how Mind Reference framework presentation may 
improve these presentation issues, an evaluation experiment was conducted to test the 
above hypothesis. The experiment was designed to vary Mind Reference related 
presentation in four conditions (A, B, C and D) to identify the degree of their effect on 
pilots’ performance.  The Mind Reference developed display features were compared with 
the commonly used numerical representation of the same information used on most Primary 
Flight Displays.  
The experiment comprised two parts. In the first part a between-subject design was used, 
where 40 pilots (four groups of 10 pilots) were assessed performing the task of calculating 
remaining time to target altitude, in total this comprised 320 trials (8 tasks for each pilot). 
Each group performed the experimental task on one of four display conditions: (1) A 
condition (control condition, using just numerical information), (2) B condition (Mind 
Reference presentation of a Level-Off-Altitude line), (3) C condition (Mind Reference of a 
Vertical-Speed-Triangle of 1-minute travel) and (4) D condition (complete Mind Reference 
presentation of all information needed to complete the task). In the second part of the 
experiment was a within-subject design on 17 pilots, where all pilots performed tasks only 
on two display conditions, A and D. This permitted the comparison on a larger number of 
pilots’ performing the same task in two extreme cases, on the numerical and on the display 
fully designed using a Mind Reference framework. 
The first part of the experiment permitted the examination of which features influenced 
pilots’ performance and in the second part both display conditions were tested on the same 
pilots (within-subject design) to avoid individual differences influencing the results. The 
Figure (8.1) provides the analysis structure and highlights key results (i.e., including 
outliers) that guide the reader through the analysis.  
Therefore, in testing the hypothesis firstly, combinations of the display features designed 
using guidance from the Mind Reference framework were tested to assess whether these 
helped pilots to complete an estimating task more effectively, in less time and more 
accurately in comparison to a display with numerical representation.  The second part of the 
hypothesis test was to assess if more features implemented in the display from Mind 
Reference guidance, resulted in a similar increase in pilots’ performance. 
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EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
 Structure & Results
PART 1
BETWEEN-SUBJECT design
4 groups x 10 pilots
PART 2
WITHIN-SUBJECT design
17 pilots
Time
Data-point
Score
Data-point
Overall
Performance
Data-point
 (i) Analysis of
TOTAL Time, Score and Overall Performance
over 8 TASKS between A, B, C and D conditions
Time
Data-point
Score
Data-point
Overall
Performance
Data-point
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
 (ii) Analysis of
Time, Score and Overall Performance
per SINGLE TASK between A, B, C and D conditions
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
(iii) Analysis of
Time, Score and Overall Performance
between 8 TASKS and A, B, C and D conditions
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
 (i) Analysis of
TOTAL Time, Score and Overall Performance
over 8 TASKS between A and D conditions
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
 (ii) Analysis of
Time, Score and Overall Performance
per SINGLE TASK between A and D conditions
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
 (iii) Analysis of
Time, Score and Overall Performance
between 8 TASKS and, A and D conditions
OUTLIERS if identified,
are removed
* Pilots performed twice
as fast and made less
errors on condition D,
than on A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was more
than 230% better on
condition D, than on A.
* Pilots performed
individual tasks twice as
fast and made less
errors on condition D,
than on A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was 200%
better on condition D,
than on A.
* Pilots performed tasks
3, 4, 5 and 8
significantly faster, and
also made significantly
less errors in task 5 on
condition D, than on A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was over
200% better in tasks 1,
4, 5, 7 and 8 on
condition D, than on A.
* Pilots performed 320%
faster and made
significantly less errors
on condition D, than on
A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was more
than 375% better on
condition D, than on A.
* Pilots performed
individual tasks 300%
faster and made less
errors on condition D,
than on A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was more
than 300% better on
condition D, than on A.
* Pilots performed tasks
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
significantly faster, and
also made significantly
less errors in task 3 and
5 on condition D, than
on A.
* Pilots Overall
Performance was
significantly better in
task 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8
on condition D, than on
A.
RESULTS RESULTS
 
Figure 8.1: The analysis structure
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8.2  Design Rational: Using Mind Reference Framework  
Previous findings (discussed in chapter 3 and 5) showed that pilots, flying both automated 
and non-automated aircraft, constantly use a reference to time as a crucial parameter during 
flight.  Moreover, this time parameter is a foundation upon which events become 
significant to the pilot, a concept termed in this thesis as Mind References. The concept of 
Mind References itself (discussed in chapter 6) uses broader concepts like metaphors 
(Lakoff, 2003; Pinker, 1997; Wickens, 2000) and visual cues in optical flow (Gibson, 1979) 
that suggest how humans naturally assimilate, acquire and use information. 
Based on observations of pilots’ in training, an empirical study and interviews with pilots it 
is suggested that pilots use such References to structure, organize and monitor the data 
presented to them from aircraft displays (Solodilova, 2003). 
The Mind Reference Framework proposes several underlying interface design principles 
(Table 8.2) that, it is hypothesized, will combine to reduce workload upon pilots by 
reducing calculations and reducing mental processing.  Further, it is proposed that these 
principles help assimilating vital time-dependent information to assist in time-critical 
situations. 
Mind Reference Framework – Step-Principles 
1.  The format of information displayed should be consistent with the cognitive task 
2.  Reorganize basic information needed to monitor the whole flight progress onto a 
single display along a parameter commonly referred to by operators (for example, a 
timeline) 
3.  Represent information in units of parameters and representations that are meaningful 
to the pilot to help associate and assimilate information 
4.  Group complementary information, to minimize the need for searching 
5 Establish meaningful connections, associations and interdependencies of information 
to show relationships of systems and parameters to assist in problem solving 
6.  Provide a holistic overview for ease of information integration and association 
7.  Provide a detailed overview for ease of convergence on information needed 
8.  Minimize the computation of routine calculations by associating related information 
and representing it in a form that pilots reference it in 
9.  Provide instantaneous relevant information about the future aircraft states 
Table 8.1: Mind References framework principles 
Note:   
The list of step-principles above is an abridged version of that presented in chapter 
six.  The omissions are; 
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Identify relevant Rules, Structures and Strategies. 
This was omitted for test as the relevant Rule chosen was, that the pilot should be 
able to stay mentally ‘ahead of the aircraft’ and this Rule was, in practice, embedded 
in the many of other features that were practical to test. 
Additional relevant information emerged through use of the Information Matrix.   
This was omitted as the purpose of the Information Matrix is largely to examine 
integrating many information sources, whilst it was only practical to experimentally 
test a stand-alone display feature. 
Provide a holistic overview for ease of information integration and association. 
Provide a detailed overview for ease of convergence on information needed. 
These two step-principles, above, were omitted, again, as it was only practical to test 
a stand-alone display feature, whilst the two step-principles are concerned with 
information integration and management. 
8.2.1 Display Design 
Most of the Primary Flight Displays in glass cockpits provide the following information: 
aircraft attitude, air speed, altitude and vertical speed, heading and track, vertical and lateral 
deviation, autoflight and radio navigation information. However, for the purposes of this 
investigation a prototype display was designed using a minimum of information (air speed, 
altitude, vertical speed and heading), most of which is directly relevant to the task at hand. 
This information was translated into a variety of features, according to the step-principles 
proposed and then compared with the current, largely numerical, representation of the same 
information on Primary Flight Displays. 
8.2.2 From concept to design 
Table 8.2.2a shows how current numerical representations comply with the proposed step-
principles and in comparison shows how the proposed features comply with these step-
principles. 
The step-principles should not be applied individually and are used in conjunction with 
each other. However, for clarity they are considered one by one to show how they form the 
display features (also Table 8.2.2a) and help to perform that task. 
Mind References 
Principles for task 
time to altitude 
Numerical 
features on 
current 
displays  
(Figure 8.2.2a)
Proposed features in prototype display  
(Figure 8.2.2d) 
1. Format information 
consistently with 
cognitive task 
Numerical tasks 
are cognitively 
demanding 
Whole display designed for a routine 
calculating task, features designed according to 
further principles; shapes and distance in 
between are used to assist in faster 
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calculation/estimation 
2. Reorganize 
information along a 
parameter 
Not supported Information presented and referenced with altitude tape 
3. Represent 
information in 
meaningful 
parameters  
Mostly 
numerical 
representation 
Time represented in height of triangle and 
dashes, vertical speed in units of time 
4. Group 
complementary 
information 
Not grouped Group time, vertical speed and altitude 
5. Establish 
meaningful 
connection 
Not supported 
Current altitude line is lined up with the 
vertical speed triangle; dashes lead to target 
level-off altitude, showing the path to be 
travelled; both altitude lines connect with speed 
and altitude 
6. Provide holistic 
overview Not applicable Not applicable 
7. Provide detailed 
overview Not applicable Not applicable 
8. Minimize 
computation by 
representing it in 
pilots’ form of 
reference 
Not supported 
Information combined (vertical speed and 
altitude to be travelled) and presented in units 
(minutes) that pilots require, i.e. height of the 
triangle equals one minute of vertical travel 
9. Provide 
instantaneous 
projection of future 
Not supported 
Provides target level-off altitude in relation to 
vertical speed and dashes, helping pilots 
estimate time at a glance 
Table 8.2.2a: Comparison of representation on displays 
To investigate the hypothesised benefits of using the step-principles, and to assess the new 
features designed using this guidance, a routine piloting task was chosen for a new display 
design.  This is a task where pilots’ have to calculate the time to target level-off altitude 
based on the current vertical speed. The rational for choosing this task is discussed and 
summarized in the method section. 
According to step-principle 1 the proposed feature has to support pilots’ cognitive tasks. 
For the purpose of the experiment a task that requires calculations was chosen – calculating 
the time to level-off altitude. When the task is established, the rest of the step-principles 
shape the display features to support the pilots’ task. 
Step-principle 2 – requires the designer to identify a general parameter that the pilots’ will 
be referring to while performing the task. In this particular task it is the altitude parameter. 
The parameter should be represented as a continuum along which the rest of the 
information will be placed. 
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Step-principle 3 – involves identifying a parameter that pilots need as an outcome of their 
calculation. For this task the parameter is time, represented as increments, where one 
increment is equal to one minute. These increments should be represented in terms of the 
general parameter, the altitude. This will allow pilots to reference these increments (i.e. the 
time) against the general parameter (i.e. the altitude). Since the altitude is represented as 
height, we will use the height of an object as one unit along the increments (i.e. one 
minute). Also the height is a suitable representation of the unit, because the task requires 
thinking about vertical travel, up or down. This then helps the designer to think further 
about the type of object would be appropriate to use that can represent the unit of time. 
Since, in this example, a direction representation was being sought, the symbolic 
representation in a shape of equilateral triangle seemed appropriate. 
Step-principle 4 – is responsible for grouping information required to complete the task. It 
has already been established that time and altitude should be grouped. Altitude described in 
units of time is also known in aviation as vertical speed. This leads to an additional 
meaning to the equilateral triangle, vertical speed per minute. 
Step-principle 5 – establish meaningful connections. The designer may establish three of 
the required meaningful connections in this task.  First, all current flight parameters have to 
line up together, i.e. current speed, altitude and vertical speed. Second, all future flight 
parameters also have to line up, i.e. future speed and altitude at level-off.  Lastly, to aid the 
pilot in calculations connections between the current and future altitudes, i.e. the path to be 
travelled may be shown by consecutive one-minute dashes of the vertical travel. This 
representation connects present to the future flight parameters. 
Step-principles 6 and 7 are not applicable for this calculating task. They are more suitable 
for other piloting tasks, such as monitoring and problem solving. However, these step-
principles are described in detail and through application in chapter six. 
Step-principle 8 – is achieved by grouping information appropriate for the task, which in 
this task is achieved through grouping time, altitude and vertical speed and representing 
these as an equilateral triangle. 
This spatial representation in units of time (i.e. one triangle equals one minute of vertical 
travel) allows pilots to simply estimate the number of shapes that can fit between the 
altitude lines, instead of subtracting numerical information. 
The equilateral triangle is one of many possible solutions that may exist and comply with 
step-principles (one, two, three, four, five, eight and nine), so the triangle is not necessarily 
the sole solution. Lastly (step-principle 9), an instantaneous projection has been already 
supported in the proposed design through the application of previous step-principles. 
Moreover, the height of the triangle and the consecutive projection of dashes provide pilots 
with the possibility of estimating time to altitude at a glance, rather than ‘crunching the 
numbers’. 
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Figure 8.2.2a: Display Condition A 
 
Figure 8.2.2b: Display Condition B 
 
Figure 8.2.2c: Display Condition C 
 
Figure 8.2.2d: Display Condition D 
It may be apparent at this point that not all step-principles are equally applicable for all 
types of task. For example, some are more applicable to problem solving and monitoring 
tasks, which are equally important in any cockpit, but are not the subject of the current 
experiment. 
From table 8.2.2a it can be seen that the numerical representation is not successful in the 
embodying these principles. The numeric presentations are limited and do not allow for 
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visual comparison of relative distance and size. In this instance a numerical display makes 
the calculating task difficult, as not everyone is fluent performing arithmetic tasks. It was 
important to ascertain every participants (i.e. pilots in these experiments) arithmetic ability, 
in the experiments, to identify whether higher numerical ability would aid their 
performance on the numerical display. 
8.3  Method – part (i), between-subject, 4 groups, N = 40 
8.3.1 Experimental scenario 
To test features developed using the Mind References framework on a prototype display 
one, of the many, repetitive calculating tasks was chosen, that of estimating the time to 
target level-off altitude. This is representative of other tasks, such as the calculation of the 
time to the next navigational point, and the distance over ground in a period of time. 
The task of calculating the time to level-off altitude (Table 8.3.1a) is performed routinely 
throughout each flight and so should not be time consuming or cognitively taxing. It 
requires a quick and accurate answer, as well as quick convergence on the information 
required. Consequently, the quick and accurate aspects were of interest as measures of the 
participants’ performance during the experiment. 
Experimental task instruction 
Calculate how much time is left to reach the level-off altitude from the current altitude 
take the following steps: 
• Level-off altitude minus current altitude equals remaining altitude → 14 000 – 7 
000 = 7 000 (feet) 
• Remaining altitude divided by current vertical speed (feet per 1 min) equals time in 
minutes to level-off altitude →  
7 000 / 2 000 = 3,5 (minutes) 
Table 8.3.1a: Experimental task 
8.3.2 Participants:  
The sample of participants in the study comprised 40 pilots, i.e. ten pilots per condition. 
The participants were evenly distributed across all conditions. Two out of the 40 pilots 
were female. This means 5% of the all participants in this experiment were female, which is 
representative of the general population of pilots in aviation (Aviation for Women 2004). 
The average age of the participant pilots was 36 years old (SD = 11.8), ranging from 20 to 
61 year old. The age factor was evenly distributed across all four experimental conditions 
(Figure 8.3.2a). 
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Summary of pilots' Mean age per condition with 
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Figure 8.3.2a: Summary of participants Mean age 
All participants were pilots, with total flying hours ranging from 80 to 10200 with an 
average of 3252 (SD = 2988). A summary of all pilots flying experience is shown figure 
8.3.2b. It is evenly distributed across all conditions.  
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Figure 8.3.2b: Statistical summary of participants flying hours 
8.3.3 Material:  
Experimental prototype displays were designed using Microsoft Power Point. A set of pre-
designed (i.e. by the researcher) slides was used, where each represented an individual task 
the participants’ had to perform. The slide show formed a presentation consisting of eight 
different task scenarios. The participant controlled the speed of presentation of each slide, 
moving from one task to another at his/her own pace, using a keyboard. 
The experimental displays were designed on the basis of a modern aircraft Primary Flight 
Display, showing all the basic information required to complete the experimental task. 
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There were four types of prototype displays to represent four experimental conditions. The 
experimental display condition A (Figure 8.2.2a) was a control condition that embodied 
none of the Mind References principles, and only contained basic numerical representation 
of information. The condition B display (Figure 8.2.2b) had the same information as the 
display A, plus an additional feature of a Level-Off-Altitude line. The display C (Figure 
8.2.2c) had the same information as the display A, plus an additional feature of a Vertical-
Speed-Triangle with reference dashes, where each consecutive dash indicated the next one-
minute of vertical travel. The display D (Figure 8.2.2d) had all features together on one 
display, both in numerical and Mind References form. 
The four conditions (A, B, C and D) were used to test the degree and effect of the 
incorporation of Mind References principles into the information representation on each 
display on participants’ task performance. There were eight identical tasks per condition to 
test the variety of possible situations of a vertical speed representation, four of which were 
in descent and the other four in ascent. The experimental setup is summarized in the table 
8.3.3a (below). 
Measurement of duration and accuracy of eight tasks were collected for each participant. 
Hence, there were 16 data points, eight time data-points (Time) per task and eight error 
data-points (Score) per task.   
Condi-
tions 
A 
Control Numerical 
representation 
B 
Partial Mind 
References & 
numerical  
representation 
C 
Partial Mind 
References & 
numerical 
representation 
D 
Mind References 
representation 
Features 
 
 
Tasks 
Numbers only Level-Off-Altitude line & numbers 
Vertical-Speed-
Triangle of one-
minute travel & 
numbers 
All features 
present 
1 Middle value 
2 Minimum value 
3 Maximum value 
A
sc
en
di
ng
 
4 Middle value 
5 Maximum value 
6 Middle value 
7 Minimum value 
D
es
ce
nd
in
g 
8 Middle value 
Table 8.3.3a: Outline of part I experimental tasks setup 
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8.3.4 Task and Procedure (Table 8.3.4a): 
Upon arrival all participants were asked to read and complete a consent form. The form had 
basic information about the experiment, the participants’ rights and a non-discloser 
agreement. This form assured that all of the participants had the same information about the 
experiment. 
After signing a consent form, all participants were requested to take a spatial test and an 
arithmetic test. The experiments where administered in a random order to all participants. 
These tests where introduced to account for variability in participants’ abilities. 
In the spatial test pilots had to mentally manipulate a set of two-dimensional objects 
presented on the computer and provide a written answer to 10 consecutive sets. The 
arithmetic test had 10 consecutive exercises that involved five-digit subtractions and 
divisions. The Total Time for all 10 tasks and number Total Errors were accounted for in 
the final analysis stage for each of the ability tests. These results allowed having a baseline 
of participant relative spatial and arithmetic ability. Participants’ performance was 
compared in this experiment and used as a guide to establish whether possessing a better 
arithmetic or spatial ability influenced participants’ performance on experimental displays. 
Upon completion of the spatial and arithmetic tests participants’ filled a questionnaire about 
their flying experience and then were randomly assigned to one of four groups (A, B, C or 
D display condition). They performed the 8 tasks in the randomly allocated condition. Each 
participant was asked to calculate time to target altitude as fast as they could on each slide 
with a minimum of errors, then write their answer on a provided form and then proceed to 
the next screen.  
Participants had control over the speed at which they carried out the experiment. When they 
completed one task, they wrote an answer on an answer sheet and proceeded to the next 
slide by clicking the button on the screen. The Power Point presentation registered the time 
spent on each slide (accurate a millisecond) and then presented the next task. These steps 
were repeated eight times until the final (eighth) slide was presented. Upon completion of 
the experiment, participants’ completed a post-questionnaire expressing their opinion about 
display conditions, and detailing how they performed the task. 
Experimental procedure – part I – 45 minutes 
1. Introduction and consent form 
2. Random order pre-test of Spatial and Arithmetic ability 
3. Flying experience questionnaire 
4. Random allocation of A, B, C or D condition display 
5. Training on selected condition display 
6. Performing 8 tasks on selected condition display 
7. Post-questionnaire 
Table 8.3.4a: Experimental procedure – part I 
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8.4  Results–experiment: part (i), between-subject, 4 groups, N = 40 
Three types of data-points (table 8.4 below) were collected and analyzed. (1) Time per 
individual task and Total Time spent to complete all 8 tasks was measured in minutes, 
seconds and milliseconds. (2) Score was the error per task. Total Score was the number of 
errors in the eight tasks. (3) Overall Performance was the result of dividing Time over 
Score. Hence the Total Overall Performance data-points were the result of dividing Total 
Time over Total Score. Data-points were collected for all 40 participants for each individual 
task (8 tasks per person). All 320 (i.e., 8 tasks multiply by 40 participants) trails were 
successfully recorded and analyzed.  
The same three data-points (Time, Score and Overall Performance) were collected for 
Spatial and Arithmetic ability tests. However, the ability tests had 400 trails (i.e., 10 tasks 
multiply by 40 participants) in each test. 
The table 8.4 describes the nature of data-point collected in this experiment. 
Data-point name Taken from/Source 
 Time (Time) Time taken to complete one task in minutes, seconds, and milliseconds 
 Score (Error) Full Score for correct answer 
 Overall Performance (Time over 
Score) 
Time taken to complete one task divided by 
the score for the same task 
Total Time Total time taken to complete a complete 8 tasks in minutes, seconds, and milliseconds 
Total Score Sum of scores for 8 tasks (maximum score is 8) 
Total Overall Performance (Total Time 
over Total Score) ‘Total Time’ divided by ‘Total Score’ 
Table 8.4: Nature of data-points in the experiment 
First, more general data-points, such as participants’ total performance on eight tasks (Total 
Time, Total Score and Total Overall Performance) were compared (Figure 8.1, Part 1(i)) to 
identify whether there was a difference between the four conditions. In Part 1(ii) of the 
analysis a more in depth analysis was conducted to identify participants’ average 
performance (Time per task, Score per task and Overall Performance per task) on all eight 
tasks when compared between the four conditions (Figure 8.1, Part 1(ii)). In Part 1(iii) 
participants’ performance on eight individual tasks was compared between the four 
conditions. In the process of analysis outliers were identified and further analysis 
eliminated these. Finally, spatial and arithmetic ability test results were correlated with the 
results of the experimental display conditions. The correlation results showed if there were 
any dependencies between spatial and arithmetic ability, and the participant’s task 
performance on the displays.  
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8.5  Analysis of totals over 8 tasks 
8.5.1 Total Time (over 8 tasks): 
First, a comparison of means of Total Time per 8 tasks between the four conditions was 
performed. The ANOVA test showed the significance of the difference (F = 5.3; p < .004) 
between the conditions. Figure 8.5.1a shows this difference. It can be seen that the time 
taken to complete tasks reduces with each introduction of Mind References features onto 
the display condition. Even though there is more information presented with every 
condition the mean of Total Time (i.e. pilots’ time taken to complete all eight tasks) is 
noticeably reducing. From figure 8.5.1a it is evident that participants’ were performing the 
same task of calculating time to altitude more than twice as fast on display condition D 
(i.e., display with most Mind Reference features), versus display condition A (i.e., 
numerical representation only).  
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Figure 8.5.1a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions 
To identify which of the four display conditions differed from each other, the Post Hoc 
Tukey test was performed. The significant differences in Total Time performance were 
between A and C conditions (p < .050) and A and D conditions (p < .005). As expected, the 
display condition with most Mind References required the least time, in comparison to the 
display with only a numerical information representation. See Table 8.5.1a below for 
details. 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Total Time  
Tukey HSD  
  Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
(I) Condition 
A, B, C or D 
(J) Condition 
A, B, C or D 
   Lower Bound Upper Bound
B 0:00:29.59 0:00:29.67 .752 -0:00:50.32 0:01:49.50 
C 0:01:19.95 0:00:29.67 .050 0:00:00.04 0:02:39.86 A 
D 0:01:46.92 0:00:29.67 .005 0:00:27.01 0:03:06.83 
A -0:00:29.59 0:00:29.67 .752 -0:01:49.50 0:00:50.32 B 
C 0:00:50.36 0:00:29.67 .340 -0:00:29.55 0:02:10.27 
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D 0:01:17.33 0:00:29.67 .061 -0:00:02.58 0:02:37.24 
A -0:01:19.95 0:00:29.67 .050 -0:02:39.86 -0:00:00.04 
B -0:00:50.36 0:00:29.67 .340 -0:02:10.27 0:00:29.55 C 
D 0:00:26.97 0:00:29.67 .800 -0:00:52.94 0:01:46.88 
A -0:01:46.92 0:00:29.67 .005 -0:03:06.83 -0:00:27.01 
B -0:01:17.33 0:00:29.67 .061 -0:02:37.24 0:00:02.58 D 
C -0:00:26.97 0:00:29.67 .800 -0:01:46.88 0:00:52.94 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Table 8.5.1a: PostHoc Total Time per 8 tasks between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
8.5.1.1 Outliers: 
In the process of analysis the outliers, case 6 from condition A and case 36 from condition 
D, were identified (Figure 8.5.1.1a below). The outliers were closely examined to 
determine whether and how these cases affect the results, and whether it was appropriate to 
continue analysis with these cases being included or excluded.  
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Figure 8.5.1.1a: Outliers in Total Time 
Case number 6, from display condition A, this participant took the longest (Total Time is 
0:05:23.10) to complete 8 tasks, which was 1.85 standard deviations (SD = 0:01:07.92) 
away from group mean (Mean = 0:03:17.32) (Table 8.5.1.1a below). All tasks in the 
display condition A were numerical. All participants did the Arithmetic test at the 
beginning of the experiment. The comparison of case 6 Total Time performance on 
Arithmetic test in relation to the experimental group (N=40) is relevant. Arithmetic test 
results of the whole experimental group (N = 40) show how this particular subject 
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performed in relation to group A and the rest of the 39 participants (Table 8.5.1.1a below).  
Later in the chapter (i.e., section Spatial and Arithmetic Ability test results) a full 
discussion is given of how the Total Time on Arithmetic ability test predicts Total Time 
performance on display condition A. 
Case 6 Case 36 
 Display 
Condition A 
Arithmetic 
test 
Display 
Condition D 
Arithmetic 
test 
Total Time 05:23.10 06:04.30 04:33.60 07:59.00 
Group Mean of 
Total Time 03:17.32 04:26.54 01:30.40 04:26.54 
Group Standard 
Deviation of Total Time 01:07.92 01:38.33 01:13.39 01:38.33 
Total Time is … SD 
away from the Mean 1.85 0.99 2.50 2.16 
Table 8.5.1.1a: Outliers details 
It was found this participant also scored the highest (above 90th percentile) on Total Time in 
the Arithmetic ability test in his/her group (condition A), and in relation to all 40 
participants this participant’s score lies between 75th and 90th, being (Arithmetic ability 
Total Time = 0:06:04.30) only one standard deviation (SD = 0:01:38.33) away from group 
mean (Mean = 0:04:26.54).  
This participant did not deviate more than one standard deviation in Arithmetic ability from 
the rest of the experimental group. Even though case 6 scored high among the participants 
in condition A, this score lies within one standard deviation from the mean of the whole 
population. Hence, Case 6 is representative of the whole population (N=40) that was tested. 
The Arithmetic ability test predicted the participant’s time performance on condition A 
(section 8.9), there are other participants in the whole population that scored as high or 
higher than case 6. Consequently, this participant’s performance is accounted for in the 
experimental results. 
The outlier Case 36 (Figure 8.5.1.1a) from display condition D had a Total Time of 
0:04:33.60, which is 2,5 standard deviations (01:13.39) away from the group mean 
(01:30.40) (Table 8.5.1.1a above). After examining a post-questionnaire from this 
participant the reason of such an extreme score became clear. The participant reported 
using both methods of calculation, numerical and Mind Reference information in condition 
D while performing the experimental task. This was also observed and noted by the 
researcher at the time. As this participant did not follow the instruction during the 
experiment, the result of this was that the participant was excluded from the analysis. This 
participant performed the task distinctly differently to all other participants in this 
condition. 
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8.5.1.2 Total Time without Outlier (over 8 tasks): 
Once the outlier (Case 36) is removed from the analysis, the significant difference becomes 
even higher (F = 8.6; p < .0001) in Total Time between the four conditions. Figure 8.5.1.2a 
below shows the trend of Total Time reducing markedly starting high on A display 
condition, becoming low on D. Pilots performed tasks in condition D 2.8 times faster than 
in condition A. 
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Figure 8.5.1.2a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions with outlier Case 
36 removed 
The Post Hoc Tukey analysis on Total Time without the outlier (N=39) shows that the 
significant difference between the four display conditions in the Analysis of Variance was 
due to the significant difference between condition C and A (p < .022), D and A (p < 
..0001) and condition B and D (p < .005) (Table 8.5.1.2a). From this result it was 
considered appropriate to find out whether participants’ accuracy suffered due to the rate at 
which they performed the test. 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Total Time  
Tukey HSD  
  Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
(I) Condition 
A, B, C or D 
(J) Condition 
A, B, C or D 
   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
B 0:00:29.59 0:00:26.31 .677 -0:00:41.38 0:01:40.56 
C 0:01:19.95 0:00:26.31 .022 0:00:08.98 0:02:30.92 A 
D 0:02:07.28 0:00:27.03 .000 0:00:54.37 0:03:20.19 
A -0:00:29.59 0:00:26.31 .677 -0:01:40.56 0:00:41.38 
C 0:00:50.36 0:00:26.31 .241 -0:00:20.61 0:02:01.33 B 
D 0:01:37.69 0:00:27.03 .005 0:00:24.78 0:02:50.60 
A -0:01:19.95 0:00:26.31 .022 -0:02:30.92 -0:00:08.98 
B -0:00:50.36 0:00:26.31 .241 -0:02:01.33 0:00:20.61 C 
D 0:00:47.33 0:00:27.03 .314 -0:00:25.58 0:02:00.24 
A -0:02:07.28 0:00:27.03 .000 -0:03:20.19 -0:00:54.37 D 
B -0:01:37.69 0:00:27.03 .005 -0:02:50.60 -0:00:24.78 
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C -0:00:47.33 0:00:27.03 .314 -0:02:00.24 0:00:25.58 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Table 8.5.1.2a: PostHoc Total Time per 8 tasks between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
without outlier 
8.5.2 Total Score (over 8 tasks): 
Participant’ performance on each display was graded as follows: ‘1’ being the highest score 
per task, making ‘8’ the highest score for a total of 8 tasks. The comparison of Total Score 
means shows that there was a significant difference (F = 4.3; p < .011) between the four 
conditions. 
The comparison of Total Score means, as shown on the graph (Figure 8.5.2a), shows the 
reverse trend from the one of Total Time (Figure 8.5.1a). This suggests that participants’ 
made fewer errors (i.e. higher score) on the (D) condition display in comparison to the 
other conditions. 
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Figure 8.5.2a: Mean of Total Score per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions 
Although there was a significant difference between the four display conditions in the Total 
Score, the Post Hoc Tukey test calculations shows the significant difference (SE = .26; p < 
.032) only exists between display condition B (mean 7.05) and D (mean 7.8). At this point 
it was considered appropriate to investigate whether excluding the outlier (case 36) would 
influence the overall comparison between the conditions. 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Total Score  
Tukey HSD  
  
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
(I) Condition 
A, B, C or D 
(J) Condition 
A, B, C or D    Lower Bound Upper Bound
B .1000 .26034 .980 -.6012 .8012 
C -.5500 .26034 .168 -1.2512 .1512 A 
D -.6500 .26034 .077 -1.3512 .0512 
B A -.1000 .26034 .980 -.8012 .6012 
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C -.6500 .26034 .077 -1.3512 .0512 
D -.7500 .26034 .032 -1.4512 -.0488 
A .5500 .26034 .168 -.1512 1.2512 
B .6500 .26034 .077 -.0512 1.3512 C 
D -.1000 .26034 .980 -.8012 .6012 
A .6500 .26034 .077 -.0512 1.3512 
B .7500 .26034 .032 .0488 1.4512 D 
C .1000 .26034 .980 -.6012 .8012 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Table 8.5.2a: PostHoc Total Score per 8 tasks between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
8.5.2.1 Total Score without Outlier (over 8 tasks) 
The analysis of Total Score between the four display conditions without the outlier effected 
the results, but not greatly. The comparison table 8.5.2.1a shows a slight increase in 
condition D. The same can be seen from the graph 8.5.2.1a below when compared with the 
earlier graph (Figure 8.5.2a above) with the outlier included in the analysis. 
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Figure 8.5.2.1a: Mean of Total Score per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions with outlier Case 
36 removed 
Display 
condition
s 
Mean Total 
Score for 8 
tasks  
N=40 
Mean Total 
Score for 8 
tasks no outlier
N=39 
A 7.1500 7.1500 
B 7.0500 7.0500 
C 7.7000 7.7000 
D 7.8000 7.8056 
 Table 8.5.2.1a: Mean of Total Score per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions with outlier Case 
36 removed 
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The Post Hoc Tukey analysis on Total Score without the outlier shows that same results as 
in the Total Score analysis with the outlier (Table 8.5.2a).  
8.5.3 Total Overall Performance (over 8 tasks) 
The Total Overall Performance was calculated by dividing an average of the Total Time for 
the 8 tasks by the average of the Total Score for the 8 tasks (as described above in Table 
8.5). This newly generated score (Total Time over Total Score) was calculated to account 
for pilots overall performance on the display conditions, accounting for time and error in 
one data point, eliminating the trade-off factor (i.e. if participants take longer to achieve a 
more accurate score, or make a guess to achieve a faster performance). 
When means of the Total Overall Performance were compared between the four conditions 
through Analysis of Variance (df = 39), it showed the significant difference (F = 6.9; p< 
.001) between the display conditions. 
Total Overall Performance trend (Figure 8.5.3a) is similar to that of the Total Time from 
Figure 8.5.1.2a., indicating Total Overall Performance was improving as Mind Reference 
information was being introduced onto the display.  
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Figure 8.5.3a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions 
Even though more information is presented from A to B to C and finally to D, the time to 
calculate and the accuracy (Score) combined improves. The difference in Total Overall 
Performance is over 2 times better in conditions D, than it is in A, as it can be seen from 
figure 8.5.3a above. 
The Post Hoc Tukey test calculations showed a significant difference between A and C; A 
and D; and B and D. Table 8.5.3a below highlights these results. 
The interesting point that the Post Hoc Tukey test highlights is that the mean difference in 
Total Overall Performance is significant when the triangle with reference-lines is 
introduced into the display in condition C (Figure 8.2.2c) and D (Figure 8.2.2d).  
Difference between  
Total Overall Performance 
Significance 
p < … 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
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means of: 
A & D display conditions 0.002 3.94 15.85 
A & C display conditions 0.019 3.94 12.24 
B & D display conditions 0.021 3.94 12.04 
Table 8.5.3a: Significant Difference of Total Overall Performance between A, B, C and D 
conditions 
These results were further investigated to ascertain whether these Total Overall Results 
were influenced by the inclusion of the outlier (Case 36, Figure 8.5.1.1a). 
8.5.3.1 Total Overall Performance without Outlier (over 8 tasks) 
The comparison of Total Overall Performance means between the four conditions through 
Analysis of Variance (df = 38) without the outlier shows that there is a significant 
difference (F = 10.6; p < ..0001) between the four conditions demonstrating the inclusion of 
the outlier had influenced the previous results. 
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Figure 8.5.3.1a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A, B, C and D conditions 
with outlier Case 36 removed 
When the outlier (case 36) in condition D was eliminated the difference in Total Overall 
Performance between A and D conditions was seen to be three times greater on condition 
D versus the display condition A (Figure 8.5.3.1a). 
The Post Hoc Tukey test highlighted similar results for the Total Overall Performance with 
this outlier accounted for, apart from showing a slight increase in the significant difference 
between the means. Again the display condition D produced a better performance. 
These results showed participants’ performance on a total of 8 tasks was always better on 
condition D. However, it was considered that extra analysis between mean pilots 
performance per task, per condition compared between four conditions was needed to 
ascertain whether on average participants’ did an individual task better on condition D than 
on other conditions.  
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8.6  Analysis per single task between four conditions 
The analysis of the mean group (A, B, C and D) performance per task was performed to 
determine whether, on average, participants performed better on the display condition with 
most features designed using the Mind Reference framework in comparison to the three 
other conditions. Wherein Condition A had no features designed using the framework (i.e., 
A condition – numerical presentation, Figure 8.2.2a) and condition B (Figure 8.2.2b) and C 
(Figure 8.2.2c) had partial implementations of the features designed using the Mind 
Reference framework.   
8.6.1 Time per single task between four conditions 
As it was anticipated, the result of the mean Time per individual task between the four 
conditions showed similar results to the Total Time for all 8 tasks. There was a significant 
difference (p < .004) between four conditions. The Figure 8.6.1a below illustrates the 
gradual reduction of time taken to perform an individual task in each condition. Time per 
task starting at 25 (plus or minus 8) seconds on condition A and going progressively down 
through display conditions B and C with the lowest time of 11 (plus or minus 2,5) on 
condition D display. 
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00:00:05.01
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Figure 8.6.1a: Mean Time per task with one standard deviation in all conditions 
The Post Hoc Tukey analysis on Mean Time per task (N=39) showed that there was a 
significant difference between display conditions C and A (p < .044), and D and A (p < 
.005). Next, this result was further investigated without outliers.  
8.6.1.1 Time per single task between four conditions without outlier 
The table below highlights a large difference in the Time per task between conditions A and 
D. Now that the outlier has been eliminated from the analysis the mean Time per task in 
condition D is 2.8 times less than the participants’ mean Time per single task performance 
on display condition A, where the standard deviation is reduced by five times (Figure 
8.6.1.1a and Table 8.6.1.1a). This signifies that the participants in condition D performed 
individual tasks with less variance in time than on condition A. 
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Figure 8.6.1.1a: Mean Time per task with one standard deviation in all conditions with outlier 
Case 36 removed 
 Mean Time per condition per task 
  A B C D 
Mean 00:00:24.67 00:00:20.58 00:00:14.45 00:00:11.30 With 
outlier SD 00:00:08.37 00:00:07.29 00:00:03.31 00:00:02.53 
Mean 00:00:24.67 00:00:20.58 00:00:14.45 00:00:08.75 Without 
outlier SD 00:00:08.37 00:00:07.29 00:00:03.31 00:00:01.63 
Table 8.6.1.1a: Comparison of means per single between conditions with and with outlier Case 
36 removed 
Once the outlier (case 36) was eliminated from the analysis there was an overall increase in 
the significance of the mean difference (F(3,36) = 8.508; p < ..0001) between conditions.  
The Post Hoc Tukey analysis on Mean Time per task (N=39) showed a significant 
difference between display conditions A and C (p <  .019), A and D (p < ..0001), as well as 
an additional significant difference between conditions B and D (p < .007). 
From these results it was considered appropriate to find out whether participants’ accuracy, 
on average, per condition suffered due to the rate at which they performed the test. 
8.6.2 Score per single task between four conditions 
The mean Score per individual task between the four conditions indicated that the 
participants’ accuracy was similar to the result of the Total Score per eight tasks (8.5.2a). 
The GLM Repeated Measures Test showed that there was a significant difference between 
the four conditions in Score per individual task (F(3,36) = 4.25; p < .011).  
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Figure 8.6.2a: Mean Score per task with one standard deviation in all conditions 
The results showed participants’ provide a significantly (p < .032) more accurate answer on 
condition D, than B (Figure 8.6.2a) as the PostHoc Tukey test showed. 
8.6.2.1 Score per single task between four conditions without an outlier 
This analysis performed without the outlier again did not show any improvement in 
participant accuracy performance. This is because, as discussed in the outlier section 
earlier, case 36 traded time for accuracy, this made his/her scores high, but increased Time 
spent on each task. However, this did not affect the test results. There was still a 
significance difference (F(3,36) = 4.04; p < .014). The PostHoc Tukey test too showed the 
significant difference between the same conditions B and D (p < .041).  
8.6.3 Overall Performance per single task between four conditions 
To close this part of the section the results of average group Overall Performance per 
single task between four conditions are described. The Overall Performance is a score that 
takes into account both the Time participants’ took to complete the task and the number of 
correct responses participants’ gave. 
From these results it was seen that Mean Overall Performance per individual task between 
the four conditions, similarly to the Total Overall Performance for all 8 tasks (Figure 
8.5.3a), is reducing (Figure 8.6.3a). Overall Performance per task starts as high as 26 with 
a Standard Deviation of plus or minus 7 on condition A and progressively decreases down 
through display conditions B and C with the lowest of 12. The display condition has lower 
Standard Deviation out of four conditions (SD = 3), meaning that there is a smaller 
variation in participants’ average performance per task. 
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Figure 8.6.3a: Mean Overall Performance per single task with one standard deviation in all 
conditions 
The GLM Repeated Measures test showed that there was a significant difference between 
the four conditions in Overall Performance per individual task (F(3,36) = 4.95; p < .006). 
The PostHoc Tukey test showed a significant difference between conditions A and D (p < 
.015) and B and D (p < .024). 
8.6.3.1 Overall Performance per single task between four conditions without outlier 
The graph (Figure 8.6.3.1a) and the Table 8.6.3.1a below highlight the great difference in 
the Overall Performance per task between conditions A and D. Now that the outlier is 
eliminated from the analysis the mean Overall Performance per task in condition D (Table 
8.6.3.1a) is almost 3 times less than the participants’ mean Overall Performance per single 
task performance on display condition A, with the standard deviation reduced by almost 4 
(3.834) times. 
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Figure 8.6.3.1a: Mean Overall Performance per single task with one standard deviation in all 
conditions without an outlier 
 Mean Overall Performance per condition per single task 
  A B C D 
Mean 25.46 24.60 15.44 11.51 With 
outlier SD 7.40 13.56 3.72 2.88 
Mean 25.46 24.60 15.44 8.76 Without 
outlier SD 7.40 13.56 3.72 1.93 
Table 8.6.3.1a: Comparison of means per single between conditions with and with outlier Case 
36 removed 
The GLM Repeated Measures test showed a significant difference (p < ..0001) between 
conditions. The PostHoc Tukey test showed the significant difference between the same 
conditions A and D (p < .001), and B and D (p < .002), but with much higher significance. 
These results show participants’ average task (on total of 8 tasks) performance between the 
four conditions was always better on condition D. However, it was considered that extra 
analysis was needed to identify between which out of eight tasks there was a difference in 
the four conditions. This was required to identify which presentations in the total of the 
eight tasks was producing the best and the worst performance. 
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8.7  Analysis per task between 8 tasks 
The analysis of the mean performance per individual task was compared between four 
conditions to determine on which out of eight type of presentations participants’ performed 
better. It was expected that even though the arithmetic difficulty of the tasks increased, 
participants’ would still perform better on the display condition with the most features 
designed using the Mind Reference framework (i.e., D condition - Figure 8.2.2d) in 
comparison to the three other conditions (i.e., A condition – numerical presentation – 
Figure 8.2.2a; condition B – Figure 8.2.2b; C – Figure 8.2.2c).  
8.7.1 Time per task between 8 tasks 
This section discusses how the variety of possible representations of vertical speed as a 
Mind Reference feature affected participant’ (i.e. pilots in these experiments) performance 
in the eight tasks (four in descent and four in ascent representations). The end of this 
section also discusses participants’ comments and suggestions for display design 
improvement as collected in the post-experiment questionnaire. 
The data collected allowed a comparison of the individual mean Time per task between the 
four conditions. An Analysis of Variance (Table 15) showed a significant difference in 
tasks 3 (F(3,36) = 7.3; p< .001), 4 (F(3,36) = 4.3; p< .010), 5 (F(3,36) = 5.6; p< .003) and 8 
(F(3,36) = 5.3; p< .004) between four conditions. 
Figure 8.7.1a highlights the difference in Time per task between all four display-conditions 
graphically. Display condition D allowed participants’ to produce the better Time 
performance on almost all tasks out of all four conditions. 
As discussed earlier, the display conditions A and B had none and minimal amount of Mind 
Reference information present respectively. As it can be seen from Figure 8.7.1a, 
participants’ still performed better with some level of Mind Reference information on 
condition B versus condition A (i.e., A - purely numerical information presentation). The 
same tendency is true for conditions C and D, where condition D (with maximum Mind 
Reference information) allowed pilots to perform slightly better, apart from one task (5). 
Results on task 5 are discussed further in the next section that discusses the outlier in the 
data. Time pre task performance on condition C was slightly better (difference of 01.67 
seconds) than on condition D. This is attributed to an outlier in a group D, which was 
discussed earlier in this chapter, which was removed in further analysis and the results are 
discussed in the next section 8.7.1.1. 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 8:  Designing and Evaluating  
 201
MEAN TIME PER TASK FOR ABCD CONDITIONS
00:00.0
00:04.3
00:08.6
00:13.0
00:17.3
00:21.6
00:25.9
00:30.2
00:34.6
00:38.9
00:43.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TI
M
E
A
B
C
D
 
Figure 8.7.1a: Mean Time per task between A, B, C and D conditions 
Table 8.7.1a below shows the same trend as the figure 8.7.1a above. The table, however, 
shows further details of how Time per task reduces from A to D conditions and from task 1 
to task 8. 
Descriptives 
 Mean Time per condition per task 
Task A B C D 
Task 1 0:00:21.71 0:00:21.38 0:00:19.10 0:00:11.04 
Task 2 0:00:25.38 0:00:18.10 0:00:18.96 0:00:14.15 
Task 3 0:00:35.48 0:00:29.00 0:00:13.90 0:00:13.00 
Task 4 0:00:21.21 0:00:20.93 0:00:12.53 0:00:08.82 
Task 5 0:00:38.34 0:00:32.77 0:00:12.81 0:00:14.48 
Task 6 0:00:12.77 0:00:11.55 0:00:10.57 0:00:09.87 
Task 7 0:00:20.98 0:00:13.03 0:00:16.32 0:00:11.60 
Task 8 0:00:21.45 0:00:17.87 0:00:11.38 0:00:07.40 
     Trend – Tim
e reducing 
 
Trend – Time reducing 
 
Mean 00:00:24.67 00:00:20.58 00:00:14.45 00:00:11.30 
SD 00:00:08.37 00:00:07.29 00:00:03.31 00:00:02.53 
 
Table 8.7.1a: Mean Time per task in all conditions 
When the difference in Time performance was compared on the first (task 1) and the last 
(task 8) task across all participants’ in all display conditions, although there was a 
significant between the four conditions (t = 2.48; p < .035), the improvement was only on 
the condition D. There was practically (less then half a second) no improvement between 
the same tasks on condition A, but on the display condition D there was an improvement of 
3.5 seconds. Figure 6 highlights the differences graphically between the mean tasks Time in 
condition A and D. 
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Figure 8.7.1b: Comparison of mean Time per single task between Task 1 and 8 
Therefore, it was considered important to examine on which out of eight tasks there was a 
difference in performance and examine why this is the case. Three points can be extracted 
from Figure 8.7.1a above. (1) Participants’ Time performance per task fluctuates in a 
similar way on display conditions A and B. In tasks 3 and 5 participants Time per task in 
conditions A and B increased compared to the rest of the tasks. On conditions C and D the 
change is less noticeable. In tasks 3 and 5 the vertical speed value was expressed as a 
maximum value, compared to other tasks these were the most arithmetically demanding 
tasks of all presented to participants. However participants still performed better on 
conditions C and D. On task 6, however, all display conditions performed similarly low in 
Time per task, but the lowest Time was still on display condition D. (2) Participants’ 
performance was fairly consistent on display conditions C and D, where most of the Mind 
Reference principles were implemented in the design. (3) Display condition D, however, 
supported the most consistent performance, the mean was 0:01:30.40 with Standard 
Deviation of 0:01:13.49, which was lower than on condition C. 
Depending on the type of vertical speed task value introduced (maximum value – on tasks 3 
(Figure 8.7.1e) and 5 (Figure 8.7.1g), middle value – on tasks 1 (Figure 8.7.1c), 4 (Figure 
8.7.1f), 6 (Figure 8.7.1h) and 8 (Figure 8.7.1j), minimum value – on tasks 2 (Figure 8.7.1d) 
and 7 (Figure 8.7.1i)) in both descending and ascending task scenarios, the participants 
performed better on displays where the middle vertical speed task value or the minimum 
task value was introduced. Table 8.3.3, at the beginning of the chapter, summarises the 
experimental setup and shows the sequence of task values in the scenarios presented to 
participants. 
Comparison of the various representations of vertical-speed-triangle (maximum, middle 
and minimum values) in the four display conditions was made to determine on which task 
participants gave the best Time performance. Tukey PostHoc test showed the significant 
differences, which are summarised in table 8.7.1b below. 
Task Vertical Speed 
representation 
Display 
Condition 
Significance 
p < … 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
3 task Maximum value C and A .004 0:00:05.86 -0:00:21.58 
  D and A .003 0:00:05.86 -0:00:22.48 
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  D and B .046 0:00:05.86 -0:00:16.00 
4 task Middle value D and A .028 0:00:04.21 -0:00:12.39 
  D and B .032 0:00:04.21 -0:00:12.11 
5 task Maximum value C and A .011 0:00:07.68 -0:00:25.53 
  D and A .018 0:00:07.68 -0:00:23.86 
8 task Middle value D and A .005 0:00:03.90 -0:00:14.05 
Table 8.7.1b: PostHoc of mean Time per task between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
The Tukey PostHoc test results showed that task 3 (Figure 8.7.1e) and 5 (Figure 8.7.1g) 
with a task scenario of maximum value of vertical speed triangle appeared to have a 
significant difference (ANOVA, F (3,36) = 7.29, p < .001 and F (3,36) = 5.62, p < .003 
respectively, see table 8.7.1b above). The difference in mean Time between conditions A 
and D, on tasks 3 and 5, were more than double. Similar results were seen in the tasks with 
the middle value of vertical speed, tasks 4 (Figure 8.7.1f) and 8 (Figure 8.7.1j) (ANOVA, 
F(3, 36) = 4.33, p < .010 and F(3, 36) = 5.25, p < .004) 
Task 6 appeared to have the least amount of difference in mean Time between all four 
conditions (ABCD). This could be attributed to a simpler arithmetic task in this scenario 
compared to the rest of the task scenarios (Figure 8.7.1h).  
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Figure 8.7.1c: Display for task 1 
Figure 8.7.1e: Display for task 3 
Figure 8.7.1g: Display for task 5 
Figure 8.7.1i: Display for task 7 
 
Figure 8.7.1d: Display for task 2 
Figure 8.7.1f: Display for task 4 
Figure 8.7.1h: Display for task 6 
Figure 8.7.1j: Display for task 8 
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8.7.1.1 Time per task without outlier, N = 39 
Task 5 was the only task where participants’ performance was worse than on condition C. 
This required a close examination of the Time data-points of individual participants on task 
5. This revealed that there was in outlier, case 36, in condition D. This participant has been 
previously discussed; the participant performed all tasks (reported in the post-
questionnaire) using both methods of calculation, numerical and Mind Reference 
information in condition D. Eliminating this outlier showed a greater significant difference, 
and also showed significance to one more additional task (task 2) (Figure 8.7.11a). 
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Figure 8.7.1.1a: Time per task between conditions A, B, C and D (N = 39) 
PostHoc analysis showed there is always a significant difference between conditions A and 
D in tasks 2 (p > .031), 3 (p > ..0001), 4 (p > .028), 5 (p > .004) and 8 (p > .002). Table 
8.7.1.1a below highlights further the significant differences between conditions A and C in 
tasks 3 and 5; between conditions B and D in tasks 3, 4, 5 and 8; and between condition A 
and C in tasks 3 and 5. These results showed that even when not all Mind Reference 
features are implemented on the display, such as in the condition C, participants’ 
performance is still faster than on a purely numerical display, such as the condition A 
display. 
Task Display Condition 
Significance 
p < … 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
2 task D and A .031 0:00:05.59 -0:00:16.24 
C and A .002 0:00:05.45 -0:00:21.58 
C and B .042 0:00:05.45 -0:00:15.10 
3 task 
D and A .000 0:00:05.60 -0:00:25.75 
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D and B .008 0:00:05.60 -0:00:19.27 
D and A .028 0:00:04.37 -0:00:12.85 4 task 
D and B .033 0:00:04.37 -0:00:12.57 
C and A .007 0:00:07.31 -0:00:25.53 
C and B .046 0:00:07.31 -0:00:19.96 
D and A .004 0:00:07.51 -0:00:27.61 
5 task 
D and B .029 0:00:07.51 -0:00:22.04 
D and A .002 0:00:03.93 -0:00:15.44 8 task 
D and B .023 0:00:03.93 -0:00:11.86 
Table 8.7.1.1a: PostHoc of mean Time per task between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
(N=39) with outlier Case 36 removed 
From this result it was considered appropriate to find out whether the participants’ accuracy 
suffered due to the rate at which they performed the individual tasks. 
8.7.2 Score per task between 8 tasks 
As shown in the ANOVA table … below the mean Score per task only differed 
significantly in tasks 3 (p > .010) and 5 (p > .001). This result was encouraging, because 
these were the most difficult task scenarios for the participants to perform (i.e. maximum 
vertical speed value). Despite the fact that participants had as much time as they needed, 
they still performed significantly poorly on displays with minimal or no Mind Reference 
design features and performed better on displays with the maximum Mind Reference 
features presented (i.e. condition D). Also these two tasks were commented on in the post-
questionnaire, as being ‘difficult’ to count. Suggestions for further improvements on these 
displays will be considered in the discussion section.  
Figure 8.7.2a highlights how mean Score does not fluctuate on display condition D versus 
A and B conditions. The display condition D appeared to help pilots to produce consistent 
performance on all task throughout the experiment. 
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Figure 8.7.2a: Score per task between conditions A, B, C and D 
A PostHoc analysis showed there were significant differences between conditions in tasks 3 
and 5. Table 8.7.2a below highlights the significant differences.  
Task Display Condition 
Significance 
p < … 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
C and A .045 .146 .400 
3 task 
D and A .020 .146 .450 
B and A .007 .086 -.300 
C and B .003 .086 .325 5 task 
D and B .001 .086 .350 
Table 8.7.2a: PostHoc of mean Score per task between tasks and A, B, C and D conditions 
8.7.2.1 Score per task without outlier, N = 39 
When the analysis of the data was performed without the outlier (case 36) it showed similar 
differences in the Score per task, for the same tasks as in the analysis with the outlier, 
however, there were greater differences in task 3 (p > .013) and task 5 (p > ..0001). 
The figure 8.7.2.1a below confirms and highlights a slight improvement in condition D 
display on tasks 3 and 5, making accuracy performance on display condition D more 
consistent across all 8 tasks.  
The Post Hoc Tukey analysis also showed similar differences in tasks 3 and 5 in the same 
conditions as when the outlier was part of the analysis.  
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Figure 8.7.2.1a: Score per task between conditions A, B, C and D (N = 39) with outlier Case 36 
removed 
8.7.3 Overall Performance per task between 8 tasks 
The Overall Performance data-points were calculated in the same manner as those 
discussed earlier, where the Time and Score per single task are taken into account, 
eliminating a trade of factor, i.e. time over accuracy or visa versa. 
The Overall Performance per task between conditions A, B, C and D shows a similar trend 
(Figure 8.7.3a) to Time per task (Figure 8.7.1a). There is only one case, in task 5 where 
participants’ performance in condition D was not as efficient as in condition C.  
The Analysis of Variance of an Overall Performance per task between conditions showed a 
significant difference in tasks 5 (p > .005) and 8 (p > .008).  
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Figure 8.7.3a: Overall Performance per task between conditions A, B, C and D 
To further understand the difference in participants’ performance in individual tasks 
between the four conditions a data table (Table 8.7.3a) was constructed. The table shows 
that the trend of Overall Performance is improving with introduction of Mind Reference 
features onto the display. The table also shows further details of how Time per task reduces 
from task 1 to task 8 in condition A and D. Consequently, it was examined whether there 
was a significant improvement in pilots performance between these two tasks, first and last.  
Descriptives 
 Mean Overall Performance per condition per task 
Task A B C D 
Task 1 28.63 21.76 21.58 11.47 
Task 2 26.20 18.10 20.09 14.15 
Task 3 24.02 32.77 14.95 13.00 
Task 4 21.21 26.24 13.69 9.55 
Task 5 40.71 53.70 13.44 16.09 
Task 6 14.67 11.49 10.84 8.80 
Task 7 24.11 13.75 16.32 11.60 
Task 8 24.13 19.01 12.58 7.40 
 
Trend – Overall Performance increasing 
Mean 25.46 24.60 15.44 11.51 
SD 7.40 13.56 3.72 2.88 
 
Table 8.7.3a: Mean Overall Performance per task in all conditions 
From the analysis of mean differences in four different conditions between the first and the 
last task, the significant difference appeared to be only in the display condition D (p > 
.036). 
When means for each task between two conditions (Table 8.7.3b) are compared, A being 
numerical and D being the maximum application of Mind Reference features to the 
presentation, four things became obvious: (1) condition D always provides better Overall 
Performance; (2) condition D is always at least one and halftimes better, and in three cases 
two and half times better; (3) Overall Performance on condition D improves more on the 
last task than on the first task. (4) Performance in D condition is most consistent than in A 
condition throughout all 8 tasks. 
Task/ 
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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A 28.6 26.2 24.0 21.2 40.7 14.7 24.1 24.1 
D 11.5 14.2 13.0 9.6 16.1 8.8 11.6 7.4 
Mean 
Difference 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.5 1.7 2.1 3.3 
Table 8.7.3b: Mean difference in Overall Performance per task between tasks and A, B, C and 
D conditions 
A Post Hoc analysis of the Overall Performance per task showed that there is a significant 
difference between conditions C and B (p > .012), D and B (p > .020) in task 5, and D and 
A (p > .008) in task 8. 
8.7.3.1 Overall Performance per task without outlier, N = 39 
The Overall Performance per individual task between conditions was examined further 
without an outlier. The Analysis of Variance of Overall Performance per task without the 
outlier (case 36) showed greater, more significant differences, and between more tasks: 2 (p 
> .043), 3 (p > .054), 5 (p > .002), 6 (p > .048), and 8 (p > .005). 
Figure 8.7.3.1a below highlights participants’ performance on individual tasks with an 
outlier (Case 36) removed. The figure shows the pilots Overall Performance on individual 
tasks is always better on display condition D. The table 8.7.3.1a, below, highlights where 
the significant differences between conditions occurred.  
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Figure 8.7.3.1a: Overall Performance per task between conditions A, B, C and D (N = 39) with 
outlier Case 36 removed 
Task Display Condition 
Significance 
p < … 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
2 task D and A .026 5.739 -17.056 
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3 task D and B .054 8.64 -23.033 
C and B .009 11.832 40.263 
5 task 
D and B .006 12.156 42.970 
6 task D and A .029 3.131 -9.163 
8 task D and A .004 4.955 -18.116 
Table 8.7.3.1a: PostHoc of mean Overall Performance per task between tasks and A, B, C and 
D conditions (N=39) with outlier Case 36 removed 
8.8 Discussion for part (i) 
8.8.1 Total Time, Total Score and Total Overall Performance  
All three types of data collected, Total Time, Total Score and Total Overall Performance 
showed the same consistent results, emphasizing there are significant differences between 
conditions A and D. Participants performed the task of calculating time to altitude more 
than 200% faster and with significantly fewer errors using the display condition that wholly 
embodied the Mind References concept, in comparison to the numerical presentation.  
However, this was true only between certain conditions, A and C, A and D and B and D. 
There was an apparent ceiling effect in the Total Score. The reason for this effect could be 
because the task itself was relatively easy and all participants were experienced pilots who 
perform this type of calculating task on a regular basis. Even though the task was relatively 
easy, there was still a significant improvement in pilots’ performance, when all Mind 
References features were present on the display, in comparison to numerical presentation 
and presentation partially implementing Mind Reference features. The numerically 
represented display features do not match any of the principles of the Mind Reference 
framework – mainly because numbers do not carry the same instantaneous significance 
unless they are referred against, or associated with, other numerical parameters. 
In the process of analysis an outlier was identified and eliminated, as a consequence, the 
results of participants’ performance became even more significant (Table 8.8.1a below). In 
the case of Total Overall Performance between A and D conditions participants performed 
300% better on condition D in comparison to the display condition A. The Total Time 
results showed that pilots completed the 8 tasks on condition D more than two and half 
times faster than those pilots performing the same tasks on display condition A. The Total 
Score results without an outlier showed no further improvement due to the ceiling effect 
and also because case 36 traded time for accuracy. This made his/her scores high, but 
increased his/her time spend on each task. By eliminating these results from the data 
analysis of Total Score in fact made the results slightly less significant (Table 8.8.1a). 
  Total Time Total Score Total Overall Performance 
  A D A D A D 
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Mean 03:17.32 01:30.40 7.15 7.80 27.629 11.782 
SD 01:07.92 01:13.39 .738 .405 8.941 9.746 
Sig. .004 .011 .001 
With 
outlier 
Post 
Hoc 
Test 
A and C; p < .050 
A and D; p < .005 B and D; p < .032 
A and C; p < .019 
A and D; p < .002 
B and D; p < .021 
Mean 03:17.32 01:10.04 7.15 7.806 27.629 9.169 
SD 01:07.92 00:37.62 .738 .429 8.941 5.481 
Sig. .000 .014 .000 
Without 
outliers 
Post 
Hoc 
Test 
A and C; p < .022 
A and D; p < .000 
B and D; p < .005 
B and D; p < .041 
A and C; p < .007 
A and D; p < .000 
B and D; p < .002 
Table 8.8.1a: Comparison between results of Totals with and without an outlier 
In the Total Time data analysis, once the outlier was eliminated, another significant 
difference between B and D condition transpired (Table 8.8.1a). This was again due to the 
fact that an outlier, the case 36, traded time for accuracy. Once his data (high Total Score 
and high Total Time) was eliminated, the mean Total Time in condition D reduced and this 
increased the mean difference, making the difference between B and D conditions 
significant, and also increasing the significance between the conditions in Total Overall 
Performance, but the Total Score data stayed almost the same. 
An interesting finding from the analysis of the Total Score is that a significant difference 
was not seen between conditions A and D, but instead it was between display conditions B 
and D. Both display conditions A and B had the same level of numerical information 
presented, but display B had some additional information (i.e., display features) presented 
using the Mind Reference framework to assist the participant in the experimental task. 
These features were a level-off altitude line and a vertical-speed-triangle. Both features are 
the result of step-principles 4 (i.e. group complementary information), partially step-
principle 3 (i.e. in a meaningful form), step-principle 8 (i.e. represent in a form of reference 
suitable for the task), and the partial implementation of step-principle 5 (i.e. establish 
meaningful connections). 
From these results it is reasoned that implementing only these step-principles did not assist 
the participants in performing their tasks with more accuracy when compared with the 
numerical presentation. However, the participants’ performance did improve, although not 
significantly, on displays B versus A in terms of Total Time (by 30 seconds) and Total 
Overall performance. 
From the systematic analysis of the results in this first part of the experiment, it becomes 
clear that the step-principles derived from the Mind Reference framework need to be 
applied in conjunction with one another to improve the participants’ performance 
significantly. The results show that when more step-principles were applied on a condition 
display, the better participants performed the tasks. From the graphs (Total Time, Total 
Score and Total Overall Performance) with and without an outlier there is an evident trend 
of the participants improving Total Time and Total Overall Performance from A to B, B to 
C and C to D. Even through the Total Score results had a ceiling effect, where was still a 
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trend of improvement, obvious from B to C and C to D. 
When the bare minimum of principles were applied in the design, like in case of condition 
B, where information is grouped only according to step-principle 4 and the partial 
application of the 5th step-principle (i.e. dashes are absent), the participant’ Total Time and 
Total Overall Performance was slightly better, in comparison to condition A. In contrast, in 
condition C step-principle 2 (i.e. information along a parameter – altitude), 3 (i.e. 
meaningful parameters – triangle), 5 partially implemented with level-off altitude line being 
absent (i.e. meaningful connections – dashes), and step-principle 8 (i.e. pilots’ reference 
representation) were combined, and participants’ performance improved significantly 
between A and C. At this stage, in the condition C, significant improvement was seen in 
pilots Total Time and Total Overall Performance, even though not all Mind Reference step-
principles were fully applied. In condition D, all step-principles were integrated in the 
design of the features to assist the participants in their task, and their performance 
improved.  
8.8.2 Time, Score and Overall Performance per single task 
The analysis of data per single task performance showed that participants performed 
consistently better on condition D in Time and Overall Performance data. Participants’ 
performed each single task on average at more than double the rate on condition D than on 
condition A. Once the outlier was eliminated the data showed that participants performed 
tasks 2.8 times (Time data) faster on D than on A conditions. The same was true for the 
Overall Performance data; and without an outlier pilots’ Overall Performance was 2.9 
times better.  
The Time per single task data analysis showed the same trend as the Total Time data once 
the outlier was eliminated. There was an additional significant mean difference between B 
and D condition that transpired. 
The results on Time, Score and Overall Performance per single task showed a similar trend 
of results as the Total results (see section 8.8.1) discussed earlier, apart from the Overall 
Performance results per single task, which show only significant mean differences between 
A and C, A and D conditions with and without an outlier (Table 8.8.2). 
  Time Score Overall Performance 
  A D A D A D 
Mean 00:24.67 00:11.30 0.89 0.98 25.46 11.51 
SD 00:08.37 00:02.53 0.14 0.04 7.40 2.88 
Sig. .004 .011 .006 
With 
outlier 
Post 
Hoc 
Test 
A and C; p < .044 
A and D; p < .005 B and D; p < .032 
A and D; p < .015 
B and D; p < .024 
Mean 00:24.67 00:08.75 0.89 0.98 25.46 8.76 
SD 00:08.37 00:01.63 0.14 0.05 7.40 1.93 
Without 
outliers 
Sig. .000 .014 .000 
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Post 
Hoc 
Test 
A and C; p < .019 
A and D; p < .000 
B and D; p < .007 
B and D; p < .041 A and D; p < .001  B and D; p < .002 
Table 8.8.2: Comparison between results of per single task with and without an outlier 
A further aspect of the data becomes obvious from the analysis of data per single task 
performance, which is the difference in Time performance on the first (task 1) and the last 
(task 8) tasks across all participants in the four display conditions. The significant (t = 2.48; 
p < .035) improvement, however, was only in condition D. There is practically no 
improvement (less than half a second) between these tasks in condition A, but on the 
display condition D there was an improvement of 3.5 seconds between first and last task.  
The same trend is apparent for the Overall Performance per single task. There is a 
significant difference between the first and the last mean in condition D, but none in any 
other conditions. The Score per single task data does not show any significant differences 
between the first and the last task means in all of the four conditions. This is again due to 
the ceiling effect in the Score data.   
8.8.3 Time, Score and Overall Performance per task between 8 tasks (Table 8.8.3) 
At the initial stages of the analysis, with the outlier (case 36) included, the significant 
differences were observed in a half (4 out of 8 tasks) of the experimental trial tasks, either 
in some or across all data (Time, Score and Overall Performance). The significant 
differences between conditions occurred in tasks with the middle and maximum values of 
vertical speed, apart from in tasks 1 and 6.  
Task 1 was assigned the middle value, but it was also the first task. It is assumed that the 
difference in participants’ performance between conditions did not occur because of the 
familiarization with the experimental task was still taking place. As was shown and 
discussed in the previous section there was a difference in participants’ performance 
between the first and the last tasks in all conditions, but the significant difference was only 
observed in the condition D. Task 6 was also assigned the middle value of vertical speed, 
but task 2 and 7 (with minimum value) appeared to be arithmetically easier to resolve. 
Participants’ performance in all three tasks did not show any significant difference between 
conditions. 
The significant difference in Score data between B and A conditions in task 5, like in no 
other case, was due to pilots making a more accurate scoring on display A, than on B. It has 
been pointed out earlier that this is probably due to only a few Mind Reference step-
principles being implemented on the display that assist in performing an accurate 
calculation. The rest of the results in the Score data, emphasize the advantage of having 
Mind Reference features implemented on the display to assist participants perform tasks 
quicker and with better accuracy, such as in case of conditions C and D. Task 3, similar to 
task 5, has a maximum value of vertical speed, and showed that participants perform 
significantly better in Score and Time on displays C and D in comparison to display A on 
this task. 
In task 4 participants’ Time performance showed significant differences between D and A, 
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D and B, but showed no significant difference in the Score or Overall Performance data. 
However, if the raw data and graphs are examined there is a clear trend of improvement in 
participants’ performance on this task moving from the A to the D display condition. 
The same trends were observed in the Totals and per single task data did not transpire in all 
data between tasks. In the analysis of Total Score a significant difference was not observed 
between A and D, but instead it was seen between display conditions B and D.  The same 
trend was observed on task 5, but not on task 3, which appears similar to task 5. Task 3 
shows significant mean differences between conditions C and A, D and A. 
Participants performed better using Mind Reference features when the task was more 
challenging. They produced significantly better results on condition D, than A on the 
maximum and middle vertical speed values. Although there was no significant difference in 
participants’ performance in another type of a task (minimum value), the participants Time 
and Overall Performance was superior on condition C and D, than on condition A and B. 
 
Task Vertical speed Time Score 
Overall 
Performance 
1 Middle 
value - - - 
2 Minimum 
value - - - 
3 Maximum 
value 
C and A; p < .004 
D and A; p < .003 
D and B; p < .046 
C and A; p < .045 
D and A; p < .020 - 
4 Middle 
value 
D and A; p < .028 
D and B; p < .032 - - 
5 Maximum 
value 
C and A; p < .011 
D and A; p < .018 
B and A; p < .007 
C and B; p < .003 
D and B; p < .001 
C and B; p < .012 
D and B; p < .020 
6 Middle 
value - - - 
7 Minimum 
value - - - 
W
ith
 o
ut
lie
r 
8 Middle 
value D and A; p < .005 - D and A; p < .008 
1 Middle 
value - -  
2* Minimum 
value D and A; p < .031 - D and A; p < .026 
3 
Maximum 
value 
C and A; p < .002 
C and B; p < .042 
D and A; p < .000 
D and B; p < .008 
C and A; p < .049 
D and A; p < .027 - 
W
ith
ou
t o
ut
lie
r 
4 Middle 
value 
D and A; p < .028 
D and B; p < .033 - - 
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5 
Maximum 
value 
C and A; p < .007 
C and B; p < .046 
D and A; p < .004 
D and B; p < .029 
B and A; p < .006 
C and B; p < .003 
D and B; p < .001 
C and B; p < .009 
D and B; p < .006 
6 Middle 
value - - D and A; p < .029 
7 Minimum 
value - - - 
8 Middle 
value 
D and A; p < .002 
D and B; p < .023 - D and A; p < .004 
* Highlighted expressions are additional significant differences that appeared when the 
outlier was eliminated.  
Table 8.8.3: Comparison between results of between 8 tasks with and without an outlier 
It was found when an outlier was eliminated from the data analysis, the participants’ there 
were significant differences in performance between all tasks between conditions except for 
tasks 1 and 7 that show no significant difference between conditions, although it is still can 
be observed in the graphs. This could be attributed to the same reasoning discussed earlier, 
i.e. task 1 being the first task, where pilots are still familiarizing themselves with the 
display presentation on all conditions; and Task 7 being not challenging enough 
arithmetically, therefore, not showing any significant difference between conditions. 
The analysis without an outlier showed two additional tasks, 2 (minimum value) and 6 
(middle value) to have a significant difference in participants’ performance between 
conditions D and A. 
Apart from the Score data, all Time and Overall Performance data showed a greater 
significant difference between the same conditions and additional conditions, such as 
between conditions C and B in tasks 3 and 5.  
Between conditions C and B, where minimal difference was employed in Mind Reference 
features, there was still significant difference observed in tasks 3 and 5. It showed two 
aspects. (1) When tasks, such as 3 and 5 (maximum value) that are arithmetically difficult 
compared to other tasks, participants performed better on displays even if not all step-
principles were implemented (condition C). (2) When tasks were more arithmetically 
difficult participants showed a greater difference in performance in favour of displays with 
Mind References principles, where they performed significantly better, i.e., in some cases, 
discussed earlier, 300% better.  
Also, once an outlier was eliminated participants’ performance on all tasks became more 
consistent, steadily improving across all tasks on display condition D in Time and Overall 
Performance. On conditions A and B, in some cases participants’ performance fluctuated 
around 300% between tasks. 
It is concluded from the above results that participants performed experimental tasks 
significantly better on the displays employing the Mind Reference step-principles. 
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8.8.4 Post-Questionnaire suggestions from pilots 
Despite the fact the most participants said that it was time consuming to count the number 
of lines in the maximum value presentations of the vertical-speed-triangle, such as in tasks 
3 and 5, the participants still performed these tasks significantly faster on the display with 
the Mind Reference symbology (see display condition D), rather than on the numerical 
representation display (see display condition A).  
Participants’ general comments were in favour of displays where Mind References step-
principles were implemented. Even in case 36 (an outlier) said, “If one can rely on the 
computer, the triangle + minute marks are very quick + easy. But why not go one step 
further and display minutes”. It transpired from the discussions after the experiment that 
pilots (i.e. the participants of the experiments) did not need a precise answer for a task such 
as the one used in the experiment, but rather in flight they need a quick estimate, which the 
triangle provided effectively. 
The participant pilots also suggested several other situations where similar calculations 
could be supported. One case is when pilot needs to estimate the amount of fuel left in the 
tanks and how long (time) and how far (distance and suitable landing) this fuel will last. 
The second case was about estimating the time and place for starting the descent (i.e., 
identifying a 3-dimentional point at the top of the descent) in order to later reach a 
particular navigational point in the air, i.e., the top of final approach. 
8.9 Result of Spatial and Arithmetic ability tests 
All pilots participated in both parts (I and II) of the experiment completed Spatial and 
Arithmetic ability tests at the beginning of the session. The objective was to investigate 
how participants’ performance on display conditions was affected by their arithmetic and 
spatial ability, mainly because the tasks in the two extreme conditions A and D would rely 
heavily on these abilities. Condition A contained numerical data and required participants 
to perform an arithmetic task, where condition D had Mind Reference features that were 
represented spatially for this experimental task. 
The hypothesis was that participants’ performance on the Arithmetic ability test would 
predict their performance in the display condition A. The correlation and Figure 8.8a and 
8.8b show that this is true for both parts of the experiment. These correlations are with (R = 
.809) and without (R = .703) outliers in Total Time data in the first part of the experiment in 
between-subject designs, and in the second part of the experiment, in within-subject design 
study. These results suggest that 65% with and 49% without outliers of variability in Total 
Time performance on display A is predicted by Total Time performance on Arithmetic test 
in the first part of the experiment. 
In the first part of the experiment, it was important to eliminate the possibility of these 
correlations (between Total Time on A and Total Time on Arithmetic test) to be due to 
participants’ individual difference between groups A and D. The correlation of participants’ 
performance was performed on an Arithmetic test between groups A and D conditions. The 
results showed that there was no significant correlation between these groups of 
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participants. It is concluded that the correlation between Total Time on A and Total Time 
Arithmetic data was not due to individual difference in participants’ performance, but due 
to their measured performance on the Arithmetic test. 
In the second part of the experiment (within-subject design), where the data was compared 
against the same participants performance, similar results were observed in the data with (R 
= .754, 56% predicted) and without outliers (R = .724, 52% predicted). In addition, it was 
also observed that the Total Overall Performance showed similar results of a significant 
correlation with (R = .613, 38% predicted) and without outliers (R = .543; 30% predicted). 
This confirms that individual differences among the participants do not influence the 
results.  
All following correlations figures showed no correlation. 
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Figure 8.9a: Correlation Total Time between condition A and Arithmetic test (part I) 
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Figure 8.9b: Correlation Total Time between condition A and Arithmetic test (part II) 
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Figure 8.9c: Correlation Total Score between condition D and Arithmetic test (part II)  
Given the example correlation above, figure 8.9c, this shows both that it is still difficult to 
fit a regression line to these data-points, and if fitted it would be of a low value, and so a 
poor predictor. This graph has been included as one the best examples of the correlation 
(Figure 8.9a and 8.9b). Hence, there appears to be no correlations between participants’ 
performance on arithmetic and spatial ability test versus their performance on display 
conditions A and D. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis that pilots’ performance can be predicted by pilots’ 
performance on the Spatial ability test is not supported by these results.  
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8.10 Method – experiment: part (ii), within-subject, 2 groups, N = 17 
Now that the effects of individual Mind Reference presentation versus numerical 
representation in the four different groups of participants (in between-subject design) has 
been investigated in detail, it is appropriate to explore these effects further in within-subject 
design experiments. In the second part of the experiment all participants performance is 
examined on both the two extreme conditions, A (numerical representation) and D (Mind 
Reference presentation) display conditions. This method eliminates any individual 
differences that could have influenced the result in part I of the experiment. The sample 
size here was larger, i.e., 17 pilots per condition, and was also counterbalanced, i.e., a 
random allocation between the two conditions eliminates the order effect.  
8.10.1 Participants:  
A sample of participants in this part of the experiment comprised 17 pilots, i.e. 17 pilots per 
display condition. The sample is well balanced across both conditions. One out of 17 pilots 
was a female. The average age of the pilots who participated was 36 years old (SD = 11.2), 
ranging from 21 to 61 year old. The flying experience ranged from 80 to 10000 flying 
hours with an average of 3431 hours and standard deviation of 3055.  
8.10.2 Material:  
The two prototype displays used and were the same as in the experiment part I display 
condition A (Figure 8.2.2a - numerical representation) and D (Figure 8.2.2d - Mind 
Reference presentation). 
The experimental setup is summarised in the table 8.10.2a below. It is the same as for 
experimental part I, only there were two display conditions A and D, numerical and Mind 
Reference presentation of information respectively. Two features on the display D, Level-
Off-Altitude line and Vertical-Speed-Triangle of 1-minute travel, were assumed to assist in 
faster completion of the experimental task with less errors, and are both in the display 
condition D. There were eight calculating tasks per condition that were representative of a 
variety of possible vertical speed representations, four of which were in a descending 
representation, and the other four in an ascending representation. Hence, there were 16 data 
points collected for each participant, eight time-data-points (Time) per task and eight error-
data-points (Score) per task.   
Condi-
tions 
A 
Control Numerical representation 
D 
Mind References representation 
Features 
Tasks Numbers only All features present 
1 Middle value 
2 Minimum value 
A
sc
en
di
ng
 
3 Maximum value 
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4 Middle value 
5 Maximum value 
6 Middle value 
7 Minimum value 
D
es
ce
nd
in
g 
8 Middle value 
Table 8.10.2a: Outline of part II experimental tasks setup 
The experimental condition A display was a control condition that had none of the Mind 
Reference presentation features. It only contained a basic numerical representation of the 
information required to estimate the time to a target altitude. The display D had all features 
together on one display, being represented in numerical and in Mind Reference form. 
8.10.3 Task and Procedure 
The task and procedure was the same as in the experiment part I apart from the additional 
last four additional steps (8-10). Table 8.10.3a, below, outlines the procedure. These steps 
were added for pilots to repeat the experimental task on an additional display condition. All 
participants completed the tasks on both the numerical and the Mind Reference displays for 
comparison in within-subject experimental design.  
All participants read and completed a consent form. The form had basic information about 
the experiment, the participants’ rights and a non-discloser agreement. This form also 
assured that all of the participants had the same information about the experiment. 
At the beginning of the experiment all participants were requested to take a spatial test and 
an arithmetic test. All participants where administered the spatial and arithmetic tests in 
random order. These tests were the same as in the experiment reported in part I. The tests 
where introduced to account for the variability in the participants’ abilities, which was 
discussed earlier in this chapter (see section 8.9).  
Upon completion of spatial and arithmetic tests participants filled out a questionnaire about 
their flying experience and then were randomly assigned to either a A or D display 
condition. They would perform 8 tasks on a randomly allocated first condition. Each 
participant was asked to calculate time to target altitude as fast and as accurately as they 
could on each screen, they would write their answer and then go on to the next screen and 
repeat these steps until they came to a final screen. The software registered time spent on 
each screen with millisecond accuracy. The participants themselves wrote their answer on 
an individual score sheet. Upon completion of all the computer tasks, participants 
completed a questionnaire expressing their opinion on the displays and described how they 
preformed the tasks. Then the participants were trained on the second display condition, 
whichever type remained, i.e. if they first did the task on the display condition A, then the 
second would be the display condition D and visa versa.  
Experimental procedure – part II 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 8:  Designing and Evaluating  
 222
1. Introduction and consent form 
2. Random order pre-test of Spatial and Arithmetic ability 
3. Flying experience questionnaire 
4. Random allocation of A or D condition display 
5. Training on selected condition display 
6. Performing 8 tasks on selected condition display 
7. Post-questionnaire on the first allocated display 
8. Second experimental display condition 
9. Training on the second condition display 
10. Performing 8 tasks on the second display condition 
11. Post-questionnaire on the second display condition 
Table 8.10.3a: Experimental procedure – part II 
8.11 Results – experiment: part (ii), within-subject, 2 groups, N = 17 
The same data-points were collected and analysed in the second part of the experiment 
(Table 8.11a). 
Data-point name Taken from/Source 
Time (Time) Time taken to complete one task in minutes, seconds, and milliseconds 
Score (Error) Full score for correct answer 
Overall Performance (Time over Score) Time taken to complete one task divided by the score for the same task 
Total Time Total time taken to complete a complete 8 tasks in minutes, seconds, and milliseconds 
Total Score Sum of scores for 8 tasks (maximum score is 8) 
Total Overall Performance (Total Time 
over Total Score) ‘Total Time’ divided by ‘Total Score’ 
Table 8.11a: Nature of data-points in the experiment 
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8.12 Analysis of totals over 8 tasks 
The analysis began with the Total data-points. This gave a general overview of the data in 
the within-subject design. Then analysis was performed on participants’ average task 
performance, and as with the last analysis, participants’ performance between the 8 tasks by 
comparing the two display conditions A and D was examined.  
8.12.1 Total Time (over 8 tasks): 
A paired T-test was performed to determine whether there was a difference in pilot 
performance between condition A and D. The paired T-test result of Total Time means 
between display conditions A and D, showed a significant difference (p < ..0001). The 
figure 8.12.1a and the table (8.12.1a) of means shows that participants completed the same 
8 tasks more than 3 times faster on condition D, than they did on condition A. The Standard 
Deviation of Total Time on D condition is less than a minute, compared with the Standard 
Deviation of 1 minute and 28 seconds. This shows that participants performed the 8 tasks 
on the display condition D faster and with a more consistent Total Time. 
Total Time on DTotal Time on A
M
ea
n 
To
ta
l T
im
e 
in
 s
ec
on
ds
 (8
 ta
sk
s)
240
180
120
60
0
61
200
 
Figure 8.12.1a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
Paired Samples Statistics 
Total Time Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
A 0:03:19.59 17 0:01:28.10 0:00:21.37
D 0:01:00.76 17 0:00:56.70 0:00:13.75
Table 8.12.1a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
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8.12.1.1 Outliers 
After inspecting the initial data for extreme values, two outliers were found, one in each 
condition, case 12 in display condition A and case 15 in display condition D. The outliers 
were closely examined to determine whether and how these cases affect the results, and 
whether it was appropriate to continue analysis with these cases being included or 
excluded.  
Case 12 had a maximum score (Total Score = 10) on the Arithmetic test, i.e. great 
accuracy, but the second longest time (Total Time = 0:07:37.50, above 85%), where the 
Mean is 0:04:23.83 with a Standard Deviation of 0:01:46.43 out of the whole group 
(N=17). It appears in this case the participant chose to sacrifice time over accuracy, when 
performing the Arithmetic ability test.  
Case 15, just like the case 12, had the maximum score (Total Score =10) on Arithmetic test, 
i.e. great accuracy, but the longest time (Total Time = 0:07:59.00, above 90%), where Mean 
of Total Time is 0:04:23.83 with Standard Deviation of 0:01:46.43 out of the whole 
experimental sample (N=17). This participant’s Total Time is more than two standard 
deviations away from the mean. This participant also sacrificed time for accuracy.  
Cases 12 and 15 had the highest (second and first respectively) time in Total Time in 
Arithmetic test. Both cases 12 and 15 were also listed as the highest (third and second 
respectively) in Total Overall Performance in the Arithmetic test and in the Total Overall 
Performance on Display condition A (Case 12) and D (Case 15) (Figure 8.12.1.1c). 
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Figure 8.12.1.1a: Outliers in Total Time on display conditions A and D 
Next, the Total Score data was examined for any outliers (Figure 8.12.1.1b). Case 10 was 
an outlier on display condition A with the Total Score of 4, where the group average is 7 
(Total Time 0:02:51.60, where group mean is 0:03:19.59 with a standard deviation of 
0:01:28.10). However, he/she was not an outlier on condition D. On D condition case 10 
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scored the top score of 8 and faster than the mean Total Time 0:00:39.30, where the group 
mean was 0:01:00.76 with a standard deviation of 0:00:56.70. Case 10 scored below 
average on the Arithmetic test. Case 10 had a lower than average group performance on the 
A condition which could be predicted through the Arithmetic test, as it was concluded in 
section 8.9. It can be concluded that participants performed more efficiently on the D type 
display, than on the numerical display A. The decision was not to eliminate Case 10 from 
the analysis. 
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Figure 8.12.1.1b: Outliers in Total Score on display conditions A and D 
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Figure 8.12.1.1c: Outliers in Total Overall Performance on display conditions A and D 
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The decision was to exclude outliers 12 and 15 from the analysis of Total Score, Total Time 
and Total Overall Performance and to perform the analysis with and without outliers and 
compare the difference. 
8.12.1.2 Total Time without Outliers (over 8 tasks) 
Once the outliers were eliminated the difference in participants’ performance on 
experimental displays increased. Participants’ performed all 8 tasks 3.8 times faster on D 
(Figure 8.12.1.2a), than on A with significant difference of p < ..0001. The mean table 
(8.12.1.2a) shows that not only the mean on the display condition D reduced but the 
Standard Deviation also reduced by only 15 seconds, compared with the Standard deviation 
on A of 1 minute and 3 seconds, making participants’ Total Time performance on D even 
more consistent than when the outliers were included in the analysis. 
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Figure 8.12.1.2a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions with outliers 
Cases 12 and 15 removed 
Paired Samples Statistics 
Total Time Mean N Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
A 0:03:00.79 15 0:01:03.05 0:00:16.28
D 0:00:46.49 15 0:00:14.86 0:00:03.84
Table 8.12.1.2a: Mean of Total Time per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions with outliers 
Cases 12 and 15 removed 
8.12.2 Total Score (over 8 tasks) 
Although the difference in the Total Score results was not as great as in the Total Time 
data, the difference in means between A and D still showed  (p < .006) significance. The 
mean table 8.12.2a shows that despite the mean difference not being great, the difference in 
standard deviations is large on display condition A. This indicates that participants 
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performed more consistently on display condition D that on A 
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Figure 8.12.2a: Mean of Total Score per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
Paired Samples Statistics 
Total Score Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
A 6.9559 17 1.09771 .26623 
D 7.8676 17 .28115 .06819 
Table 8.12.2a: Mean of Total Score per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
8.12.2.1 Total Score without an Outlier (over 8 tasks)  
The elimination of outliers (case 12 and 15) from the analysis did not make any difference 
to the results. 
8.12.3 Total Overall Performance (over 8 tasks) 
Despite the Total Score data on participants’ performance having minimal significant 
difference between A and D, the Total Overall Performance, that takes time into account 
and shows very significant difference (p < ..0001). The figure (8.12.3a) and the two means 
(table 8.12.3a) below show that the difference between means is more than three and half 
times.  
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Figure 8.12.3a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
Paired Samples Statistics 
Total Overall 
Performance  Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
A 28.9415 17 12.15743 2.94861 
D 7.7653 17 7.33424 1.77881 
Table 8.12.3a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
8.12.3.1 Total Overall Performance without Outlier (over 8 tasks) 
Once the outliers were eliminated the significant difference (p < ..0001) improved and the 
mean difference (Table 8.12.3.1a) between participants Total Overall Performances raised 
four and half times with standard deviations to match each condition (Figure 8.12.3.1a). 
The Standard Deviation in A condition was more than 9 points, where in D condition it was 
only 2 points, making participants performance on display condition D more consistent, 
than on A. 
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Figure 8.12.3.1a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A and D display 
conditions with outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed 
Paired Samples Statistics 
Total Overall 
Performance Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
A 26.7359 15 9.27541 2.39490 
D 5.9307 15 1.92742 .49766 
Table 8.12.3.1a: Mean of Total Overall Performance per 8 tasks on A and D display conditions 
with outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed 
8.13 Analysis per single task between conditions A and D 
8.13.1 Time per single task between conditions A and D 
Two-tailed, paired t-tests showed that there was a significant difference in Time (p < 0.001) 
per single tasks (i.e., total of 8 tasks) between display conditions A and D (Figure 8.13.1a). 
The difference in participants average Time performance per single task on condition D was 
more than 3 times faster than on condition A (Table 8.13.1a). At times participants 
performed a single task on D condition 4 times faster, than on A. 
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Figure 8.13.1a: Mean of Time per single task on A and D display conditions 
 A D 
Mean per 
single task 00:25.0 00:07.6 
SD per single 
task 00:10.3 00:01.4 
Table 8.13.1a: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions 
8.13.1.1 Time per single task between conditions A and D without outliers 
A further Two-tailed, paired t-test showed that there was a significant difference between 
Time (p < 0.001) in the single tasks in display conditions A and D without outliers. From 
the table (8.13.1.1a) and in figure (8.13.1.1a) below it is evident that participants’ Time 
performance on a single task was much superior on D than on A. On average the 
participants reduced their Time spent on a single task by 4 times.  
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Figure 8.13.1.1a: Mean of Time per single task on A and D display conditions with outliers 
Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
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 A D 
Mean per 
single task 00:22.6 00:05.8 
SD per single 
task 00:09.4 00:00.8 
Table 8.13.1.1a: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions without outliers N=15 
8.13.2 Score per single task between conditions A and D 
A two-tailed, paired t-test showed that there was no significant difference between the 
Score on single tasks in the display conditions A and D. Although the participants’ Score 
performance did not appear to be significantly different between A and D conditions, the 
table (8.13.2a) and the figure (8.13.2a) below highlight the difference in participants’ 
performance.  
There are two reasons that there is no statistically significant difference between Score per 
single task data in pilots’ performance. One, there is a ceiling effect, similar to the effect in 
part I of this experiment, discussed in section 8.7.2. Two, the larger sample might have 
shown the significant difference. 
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Figure 8.13.2a: Mean of Score per single task on A and D display conditions 
 A D 
Mean per 
single task 0.87 0.98 
SD per single 
task 0.14 0.03 
Table 8.13.2a: Mean of Score per task on A and D display conditions 
8.13.2.1 Score per single task between conditions A and D without an outlier 
The same trends in Score per single task were observed in the analysis without outliers as 
with the outliers. 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 8:  Designing and Evaluating  
 232
8.13.3 Overall Performance per single task between conditions A and D 
Despite the fact the Score per single task data did not show a statistically significant 
difference between the two display conditions, the Overall Performance of participants per 
single task data did show significant difference. The Two-tailed, paired t-test showed that 
there was a significant difference between Overall Performance (p < 0.001) on single tasks 
between display conditions A and D. The mean difference between conditions A and D was 
more than 3 times. Mean table (8.13.3a) and figure (8.13.3a) show the difference in pilots 
Overall Performance per single task in both conditions. 
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Figure 8.13.3a: Mean of Overall Performance per single task on A and D display conditions 
 A D 
Mean per 
single task 25.83 7.88 
SD 10.51 1.51 
Table 8.13.3a: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions 
8.13.3.1 Overall Performance per single task between conditions A and D without 
outliers 
Once outliers were eliminated the difference in pilots’ Overall Performance per single task 
increased to three and half times between conditions A and D (table 8.13.3.1a and figure 
8.13.3.1a). The Two-tailed, paired t-test showed that there was a significant difference 
between Overall Performance (p < 0.002) single tasks in display conditions A and D 
without outliers. 
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Figure 8.13.3.1a: Mean of Overall Performance per single task on A and D display conditions 
with outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
 A D 
Mean per 
single task 22.62 6.00 
SD 9.53 0.88 
Table 8.13.3.1a: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions with 
outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
8.14 Analysis per task between 8 tasks 
The last stage of the analysis looked at participants’ performance on 8 individual tasks and 
compared these between the two conditions.  
8.14.1 Time per task between 8 tasks: 
Participants’ Time performance on 8 tasks showed significant difference in all tasks 
between display conditions A and D, apart from task 6 (Table 8.14.1a). As was discussed in 
the first part of the experiment, the reason for this is no significant difference could be 
attributed to task 6 as it was relatively easy to complete arithmetically. This means that 
participants completed this task on average quite fast (11.14 seconds) on display condition 
A, even though the same task was still completed faster in condition D (7.86 seconds) 
(Table 8.14.1b and Figure 8.14.1a). 
Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)Time per task 
between A 
and D Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
   
    Lower Upper    
Task 1 0:00:14.47 0:00:11.10 0:00:02.69 0:00:08.76 0:00:20.18 5.373 16 .000 
Task 2 0:00:15.64 0:00:15.06 0:00:03.65 0:00:07.90 0:00:23.39 4.281 16 .001 
Task 3 0:00:30.19 0:00:21.84 0:00:05.30 0:00:18.96 0:00:41.42 5.700 16 .000 
Task 4 0:00:13.49 0:00:12.03 0:00:02.92 0:00:07.30 0:00:19.67 4.622 16 .000 
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Task 5 0:00:32.28 0:00:19.52 0:00:04.73 0:00:22.24 0:00:42.31 6.819 16 .000 
Task 6 0:00:03.27 0:00:09.62 0:00:02.33 -0:00:01.68 0:00:08.22 1.402 16 .180 
Task 7 0:00:12.02 0:00:16.08 0:00:03.90 0:00:03.75 0:00:20.28 3.082 16 .007 
Task 8 0:00:17.50 0:00:16.58 0:00:04.02 0:00:08.97 0:00:26.03 4.352 16 .000 
Table 8.14.1a: T-test Time per task between tasks and A and D display conditions 
The data in the table 8.14.1b and figure 8.14.1a below show that participants performed all 
tasks on display condition D faster and, comparatively, at more a constant average Time per 
task than they were able to on display condition A. 
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Figure 8.14.1a: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean Time per task 
Task A D 
1 0:00:21.38 0:00:06.91 
2 0:00:23.79 0:00:08.15 
3 0:00:39.05 0:00:08.86 
4 0:00:19.38 0:00:05.89 
5 0:00:41.71 0:00:09.44 
6 0:00:11.14 0:00:07.86 
7 0:00:20.19 0:00:08.18 
8 0:00:22.96 0:00:05.46 
Table 8.14.1b: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions 
8.14.1.1 Time per task between 8 tasks without outliers, N = 15 
Once the two outliers, cases 12 and 15, were eliminated from the analysis, the significant 
difference was across all tasks between the two conditions (Table 8.14.1.1a). Participants 
performed significantly faster on condition D, and on task 5 performed more than 5 times 
faster (Table 8.14.1.1b). Again, participants were recorded a steady Time performance 
throughout all tasks on display condition D (Figure 8.14.1.1a). 
Paired Samples Test 
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 8:  Designing and Evaluating  
 235
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
   
Time per 
task on 
A and D 
   Lower Upper    
Task 1 0:00:14.65 0:00:10.59 0:00:02.74 0:00:08.79 0:00:20.52 5.357 14 .000 
Task 2 0:00:17.72 0:00:09.63 0:00:02.49 0:00:12.39 0:00:23.05 7.128 14 .000 
Task 3 0:00:27.79 0:00:16.75 0:00:04.33 0:00:18.51 0:00:37.06 6.424 14 .000 
Task 4 0:00:12.29 0:00:08.06 0:00:02.08 0:00:07.83 0:00:16.76 5.909 14 .000 
Task 5 0:00:32.00 0:00:20.04 0:00:05.18 0:00:20.90 0:00:43.10 6.183 14 .000 
Task 6 0:00:04.82 0:00:03.54 0:00:00.91 0:00:02.86 0:00:06.78 5.273 14 .000 
Task 7 0:00:10.04 0:00:08.73 0:00:02.25 0:00:05.21 0:00:14.87 4.456 14 .001 
Task 8 0:00:15.01 0:00:09.86 0:00:02.55 0:00:09.55 0:00:20.47 5.893 14 .000 
Table 8.14.1.1a: T-test Time per task between tasks and A and D display conditions with 
outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
Display Conditions
DA
M
ea
n 
Ti
m
e 
pe
r t
as
k 
no
 o
ut
lie
rs
50
40
30
20
10
0
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3
Task 4
Task 5
Task 6
Task 7
Taks 8
5
20
7
17
6
11
7
39
5
17
7
34
5
23
6
21
 
Figure 8.14.1.1a: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions with outliers Cases 12 
and 15 removed, N=15 
 Mean Time per task 
Task A D 
1 0:00:20.69 0:00:06.03 
2 0:00:22.72 0:00:05.00 
3 0:00:34.32 0:00:06.53 
4 0:00:17.46 0:00:05.17 
5 0:00:38.69 0:00:06.69 
6 0:00:10.75 0:00:05.93 
7 0:00:16.55 0:00:06.51 
8 0:00:19.60 0:00:04.59 
Table 8.14.1.1b: Mean of Time per task on A and D display conditions with outliers Cases 12 
and 15 removed, N=15 
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8.14.2 Score per task between 8 tasks 
The Score per individual task performance showed a difference between A and D 
conditions only in two tasks 3 and 5. Tasks 3 and 5 were relatively difficult arithmetically, 
as discussed in the part one of the experiment. However, the figure (8.14.2a) below shows 
that participants performed consistently better on display condition D, than on A. 
Participants managed to make no errors in task 4 on D condition, where the same 
participants, on average, made mistakes on all 8 tasks on display condition A (Table 
8.14.2b). All 17 participants made no errors in tasks 2, 3, 7 and 8 on condition D. On 
Condition A, however, there were no such cases. 
Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
   
Score per 
task on 
A and D 
   Lower Upper    
Task 1 .0294 .23188 .05624 -.0898 .1486 .523 16 .608 
Task 2 -.1029 .26603 .06452 -.2397 .0338 -1.595 16 .130 
Task 3 -.4559 .48602 .11788 -.7058 -.2060 -3.867 16 .001 
Task 4 .0000 .17678 .04287 -.0909 .0909 .000 16 1.000 
Task 5 -.1912 .31287 .07588 -.3520 -.0303 -2.519 16 .023 
Task 6 -.0147 .13893 .03370 -.0861 .0567 -.436 16 .668 
Task 7 -.0882 .26430 .06410 -.2241 .0477 -1.376 16 .188 
Task 8 -.0882 .17547 .04256 -.1785 .0020 -2.073 16 .055 
Table 8.14.2a: T-test Score per task on A and D display conditions 
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Figure 8.14.2a: Mean of Score per task on A and D display conditions 
 Mean Score per task 
Task A D 
1 .9559 .9265 
2 .8971 1.0000 
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3 .5441 1.0000 
4 .9706 .9706 
5 .7941 .9853 
6 .9706 .9853 
7 .9118 1.0000 
8 .9118 1.0000 
Table 8.14.2b: Mean of Score per task on A and D display conditions 
8.14.2.1 Score per task between 8 tasks without an outlier, N = 16 
The same trends in Score per task in 8 tasks without outliers were observed in the analysis 
with the outliers accounted for. 
8.14.3 Overall Performance per task between 8 tasks 
The Overall Performance per task in 8 tasks between conditions A and D, showed there 
was significant difference in participants’ performance in all tasks, apart from two, tasks 3 
and 6 (Table 8.14.3a). Task 6 was mentioned earlier as arithmetically easy for participants 
to complete in both conditions, but still participants performed better on display condition 
D (Figure 8.14.3a and Table 8.14.3b). As discussed in the outliers section of this part of the 
experiment, case 15 had traded the time spend on each task for accuracy and had double-
checked each answer using both methods. This made his/her Time data high, which in turn 
increased his/her Overall Performance score on display condition D. This is the reason for 
difference in mean score on task 3 being not being recorded as significant. 
Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
   
Overall 
Performance 
per task on 
A and D 
   Lower Upper    
Task 1 16.4294 18.05530 4.37905 7.1462 25.7126 3.752 16 .002 
Task 2 14.9176 15.47850 3.75409 6.9593 22.8760 3.974 16 .001 
Task 3 23.1863 46.65826 11.31629 -.8032 47.1757 2.049 16 .057 
Task 4 14.0588 12.07120 2.92770 7.8524 20.2653 4.802 16 .000 
Task 5 37.5333 22.42772 5.43952 26.0021 49.0646 6.900 16 .000 
Task 6 4.2843 11.38760 2.76190 -1.5707 10.1393 1.551 16 .140 
Task 7 13.0471 19.03763 4.61730 3.2588 22.8353 2.826 16 .012 
Task 8 20.1980 17.17213 4.16485 11.3689 29.0271 4.850 16 .000 
Table 8.14.3a: T-Test – Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions 
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Figure 8.14.3a: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions 
 Mean Overall Performance per task 
Task A D 
1 24.2549 7.8255 
2 23.0647 8.1471 
3 32.0451 8.8588 
4 20.2588 6.2000 
5 47.9137 10.3804 
6 12.2529 7.9686 
7 21.2235 8.1765 
8 25.6627 5.4647 
Table 8.14.3b: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions 
8.14.3.1 Overall Performance per task between 8 tasks without outliers, N = 15 
When the outliers were eliminated in both display conditions, it was observed that all 8 
tasks showed a significant difference in participants Overall Performance per individual 
task between the two conditions (Table 8.14.3.1a). From the figure (8.14.3.1a) and table 
(8.14.3.1b) below it can also be seen that participants’ performance became even more 
consistent across all eight tasks. 
Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
   
Overall 
Performance 
per task on 
A and D 
   Lower Upper    
Task 1 16.8733 18.50320 4.77751 6.6266 27.1201 3.532 14 .003 
Task 2 16.9000 10.52297 2.71702 11.0726 22.7274 6.220 14 .000 
Task 3 13.3911 23.11196 5.96748 .5921 26.1901 2.244 14 .042 
Task 4 12.9400 8.22321 2.12322 8.3861 17.4939 6.095 14 .000 
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Task 5 37.6667 20.37971 5.26202 26.3808 48.9526 7.158 14 .000 
Task 6 5.9689 7.14131 1.84388 2.0142 9.9236 3.237 14 .006 
Task 7 11.2067 14.13357 3.64927 3.3798 19.0336 3.071 14 .008 
Task 8 18.0644 11.62880 3.00254 11.6246 24.5043 6.016 14 .000 
Table 8.14.3.1a: T-Test - Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions without 
outliers cases 12 and 15 
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Figure 8.14.3.1a: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions with 
outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
 
 Mean Overall Performance per task 
Task A D 
1 23.9489 7.0756 
2 21.9000 5.0000 
3 19.9244 6.5333 
4 18.4600 5.5200 
5 44.3600 6.6933 
6 12.0200 6.0511 
7 17.7200 6.5133 
8 22.6578 4.5933 
Table 8.14.3.1b: Mean of Overall Performance per task on A and D display conditions with 
outliers Cases 12 and 15 removed, N=15 
8.15 Discussion for part (ii) 
There was no variability in participants’ abilities between groups in this part of the 
experiment as this was designed as a within-subject experiment. All 17 participants 
performed the experimental task on both display conditions. All data on participants’ 
performance on the display conditions A and D was not influenced by participants 
individual differences, such as was the case in the part I of this experiment.  
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8.15.1 Total Time, Total Score and Total Overall Performance 
Total Time, Total Score and Total Overall Performance showed the same consistent results, 
emphasising the difference between conditions A and D. Participants’ performance on all 8 
experimental tasks on the display condition D with Mind Reference features was more than 
three times faster and with significantly less error than on the condition A (numerical 
representation) display. The Total Overall Performance shows that participants 
performances improved more than three and half times on display condition D (Table 
8.15.1a).  
It was found again, once the outliers were eliminated, the data showed even further 
significant difference between participants’ performance on display condition A and D. 
Participants’ performance in Total Time improved, being 3.8 times faster on the display 
where Mind Reference principles were used in the design of its features. The Total Overall 
Performance improved by four and half times. The Total Score results had the ceiling 
effect, just like in the first part of the experiment. The Total Score results though showed no 
further improvement, when outliers were eliminated. 
  Total Time Total Score Total Overall Performance 
  A D A D A D 
Mean 03:19.59 01:00.76 6.956 7.868 28.942 7.765 
SD 01:28.10 00:56.70 1.1 .281 12.157 7.334 
With 
outlier 
Sig. .000 .006 .000 
Mean 03:00.79 00:46.49 7.14 7.86 26.736 5.931 
SD 01:03.05 00:14.86 .816 .288 9.275 1.927 
Without 
outliers 
Sig. .000 .007 .000 
Table 8.15.1a: Comparison between results of Totals with and without an outlier 
8.15.2 Time, Score and Overall Performance per single task 
Data on participants’ performance per single task showed the same trends (Table 8.15.2a) 
as the Totals data (Table 8.15.1a). Condition D offered participants display features that 
give them an advantage in performance on the experimental task, when compared with 
display condition A.  
  Total Time Total Score Total Overall Performance 
  A D A D A D 
Mean 00:25.0 00:07.6 0.87 0.98 25.83 7.88 
SD 00:10.3 00:01.4 0.14 0.03 10.51 1.51 With 
outlier Advantage 
over A 
3.3 times faster Better 3.3 times better 
Mean 00:22.6 00:05.8 0.89 0.98 22.62 6.00 Without 
outliers SD 00:09.4 00:00.8 0.14 0.03 9.53 0.88 
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Advan
tage 
over A 
3.9 times faster No further 3.8 times better 
Table 8.15.2a: Comparison between results of per single task with and without outliers 
8.15.3 Time, Score and Overall Performance per task between 8 tasks 
When comparing each of the 8 tasks between the two conditions, participants Time and 
Overall Performance was always better on display condition D. The same is true for Score 
data, apart for one occasion when on average participants scored better by 0.03 point on 
task 1 on display A, however in Time and Overall Performance on task 1 participants 
showed a significant advantage performing the task on display D, than A. 
The upper half of the table (8.15.3a) below shows significant differences in the 
participants’ performance with all participants data included, and the bottom half shows 
participants’ significant performance without outliers.  
In the upper half of the table, the Time per task data shows a significant difference on all 
tasks apart from task 6. As discussed previously, task 6 was relatively easy to perform and 
the results did not show a significant difference between the two conditions. However, from 
mean data (11.14 seconds on A; 07.86 seconds on D), it was evident that participants found 
this arithmetic task 6 relatively easy, but still performed better on display condition D.  
The Score data per task had a ceiling effect as discussed in the discussion part of the 
previous sections. As a result the Score data showed only significant difference in tasks that 
were relatively difficult to perform arithmetically on display A, where participants made 
more errors. However, the same participants performed tasks, 3 and 5, with significantly 
fewer errors on display condition D. 
The Overall Performance data per task indicates significant differences in participants’ 
performance on 6 out of the 8 consecutive tasks. The mean data (Figure 8.14.3a above in 
the Overall Performance per task section) shows that participants consistently performed 
tasks better on the display with Mind References features. 
 
Task Vertical speed Time Score 
Overall 
Performance 
1 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .002 
2 Minimum 
value p < .001 -  p < .001 
3 Maximum 
value p < .000 p < .001 - 
4 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .000 
5 Maximum 
value p < .000 p < .023 p < .000 
W
ith
 o
ut
lie
r 
6 Middle 
value - - - 
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7 Minimum 
value p < .007 - p < .012 
8 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .000 
1 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .003 
2 Minimum 
value p < .000 - p < .000 
3 Maximum 
value p < .000 .003 p < .042 
4 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .000 
5 Maximum 
value p < .000 .044 p < .000 
6 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .006 
7 Minimum 
value p < .001 - p < .008 
W
ith
ou
t o
ut
lie
r 
8 Middle 
value p < .000 - p < .000 
Table 8.15.3a: Comparison between results of between 8 tasks with and without an outlier 
The second bottom half of the table shows the significant differences in means between the 
two conditions without the outliers. The Score data per task showed the significant 
difference only in the two tasks 3 and 5, similar to the data where all pilots were included in 
the analysis. Participants, however, showed significantly better performance on the display 
condition D at all times in all 8 consecutive tasks in Time and Overall Performance data.  
8.15.4 Post-Questionnaire suggestions from participants 
When asked about the preference of the vertical speed representation, all 17 participants 
found it faster and easier to use the Mind Reference presentation to the numerical 
presentation. 
8.16 Conclusion 
The results from evaluating the display features designed using Mind Reference framework 
principles have shown a significant improvement in pilots’ (i.e. the participants of the 
experiment) performance on one particular calculating task, that of calculating time to 
altitude. From this it is considered that this framework may also be usable for the design of 
display of features that support similar calculating and estimating tasks, such as fuel 
consumption over time and distance, or time and distance left to next navigation point.  
The results point to the opportunity of generating representations through the use of the 
Mind Reference framework for vital information that needs instant calculations and 
estimations. These representations will minimize pilots’ cognitive effort spent on repetitive, 
but essential tasks while flying, and also minimize errors and time taken by the pilot to 
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complete these calculations. 
Moreover, the use of this framework can be extended to other focal types of pilots’ tasks, 
such as problem solving, monitoring and managing tasks, as described in the discussion in 
chapter six. Chapter six described how to apply the Mind References step-principles in the 
design of displays that assist pilots in the management of automated systems and problem 
solving during the flight.  However, it stopped short of testing these displays, as this is 
outside the scope of this current research.  
In modern cockpits, pilots are faced with an ever-increasing amount of information. The 
challenge is to deliver information in a meaningful way, drawing on the existing knowledge 
and natural abilities of pilots. It is a well-known fact that pilots have a high workload, 
which progressively increases with introduction in new equipment, reduction of crew and 
new responsibilities for pilots, for example, air-traffic awareness/control for commercial 
airlines and additional operational tasks for military aircraft.  There are several tasks in the 
pilot’s routine where the designer can minimize the pilot’s time spent on a task by 
presenting information to pilots’ in a meaningful way. One way to present information with 
these attributes is to use a Mind Reference presentation, which has been explored and tested 
in this chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Scope of the Mind References framework  
The aim of this thesis was to uncover information related problems that pilots’ have in 
with the glass cockpit.  To identify the roots of these problems, and to find solutions to 
the information presentation problems to help pilots’ more effectively operate 
automated aircraft.  The resulting thesis of these studies can be regarded as providing 
two things: (1) it reveals how a new systematic interface design process was conceived 
from first identifying effective information presentation directly from the operator in 
their time-critical working environment; and (2) it provides a resulting framework, that 
serves as guidance for the interface designer on how to arrive, structure and present 
information presentation to a operator in a cognitively efficient manner. 
This chapter brings the results of observational and empirical studies and experiments 
together, showing how these results provide answers for the four research questions 
posed in chapter one. The results show how the systematic interface design process, the 
method used, and the resulting framework work together. The applications and 
limitations of the framework are also discussed. Further, it outlines the lessons learned 
during this research, followed by the main contributions of this thesis. Lastly, 
possibilities of future applications of the framework and of the systematic interface 
design process are discussed. 
9.2 Research Question One: Root causes of the problems pilots have 
with automation 
RQ1 - What are the root causes of the problems pilots have with 
understanding and operating automated systems?  
In posing this question, two directions where investigated, (a) the existing design 
processes, which are currently used in the aerospace domain, were examined; and (b) 
how pilots are trained and acquire their understanding about aircraft operation and 
automation. 
It was found that design processes generated in the research domain are rarely followed 
in the industry (Newman & Greeley, 2001; Singer, 2002). Another fundamental finding 
was that the operators’ information demands are not considered early enough in the 
design process to influence the final design. In fact, pilots are involved too late in the 
design process, such as during the evaluation and testing of the final design. At this 
stage pilots input on the usability of the design are too late and to expensive to 
implement. Furthermore, pilots who do have a chance to evaluate the design are test-
pilots, who are not representative of the pilot population that will be using the final 
designed product. 
Therefore, to understand the root-cause of information problems that pilots’ experience, 
investigations were performed through both, the observational study of airline pilots 
being trained on a glass cockpit aircraft, and during their first operational experiences 
after training in flight. These investigations illuminated the root-causes of problems that 
pilots encounter during training and operation of a glass cockpit aircraft. 
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The root-cause of problems that pilot have with information in the glass cockpit lies on 
two levels, at the concept and design level, and also at the implementation level of 
design. During the concept and philosophy of cockpit design the manufacturers designs 
are not considerate to how pilots think of aircraft operation. In fact, at times the aircraft 
automation operates in the completely the opposite way to what the pilot expects. 
During the implementation of design, logical designs are not followed through 
throughout the cockpit, which brings inconsistencies into the cockpit. This can lead to 
the same information being presented to the pilot in completely the reverse manner, 
confusing pilots. 
In this thesis, the root-causes of the problems were investigated through empirical study 
(RQ2), systematic design (RQ3) and the implementation process (RQ4). A method of 
eliciting knowledge directly from the pilots was used to understand how to support their 
aircraft operational practice. 
9.3 Research Question Two: Method for eliciting knowledge in a 
time-critical domain 
RQ2 - What is a suitable method for eliciting information about the 
knowledge of how pilots operate in a time and safety critical 
environment?  And further, is there a method that brings valid 
and reliable reports on pilots’ own experience?  
The second research question lead to a modification of an existing knowledge elicitation 
method, the cued-recall-debrief method (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan 1997). It was 
modified to systematically discover fundamental information structures, rules and 
strategies that pilots use to understand and operate the aircraft. The method did 
uncovered these elements and these became a basis of a framework that develops a 
design philosophy for automated aircraft and the design of displays that support and 
comply with pilots’ strategies and rules of aircraft operation. 
The method was a systematic approach to investigation in real-time the pilot and aircraft 
operation whilst not disturbing the pilot’s continuous work and preserving the links in 
time-dependent information. The method allowed pilots to relive the flight during a 
debrief session, where the researcher was able to cue pilots to recall their inner thought 
processes from any point of the flight, and it permitted the researcher to ask all the 
questions required for the study without interrupting the pilot’s operational 
environment.  
The method also included an evolutionary analysis that allowed the retrieval of time-
dependent information whilst preserving the links in information that the pilots use 
throughout the flight.  It showed how to expose information that the pilots’ use as 
references, and how to recognize the strategies that pilots’ use to organise their 
information-space, and how they overcome existing information related problems in the 
glass cockpit.  Lastly, the evolutionary analysis revealed a diagram of the ‘Evolution of 
Information Flow’, which showed how pilots’ use information through the flight, and 
how the existing information structures are developed and used. It also revealed the 
strategies that pilots use to acquire, manipulate and monitor information in an 
automated cockpit. 
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9.4 Research Question Three: Mind Reference Framework 
RQ3 - Is there a conceptual framework that helps designers and 
engineers compose and deliver effective information 
systematization and presentation throughout the glass cockpit and 
on individual interfaces?  
In considering this question, a wide range of conceptual frameworks were examined, 
out of which few have considered investigating the pilot’s perspective and experience of 
aircraft operation (e.g., a notable exception being Hutchins & Holder, 2000). None have 
systematically investigated pilots every day aircraft operation, apart from Sarter and 
Woods body of work (e.g. 1992, 1994 & 1995). Existing research has tended to focus 
on specific isolated automation related problems, but has not been extended to a 
framework that can assist designers in avoiding these problems in future cockpit 
development. 
A systematic investigation using a modified cued-recall-debrief method was conducted 
in the full-flight simulator with participation of experienced pilots. As a result a Mind 
Reference framework emerged that consists of rules, information structures and 
strategies that the pilots’ were observed to use to make sense of the vast amount of 
information they need to process in a short span of time.  This framework may be 
helpful in design of future interfaces. 
9.5 Research Question Four: Effective Information Presentation 
RQ4 - What is more effective information presentation? and how can this 
be arrived at?  
The last research question is answered through the application of the Mind Reference 
framework in two types of displays: the first display was aimed to provide the pilots 
with information that helps them manage and monitor automation throughout the flight; 
and second display was aimed to help pilots perform a typical calculating task faster and 
more accurately, relative to a typical numerical presentation of the same information.  
Chapter seven provided detailed guidance of how to apply a Mind References 
framework in the design of a monitoring display. The framework contains intentionally 
ordered step-principles that guide a designer through the development of each feature on 
the display. They direct the designer to consider relevant rules and information 
structures to support pilots’ information management strategies and tasks. The 
framework contains an Information Matrix that consists of three information 
classification dimensions that are characteristic of the information pilots’ were observed 
to use. The designer is guided through the use of the Information Matrix to uncover 
appropriate presentation for required information, as well as to explore the links and 
relationships that need to be considered  
The second display was designed to support a typical, for a pilot, calculating task and 
was designed through the application of the step-principles based on the Mind 
References framework established in chapter six. Chapter eight then examined the 
effectiveness of the information presentation on this display. The test was run on 40 
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experienced pilots. In this experiment the pilots’ performed the task of calculating the 
time to altitude more than 200% faster and with significantly fewer errors using a 
display that was designed through the application of step-principles when compared to 
using a numerical presentation of information. 
9.6 Application and Limitation 
This thesis has shown how to apply the systematic interface design process. Within this 
thesis the outcome of the systematic interface design process, the Mind-Reference 
frameworks step-principles, have been validated through the experiment with 
professional pilots. As part of future work it may be helpful to validate the systematic 
interface design process as a whole. However, it is argued that design method validation 
needs to be conducted using participation of professional design engineers, therefore to 
gather this data requires a considerable amount of time and expense, and is out of scope 
of this research.   
One limitation of this systematic interface design process is that it requires a 
considerable amount of time. However, there is a benefit in understanding operators’ 
information requirement prior to design and providing information to the designer on 
cognitively efficient information presentation solutions. It can be cost effective to ‘get it 
right the first time’, and not to involve the operator too late in the design process, as is 
still done in the industry, when it is too late and too costly to implement recommended 
changes.   
The advantage of the systematic interface design process is that it can be extended to 
understand operator information demands in most time and safety critical domains. For 
example NASA Ames (Johnson, W., Lee, P. U., & Battiste, V. Personal 
communication, 19-20 May 2005, Moffett Field, CA) are considering applying it to 
study Air Traffic Controllers and spacecraft operators’ information demands.  
The advantage, and at the same time a limitation, of one of the steps of this process, is 
that the use of a head-mounted camera on the operator for a cued-recall-debrief method 
does not require the researcher to be in the same location, as it can be either dangerous 
for an inexperienced person to be in that environment, or the presence of the researcher 
can affect the safety of the system. This method allows the researcher to study 
previously inaccessible domains, for example during military type operations. 
However, the meaning-rich information presentation solutions the designer, or 
researcher, can achieve using the Mind Reference framework in design of new displays 
and interfaces may be either excessively demanding for a commercial-of-the-shelf 
equipment developer, or not readily acceptable to the industry as it does not represent an 
incremental advance on current technology.  
Also, it must be noted that, especially in an aerospace domain, ‘design does not operate 
in a void’. Government and industry standards regulate the degree of novelty in safety-
critical domains. However, the potential benefits of efficient and accurate operator 
performance using complex displays and interfaces may increase overall safety and 
become the standard to follow.    
Solodilova-Whiteley  Chapter 9: Conclusions 
  
249
9.7 Future Work 
The Mind Reference framework can serve two further purposes. Firstly, it can show the 
information levels at which pilots’ have problems, thus aiding the evaluation of 
interfaces to identify potential information problem areas. Secondly, during interface 
design and evaluation, it can direct the designer’s attention to possible solutions for 
issues related to information presentation and structure. Initial work on the use of the 
Mind Reference Framework as an evaluation tool has already begun (Solodilova, 
Lintern, and Johnson, 2005). 
Another area for exploration is the design and evaluation of an integrated information-
space in a whole cockpit with the use of the Mind Reference framework. The 
monitoring display described in chapter seven has attracted the attention of C130J 
Hercules pilots (Deen, G. Personal communications, 18-21 April, 2005 and 14-17 April, 
2003). They would like to see this display being used prior to and during the flight crew 
briefing, and also presented throughout the flight to maintain a shared understanding of 
the flight progress.  
Lastly, during the experiment reported in chapter eight, it was observed that pilots’ 
performance significantly improved between the first and last task on the display, which 
was designed through the application of the Mind Reference step-principles. Further 
research may provide an insight on whether the displays designed using this framework 
make operators training less time consuming. 
  
 
 
251
References 
Pan American World Airways Inc. (1990). Flight Check, 68 (32). 
Ansett Australia A320 Flight Crew Opearting Manual: FMGS Pilot's Guide. (2000). Vol. 4. 
Melbourne: Flight Operation Department. 
A319/A320/A321 Flight Crew Operating Manual.  (2000)System Description 1.  Revision 
30.  Ansett Australia. 
Administration, F. A. (1996). Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors Team 
Report on: The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems. 
Washington, DC: FAA. 
Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia. (1996). AA965 Cali Accident Report, Near 
Buga, Colombia, Dec 20, 1995. : Retrieved August, 20, 2003 from http://www.rvs.uni-
bielefeld.de/ publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/Cali/calirep.html 
Aeronautica Civil. Controlled Flight Into Terrain, American Airlines Flight 965, Boeing 
757-223, N651AA, Near Cali, Colombia (1996), December 20, 1995. Technical report, The 
Republic of Colombia, Santafe de Bogota, D.C., Colombia. 
Airbus Industrie. (1996). FMGS Integration of Autopilot, Flight Director and Autothrust: 
Mode Logics and Mode Reversions. Blagnac Cedec: Press Department. 
Airbus Industrie. (1997). A320 Flight Crew Courseware Demonstration [CD-ROM]. 
Blagnac Cedex, France: Airbus Industrie. 
Airbus Industrie. (1998). A319/A320/A321 Flight deck and systems briefing for pilots. 
Blagnac Cedec: Airbus Indistrie. 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport Japan (1996). China 
Airlines Airbus Industrie A300B4-622R, B1816 Nagoya Airport April 26, 1994. Tokyo: 
Ministry of Transport. 
Alternate Taxonomy of Flightdeck Automation Problems and Concerns (n.d.). Retrieved 3 
October 2005 from http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/phase1/phase1alttaxonomy.aspx  
Amalberti, R. R. (1997). When Human Errors Serve Safety Goals. (Vol. 3). 
Amalberti, R. R. (1999). Automation in Aviation: A Human Factors Perspective. In D. J. 
Garland & J. A. Wise & V. D. Hopkin (Eds.), Handbook of Aviation Human Factors (pp. 
173-192). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Amelink, M. H. J., van Paassen, M. M., & Mulder, M. (2003). Total energy-based 
perspective flight path display for aircraft guidance along complex approach trajectories. 
Paper presented at the The 12th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, 
OH,  
Ansett Australia. (1997). A320 Flight Crew Operating Manual. 
Aviation for Women: The Facts. (2004). Aviation for Women Magazine. Retrieved May, 
10, 2005 from URL:http://www.wai.org/resources/facts.cfm.  
 
252
Bainbridge (1999). In D. J. Garland & J. A. Wise & V. D. Hopkin (Eds.), Handbook of 
Aviation Human Factors (pp. 173-192). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Baxter, P. (1998). Old way/new way: Problems and strategies in behavioural training. 
Presented at the September meeting of the Human Factors Group of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society, London, UK. 
Bendy, G. Z., Seglin, M. H., & Meister, D. (2000). Activity Theory: history, research and 
application. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 1(2), 168-206. 
Billings, C. E. (1993). Cognitive systems in context. Columbus, OH, Cognitive Systems 
Engineering Laboratory Paper. 
Billings, C. E. (1997). Aviation Automation: The search for a Human-Centered Approach. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Birmingham, H. P. F. & V. Taylor (1954). A human engineering approach to the design of 
he man-operated continuous control systems. Washington, DC, U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory. 
Bluecoat (2004). Retrieved May, 1, 2004 from web address www.bluecoat.org 
Bogatyreva, O., & Shillerov, A. (1998). Social Synergetics. Novosibirsc. 
Boorman, D. J., & Mumaw, R. J. (2004). A New Autoflight/FMS Interface: Guiding 
Design Principles. Paper presented at the Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, 
Toulouse, France,  
Bureau Enquetes Accidents (1992). Rapport De La Commission D'enquête Sur L'accident 
Survenu Le 20 Janvier 1992 Près Du Mont Sainte-Odile (Bas Rhin) À L'airbus A 320 
Immatriculé F-GGED Exploité Par La Compagnie Air Inter, Strasbourg. 
Cantor D, Andreassen C, Waters H. (1985). Organization in visual episodic memory: 
Relationships between verbalised knowledge, strategy use, and performance. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 40, 218-232. 
Cooke, N. J. (1994). Varieties of knowledge elicitation techniques. International Journal of 
Human-Computer Studies, 41, 801-849. 
Degani, A. (2004). Taming HAL: Designing interfaces beyond 2001. New York: St. 
Martin's Press/Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Degani, A., Shafto, M., & Kirlik, A. (1999). Modes in Human-Machine Systems: 
Constructs, representation, and classification. International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 9(2), 125-138. 
Degani, A., Shafto, M., Kirlik, (1996). Modes In Automated Cockpits: Problems, Data 
Analysis And A Modeling Framework, Proceedings Of The 36th Israel Annual Conference 
On Aerospace Sciences. Retrieved July, 5, 2004: http://human-
factors.arc.nasa.gov/IHpublications/ degani/modeusage/modes2.html 
Degani, Shafto, & Kirlik. (1999). Comment on “automation surprises when pilots have 
difficulty understanding the current status of the automatic system as well as the 
consequences of the interaction with it. International Journal of Aviation Psychology 9(2), 
125-138  
 
253
Dekker, S., & Woods, D. D. (1999). Automation and its impact on human cognition. In S. 
Dekker & E. Hollnagel (Eds.), Coping with Computers in the Cockpit (pp. 7-27). 
Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Demagalski, J.,  Harris D., Salmon, P., Stanton, N., Marshall, A., Waldmann, T. & Dekker, 
S. (2002). Design Induced Errors on the Modern Flight Deck During Approach and 
Landing. In (eds), Proceedings of HCI-AERO’2002, October 23-25, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, USA. 
Diaper, D. (Ed.) (1989). Knowledge Elicitation: Principles, Techniques, and 
Applications. England: Ellis Horwood Limited. 
Diaper, D., & Stanton, N. (2004). The Handbook of Task Analysis for Human-Computer 
Interaction. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dinadis, N., & Vicente, K. J. (2000). Designing functional visualizations for aircraft system 
status displays. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology. 
Eldredge, D., Mangold, S., & Dodd, R. S. (1992). A Review and Discussion of Flight 
Management System Incidents Reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (Final 
Report DOT/FAA/RD-92/2). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 
Aviation Administration. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995). "Towards a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems." 
Human Factors 37, 85-104. 
Endsley, M. R. (1999). Situational Awareness in Aviation Systems. In: Handbook of 
Aviation Human Factors.  Edited by Garland, Daniel J., Wise, John A., & Hopkin V. 
David. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London. 
Federal Aviation Authority (1999). Advisory Circular: Installation of Electronic Display 
Instrument Systems in Part 23 Airplanes. USA: US Department of Transportation. 
 Feary, M., Barshi, I., Sherry, L., & Alkin, M. (1999, May 3-6). "Why is it Doing That?" 
Two Perspectives of an Autoflight System. Paper presented at the Tenth International 
Aviation Psychology Symposium Conference, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH,  
Federal Aviation Authority (1996). Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors Team 
Report on: The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems. 
Washington, DC: FAA. 
Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport of France. (1989). Final report 
concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to 
the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC: Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs. 
Funk, K., Lyall, B., Wilson, J., Vint, R., Niemczyk, M., Suroteguh, C., & Owen, G. (1998). 
Flight Deck Automation Issues. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, (Special 
Issue on Aircraft Automation). 
Gagne, R. M. (1962). Psychological principles in systems development. New York, Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Garland, D. J., Wise, J. A., & Hopkin, V. D. (Eds.). (1999). Handbook of Aviation Human 
Factors. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
254
Gibson, J. (1979). Ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 
Grudin, J. (1992). Consistency, Standards, and Formal Approaches to Interface 
Development and Evaluation: A Note on Wiecha, Bennett, Boies, Gould, and Greene. 
ACM Transactions on Information Systems 10(1), pp.103-111. 
Grudin, J. (1989). The Case Against User Interface Consistency. Communications of the 
ACM 32(10), pp. 1164-1173. 
Helander, M. G., Landauer, T. K., & Prabhu, P. V. (Eds.). (1997). Handbook of Human-
Computer Interaction (2 ed.). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Heymann, M., & Degani, A. (2002). Constructing Human-Automation Interfaces: A 
Formal Approach. Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Computer 
Interaction in Aeronautics, 23-25 October 2002, (pp. 119-124), Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Higgleton, E. and M. Thomson (2000). Chambers Compact Dictionary. Edinburgh, 
Chambers Harrap Publishers. 
Holder, B., & Hutchins, E. (2001). What pilots learn about autoflight while flying on the 
line. Paper presented at the The 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
March 5-8 2001, Columbus, OH. 
Hollnagel, E. (1993). Reliability of cognition: Foundations of human reliability analysis. 
London: Academic Press Inc. 
Howard, M. (1999). Visualising automation behaviour. In S. Dekker & E. Hollnagel (Eds.), 
Coping with Computers in the Cockpit (pp. 55-67). Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing 
Company. 
Human Interface Design Methodology for Integrated Display Symbology. (SAE ARP-
4155)(1995). 
Hutchins, E. (1995). How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds. Cognitive Science (19), 265-
288. 
Hutchins, E. (1996). Integrated Mode Management Interface (NASA-CR-202220). San 
Diego, La Jolla: California University. 
Hutchins, E. (2000). The cognitive consequences of patterns of information flow. 
Intellectica, 1(30), 53-74. 
Hutchins, E. (2004). Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends. Journal of Pragmatics (in 
press). 
Hutchins, E., & Holder, B. (2000.). Conceptual Models for Understanding an Encounter 
with a Mountain Wave. Paper presented at the HCI-Aero 2000, Toulouse, France.  
Hutchins, E., Holder, B., Hayward, M. (1999). Pilot Attitudes Towards Automation. 
Retrieved November, 20, 2003 from: http://hci.ucsd.edu/hutchins/attitudes/attitudes.pdf. 
2004. 
Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport of France (1989). Final report 
concerning the accident which occurred on June 26th 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim (68) to 
the Airbus A 320, registered F-GFKC, Ministry of Planning, Housing, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs. 
 
255
Johnson, C. W. (2003). The Failure of Safety-Critical Systems: A Handbook of Accident 
and Incident Reporting. Glasgow: Glasgow University Press. 
Johnson, C. W. (2004). Workshop on Complexity in design, 16-17 September 2004, Bath, 
UK.  
Johnson, C. W., & Holloway, C. M. (2004). On the Over-Emphasis of Human 'Error' As A 
Cause of Aviation Accidents: 'Systemic Failures' and 'Human Error' in US NTSB and 
Canadian TSB Aviation Reports. Retrieved December, 22, 2004 from: 
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/publications. 
Johnson, E. N., & Pritchett, A. R. (1995). Experimental Study of Vertical Flight Path Mode 
Awareness.  Proceedings of the Sixth IFAC/IFIP/IFORS/IAE. Symposium on Analysis, 
Design and Evaluation of Man-Machine Systems. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Johnson, P., Johnson, H., & Hamilton, F. (2000). Getting The Knowledge Into HCI: 
Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Task Knowledge Structures. Cognitive Task Analysis. 
Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 201-214. 
Johnson, W., Lee, P. U., & Battiste, V. (2005). Use of Modified Cued-Recall-Debrief 
method to study Air Traffic Controler Information Requirements. Moffett Field, CA. 
Kearns, J. H. (1982). A system approach for crew station design and evaluation (AFWAL-
TR-81-3175). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Flight Dynamics Laboratory. 
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Macgregor, D. (1989). Critical Decision Method for Eliciting 
Knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 19(3), 462-472. 
Klein, G. (2004). Cognitive Work Analysis, Cognitive Engineering Webconference. 
Internet broadcasted from Dayton. 
Klein, G. (2004). The Power of Intuition. Currency Books, NY.  
Kugler, P. (2005). Presented at the Cognitive System Engineering Day. 4 October 2005, 
Dayton, Ohio. 
Kuhl, J. (1985). Volitional mediators of cognition-behavior consistency: Self-regulatory 
processes and action versus state orientation. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman (Eds.), Action 
Control: From Cognition to Behavior (pp. 101-128). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2003). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Larish, J. F. and J. M. Flach (1990). Sources of optical information useful for perception of 
speed of rectilinear self-motion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance 16, 295-302. 
Lintern, G. (1995). Flight Instruction: The Challenge From Situated Cognition. The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5(4), 327-350. 
Lintern, G. & Naikar, N. (1999). Specification of Training Simulators by Cognitive Work 
Analysis. Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium in Aviation Psychology. [CD-
ROM]. 
Lintern, G., Waite, T., & Talleur, D. A. (1999). Functional Interface Design. The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 225-240. 
 
256
Lintern, G. (2000). An Affordance-Based Perspective on Human-Machine Interface 
Design. Ecological Psychology, 12(1), 65-69 
Lintern, G. (submitted in 2004). A Virtual Information-Action Workspace for Military 
Intelligence Planning. The International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics. 
Lintern, G., Roscoe, S. N., & Sivier, J. L. (1990). Display principles, control dynamics, and 
environmental factors in pilot training and transfer. Human Factors, 32, 229-318. 
Long, J., & Dowell, J. (1989). Conceptions of the Discipline of HCI: Craft, Applied 
Science and Engineering. In: Proceedings of the HCI'89, People and Computers. 
Cambridge University Press, September 5-8 1989, pp. 9-3. 
Lyall, B. (1998). Autoflight Mode Awareness Issues: An Overview, FAA Mode Awareness 
Workshop. Seattle. 
Lyall, B., & Funk, K. (1998, March 25-28, 1998). Flight Deck Automation Issues. Paper 
presented at the The Third Conference on Automation Technology and Human 
Performance, Norfolk, VA, pp. 288-292. 
Martin-Emerson, R., & Wickens, C. D. (1997). Superimposition, Symbology, Visual 
Attention, and Head-Up Display. Human Factors, 39(4), 581-601. 
McDougall, S., & Curry, M. (2004, 16-17 September 2004). More than just a picture: Icon 
interpretation in context. Paper presented at the Coping with Complexity: Sharing New 
Approaches for the Design of Human-Computer Systems in Complex Settings, Bath, UK, 
pp. 72-80. 
McLennan, J., Omodei, M., M., & Wearing, A. (2000, 5-8 June). Cognitive Processes of 
First-on-Scene Fire Officers in Command at Emergency Incidents as an Analogue of Small-
Unit Command in Peace Support Operations. Paper presented at the 2nd International 
Workshop on The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations, Breda, The 
Netherlands. 
McLennan, J., Omodei, M. M., & Wearing, A. J. (1996). A new methodology for 
naturalistic decision research: Investigating fire officers' decisions. Paper presented at the 
Judgment and Decision Making Society Annual Meeting, Chicago, USA.  
McLennan J, Omodei M, Rich D.(1997).Using a head-mounting video camera system and 
two-stage debriefing procedure: A new approach to advances skills training in industry. 
Swinburne University of Technology Institute of Social Research, Melbourne, Australia.  
McLennan, J., Omodei, M. M., & Wearing, A. J. (1996). A new methodology for 
naturalistic decision research: Investigating fire officers' decisions. Paper presented at the 
Judgment and Decision Making Society Annual Meeting, November, 1996, Chicago, USA. 
McLeod, P. (1976). Control strategies of novice and experienced controllers with a slow 
response system (a zero-energy nuclear reactor). In Monitoring behavior and supervisory 
control. T. Sheridan and G. Johannsen. New York, Plenum. 
Ministry of Civil Aviation - India (1990). Report on Accident to Indian Airlines Airbus A-
320 Aircraft VT-EPN at Bangalore, February 14, 1990. Ministry of Civil Aviation, 
Government of India. 
 
257
Naikar, N., & Pearce, B. (2001). Analyzing activity for new, complex systems with 
cognitive work analysis. Paper presented at the The 37th Annual Conference of the 
Ergonomics Society of Australia, Sydney, Australia, 
Naikar, N., Drumm, D., Pearce, B. & Sanderson, P.M. (2002). A formative approach to 
designing reams for first-of-a-kind, complex systems. Proceedings of the 21st European 
Conference in Human Decision Making and Control, (pp.162-168.) 
Neisser U. Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implication of the Cognitive Psychology. 
San Francisco: Freeman, 1976. 
Newman, R. L., & Greeley, K. W. (2001). Cockpit Displays: Test and Evaluation. 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Newman, R. L., & Greeley, K. W. (2001). A Review of Cockpit Design Guidlines, Cockpit 
Displays: Test and Evaluation. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Norman, D. (1988). The Design of Everyday Things, Doubleday, New York. 
Norman, D. A. (1986). Cognitive Engineering, in User Centred Systems Design. In D. A. 
Norman & S. W. Draper (Eds.), New Perspective on Human-Computer Interaction (pp. 31-
61). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
O’Neill, E. J. (1998). User-developer cooperation in software development: building 
common ground and usable systems. Computes Science. London, Queen Mary and 
Westfield College, University of London: 387.  
Omodei, M., Wearing, A., & McLennan, J. (1997). Head-mounted video recording: A 
methodology for studying naturalistic decision making. In R. Flin & E. Salas & M. Strub & 
L. Martin (Eds.), Decision Making Under Stress: Emerging Themes and Applications (pp. 
137-146). Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Omodei, M., Wearing, A., & McLennan, J. (1998). Integrating Field Observation and 
Computer Simulation to Analyse Command Behaviour. Paper presented at the NATO RTO 
Workshop on The Human in Command, June 1998, Kingston, Canada. 
Orasanu, J., & Fischer, U. (1997). Finding Decisions In Natural Environments: The View 
From the Cockpit. In C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic Decision Making 
Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Orasanu, J., Fischer, U., McDonnell, L., Davison, J., Haars, K., Villeda, E., & Aken, C. V. 
(1998). How Do Flight Crews Detect and Prevent Errors Findings from a Flight 
Simulation Study. Paper presented at the Forty-first Annual Conference of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomic Society, Chicago, Illinois. 
Owen, G., & Funk, K. (1997). Flight Deck Automation Issues: Incident Report Analysis. 
Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University, Department of Industrial and Manufacturing 
Engineering. Retrieved December17, 2004 from: 
http://www.flightdeckautomation.com/incidentstudy/incident-analysis.aspx. 
Palmer, E., (1995). “Oops It Didn’t Arm”, A Case Study Of Two Automation Surprises, 
Proceedings of The Eighth International Symposium On Aviation Psychology. Retrieved 
December, 1, 2003 from URL: http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/ 
ihi/papers/publications/palmer/OSU95_Oops/ PalmerOops.html. 
 
258
Palmer, M. T., Rogers, W. H., Press, H. N., Latorella, K. A., & Abott, T. S. (1995). A 
Crew-Centered Flight Deck Design Philosophy for High Speed Civil Transport Aircraft 
(TM-109171): NASA. 
Pinker, S. (2003). How the Mind Works. Middlesex, England, Penguin Press. 
Potter, S. S., Roth, E. M., Woods, D. D., & Elm, W. C. (2000). Bootstrapping multiple 
converging cognitive task analysis techniques for system design. In J. Schraagen, M. & S. 
Chipman, F & V. Shalin, L. (Eds.), Cognitive Task Analysis (pp. 317-340). Mahwah, Nee 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Preece, J., Rogers, Y., & Sharp, H. (2002). Interaction Design, Beyond Human Computer 
Interaction. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Rasmussen, J. (1988). Information processing and human-machine interaction: An 
approach to cognitive engineering. New York, North Holland. 
Rasmussen, J. (1999). Ecological interface design for reliable human machine systems. 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9, 203-223. 
Rasmussen, J., Pejtersen, A. M., & Goodstein, L. P. (1994). Cognitive systems engineering. 
New York, John Wiley. 
Reason, J. T. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Reising, J. M., Liggett, K. K., & Munns, R. C. (1999). Controls, Displays and Workplace 
Design. In D. J. Garland & J. A. Wise & V. D. Hopkin (Eds.), Handbook of Aviation 
Human Factors (pp. 327-354). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Roscoe, S. N. (1968). Airborne displays for flight and navigation. Human Factors, 10, 321-
332. 
Roscoe, S. N., Corl, L., & Jensen, R. S. (1981). Flight display dynamics revisited. Human 
Factors 23, 341-353. 
Rubin, J. (1994). Handbook of Usability Testing: How to Plan, Design, and Conduct  
Effective Tests. John Wiley & Sons. 
Runkel, P. J. & McGrath, J. E. (1972). Research on human behavior: A systematic guide to 
method. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Sarter, N. B., & Amalberti, R. R. (Eds.). (2000). Cognitive Engineering in the Aviation 
Domain. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation. I. 
Operational experience with the Flight Management System. The International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology, 2, 303-321. 
Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1994). Pilot Interaction with cockpit Automation II: An 
Experimental Study of Pilots' Model and Awareness of the Flight Management System. The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(1), 1-28. 
Sarter, N., and Woods, D. (1995a). How in the world did we get into that mode? Mode 
error and awareness in supervisory control. Human Factors, 37 (1), 5-19. 
Sarter, N. B., & Woods, D. D. (1995b). Strong, Silent, and Out-of-the-loop: Properties of 
Advanced (Cockpit) Automation and Their Impact on Human-Automation Interaction 
(CSEL Report 85-TR-01). 
 
259
Sarter, N. B. &. Woods D. D (1997). "Team Play with a Powerful and Independent Agent: 
Operational Experiences and Automation Surprises on the Airbus A-320. Human Factors 
39(4), 553-569. 
Sarter, N. B., Woods, D. D. (2000). Team Play with a Powerful and Independent Agent: A 
Full-Mission Simulation Study. Human Factors , 42(3), 390-402. 
Shneiderman, B. (1987). Designing the user interface. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
Singer, G. (2002). Methods for Validating Cockpit Design: The best tool for the task. Royal 
Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Singer, G., & Persson, U. (1996). Fly-by-Wire for the SAAB 2000 - Concept, 
Development, and Testing. Paper presented at the 20th ICAS Congress, Sorrento, Italy. 
Solodilova, I., Lintern, G., Johnson. (2003). The Modern Commercial Cockpit As a Multi-
Dimensional, Information-Action Workspace. The 12th International Symposium on 
Aviation Psychology, Dayton, OH, USA. 
Solodilova I, Johnson P. ‘Mind References’ in the Glass Cockpit: An Experimental Study. 
(2004). In: Proc International Conf on Human Computer Interaction in Aeronautics (HCI-
Aero 2004). Toulouse, France. 
Solodilova, I., Lintern, G., & Johnson, P. (2005). A Mind-Reference Framework for Design 
and Evaluation of Intuitive and Natural Interfaces. Paper presented at the The 13th 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 18-21 April 2005, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, USA.  
Stokes, A. F. and C. D. Wickens (1988). Aviation Displays. Human Factors in Aviation. E. 
L. Wiener and D. C. Nagel, Academic Press Inc. 
Storey, B. A., Rountree, M. E., Kulwicki, P. V., & Cohen, J. B. (1994). Development of a 
Process for Cockpit Design. Paper presented at the National Aerospace Electronics 
Conference, (pp. 688-695), Dayton, OH. 
Tarnowski, E. (1999). Airbus Cockpit Philosophy. Toulouse: Experimental Test Pilot, 
Airbus Industrie. 
Still, D. O., & Temme, L. A. (2001). Oz: A Human-Centered Computing Cockpit Display. 
Report, Institute for Human and Machine Cognition, Pensacola, FL. 
Trujillo, A. (1996). Airline Transport Pilot Preferences for Predictive Information. (NASA 
TM-4702). 
Trujillo, A. C. (1997). Pilot Performance With Predictive System Status Information. Paper 
presented at the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, October 
12-15 1997, (pp. 1972-1977). Orlando, Florida.  
Trujillo, A. C. (2001). Response Times in Correcting Non-Normal System Events When 
Collocating Status, Alerts and Procedures, and Controls. Paper presented at the IEE 
Conference on People in Control, June 18-21 2001, Manchester, United Kingdom.  
Vicente, K. J. (1999). Cognitive Work Analysis: Towards Safe, Productive, and Healthy 
Computer-Based Work. Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
260
Wadsworth, Y. (1998). What is Participatory Action Research? Action Research 
International. 1-18. Retrieved, March 7, 2005 from www.scu.edu.au/schools/ar/ari/p-
ywarsworth98.html. 
Walmsley, M. (2000). Graphical Flight Mode Annunciator Display. Unpublished Master of 
Science, University of Bristol, Bristol. 
Wickens, C. D. (1986). The effects of control dynamics on performance. In Handbook of 
perception and performance. K. Boff, L. Kaufman and J. Thomas. New York, Wiley. 2: 
(pp. 39-60).  
Wickens, C. D., & Hollands, J. G. (2000). Engineering psychology and human 
performance (Third ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Wickens, C. D., Haskell, I., & Harte, K. (1989). Ergonomics design for perspective flight-
path displays. IEEE Control Systems Magazine 9 (4), 3-8. 
Wickens, C. D., Gempler, K., & Conejo, R. (1999). Unreliable automated attention cueing 
for air-ground targeting and traffic maneuvering. 43rd Annual Conference of Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, CA, Human Factors Society. 
Wiener, E. L. (1989). Human factors of advanced technology ("glass-cockpit") transport 
aircraft. Moffett Field, CA, NASA-Ames Research Center. 
Wiener, E. L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error, NASA 
Contractor Report NCA2-441.  
Wiener, E. L., & Curry, R. E. (1980). Flight-deck automation: Promises and problems 
(NASA Tech. Mem. 81206). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.  
Wilkins, R. R. (1995). Designing the conceptual flight deck for the short haul civil 
transport/civil tiltrotor (SAE Paper 951997). 
Woods, D. D. (1993). Cognitive systems in context. Columbus,OH: Cognitive Systems 
Engineering Laboratory Paper. 
Woods, D. D. (1994). Visualising Function: The Theory and Practice of Representation 
Design in the Computer Medium. Unpublished manuscript. Columbus OH: Cognitive 
Systems Engineering Laboratory, Ohio State University. 
Woods, D. D. (1995). Towards a Theoretical Base for Representation Design in the 
Computer Medium: Ecological Perception and Aiding Human Cognition. In J. Flach, M. & 
P. Hancock & J. Caird & K. J. Vicente (Eds.), Global Perspectives on the Ecology of 
Human-Machine Systems (pp. 157-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Woods, D. D., Johannesen, D., Cook, R., & Sarter, N. (1994). Behind Human Error. 
CSERIAC, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH. 
Woods, D. D., Wise, J., & Hanes, L. (1981). An Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plant Safety 
Parameter Display Systems. The 25th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society, Santa 
Monica, CA, Human Factors Society. Retrieved May, 9, 2003 from 
www.flightdeckautomation.com/phase1/phase1alttaxonomy.aspx. 
 261
Appendix 1 
Table 3.1: Based on 1st Debrief Transcript 
 
Attention Action Thought (or 
‘Striked me’) 
Plan 
 brakes come off   
  make sure the trim 
set 
 
 put my flaps down   
 I’m putting my throttle 
up to full thrust 
 to go down the 
runway 
focus on keeping 
down the centerline 
keeping the aircraft 
moving down the 
centerline 
  
watching my airspeed pushing the joystick 
forward 
 to keep the aircraft 
on the ground until 
my airspeed gets 
over 80 
 slowly easing joystick 
back 
  
 aircraft just lifted of the 
ground 
  
 starting to pull the 
joystick back 
  
to look at my artificial 
horizon 
   
building off to my left  to indicate my 
climb and my 
direction 
 
see where my 
compass is pointing 
  to make sure I’m 
traveling north 
   concentrating on 
climbing to 2000 
feet 
   where I’m going to 
do my bank to the 
east 
checking the altimeter    
building goes out of 
sight 
flaps have come up   
concentrating on 
altimeter 
   
keeping my direction 
North 
   
 262
 keeping the aircraft 
stable 
  
 slight rudder movement 
to keep myself facing 
north 
  
Checking the airspeed   between 60 and 80 
focusing back on the 
altimeter 
   
Occasionally doing 
scans of the visual 
horizon 
  looking at for 
anything that I 
might run into 
 I’m coming up towards 
2000 
 I want to continue 
climbing through 
the bank 
 I turn to the right and to 
face East 
 I’m want to going 
to keep my climb 
to lead to 3000 
 Trying to conduct a 
steady turn on the 2000 
  
  I have in fact ended 
up loose a bit of 
climb on the turn 
 
, having to make 
adjustments to that 
(lose of climb) 
   
focusing on the 
compass 
   
   make sure that I 
line up East 
 I over turned   
 so had to make minor 
adjustments… on the 
easterly setting 
  
focusing that I’ve got 
the same climb angle 
   
and focusing on my 
altimeter  
  keeping me going 
to the east 
the compass    
  need to check the 
clock 
 
   when I do my next 
turn at 3000 to go 
South 
   want to make sure 
that I travel south 
 263
for 3 min 
glancing across the 
clock 
   
   planning to level 
out at about 3000 
  I have a tendency 
to continue 
climbing when 
flying on the 
straight 
 
 I’ve started turning a 
little bit early 
  
focus on the clock   hopefully level out 
at 3000 
  During the bank 
actually lost a bit of 
altitude 
 
 made it to 3000 during 
the bank 
  
concentrating on the 
compass 
  to get my barring to 
the South 
 using both joystick & 
rudder to do the turn 
  
keeping an eye on the 
speed 
   
 I’m flying south   
 I’ve cut the engine back 
a bit 
 because I should be 
turning just over 
that … to the South 
of that building 
Not enough time has 
elapsed… 
  …Not enough time 
has elapsed for me 
to do to initiate that 
turn 
   I’ve started to think 
about my next 
maneuver when it 
gets to 3 min 
   which will be to 
shut the throttle off, 
put the nose down 
& dive to the west 
I see my altitude … 
3000 
   
  I’ve realized I’m  
 264
quite a bit further 
south 
  because I’m 
normally taking the 
throttle a little in 
prior to this 
 
   know my approach 
to the runway is 
going to be longer 
… 
   …so therefore my 
descent rate has to 
be less 
 pushed the throttle in   
 commenced the steep 
dive 
  
keeping an eye on the 
airspeed 
   
  I don’t want to stall 
in a dive 
 
my pitch/roll angle   I could descent to 
2000 
focusing also on the 
compass 
   
   I’ll line up on the 
west first 
focus on the altimeter  I can get to the 
west quicker than I 
can loose a 1000 
feet 
 
   I’m now starting to 
think about what 
type of throttle 
setting I’m going to 
need once I do my 
next thing to the 
north 
   I’m going to need 
quite a bit of 
throttle in to get all 
the way back to the 
runway 
  I come around to 
2000 feet 
 
checking my airspeed    
 265
checking it’s nice & 
high 
   
   . I’m about to do 
another steep bank 
to the right 
 I turned to the right   
   I’m going to start 
looking on the 
horizon for that 
runway 
I’m using the wind to 
give me an indication 
of what the speed 
   
There is the city & 
there is the runway 
   
  I haven’t got quite 
far enough west to 
line up with the 
runway 
 
 I’ve readjust the aircraft   
 I’m aiming off   
Checking my airspeed  I’m not losing too 
much altitude 
 
 Start putting the flaps 
down 
 right down (flaps) 
so that I can get 
maximum amount 
of lift 
  plane is handling 
like a cow, because 
my airspeed is still 
quite low 
 
  but I’m not going 
to stall 
 
 I put a bit more throttle 
on. 
  
  I’m also a long way 
out 
 
   I can’t do my 
normal approach 
landing from here. 
  reminding myself 
that the airfield is 
at 600 feet of sea 
level 
 
   So I’m not to look 
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for zero altitude 
when landing 
 Bring the aircraft round 
now 
I’m basically lined 
up with the strip 
 
my altitude and the 
airspeed 
 My major concern 
now is my altitude 
and the airspeed 
 
possible collision 
items 
   
can see that blimp up   deciding that there 
is no chance I’m 
going to run into 
that 
 I’m coming down   
  I’m realizing that 
I’m probably about 
200 feet below 
where I want to be 
 
   deciding when I 
should increase the 
throttle to get in 
there 
 increase the throttle   
  runway is so long I’m going to aim 
for the center of the 
runway 
   just land short on 
the runway 
 I’m doing my best to 
maintain very gradual 
descent 
  
 I line up on the runway   
 Rolling the aircraft 
from side to side to give 
me a bit more visibility 
  
visibility of the 
buildings & the 
runway 
  to judge my 
distance out 
  At this point I’m 
realizing that I’m 
definitely to low 
 
 increase the throttle   
Concentrating on 
lining up 
starting to pull the 
throttle back 
  
 I’m going rolling…   
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so that I can see the 
runway 
bringing across to the 
right 
  
 Lining up on the center   
looking at where the 
sea meets the sand 
  give me a good 
indication when 
I’m over the 
runway 
  definitely still too 
low 
 
looking at the 
altimeter 
 I’m not loosing 
much altitude 
 
 keeping as steady as I 
can 
  
 Trying to get back on to 
the glidepath. 
  
  Realizing that I’m 
not going to make 
it 
 
Looking out to the left    
  I’m still over water I expected that to 
be just coming over 
the sandy beach 
 Increase throttle a bit   
Altitude Just trying to maintain 
enough altitude 
  
 Drop on the front of the 
runway 
  
 Throttle off   
 Touch down   
 Put the brakes on   
   I try to keep the 
aircraft moving 
down the runway. 
 the aircraft moving 
down the runway. 
  
Attention  Action Thought (‘Striked 
me’) 
Plan 
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Table 3.2:  Analysis of Flight Stages based on the 1st Debrief Transcript  
 
Down the Runway Take Off Climb Climbing Turn Climb Climbing Turn to 
level out 
Level Off Slow down 
Brake come off Easing the joystick Concentrating on 
altimeter 
Approaching 2000 Focus on climb 
angle 
Turning Flying South Cut the engine, “I 
should be turning 
South” 
Trim set Pull back on the 
joystick 
Keeping direction Turn right (East) & 
climb to 3000 
Focus on altimeter Focus on the clock Taking note of time Checking the clock 
Flaps down Look at artificial 
horizon 
Keeping airplane 
stable  
Conducting steady 
turn 
Going East Climbing & banking Keeping South 
direction 
Think of next 
maneuver 
Throttle up Look outside for 
climb & direction 
Rudder movements 
for North direction 
Make adjustment in 
climb & turn 
Focus on compass Concentrating on 
compass 
Watching the clock Watch the altitude 
Keeping airplane 
centerline 
Look at compass, 
traveling North 
Check airspeed 
between 60 & 80 
Focus on compass “Check the clock on 
the next turn at 3000 
to travel 3 minutes.” 
Get barring South Look outside – 
navigation 
“I’m quite a bit 
further south” 
Watching airspeed 
for 80 
Climbing to 2000 Focus on altimeter Line up East Look at clock Use joystick & 
rudder to turn 
Checking height “know my approach 
is going to be 
longer…” 
Joystick forward “Where to bank to 
the East?” 
Look outside Minor adjustments 
to on East heading 
 Keep an eye on the 
speed 
Readjust, put the 
nose down, loose 
altitude 
“…so therefore my 
descent rate has to 
be less” 
 Check altimeter     See building  
 Look outside     Calculating how far 
I’m 
 
 Flaps up     I’ve been traveling 
faster than usual 
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Turning Descent Descent Turning 
Descent 
Final Approach Last adjustments 
before touch down 
Touch down Rolling down the 
runway 
Push the throttle back Focus on compass Turn right Aim on the runway Lining up Drop on front of the 
runway 
Keeping centerline 
Steep dive Line up on West Look outside for 
runway 
Check airspeed Throttle back a little Throttle off Braking  
Keep an eye on 
airspeed 
Focus on altimeter See the city & runway Loosing too much ALT Look outside Touch down  
“Don’t’ want to stall.” “what throttle setting I 
need to the north?” 
Adjustment on runway 
line up 
Flaps down Lining up on the center Brakes on  
My pitch & roll angle “need quite a bit of 
throttle” 
 Hard to maneuver the 
plane 
Look outside   
Descent to 2000 Checking height  “I’m not going to stall” Look at altimeter   
Focus on compass Checking airspeed  Put more throttle Keeping steady   
   “airfield is at 600 feet 
of sea level” 
Back on glidepath   
   I’m lined up Look outside   
   Check airspeed Increase throttle   
   Check altitude Check altitude   
   Look outside    
   “I’m low”    
   Increase throttle    
   Aim for center of 
runway 
   
   Maintain gradual 
descent 
   
   Lined up with runway    
   Rolling aircraft from 
side to side to look 
outside 
   
   Judge distance out    
   Increase throttle    
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Situation         Situation         Situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Present Action         Present Action         Present Action 
    Using…       Using…       Using… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Info required      Info required      Info required 
 
 
Future Action                    
         
 
 
        Future action         
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
- approaching 3000 
- leveled out early 
- commenced bank 
to the South 
- banking aircraft to 
the right 
- leveling out 
- scanning 
instrument panel 
& outside 
environment 
Timeline 
0:35.00 – 0.35.53 
- altitude 
- angle of bank 
- angle of attack 
- compass/ 
  direction 
- timer 
- landmarks 
- airspeed 
- leveled out 
- keeping the 
altitude 
- flying fast for 3 
min 
0:40.03 – 0;41.28
-  traveling south at 
3000 feet, slightly 
climbing 
- maintaining high 
speed 
- checking the timer 
- judging height in 
relation to airfield 
- reducing throttle 
- scanning instrument 
panel & outside 
environment for ref 
points 
- altitude 
- angle of bank 
- angle of attack 
- compass/direction 
- timer 
- airspeed vs. stall V 
- rate of descent 
- outside 
environment 
- landmarks/ 
   proximity to 
airfield 
- descent when 3 min 
is up i.e. point 
aircraft nose down 
- cut the engine off 
- turn to the west 
- loose altitude fast to 
2000 
- joystick 
- rudder  
  
  
- joystick 
- rudder 
- throttle 
0:46.37 – 0;48.20
- aircraft descending to 
2000 
- turning West 
- pushing aircraft’s 
nose down for slow 
descent  
- banking right 
- adjusting throttle 
- scanning instrument 
panel & outside  
environment  
- altitude 
- angle of bank 
- angle of attack 
- compass/ direction 
- airspeed vs. stall V 
- rate of descent 
- outside 
environment 
- airfield 
- flaps indication 
- joystick 
- rudder 
- throttle 
Future action 
- rolling out of the 
bank to the West 
- adjusting aircraft’s 
attitude 
- turn to the west 
- pulling nose up 
closer to 2000 
- starting another  90’ 
descending turn to 
the North 
- searching for airfield 
- dropping flaps at low 
airspeed 
Table 3.3: Continuous flight analysis   APPENDIX 1 
Modified info with 
respect to future action
Modified info with 
respect to future action
Modified info with 
respect to future action 
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ALT 
feet 
o 
2680 
3000 
Timeline 
SE 
E 
80 
80 
12:05 12:07 
4’ 
0’ 
Appendix 1  Figure 3.1: Example display   
Appendix 2
AircraftFeature AnalysedRole Change
Over-
confiden
ce
Under-
confidenc
e
Understanding Use Manual Skill Automation Awareness
Situation 
Awareness
Focus of 
Attention Workload
C130J pitch 
alert
4. IAS mode places FD in speed on 
pitch mode, i.e. speed is controlled by 
pitch, and is incompatible with A/T
PROBLEM:
(a) IAS came from old conventional 
aircraft and could be used in 
climb/descent and level flight, but here 
it can only be used in climb or descent 
and incompatible with level flight
(b )IAS is associated with control of 
speed, but here IAS mode is a vertical 
mode
(c) IAS, the speed related mode, is  
incompatible with A/T
SUBHEADING:
Pilot may over rely or underlay on 
automation due to poor 
understanding, poor interface 
design and automation logic and 
function presentation. Hence this 
category should be a higher 
category.
3. A/T modes have a table 16x16 on priority of modes
PROBLEM:
Poor way to present to pilots the logic priority of A/T 
modes (see A/T table for examples) i.e. as it appear 
from the table 'HOLD' modes have no priority, but 
ALT HOLD will disengage ALT SEL, VS, IAS and has 
a priority over PITCH HOLD
1. Pitch recovery - 
Chevron pairs ^^ indicated 
that the nose is high.
PROBLEM:
(a) Contradicting to FD 
philosophy 'Fly towards'
(b) Too similar to Chevron 
^ indicating that the nose 
is low
11. Representation of information in a different 
dimension than the rest of the display
PROBLEM:
PFD does not show graphically distance, it is 
done on NAV display. However this PFD has 
'CAPS distance tape' (see figure 18D2) showing 
how far behind or ahead of the target the aircraft 
is
C130J 16. CNI-MU have no clear logic in 
structure of pages and structure on the 
pages for pilots to follow
PROBLEM:
Pilots find it difficult to navigate through 
the CNI-MU pages
15. Mode change may not occur when supposed to
PROBLEM:
In any climb mode selected NAV or ALT mode may 
not capture course (NAV) or altitude (ALT) and go 
through present parameters if there is a deviation. 
The altitude will only be captured within 10% of the 
rate of climb and the course will be captured only 
within 5% of the target course. These information is 
not announced to the pilot 
27. Absence on the same 
information on similar 
displays
PROBLEM:
AGL information is only 
displayed on the HDD and 
not on the HUD
SOLUTION see note 27
12. Wrong association of information may occur
PROBLEM:
Speed Error Tape is located on the same side, 
left, as the  Airspeed Indicator, but CAPS 
Distance Tape is located on the side of the 
Altimeter and VVI. This allows for possibility of 
interpreting the CAPS Distance Tape as Altitude 
deviation instead of distance deviation  (see 
figure 18D2)
C130J 20. No clear guidance to show which AP or FD 
modes are engaged
PROBLEM:
It is the same annunciation on PFD and Reference 
Set/Mode Select panel; apart from alphanumerical 
annunciation on Mode Annunciation Panel
13. Information interpretation may be wrong
PROBLEM:
When the CAPS Distance Tape is below the 
Climb/Dive Marker the aircraft is ahead of its 
target and visa versa, however the Speed Error 
Tape indications are reverse if it is below the 
Climb/Dive Marker than the speed is behind or 
low of required speed and if above the speed is 
to high (see figure 18D2)
C130J 22. Automation modes are not traceable, observable 
or predictable at all times
PROBLEM:
This does not allow the pilot to be ahead of the plane, 
which is the basic rule pilots must follow to 
successfully fly any aircraft
SEE pc 45 (Sarter and Woods, in press p. 4)
C130J 25. Automation response or not response are not as 
expected
PROBLEM:
The pilot tried to engage the APPR too early, the 
NDB was not….??? and automation did not allowed 
that, but gave no feedback why
C130J 34. Automation logic is not clear
PROBLEM:
(a) During an ILS in APPR mode, there are courses 
back and front that can be captured on interception. 
There is no clear logic what determines when the 
aircraft intercepts and whether it should have 
intercepted the course already, and which course 
back or front it is going to take. None of the above 
information is announced and it can only be 
monitored by a pilot
(b) Some automation modes are mutually exclusive 
and can not be selected at the same time or will 
disengage other modes and have a priority over them
PILOT Centred Problems
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777 37. Logic discrepancy and too 
many conditions, 'ifs' to remember
PROBLEM:
If the speed is above 80 knots, if 
FD is on and if LNAV and VNAV 
are armed, pushing the TOGA 
switch would disarm the LVAN and 
VNAV. However pushing TOGA 
switch twice set the throttle at full 
thrust.
36. Automation logic is not clear
PROBLEM:
during take off if LNAV or VNAV modes are armed, 
the push of a TOGA switch will disarm LNAV and 
VNAV, leaving the pilot without the navigational data 
for automation to follow
50. Mode Annunciation on 
PFD is inadequate to 
reflect the automation 
mode change
PROBLEM:
Once mode is changed it 
flashes for 10 seconds in a 
new mode alphanumerical 
format. However if the pilot 
is busy with other tasks for 
the same amount of time 
that change can be missed
777 39. Automation use logic
PROBLEM:
APP button can not disconnect 
APP mode, if LOC and G/S 
engaged. The pilot first have to 
disconnect the FD and only then 
the APP button to disconnect the 
approach mode
47.  Mode annunciations may be misinterpreted
PROBLEM:
During a take off run the autothrotle can not be 
changed until the aircraft reaches 80 knots per hour. 
Then the autothrottle goes into HOLD mode 
announciated on PFD. It can be altered after this 
annunciation. However the word 'HOLD' may be 
misinterpreted as autothrottle is 'on hold' and can not 
be altered
777 49.  PFD mode annunciations may be misinterpreted
PROBLEM:
VNAV PTH - means that navigational information is 
taken from Flight Management Computer
VNAV ALT - means the navigational information is 
taken from Mode Control Panel
VNAV SPD - means that restrictions from Flight 
Management Computer are not accounted for
A320 56. The use philosophy for a Flight 
Director is 'to fly towards' the  Flight 
Director sign but other features of the 
same display are to used in a different 
way
PROBLEM:
The 'bouncing ball' on the speed tape 
indicates  that the speed is too high 
and needs to be reduced. However 
according to 'fly towards' philosophy 
that applies to other features in this 
display would indicate to pilot to 
increase speed instead of decreasing
22. Automation modes are not traceable, observable 
or predictable at all times
PROBLEM:
This does not allow the pilot to be ahead of the plane, 
which is the basic rule pilots must follow to 
successfully fly any aircraft
SEE pc 45 (Sarter and Woods, in press p. 4
62. ECAM display 
information is inconsistent
PROBLEM:
Related fuel information is 
located in different pages 
of the ECAM displays. 
'Fuel USED' is on a 
separate page from 'FOB'. 
61. Altitude tape scales are not the same
PROBLEM:
the Altitude and the Vertical speed tape are 
different in scale. 
A320 53. Mode will not engage if some data is not entered
PROBLEM:
During take off SRS mode will not engage if one of 
the reference speeds were not entered  into MCDU
87. Most of mode 
changes, especially mode 
reversions are vertical
PROBLEM:
However there is no 
vertical representation of 
changes on displays, apart 
from an altitude tape on 
the Primary Flight Display 
and altitude restriction on 
the NAV display 
A320 54. Mode annunciations do not reflect well the 
behaviour of automation
PROBLEM:
When the pitch modes control the speed it is not 
reflected in the alphanumerical name of the mode, for 
example CLB or EXP DES
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A320 68. Automation has a different strategy to the pilot
PROBLEM:
When the pilot would like to increase the rate of 
descent, the pilot would use speed breaks. In case of 
automation when Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle 
mode are engaged pilots are advised not to use 
speed breaks, because that would lead to an 
increase thrust, i.e. what pilot do not want
A320 69. Automation has a different strategy to the pilot
PROBLEM:
When the pilot would like to have a high rate of 
descent, the pilot would not select high speed on 
throttles as an option. However, the automation in 
order to have a high rate of descent requires a 
selection of high speed on autothrottle, and speed 
breaks.
A320 70. When some data is not entered into the systems 
prior take off the mode will not engage
PROBLEM:
The FLEX TO mode will not engage during take off if:
'In FLEX TO limit mode with levers in FLX TO/MCT 
detent provided a FLX temperature has been entered 
on Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (take off 
page).'
A320 71. Pilots have to rely on memory to remember 
conditions under which automation will or will not 
engage
PROBLEM:
If Flight Director is off the pilot can not have managed 
speed, only in APPR mode the pilot can have 
managed speed without the Flight Director.
A320 72. Automation has a different strategy to the pilot
PROBLEM:
During descent the pilot controls speed by pitch, but 
the automation controls speed by thrust
A320 73. Pilots have to rely on memory to remember 
conditions under which automation will or will not 
engage
PROBLEM:
To engage HDG/ TRK the pilot has to wait for 5 sec 
after lift off before engaging it, but HDG/TRK has to 
be preset before take off and up to 30 feet, otherwise 
NAV mode engages and at 30 feet RWY TRK will be 
announced
A320 74. Airbus automation philosophy states, 
'…automation system does not work against a pilot 
input.'
PROBLEM:
Mode reversions happen as a result of automation 
'disagree' with pilots' input (see Mode Reversion 
extract from the manual). One example is when the 
pilot enters a new altitude which is below or above 
during climb or descent respectively and automation 
rejects it and proceed in the direction  opposite to 
what the pilot selected
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A320 75. Although that FMGS mode logic says that mode 
'reversion does not modify the aircraft behaviour' 
(FMGS 1996, section 28), it actually does and it also 
changes aircraft state and conditions under which it 
operates
PROBLEM:
Conditions: Mode reversion due to change from NAV 
mode to HDG/TRK not only discard all speed and 
altitude restriction, but it also changes how it controls 
the speed. 
Behaviour and state: From original DES mode where 
the automation controlled speed by thrust, it is now in 
a V/S mode and controls speed by pitch 
A320 76. The annunciation of mode reversion is salient
PROBLEM:
Once the mode reversion occurs the new mode is 
announced to the pilot, flashing for 5 seconds. 
However if pilots were involved in other tasks, this 
might be missed
A320 77. Automation engagement implies a sequence, 
which might not be obvious to the pilot
PROBLEM:
The pilot must have some speed mode before 
activating the APPR mode, otherwise automation 
does not have a speed reference to fly the approach
A320 88. Automation behaviour may not be apparent
PROBLEM:
In TOGA mode, executing a go around and THR CLB 
mode is flashing, changing autothrotle will only bring 
it to idle or previous speed, which is the opposite to 
what the pilot wants, i.e., a full power on thrust.
??? WHAT TO DO TO AVOID THIS ???
Only when reached accelerated ALT.
A320 90. Rules to remember to avoid surprises
PROBLEM:
ATHR will not engage below 100 feet, if Flight 
Director and Autopilot is disengaged
A320 91. Automation may have misleading mode names
PROBLEM:
Speed Reference System (SRS) mode is actually 
uses a pitch guidance to maintain speed. Despite the 
fact that it has the word 'speed' in the name of the 
mode, it is a vertical mode (Airbus manual, Vol. 1, p. 
22-30-1) 
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Automation 
Levels Pilot/Automation Interface Standardization
Air Traffic 
Control Use Philosophy
description of intended function and limits instances when does this represent a does the feature is the feature active at is the representation to the pilot logical and clear.  consistency, etc.. n/a Automation USE PHILOSOPHY may be lacking
C130J 18. Automation does not warn the pilot about 
aircraft limitation
PROBLEM:
The aircraft is flown manually on descent with 
Autothrottle set to 170 knots. The aircraft is in 
a steep descent angle and gained speed to 
190 knots. Pilot has to remember to raise the 
noise of the aircraft to slow down to 168 
knots, which is a limit on landing gear down, in 
order to put the gear down
21. HEADING:
Hard to separate 
responsibility, 
function of where 
automation function 
ends and pilots' 
responsibility begins
PROBLEM:
see problem 19
2. FD modes  are oversimplified
PROBLEM: 
(a) FD modes both lateral and vertical 
are called APPR
(b) SEL mode is too ambiguous; it 
could apply to heading, altitude and 
speed for example, but here 
applicable to altitude
17. Automation permits 
to break aircraft 
limitation
PROBLEM:
It allows to overspeed 
with gear down
5. Button on the Ref/Set panel do not directly 
correspond to annunciation on Mode Annunciation 
Panel and PFD
PROBLEM:
SEL ON button on REF/SET Mode Panel vs. ALT 
SEL annunciation on PFD Example the selection is 
different to annunciation, hence difficult correspond 
one with another
C130J 33. Automation actions are not the same as 
pilots expect
PROBLEM:
On final approach the push of a go-around 
button does not engage throttle as the pilot 
would expect.
19. Did not set up mode properly
PROBLEM:
The aircraft shot through track at 
which the aircraft should have 
captured the direction of the next 
manoeuvre and the consecutive 
mode, NAV, did not engage
8. HUD presentation of speed and altitude in a ten-
doted-circle are exactly the same (see figure… 
HUD)
PROBLEM: Confusion happens when close to the 
ground and indications are the same, monitoring 
becomes confusing
6. Order of information annunciation differs, 
selection vs. annunciation
PROBLEM:
(a) on REF/SET Mode panel the order is in the 
1st raw ALT, SEL, HDG, NAV, APPR, 2nd raw 
VS, IAS, CAPS, A/T, vs. PFD instrument position 
order - 1st raw Speed, Artificial Horizon, Altitude, 
Vertical Speed, 2nd raw ILS data, Compass, 
TCAS and NAV data/source
(b) same REF/SET Mode Panel order (see 
above) vs. Mode Announciation Panel AP ON         
AP DSNG
PITCH OFF   LAT OFF
NAV ARM   NAV CAPT
GS ARM      GS CAPT
GO ARND   BACK LOC
CAT2 ARM CAT2
C130J 29. Too many ways  (a) to enter 
information; (b) to announce
PROBLEM:
(a) FD information displayed on 
- PFD-HUD,
- PFD-HDD, 
- Mode Annunciation Panel,
- NAV-RADAR display
(b) FD can be manipulated from 
- REF/SET mode panel
- Control Wheel button
- AFCS Control Panel 
- navigational inputs through AMU and 
CNI-MU
9. Selection and annunciation of automation mode 
are far apart
PROBLEM:
REF/SET Mode Panel is located away from Mode 
Annunciation Panel where selected modes are 
announced
7. Use of colour may have different meaning 
even on the same display
PROBLEM:
(a) PFD mode annunciation - 
YELLOW for OFF modes; WHITE - for ARM, AP, 
HDG, VS, IAS, GO ARND; 
GREEN - for CAPT, CAPS, CAT2. Then HDG, 
VS, IAS, GO ARND also should be green colour, 
because they are working modes, like CAPT 
modes
C130J 23. Mode Annunciation Panel design can be 
misunderstood (see Mode Annunciation Panel)
PROBLEM:
(a) there is no particular order to the arrangement 
of indications
(b) same colour used for different type of function 
annunciation, for example CAPT, DSNG, CAT2 are 
the same colour
(c) no consistency in location of similar function 
indication, for example DSNG and OFF switch 
14. 'Fly Towards' philosophy is not followed on 
the same display: see problems 11, 12 and 13
PROBLEM:
Most symbols in the center of the Flight Path 
Indicator (see figure 18D2) comply with FD, have 
a philosophy 'Fly Towards', for example G/S 
Deviation Indicator complies to Fly Towards 
philosophy. The Speed Error Tape, Acceleration 
Cue and CAPS Distance tape do not comply with 
it. For example if Speed Error Tape is below the 
Climb/Dive marker and pilot would fly down it 
would have an unwanted effect, the aircraft would 
increase speed. As for CAPS Distance Tape, if 
pilots would follow the tape the aircraft would 
deviate from the current altitude, but not have a 
required affect on distance.
C130J 24. Buttons on REF/SET mode panel do not 
always correspond to the announcement on the 
Mode Annunciation Panel and PFD
PROBLEM:
(a) select button NAV ON on REF/SET panel 
announces NAV ARM, but button APPR ON  on 
REF/SET panel announces GS ARM
(b) SEL NO button selects an ALT SEL mode on 
PFD
C130J 26. Information location differs on the similar data 
display
PROBLEM:
QNH data location varies between HUD and HDD
C130J 28. Same information presented on similar displays 
in a different format
PROBLEM:
(a) on HDD altitude and speed are presented in 
tape format, but on HUD it is in an analogue format
(b) on the HDD compass is presented in an 
analogue format, but on HUD it is in a tape format
Automation Centred Problems
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C130J 30. Same information located in a different place 
on a similar display
PROBLEM:
CDI information  is located in the bottom middle of 
the HUD and in the bottom left corner on PFD
C130J 31. Same information represented in different 
format and in a different location
PROBLEM:
Compass in a analogue format at the bottom of the 
PFD, but  on the HUD it is in a tape  format and at 
the top of the display
C130J 32. Poor placement of important data
PROBLEM:
QNH information is away from altitude information 
and DME information is away from the rest of 
navigational data
777 44. The information presented does not 
always present what the pilot expects
PROBLEM:
Pilots are not advised to follow FD cue at 
take off, because it is incorrect until the 
aircraft takes off
42. Automation has too many levels
PROBLEM:
Navigation Display contains different 
levels of information that contain 
various types of information. Some 
levels of information do not have and 
can not display some types of 
information. For example some 
navigational display mode do not 
display point to point route legs or 
holding patterns
40. In case of 
takeover from the 
automation into a 
manual operation the 
pilot might not be 
aware of all the 
actions that the 
automation is 
performing
PROBLEM:
In Autoland LAND3 
mode if the crosswind 
is present the runway 
alignment starts at 
500' to 200' radio 
altitude but the 
correction of 
crosswind is not 
annunciated to the pilot
35. Mode Control Panel layout
PROBLEM:
FLCH mode button is located under IAS 
indications, but it relates more to ALT indication, 
more to the right
777 45. The similar switch works differently on 
Mode Control Panel
PROBLEM:
The ALT has a switch that can be switched on 
auto or on 1000. The auto indication means 
the switch has a rate sensitive rotation. 
However the same auto switch on the bank 
indications means the bank is limited by the 
Autopilot and setting that was set by the same 
switch
43. TOGA switch has too many 
functions, too many conditions, where 
TOGA switch and the times it is 
pushed would have a different 
response
PROBLEM:
(a) if FD is off and the speed is above 
80 knots the push of TOGA switch will 
pop up the FD cues on PFD
(b) once airborne to cancel the thrust 
limit derate need to push TOGA switch
(c) in approach need to push TOGA 
switch to reenable ILS tuning
(d) second push on TOGA switch sets 
a full thrust. It contradicts the rest of 
the push button logic, generally 
pushing the button one would engages 
the corresponding action and the 
second push would cancel the action, 
but the second push of TOGA switch 
instead set the thrust to full
38. The layout of information on PFD is not 
consistent with the layout on  MCP
PROBLEM:
The instruments on the PFD are in the following 
order - Autothrottle, Heading, Altitude and Vertical 
Speed, but the order on MCP - Autothrottle, 
Heading, Vertical Speed and Altitude. The Vertical 
Speed and Altitude are in different order although 
the selection of data on MCP is reflected on PFD, 
hence would be better in the same order
777 46. The mode selection is not straight 
forward
PROBLEM:
To select CLB THR mode the pilot 
need to engage FLCH or push CLB 
CON
41. Not all selections are annunciated
PROBLEM:
Authrottle selected on MCP is annunciated on 
PFD, but the selection for example of LNAV and 
VNAV are annunciated on PFD
777 48. Same button has contradicting 
functions
PROBLEM:
Pushing the ALT switch on the Mode 
Control Panel executes the altitude 
entered, but the same button also 
deletes the altitude restrictions 
entered in Flight Management 
Computer 
51. Button labels are not consistent
PROBLEM:
Air Bleed overhead Panel has two rows of buttons. 
All buttons are divided into two parts and each part 
of the button is lit up with the current selection. The 
top raw had 'AUTO' lit up on the top part, the 
bottom raw however has 'ON' sign at the top on 
two buttons and one button had the 'AUTO' sign. 
Moreover all of the buttons have an 'OFF'  sign on 
the second part of the button. The problem is that 
the pilot can only see the lit up selection and can 
not see the other half and if the pilot would choose 
to follow the signs on the rest of the buttons, the 
pilot can mistake what he expects to see once the 
button is selected.
777 52. The mode selection is not straight 
forward
PROBLEM:
When APP button is pushed on Mode 
Selection Panel LOC and G/S modes 
are annunciated on the PFD
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A320 58. Misleading messages on MCDU
PROBLEM:
"Always wait 1 minute after the 'PLEASE 
WAIT' message disappears from the MCDU 
before engaging or re-engaging the FDs and 
the AP to the reset FMGS."
92. Similar buttons have contradicting 
functions
PROBLEM:
Flight Control Unit has similar buttons 
that set engage selected mode by 
pulling the knob and managed modes 
by pushing it. However by pushing the 
V/S and FPA knob also executes the 
level off and returns a value to zero.
5. Button on the glareshield FCU panel do directly 
correspond to annunciation on PFD
PROBLEM:
To select the desired mode pilot have to remember 
which combination of buttons adds to for example a 
THR CLB
64. Order of information presented differs on the 
same display
PROBLEM:
On the PFD the automation mode annunciation is 
in the following order:
Speed, Vertical and Lateral (heading) mode;
however instruments are in a slightly different 
order Speed, Heading/Attitude, Altitude and 
Vertical Speed. The mode places are switched 
otherwise would have the same order as the 
instruments.
A320 78. Systems tricks and 'ifs' to remember
PROBLEM:
'FMGS may display temporaty erroneous 
predictions that can affect various data such 
as ECON speed/MACH, optimum flight level, 
fuel or time predictions.
If erroneous predictions are observed:
On ground or in flight - re-enter the same cost 
index to restart a computation', but in 
brackets it says, (in descent or approach, a 
cost index changes does not restart the 
computation)
(a) how does a pilot supposed to trust the 
automation if such errors might occur
(b) how does the pilot identify an error, if 
he/she trusts the automation
(c) on top of the above problems, the pilot has 
to remember if there are other conditions 
under which such action will not fix the 
problem.
9. Selection and annunciation of automation mode 
are far apart
PROBLEM:
FCU is located away from PFD where modes 
selected on FCU are announced
65. Order of the same information presented 
differs in the cockpit
PROBLEM:
Flight Control Unit order is Speed, Heading, 
Altitude and Vertical Speed;
Primary Flight Display  mode order is Speed, 
Vertical and Lateral (heading) mode;
but it does not match the order of instruments 
Speed, Heading/Attitude, Altitude and Vertical 
Speed.
A320 83. Conjunctions of mode may have 
unexpected behaviour
PROBLEM:
'When expedite mode is engaged, the system 
disregards speed limits and speed constrains 
no matter what lateral is engaged.'
However when lateral mode, NAV, is engaged 
it supposed to account for speed limits and 
speed constrains
10. Engine indications on the ….. Displays are in 
unnatural order
PROBLEM:
On engines displays engine 2 is on the left and 
engine 1 is on the right, which is different to actual 
position. If facing forward in the cockpit, engine 1 
is on the left and engine 2 is on the right.
66. Same information does not have a consistent 
place
PROBLEM:
(a) Autopilot, Autothrottle and Flight Director 
initiation buttons are too far from each other on 
the Flight Control Unit to be related to each other. 
(b) Autothrottle is also away from the Speed 
selection.
(c) On the Primary Flight Display all these 
annunciations are clamped together  
A320 84. Limitation of the system
PROBLEM: 
'No step can be inserted in an alternative 
plan'. The alternative plan is the one that is 
likely to need alteration depending on the 
circumstances.
55. The Flight Director symbols can be 
misinterpreted
PROBLEM:
Flight Path Angle should not be used in climb, 
because the climb will be too low. It should be used 
to level off
A320 86. Limitations of mode use
PROBLEM:
ALT* can not be used on descent otherwise 
aircraft becomes locked until the altitude is 
captured and the mode can not be changed
??? 57. Entry in the MCDU is not straight forward
PROBLEM:
The speed data is entered under the vertical flight 
plan, but the speed restrictions are under the 
speed restrictions
A320 89. Automation behaviour may be unexpected 
PROBLEM: -AUTOMATION AWARENES?
In climb if ATHR is engaged will come back to 
approach speed, which will be to low, 
especially if this happens during a go-around
59. Inconsistency in information being displayed on 
MCP
PROBLEM:
When the managed mode is engaged the window 
with the numerical value is dashed and in the 
selected mode the actual value is displayed in the 
window. However the altitude value is always 
displayed, even if the managed (from the flight 
plan) mode of altitude is engaged. It can be 
particularly deceiving when mode reversions 
happen. In this case the pilot enters a new altitude, 
but the automation does not accept the new 
altitude and does not follow it. The altitude window 
however still displays the value that the aircraft is 
not following. 
A320 60. The managed mode information is not clearly 
annunciated and spread over the cockpit
PROBLEM:
When the managed (from the flight plan) mode is 
engaged the value is dashed in the relevant MCDU 
window. To find out what value the pilots has to 
find out from PFD or MCDU
A320 63. Symbology is not intuitive
PROBLEM:
The Non Directional Beacon symbol is a triangle, 
that looks like an arrow, but the beacon itself does 
not provide the direction.
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A320 67. Related controls are spread over the cockpit
PROBLEM:
Controls related to establishing an automated 
approach are located away from each other on the 
Flight Control Unit. The Flight Director (FD) and 
Instrument Landing System (ILS) buttons are away 
from Localiser (LOC) and Approach (APPR) 
buttons with AP and A/THR 
A320 79. Entry of data has rules
PROBLEM:
Direction/velocity must be entered simultaneously. 
The previous entry will be completely overwritten 
even if the pilot enters only one data point
A320 80. Trick to bring up specific pages of Multipurpose 
Control and Display Unit
PROBLEM:
To activate the secondary plan the pilot has to 
switch to HDG mode from NAV mode in order to 
have a prompt to activate the secondary plan
A320 81. Discrepancy in proposed logic
PROBLEM:
During a go around operation 'Whenever LOC*, 
LOC, LAND, FINAL or GA modes are engaged, the 
HDG present is available. If the pilot rotates the 
HDG/TRK knob to set the value, it will remain 
displayed in the window'. However, according to 
philosophy when managed modes are engaged the 
HDG/TRK will remain dashed and the new selected 
value will only be displayed for 5 sec and then 
disappear.
A320 82. Different buttons engage the same mode
PROBLEM:
'The pilot pushes the 'APPR' pushbutton on the 
Flight Control Unit to arm or engage the localizer 
and glide slope or 'FINAL APP', depending upon 
that approach type he had inserted in the flight 
plan.
The 'LOC' pushbutton arms or engages only the 
localizer mode.' (Airbus manual Vol. 1, p 22-30-1)
APPR pushbutton 'arms, disarms, or disengages 
the approach modes:
LOC and G/S modes if an ILS approach is selected 
in the active F-PLN.
APP NAV-FINAL modes if a non precision 
approach is selected in the active F-PLN.'
A320 85. Information does not have a constant location 
and the pilot is required to remember the location 
of required information 
PROBLEM:
'No predictions are displayed for the selected 
alternative on flight plan pages, but the pilot can 
read ALTN trip fuel and time on the INIT B page 
before engine start, and estimated time and 
estimated fuel on board at alternative on the FUEL 
PRED page after engine start.' (Airbus manual Vol. 
1, p 22-20-27)
A320 93. Hard to differentiate which mode has a priority
PROBLEM:
Currently there is not indications which mode has a 
priority, for example how can the pilot identify 
which mode, vertical or autothrittle controls the 
speed.
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C-130J Observation Study 
24/10/01  09:30 
Debrief tape 1 
Automation 
 
TIME 
LINE 
SEQUIENCE 
OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG UNDERLYING 
PILOT’S 
REFERENCE 
SYSTEMS 
COMMENTS - DEBRIEF GOALS: FROM
-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
NOTES 
00:00 FLIGHT 
PREPARATI
ON (Setting up 
the cockpit) 
 Structure of 
checklist, i.e., 
- adapting around 
cockpit problems; 
- possibly that’s a 
structure that 
pilots thinks in?) 
‘In the preparation what I’m doing is preparing the cockpit 
for the standards that we have in our checklists.’ 
Displaying 
reference 
maps 
 A Locating, 
folding & 
placing maps for 
good 
accessibility 
during the flight 
Paper 
location 
reference 
maps 
 
     Displaying 
T/O charts 
 A Locating & 
placing charts on 
control column 
Paper 
charts  
 
01:10 Airplane 
Forms: Data 
Entry 
 Imposed structure 
on T/O procedure 
by CNI, of in 
which order to 
input information 
‘I’m looking at the CNI at the moment to insure that all of the 
different functions with in COMM/NAV interface are set for 
the T/O, so I’m sequential going through the buttons, 
checking that we have the right NAV aids tuned; that we 
have the right communication frequencies tuned, the 
identification box is set up correctly.’ 
Data entered 
for the whole 
flight (as 
much as 
possible) 
 AP Programming 
the system from 
T/O to landing 
CNI  
02:10     Radio data 
entry 
  Programming 
radio 
frequencies 
AMU  
02:30     Navigational 
data entry 
  Programming 
navaids 
AMU  
03:35  Rhythmic 
 
 ‘That was a navigation tune.  It’s not realistic in the sim.  
Normally it’s just one switch selection & everything is preset 
for you’ 
???   Working 
through 
CNI  
04:00   @ Does actually 
CNI calculates? 
Or it’s a system 
inside/computer 
that calculating 
‘Checking the T/O & landing data is correct.  You might 
actually see me flip trough my book see if my T/O & landing 
data, check the speeds, for what weight we are at & that way 
it’s checking the calculation of the CNI to insure that’s 
correct.  Then I will check the route that we have, put in the 
box & that way we check that against our navigational charts 
to make sure that distances & tracks we have on those match 
up to what the COMM/NAV interface gives us.  That way we 
will know when we engage the automation will give us the 
correct path for us.’ 
Keeping 
aircraft in 
balance 
 AP Programming 
weight/balance 
parameters, 
including take 
speeds 
From 
papers 
tables 
data 
entered & 
into CNI 
(crossche
ck) 
 
Appendix 3 
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‘So realistically having that route in there is good for 
automation, but if you are doing a short leg you can do it 
without that sort of stuff in, but makes the workload a lot 
higher.’ 
‘The landing data includes threshold speeds and approach 
speeds per flap setting.  So if I was with 0 (zero) flap there 
will an approach speed & a threshold speed & what I will be 
looking at for are those on finals is to try and aim to hit those 
speeds. The approach speed I will fly all the down until I get 
close to the threshold & then I pull a little bit of power off, 
have the speed dribble back until I hit my threshold speed 
over the threshold 350ft; & then from there I pull my throttles 
back to flight idle & speed will decay to a touch down speed. 
Those speeds are already pre-calculated in the CNI & by me 
doing it I’m checking that they are correct, if they are not 
correct, we are possibly flying slower then we are required to 
be for that weight.’ 
04:44     Same 
information 
among the 
crew 
  Cross-checking Outside 
runway 
direction 
 
05:00    ‘Different ways that we can access NAV aids one through the 
CNI & one through the COM/NAV interface, which is just on 
the glare shield.  Certainly when we are flying I prefer to 
enter at the top, because gonna still be looking out.  Whereas 
as soon as your heads down, you are back to a one-pilot 
cockpit.’ 
‘Ye, just checking a setup that it’s all right. Now I’m setting 
all of my avionics.  I will be using the boxes under the 
glareshield there to insure that I’ve got the correct screen 
selected there then it’s going to give me information relevant 
to what I’m doing directly after take-off there.’ 
  A Adjusting 
NAVvaids 
  
04:40 Briefing:     Cross-
reference of 
information 
between the 
crew 
 AP Cross-checking 
for the right 
reference 
information (i.e. 
date of issue, 
airport, runway, 
direction, 
T/O paper 
plates 
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navpoints along 
the route, 
distributing 
workload). 
Discussing how 
to position 
navigational 
displays for ease 
of interpretation 
during the flight 
06:10 Pre-flight 
Checklists: 
‘Gosh, these PFDs are 
annoying, aren’t they.  
Down on the bottom 
right there.’ 
‘Ye. They are an 
awful.’ 
 ‘Now what I’m doing there is having a look at the overhead 
panel there just double checking making sure all the switch 
position are in the correct positions for the take-off there.’ 
‘We would have normally checked that in the other checklist 
leading us up to the runway there, but because we are in the 
sim I just did quick check there.’ 
‘I’m looking for mainly that all the switch positions are in 
auto, because of the most of the systems on the J are 
automated.  Checking to see that the fuel set up is correct.  
That’s an important one.  Making sure that the correct tanks 
are feeding into correct engines & there no cross-feed set up, 
sufficient fuel is in each other tanks, which you would have 
obviously checked before you have been started.  And also 
from my line-up checks that was another of the main things 
turn of the PITOT heaters & the NESA heat, which is the 
windscreen heat and that the strobes are flashing white, 
which is all part of the line-up checklist.’ 
 
‘I will give you a little background info there.  The Primary 
Flight Display there as you can see with the yoke, the top the 
yoke lies right over the radio magnetic indicator (RMI). 
When the yoke is fully forward as it is prior to the take-off 
there.  It’s very hard to check the selections you’ve got in 
pointer 1 & the pointer 2 & also once you take off you 
looking for the distance the radar then has the at the bottom 
there. It tells you how far away from the runway you are, so it 
gives you an idea of when to turn. And also even during 
flight, when the yoke is a little bit further back, it still does 
cuts of the bottom of the RMI there. So you can’t read RMI, 
which is the just the compass card there, which just 
  M Checking 
overhead 
Overhead 
console 
PFD – data needed. 
Pilot’s are looking 
for/calculating the 
point of turning from 
the distance away 
from the runway of  
TO presented by a 
radar on PFD. 
PRINCIPLE – pilot 
need a reference 
system to always 
maintain the  SA & to 
tie the information 
some where – need 
for continuation on 
info in anyone’s mind 
in order to retain the 
information.  
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underneath the attitude indicator there.  So it makes a little bit 
more difficult, increases your workload to check behind the 
column there, to read there everything you need.’ 
‘With HUD it’s is perfectly displayed, it’s right in front of 
you, but the PFD you don’t have any more analogue 
instrumentation to tell you.  So you really have to rely on 
your PFD once you’ve lost your HUD. On the NAV/RADAR 
display it’s perfectly displayed.’ 
07:20    ‘I was checking in the REF/Mode panel the MINIMUMS, 
which is the height that we have for the Instrument Landing 
System into Sydney, and also the Radar altimeter height that 
we have.  On the approach plate you will see 2 heights, one is 
the barometric setting & the other is the RADAR alt setting. I 
was just checking those sort of selection & to see that the 
figures where correct, because the aircraft will tell you once 
you get to MINIMUMS. You will hear on finals it will go 
‘MINIMUMS’.  It will tell you, that you are at MINIMa. 
Obviously that’s a check for us if you are not visual you have 
to go around, but if you are visual obviously just 
acknowledge it & continue.’  
  M Checking speed 
reference panel 
 Need to see 2 heights, 
again the 
REFERENCE system 
principle. 
MINIMUMS – points 
of reference for pilots 
07:31    ‘And I’m just checking of my instrument approach plate there 
the figure that I just checked in the REF/Mode panel’ 
  M Checking T/O 
chart??? 
???  
10:40    ‘There is nothing on the mode selector panel at the moment. 
You will see me selecting ‘SEL’ button on the mode selector 
panel, because that’s a minimum selection we do prior take-
off.’ 
‘I’m selecting ‘SEL’, so that when we are in the climb out 
there, the FD will give me the information to intercept the 
ALT we’ve got set in the ALT/SEL there.’ 
Final 
adjustments 
 A Arming mode 
ALT/SEL 
REF/MO
DE Select 
Panel 
Information selected 
on first on the Ref Set 
part of the panel & 
then pressed as a 
mode on Mode Select 
Panel, the result of 
which appears on the 
PFD – 3 places!!!  
10:56    ‘Checking the stand-by Attitude Indicator.  If we loose 
electrics we’ve got to have a reference to the Attitude out 
there, so it’s really good.’ 
‘I’m setting the barometer there.  I’ve looked into the top of 
the take-off data, have got what QNH that was supposed to 
be set.  I set that on the stand by & then went into the 
REF/MODE panel & set it there.  What I’m looking for 
appear in cyan at the bottom right hand side just underneath 
the altimeter (on the PFD) ’ 
  A Adjusting 
Standby 
Altimeter 
Main 
Instrumen
t Panel 
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11:02    Same as above    Adjusting the 
QNH on the 
REF/MODE to 
appear on PFD  
REF/MO
DE Select 
Panel 
 
13:07    ‘He is just marking around there.’    Doing 
something on 
AMU 
AMU  
13:30    We just selected a mode on a radar, we are just going to get 
an ACOS (Aerodrome forecast) in a second 
  AP Listening ATIS AMU  
13:50    ‘It’s a sim problem.  I stored an ACOS there. I normally not 
store an ACOS like that in the aircraft.’ 
   Inputting radar 
information 
AMU  
14:21 ~*ATC 
clearance: 
‘Glendfield 1 
departure, climb 
maintain 3000. Clear 
for T/O’ 
 ‘My consideration at that moment is to insure that. I’m not 
looking at PFD at all not.  Runway is clear, that’s why I’m 
looking out there.  We just got a clearance for take-off. 
Making sure that... I’m going to take-off park break in a 
second. That the throttles are all aligned correctly that they 
are all in the high-speed ground idle. That we’ve got all the 
line-up checks complete & once I’ve done that & I’ll just be 
worried about looking at the runway there.  Making sure I’m 
straight.  I’ll take a couple of glances in at the airspeed & 
that’s all I’m looking for to get our rotate speed.’ 
‘Turning the landing lights ON, which is another procedure 
for the co-pilot to do once we’ve got the take-off clearance.’ 
Coordination 
with other 
traffic 
ATC-
Crew 
A Indicate cleared 
route 
Radio ‘throttles are all 
aligned correctly’ 
PRINCIPLE – actions 
projected into the 
future (for example 
they will veer to the 
right if they don’t 
align all the throttles). 
‘in the high-speed 
ground idle’ – that’s 
also is not shown 
anywhere apart from 
the throttle consol. 
Same PRINCIPLE – 
project it into an 
effect they will have, 
ie as if pilots visualise 
it 
14:29 ATC 
clearance:* 
   Coordination 
with other 
traffic 
Crew-
ATC 
A Read back to 
ATC clearance 
Radio  
14:35 TAKE OFF  ‘Copy clear for T/O. 
Glenfield 1 departure 
3000.  3000 Set. Set & 
checked. Crew rolling 
for 102 knots’’ 
 ‘Crew rolling for 102 knots.’ is the speed I’m looking for, 
that’s our rotate speed & the refusal speed.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
(same 
model/pictur
e) 
PF-
PNF-
PF 
 Saying T/O 
runway, airport, 
clearance 
altitude, ref 
speeds 
Intercom  
 AFTER 
TAKE-OFF 
  ‘Quick glance at the speed.’    Rolling down 
the runway 
Throttle  
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14:56  ‘My controls.  Your 
controls.’ 
     Passover of 
controls 
  
TIME 
LINE: 
SEQUIENCE 
OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG:   GOALS: FROM
-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
 
15:03  ‘Rotate’      Rotation PFD  
15:10  ‘Landing gear up’  ‘The balk of my concentration is gone down to the attitude 
indicator on the PFD & I’m looking at the flight path marker 
relative to pitch ladder. And to see what my wings are level.  
And I’m also dropping my scan down to have a look at the 
RMI & where heading bug is, so that I know I’m flying the 
correct heading, we require for the departure.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Commanding 
Gear up 
Main 
Instrumen
t panel: 
Landing 
Gear/ 
Landing 
Light 
Panel 
‘I’m looking at the 
flight path marker 
relative to pitch 
ladder’ – PRINCIPLE 
– pilot’s reference 
system/comparisons 
within the display 
‘also dropping my eye 
to the RMI to see 
where is my heading 
bug’ – need to be 
ahead since flying 
towards it – up  
           
15:18  ‘Track 095 at 1 TAC 
1000ft, which ever is 
required. Turn right. 
Turn 095.’ 
  Crew cross-
reference 
(same 
model/pictur
e) 
PNF-
PF 
 Verification of 
the turn after 
T/O 
  
15:27  ‘Landing gear is up.’    Crew cross-
reference 
(same 
model/pictur
e) 
PNF-
PF 
    
15:28  ‘Flaps up’  ‘The other thing I’m looking at there is for before I call, 
‘Flaps Up’, that we have sufficient airspeed. So when I suck 
the flaps up, I’m not going to stall or anything like that, so 
other part of my scan is across there to the airspeed is to 
make sure that the airspeed is healthy & increasing’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Command flaps 
up 
On Center 
console: 
Wing 
Flaps 
Control 
Quadrant 
Panel: 
Flaps 
lever 
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15:33    ‘I’m about to reach out for the heading bug on the Mode 
select panel, so that I have the horizontal mode of the FD 
come up & give me information on keeping the heading bug 
rather then looking at the tiny little tick mark & the heading 
bug marker, I get a nice big line in front of me on the attitude 
indicator. And all I have to do is put the circle in the climb 
dive marker or flight path marker over the top of that dot And 
make sure that I’m tracking my heading.’ 
‘Just trimming back to. Usually when you roll your elevated 
trim is about level, once you start taking off & you are in the 
climb you need to trim back on that, because it just takes the 
force out of pulling back on the yoke.’ 
‘You just see on the top left hand side of the PFD the heading 
selection came up there.  You can see the FD there.’ 
‘The Altitude is selected & the Heading’ (modes announced 
on the PFD) 
Offloading 
work 
automation 
(didn’t tell to 
PNF) 
PF-
Auto
m 
 Switching 
heading mode 
on 
Ref 
Set/Mode 
Select 
Panel: 
HDG 
mode 
button 
‘’ – pilot gives an 
example of 
information merging 
on the PFD 
15:46  ‘1000ft. 1000. Just 
waiting for 1TAC. 
Roger.’ 
 ‘You can see there… the 2 needles pointers I’m looking for 
the distance on the bottom of that & it’s very difficult to see.’ 
‘Ye, I know I’m on course, because the FD is helping me 
there. All I’m worried about now is the distance. We’ve 
already made out our hard requirement for the departure, we 
are just waiting for that distance to come up before I can 
make right turn.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
(same 
model/pictur
e) 
PNF-
PF-
PNF 
MP  PFD Pilot’s REFERENCE 
system – ‘waiting for 
the right distance to 
come up before we 
can make our right 
turn’ 
15:55 After take-off 
checklist: 
‘After take-off check. 
Landing gear is up. 
After take-off 
checklist complete.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
 Commanding 
execution of 
after T/O 
checklist 
  
16:01  ‘1TAC right turning, 
track 170. Roger. 
Autopilot is engaged 
& turning around. 
Right turn 170.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
 Turning right 
after TACAN 
Display? 
(PFD or 
NAV) 
 
  ‘Autopilot is engaged’  ‘I just engaged the autopilot then.  Once I was happy with the 
FD indication.  It was centred in the FPM, I engaged the AP 
make sure that the AP doesn’t all over sudden do an abrupt 
turn to try & intercept the FD. Once I’ve done that the AP 
was coupled up to the heading mode on the mode selector 
panel.  That way I can just use the heading knob.  Select it 
onto 170 & the aircraft will just fly itself around on the 170.’ 
Off loading 
workload to 
automation 
PF-
Auto 
m-
PNF 
 Engaged the AP 
through the yoke 
Mode 
annunciati
on panel 
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‘See it’s flying itself now.’ 
16:13  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO’ 
 ‘You just heard ‘THOUSAND TO GO’ voice came through.  
It was obviously telling how far to go before we reach our 
height there, which we select in ALT SEL & part of our 
checklist procedure is to check that verbally with other pilot, 
so that they are also checking what’s in there own, we know 
that we are not going to keep going straight up through that 
height.’ 
 
Sharing 
information 
Auto
m-
Crew 
  Voice ‘we know that we are 
not going to keep 
going straight through 
that height’ – need to 
see if they are going 
to level off or not. 
REFERENCE – 
current vs. level off 
height 
16:17  ‘Approaching 3000. 
Checked’ 
 ‘No, I’m quite happy there. The mode selection I’ve got 
select that heading of the aircraft to fly itself there. I’m also 
not worried about the height because I know that I’ve already 
hit the ALT SEL button so AP is going to capture that & it’s 
aircraft going to level off us at our height.  I’m just 
monitoring now. I can step back & watch the aircraft fly. If it 
does something that I don’t want it to do.  Then I will take 
out the automation & get it back on track & then reselect.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
(same 
model/pictur
e) 
PF-
PNF 
 Climbing to 
ALT 
PFD  
16:20 ~*ATC 
clearance: 
‘Contact Sydney 
approach. 135.9’ 
‘135.9 Treasure, 123’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
 ATC contact   
16:33 ATC 
clearance:* 
‘Sydney Approach, 
good day, Treasure 
123 is in the right turn 
passing 2.900 
climbing 3000.’ 
‘Good morning, 
Treasure 123, continue 
climbing via Glenfield 
1, excepting vectors 
runway 007 ILS’. 
‘Glenfield 1, 
understood. Treasure 
123.’ 
 ‘See my workload is gone right down now.’ Change ATC   Change of ATC   
16:51  ‘For some reason my 
INAV posses, staffing 
up’ 
 ‘See light came up on the mode selector panel there.  That 
comes up to say that it’s ALT HOLD.  The FD does that it’s 
itself.’ 
‘I can see red marker in the centre of the course.  The course 
Annunciator came up to say that it’s not working. & so now 
 PF  Verification of 
ATIS 
 Pay attention to the 
PFD top left changes 
from ?something? 
under the line to the 
top of the line - ALT 
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what I would have been relying on there is the course 
indicator bar would tell me how far away I’m from the INAV 
track.  It’s not doing that.  So now I have got to scan that little 
needle & make sure it comes around on the correct (It’s on 
the top of where you heading right now) Now I’m watching 
the pointer 1 & that’s the whole reason I set up the Glenfield 
NDB before we departed. In case it failed I now had an 
indicator to tell me that it was pointing directly at Glenfield, 
but my workload is increased now, because now I got to 
make sure that I intercept the correct radial. Rather than have 
an indicator bar, which is a lot easier to follow, I just fly until 
it goes through the center, then it’s done & the AP can do that 
for me.  But now I have to do via that needle, I have to do it 
manually.  So I’ve got to go back to the heading knob to turn 
on to the correct heading to intercept that manually. FD is not 
helping me, it might as well not be there.’ 
HOLD, VS arrow 
goes down right away 
& ONLY a second 
later does the ALT 
HOLD button lights 
up on the mode 
selector panel. 
Same information in 3 
different places 
17:08 NEW LEVEL 
FLIGHT 
clearance 
‘For 5000 thousand’. 
‘5000 left 3000, 
Treasure 123.’ ‘Copy 
5000’. ‘5000 set’. ’ & 
checked. Leaving for 3 
for 5.’ 
 ‘See ALT HOLD selection just dropped out there, because 
we left our height.  And all I did was just put the power up 
high for our climb.’ 
‘See the FD## is gone back to horizontal (may be vertical?).  
All it’s doing it’s giving me heading information. 
   ATC new ATL 
clearance 
ALT 
button on 
the Mode 
Select 
panel 
dissappea
red 
Pay attention to the 
PFD top left changes 
from ?something? 
over the line to under 
the line - ALT HOLD, 
VS arrow goes up 
right away & 
simultaneously does 
the ALT HOLD 
button lights switches 
off on the mode 
selector panel. 
The change from top 
to bottom & vs. 
happens in less then a 
second, so as the 
automatic switch off 
the button happens at 
the same time of a 
change, i.e., there are 
no clues left that the 
change has occurred. 
Same information 
changes in 3 different 
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places.  It should be 
all happening on ONE 
place, ex. VS 
tape/arrow 
TD – see on my TV 
FD change## At the 
time of the ALT 
HOLD change FD cue 
on PFD changes to 
FD ‘Azimuth-Onside 
cue’ 
17:36  ‘Coming around to our 
course’ 
 ‘FD is not doing anything for me apart from keeping me on 
heading. But what I’m doing, which (FD heading) I just 
selected.  I had to manually think of: ‘I’m coming around to 
this radial, there is 2 degrees lead on the NDB now, because 
we are about 20 miles away from it, therefore if I’m turn 
now, I’m gonna roll out on the heading inbound to the 
Glenfield NDB of 144. That’s the calculation I’m doing 
mentally. And all I’m doing is manipulating the heading bug 
to give me what I want from that needle, but the FD is not 
helping me.’’ 
Where did you acquire the distance that you just calculated?  
I didn’t (acquire that information).  I knew, because I looked 
on the chart before we left.  It’s about 25 miles is the profile 
between the Glenfield NDB & Richmond. And I know we 
hadn’t been flying for more then 2 or 3 minutes at that stage 
so we gain 5 miles or 10 miles may be, so we still had 15 to 
20 track miles to the NDB to go & that’s just a piloting skill.  
That’s what you keep in the back of your mind I guess.  
That’s what good about NAV/RADAR display because of the 
range ring on it as well. 
*Crew cross-
reference 
  Crew cross-
reference of the 
course 
 ‘I didn’t (acquire that 
information).  I knew 
because I looked at 
the chart before we 
left’ – The pilot had to 
retain the distance in 
his head, estimate the 
amount of distance 
that they already 
passed, deduct & 
receive current 
distance away from 
target. 
17:48  ATIS info ‘Sydney 
Terminal information 
Alfa, Runway 07, 
wind 120 degree 15 
knots, clouds scattered 
1500, overcast 3500, 
visibility… QNH 
1022, temperature 15, 
  Acquiring 
only 
externally 
available 
information 
 sim
u 
Request on a 
new ATIS from 
ATC 
 Pilot have to retain 
information in 
memory ex.ATIS to 
proceed in there 
‘forward’ thinking, 
memorising numbers, 
turns, height…etc 
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17:51  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO’ 
  Sharing 
information 
Auto
m-
Crew 
lt  Voice  
17.53  ‘Approaching 5000.’ 
‘Roger’ 
    ani
ous 
   
18:25      Auto
m-
Crew 
 Sounding a 
message on the 
display  
EFIS? 
center 
 
18:30     Offloading 
workload to 
automation 
(ATHR) 
  Engaging a new 
ATHR mode 
Ref mode 
set panel, 
pushing 
‘A/T ON’ 
button & 
setting the 
value on 
the left 
IAS value 
of 170 
knots 
The ALT ON button 
on the Mode Selector 
went on as well, 
although PF didn’t 
push it.????? 
18:31  ‘Autothrottle set for 
170.’ 
 ‘I just hit the ATHR mode button there on the Mode Select 
Panel Takes one more thing out of my scan there, not having 
to worry about the pushing & pulling on the THRs.  In the 
rotary selector knob I just set the speed that I want to fly.  
The only thing (announced) you get on the PFD is on the 
acceleration caret, which is just beside the FPM. There is not 
actual reading on the PFD.  The only way you will know that 
the ATHR is engaged is that little caret on the side there has a 
diamond in it; it puts a diamond on the back of it.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Change of 
airspeed through 
Ref mode 
set panel 
 
18:40  “All right mate, can 
you just brief us 
through the ILS.” 
 ‘A quick glance across to the NAV/RADAR there. Just 
thinking, OK, pretty much know where I’m now.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 PF ‘glanced’ 
about 3-4 times, 
then PF asking 
PNF to brief ILS 
approach from 
the plate. Both 
change their 
On the 
steering 
column 
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paper approach 
plate. 
18:49  ‘Point for the ILS, 
etc.’ 
‘5000 set for localizer; 
for 3000, finals course 
is 062 Outermarker 
check height 1300ft; 
Decision height is 270, 
to set in the mins 254 
& the radar ALT is & 
the missed approach is 
at the decision height, 
we will brief that if we 
need it; & the ?edge 
roll? On Sydney. 
Understood 
  ILS brief - 
Crew cross-
reference 
PNF-
PF 
 Reviewing 
Points 
  
19:05    ‘I’m just checking what he is telling me, of the information of 
the sheet, making sure it’s correct. I was checking the 
information that the PNF was reading to me in the approach 
plate. What we are doing at the moment, is briefing the 
approach that we are going to fly into Sydney.  Switch the 
knob & have a look that the correct value is set in there. I was 
looking at the RAD ALT & the MINIMUs.’ 
‘There is a little rotary selector knob, there.  I was just 
changing it round to the position.  See that’s the only display 
that RADAR, what ever I select it will come up with a, like if 
select FPA it would change from 170 knots which I’ve got in 
the ATHR to -3.0.’ 
checking 
correct 
information 
PF  Changing/Check
ing data as PNF 
briefing the ILS 
Ref mode 
set panel 
 
19:15  ‘Treasure 123 report 
indicated airspeed.’  
‘170’.  
‘Treasure 123 copy 
that for sequencing 
increase speed to 210 
knots.’ 
‘210 Treasure 123’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
si ATC requests 
airspeed increase 
Crew change the 
airspeed  
on the 
Ref/Mode 
panel 
 
19:20    ‘What I was doing over in the Avionics Management Unit 
there was setting up my finals course for the ILS. When he 
  l Touching  AMU  
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told me the speed there, I was still marking around with the 
course knob, setting the course up.  I was trying to look over 
the edge of a wheel there to see what the course was set up.’ 
19:33  ‘Copy 210’  ‘It’s 210.  I change the speed selection for the ATHR to 210.’ 
‘To see that everything is tracking correctly (on PFD).  I was 
mainly looking at the compass to set up the course. That 
gives me my course indicator bar & the next thing I was 
looking at once I’ve made that speed change to 210, I was 
looking for that the speed tape was increasing.’ 
  ta PF changing of 
airspeed through 
… on ATC 
request due to 
other traffic 
Ref mode 
set panel 
‘looking for that the 
speed tape was 
increasing.’ 
PRINCIPLE Show 
TRENDS of change 
once manipulation 
was done to the 
system or in an usual 
trend change 
19:15-
19:40 
   ‘The Morse code was coming through there.  I was pulling 
the selector button on the side to listen to see that the 
identification against the Nav aids we were going to check, 
coming into Sydney was the correct indent, because if you 
tune the wrong frequency, you are not going to be tracking 
the right Instrument Landing System down, because they’ve 
got several.  That’s the only way to check it.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
 mu Verifying Nav 
aids 
  
19:56  ‘We won’t worry 
about the approach 
checklist, we haven’t 
really left the landing 
patter, so.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
 Amending the 
approach check 
list 
  
20:04      PF  Touching? Or 
checking? 
?AMU?  
20:13  ‘… duty Runway now 
16R… (plus new 
weather), … 
 ‘I’m going, “GREAT”!  Now we have to change everything 
we’ve just preset.’ 
 
 ATC 
broad
cast 
 ATC change of 
runway 
  
20:25      Auto
m-
Crew 
 Sounding a 
message on the 
display  
EFIS? 
center 
 
20:26  ‘Turn left further 25 
degrees, expecting 
radar vectors shortly.’ 
 ‘What I’m looking at there, now, that the co-pilot got 
instructed by ATC to turn left 25 degree.  I’m just having a 
look at what heading we are there, taking 25 degrees of that 
& turning the heading bug to there. That’s all I’m worried 
about there.’ 
 ATC-
Crew 
    
20:33  ‘Left 25 degree, 123 
inside… the wind for 
     Crew request 
ATC winds for 
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the new information 
Bravo 
new runways 
20:45  ‘Left heading 123’   Following 
ATC 
instructions 
  Turning left   
21:04  ’16 Right; Finals 
course is now on 55 
starting from 5000, 
back to us on to finals; 
decision height is now 
220 at set of min for 
RadALT is 212; 
outermarker check 
height is 12,7 DME 
1295… ’ 
 ‘That’s not how we normally operate.  We would always 
have our operation plate with us.  Procedurally that’s bad, we 
have to have plates in front of each pilot.  Now I’m relying 
on what he says to be 100% correct that he hasn’t misread the 
plate & he told me the finals course was 155, & it was 157. & 
then all over sudden I’m tracking the wrong ILS or 
something like that or listening to the tower.  Now, that sort if 
thing is going through my head. I’m going great. The runway 
has changed. We don’t have any plates here.  We only have 
one plate between us. Now it’s going to get fun.’ 
‘You can see the CDI moving around there. PNF is quickly 
briefing different requirement there heading & stuff.  I’m just 
setting it up.’ 
* Crew 
cross-
reference for 
approach 
  PNF Reading an 
approach plate 
  
21:17    ‘I’m checking again the RADALT & the MINS that he just 
read me are correct & that he is setting the right ones. See 
when he I went there (Ref mode panel).  I was not actually 
changing anything, he was, but I can watch him change it.  If 
I have started to move the knob, it would have been 
conflicting with what he was doing, depending who gets in 
first is what happens to the figure.  So that’s a pre-
coordination issue.’ 
Checking 
correct 
information  
PF  Checking data as 
PNF briefing the 
ILS 
Ref mode 
set panel 
 
21:34  ‘Continue left turning 
090; intercept 2 mile 
arc; intercept 1NM for 
the 16R ILS’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
21:52  ‘Copy left heading 090 
to intercept the… 2 
mile arc’ 
 ‘Now, what I’m looking at here is I’m going: ‘How am I 
going to intercept 12 mile arc, when I don’t have the VOR 
needle up’, because we have selected the ILS frequencies in 
there.  You saw me glancing across the NAV radar display 
there.  I’ve already had a look at the range rings there, when 
we got that radar vectored heading, we were already inside 12 
miles, which meant that’s not the way the ATC would 
normally vector us.  That’s why we had to turn all the way 
back up to the North there, to go back out to 12 miles.  You 
Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF 
 Selecting 
appropriate 
Tuning Nav aids 
(VOR;TACAN) 
AMU Information missing 
on the display – VOR 
needle 
Interesting reference 
=) – ‘to back UP, 
NORTH’ North is 
always UP on all 
maps – common view. 
Reasoning/reference 
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take a radius from there.  You know he (ATC) gave us vector 
for about 9 miles.   So we were already out of time there for 
the arc itself, so realistically the ATC shouldn’t have given us 
that, but obviously that’s the limitation of the guy running the 
sim as well as the ATC.  So that increases our workload even 
more, because now I’ve got to think about getting us back on 
track before we can start the approach.  So I’m looking at 
distance & then I’m thinking at what distance do I want to 
turn to incept the arc to get back on profile again to where I 
can intercept finals.’ 
(Iya) ‘… & all of that you are thinking in your head?’  
‘Yes, the FD can’t help me, because the ILS is selected up 
there at the moment.’  
(Iya) ‘… you can’t change that?’ 
‘We could change that, but it would be more work for us to 
seat down or look into the CNI quickly change the VOR 
needles & then by the time… The other thing I was thinking, 
we are very close to the finals course, but the time we select 
the VOR needles up, I will be on my 12 mile arc & then all 
over sudden we’ve got to select the ILS frequency again 
anyway.  So that the CDI bar is going to give me information 
on the intercepting the finals course. So it wasn’t worthwhile 
changing over for that long, it would have increased our 
workload more.  So what I’m looking at is the distance on the 
bottom of the PFD there & working out at what distance I 
have to turn into the 12 mile arc.’ 
‘The FD is taking the some workload of me right now, 
because the AP is coupled up.  It holding me my height, it’s 
flying what heading I wanted to fly, it’s flying what airspeed 
I wanted to fly.  I don’t have to worry about that. All I have 
to worry about right now is how are we going to get into 
ILS.’ 
systems ‘…because 
the ILS is selected up 
there…’ 
Automation use is 
avoided sometimes 
because it’s creating 
workload. 
‘… working out’ 
performing 
calculation 
22:13    ‘I’m just looking here, & thinking, this does not work out.  
We are way close to the airfield & they’ve told us to intercept 
what we’ve already through the 12 mile arc, so what I’m 
going to suggest to PNF is ask the ATC, we are suppose to 
intercepting the 12 mile arc, & then it prompts him to say: 
‘sorry about that’ & then he will give ridiculous heading to 
turn around on to it now.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF-
PF 
 Verifying Nav 
aids 
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22:54  ‘We need to be… ILS 
course 155; we are 
inside it now. Yes.’ 
  Crew cross-
reference for 
approach* 
 sim Discussing 
aircraft position 
in relation to ILS 
  
22:53       ul Verifying Nav 
aids 
  
23:01  ‘Approach Treasure 
123 request further left 
heading to intercept 
12 mile arc.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
ta Asking 
permission ATC 
to make left 
heading 
  
23:05     Communicat
ing with 
ATC 
ATC-
Crew 
n ATC 
confirmation of 
the route 
  
23:18  ‘Left heading 360. 
Copy that.’ 
 ‘What he has done is given us the heading to intercept & by 
rights we have to fly that heading that he has given us, until 
we intercept that arc, but we already been given that heading 
once we are inside that arc.  So technically I can’t turn until 
he give us another vector to get us back out.  If I just start 
tuning in the direction I want, that’s dangerous.  That’s 
stuffing the ATC sequencing.  That’s why I got PNF to 
query. Then he (ATC) says turn left immediately, back up to 
the North.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF 
ius    
23:36  ‘Continue turning 
heading 315 to 
intercept.’ 
 ‘Again just checking that ILS frequency is correct & 
checking the Morse code ident for that.’ 
 ATC-
Crew 
    
23:43  ‘315.’   Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF 
  Forgot to 
replay to 
ATC!!! 
 
23:45  ‘360 for us…’  ‘What happened there was, the ATC gave us a heading to 
turn on to I heard it select it around, but the PNF thought it 
was for another guy.  And you watch the ATC will go back to 
us & tell us turn left on heading 315, because that was what 
we suppose to turn on to.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
PNF-
PF 
    
23:51  ‘Continue turning 
heading 315 for 
intercept.’ 
  Making sure 
that the crew 
is following 
instructions
… 
ATC-
Crew 
    
23:54  ‘315. Apologies’    PNF-
ATC 
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23:59  ‘That would be 315. 
Selected’ 
  Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF 
    
24:06  They still have got us 
at the speed restriction 
at 210, are they?  I 
haven’t heard 
otherwise’ 
 ‘I’m queering the speed, because to organise myself to 
intercept that I don’t want to be going 210 knots, 90 degrees 
to that finals course.  The higher your speed, the larger is 
your turning radius & the more you are going to blow 
through to have to come back & to intercept there.  So what I 
wanted to do is to slow the speed down, so it was more 
standard & smaller turn radius.  Much more easier to 
intercept the ILS finals, because I knew we were getting close 
to it. Then I eventually made a decision to wind it back 
myself.  It’s probably.  It’s not standard, I shouldn’t have 
done that, but I would have hoped that the ATC would 
understand that, because we have to start configuring the turn 
on it & they cleared us for the approach.  We are the only 
ones that were in it.  That’s why I did it. ’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Discussing the 
speed restriction 
 Pilot’s need to 
REFERENCE old 
information to new to 
keep a continuum & 
in RELATION to 
surrounding (finals 
course vs. turning 
radius, height) 
24:25  ‘At 10.5 we make a… 
right turn to intercept 
the arc dark raw. 
Roger’  
 ‘So all the FD is doing there is giving me the heading to fly; 
holding the ALT.  That’s it.  All I’m watching for there down 
the bottom is the distance to come up for me to turn to the 
arc.  That’s the first turn.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
PF-
PNF 
 Planning 
position of right 
turn 
  
24:37  ‘Descent to 3000. You 
are number 3 in the 
pattern’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
 ATC position in 
the queue & 
change of ALT 
  
24:41  ‘3000 from 5000.’     PNF-
ATC 
    
24:43 DESCENT Copy 3000 leave 5’    PF-
PNF 
 Start descending 
(automation) 
  
24:45  ‘3000 set. Checked’  ‘The ALT HOLD just dropped out & that’s why we just lost 
that forth light.  He was reselecting it reselecting in the 
ALTsel. So that’s what the co-pilot is doing.  I’m watching at 
the top of Altimeter tape there that the cyan number is going 
down to 3000. That way I know once I roll over the control 
wheel & the aircraft is established on descent, the FD is 
going to capture my next altitude. That’s another thing I don’t 
have to worry about.’ 
Crew cross-
reference 
PNF-
PF 
 PNF setting new 
height. The 
mode 
disengaged from 
REF/MODE 
panel the ALT 
ON button went 
off & changes 
on PFD from top 
right ALT 
HOLD to 
bottom right 
Ref set 
mode 
panel 
Infor the pilot is 
looking for. 
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ALT…?. And of 
PFD the FD 
vertical bar 
appeared. 
24:56  It’s 9 mile.         
24:57  Roger, I’m going to 
bring that speed back 
 ‘I just wind the speed back’ (without ATC command)  PF-
PNF 
 Slowing aircraft 
down, through 
changing the ref 
speed 
Ref set 
mode 
panel 
 
25:12  ‘And I’m going to 
make a right turn.’ 
     Making a right 
turn 
  
25:19  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO’ 
  Sharing 
information 
Auto
m-
Crew 
  Voice  
25:23  ‘Approaching 3000. 
Good’ 
 ‘Just when we move the heading bug there, 90 degrees to it is 
where the CDI bar is. Again we didn’t have the VOR.  I 
couldn’t tell what radial we were on, I couldn’t tell what lead 
radial we were going to require before could turn on to the 
course. I guess to replace, so I what I did just to turn 90 
degrees on to it to intercept that track across to it.’ 
     REFERENCE – ’90 
degrees to it (HDG 
bug)’ 
‘I couldn’t tell’ – info 
missing without 
programming certain 
parameters.  
Shouldn’t be possible 
to estimate that on the 
display itself??? Take 
that into account in 
the design. 
25:39 APPROACH ‘You are cleared for 
Sydney ILS 16R for 
the 12 mile arc. Once 
established on final 
contact tower 120.5. 
Good day’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
 ATC clearance 
for ILS 
Approach 
ARM 
mode 
 
25:49  ‘Cleared for ILS 16R. 
Once established on 
120.5.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
 The vertical blue  
bar went away 
on PFD & the 
ALT HOLD 
appeared again 
on the top right 
of the PFD???? 
 ???? 
 
 
 
299
TIME 
LINE 
SEQUIENCE 
OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG UNDERLYING 
PILOT’S 
REFERENCE 
SYSTEMS 
COMMENTS - DEBRIEF GOALS: FROM
-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
NOTES 
25:54  ‘Copy cleared for the 
ILS’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
25:57  ‘& going APPR arm’  ‘What I just did there, standard procedure.  Whenever we get 
cleared for the ILS, not just cleared for finals, I can fly the 
glide slope as far as  I pushed in the approach button on 
Mode selector panel & what that does is arms the FD to tell 
me my azimuth course deviation & it also will capture the GS 
once it’s outside the comes down the meters. So the AP will 
capture that & begin to fly me down the GS. Heading is still 
controlling the direction of the aircraft, but now that I’ve 
select the APPR ARM & what that will do is the FD through 
the AP would turn the aircraft on to finals course.’ 
 PF-
Auto
m-
PNF 
 Pushes APPR 
ON button & on 
Mode Announc. 
Panel 2 light 
come on, NAV 
ARM & GS 
ARM & 2 new 
mode 
annunciation 
comes on top of 
the PFD 
The ALT ON 
button on 
REF/MODE 
panel went on 
last as well ones 
they captured 
the ALT 
Ref set 
mode 
panel 
Too many 
annunciations at once 
for ‘one goal’ 
information 
26:02  ‘& we will go ahead 
with landing 
checklist.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
 Landing 
checklist by 
PNF 
  
26:04  ‘Flaps’    PNF     
26:06  ‘Below 183, flaps 50’         
26:15  ‘Flaps are 50’   Verification PNF-
PF 
 Flaps setting 50 Flap lever  
26:17      PF  Reaching for ??? 
Speed mode 
changing speed 
for lower 
Ref set 
mode 
panel 
 
26:25  ‘Landing gear’    PNF-
PF 
    
26:28  ‘& landing gear down’  ‘I will just explain to you what I’m doing there, We are just 
about here; we are almost ready to intercept the finals course 
there. I’m configuring the aircraft ready to go down the slope.  
So what I did there is called for the landing checklist. Looked 
at my speed, because I’ve already bugged it at 170. I knew 
we were below the flap setting speed we require, so we got 
Verification PF-
PNF 
 Landing gear 
down 
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LINE 
SEQUIENCE 
OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG UNDERLYING 
PILOT’S 
REFERENCE 
SYSTEMS 
COMMENTS - DEBRIEF GOALS: FROM
-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
NOTES 
straight into the checklist. He drops the flaps, so the next 
thing I do, once he drops the flaps, wind the speed back to 
150, which is now brings us below our gear limiting speed. 
So when he gets to the landing gear part selection of the 
checklist the speed is below it & we can drop the gear. And 
we configuring to fly the approach.  I’m again winding the 
speed down.  All I’m doing is manipulating the ATHR there.  
I’m just taking from 170 back to 150.’ 
26:45  ‘Landing gear down, 
three greens’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
26:47  ‘Down, three greens’  ‘My head movement there was just looking at three green 
lights, on the gear panel & make sure it is down, indicating 
down & check that the nose wheel is centred.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 PF looks to 
check is three 
light are green 
 Same as above – 
PROJECTIONS 
PRINCIPLE as of 
current state ‘Can’t 
land, because not 
landing gear’ for 
example. 
26:49        Landing 
checklist 
complete 
  
27:10  ‘I’ve got … on my side.  
Appears to be 
capturing’ 
 ‘You could see over on the Mode Annunciator panel we had 
a shift of that lights.  It went on from NAV ARM to NAV 
CAPT, which means that on the horizontal mode it just 
captured that azimuth, so the aircraft will go: ‘Oh, we’ve got 
it. Let’s make a right turn.’ & will intercept the azimuth for 
the ILS.’ 
‘& you also saw that the HDG selector went on the mode 
selector panel the light went out, because now the NAV mode 
that’s controlling not the HDG.  I changed it, I wind it down, 
but it wasn’t controlling the direction of the aircraft that 
time.’ 
‘You can see at top the Attitude indicator I’m looking for the 
other cross to NAV CAPTure.  It’s a double check of the 
aircrafts, captured the NAV solution. That’s a double check.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Capturing ILS 
HDG ON button 
went of on 
REF/MODE 
panel & NAV 
ARM switched 
to NAV CAPT 
on Mode 
ann.panel.  On 
PFD the left top 
bottom mode 
annunciation 
went to the top. 
lights 
change on 
the Ref 
set mode 
panel & 
Mode 
Announci
ation 
panel…?? 
Which 
mode 
change?  
$$$There 
is a delay 
in pilots 
respond 
for about 
3 sec… 
possibly 
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LINE 
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DIALOG UNDERLYING 
PILOT’S 
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COMMENTS - DEBRIEF GOALS: FROM
-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
NOTES 
because 
the 
indication 
is just a 
light??? 
27:44    ‘What it is doing there, it switched to NAV ARM again (I’m 
not so sure!  The change is from GS ARM to GS CAPT & 
REF/MODE panel the ALT ON light went off), because we 
are flying through it, because there was a 90 degree intercept.  
It was too rough for it, so it’s gone through it & it’s gone out.  
Now, it’s going, ‘OK, I’m established on a turn, now I’m 
going to come back the other way. ’ That’s why it’s pointing 
that way, it’s doing another interception of the nav course. 
You can see that, there.  It’s just gone through it, but if we 
were doing 210 knots, that would have been way out.’ 
 Auto
m-
Crew 
  Light’s 
change 
again on 
the Ref 
set mode 
panel & 
Mode 
Announci
ation 
panel…?? 
Which 
mode 
change? 
$$$ 10 
seconds 
delay in 
pilots 
respond 
 
27:54 ILS captured ‘& we have NAV 
capture there’ 
   PF-
PNF 
 Rotating knob 
on  
  
28:05  ‘Established ILS finals 
9 miles 3 greens’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
 ATC change 
new frequency, 
contacting 
Sydney ATC 
AMU  
28:12      ATC-
Crew 
 reading back   
28:23  ‘Left 3000 for minima 
220’ 
 ‘I was looking at the NAV RADAR display, but I don’t know 
why.  I think I was just checking the general orientation to 
see that all is matched up.’ 
‘What I’m looking at the PFD, that the CDI bar is central, the 
GS indicator is down the left hand side of the attitude 
indicator is right on the centre dot & then I’m looking at that 
the flight path marker is right around the FD there, which is 
giving me azimuth & GS information. Just monitoring that is 
   Checking Ref set 
mode 
panel 
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COMMENTS - DEBRIEF GOALS: FROM
-TO 
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all I’m doing there.’ 
28:34  Outermarker check 4.7 
DME, 1295’ 
  Crew cross-
reference 
PNF-
PF 
    
28:43  ‘the beacon button 
pulled.  Roger’ 
 ‘All I’m doing is focusing of the PFD. It’s very important to 
do that in the approach.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
    
29:00  ‘Land in view. Right.’  ‘The Co-pilot is giving me cue from outside.  He is just 
telling me what he just seen out there, because I’m focusing 
on the PFD, because I’m the PF at the time & then once he 
said ‘Visual’, then I can look up from that & I can make the 
assesment the runway, the visibility, the distance that we 
have & check if that is what is required for the approach.’ 
 PNF-
PF 
    
29:26    ‘I did a glance to the right there, the camera probably didn’t 
show, but I was looking at the CNI there, to make sure that I 
had the landing speed page up in the landing data, so then I 
could check my approach threshold speeds.’ 
 PF  Looking at CNI Landing 
page data 
 
29:47      PF  Referencing 
outside  
Runway  
29:47  ‘Runway visual. Got 
Runway in view also. 
Continue down for the 
glideslop there. 
Roger.’ 
   PNF-
PF-
PNF 
 Visual of the 
runway 
verification 
  
29:54  ‘Good for 1295’  ‘You can hear the beacon coming through.  When I said 
before my beacon button is pulled, what that allows me to do 
at the outer marker, which is that sound.  All it is just a radio 
beacon underneath & that particular point, at that distance 
from the runway that give us an accurate check at 1295 feet. 
That we are right on glideslope.  It validates the landing 
instrument system for us.  & by us checking we know that the 
GS is good & it checks out & then I look at the PFD then & 
make sure the GS indicator is right on the center.’ 
Height & 
slope check 
PNF  Listening to 
beacon aids - 
passing over  
External 
sound – 
outer 
marker 
Again – 
REFERENCE – 
PROJECTION with 
the current where will 
you be. 
30:05  ‘The height is 
checked. & that’s good 
to go.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
30:09  ‘Outermaker 3 greens’    PNF-
ATC 
    
30:13     ATC 
clearance to 
land 
ATC-
Crew 
 Confirmation   
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PLANNING: 
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S USED: 
NOTES 
(confirming 
– ‘same 
picture’) 
30:15  ‘3 greens’    PNF-
ATC 
 Checking 
landing gear 
  
30:19 LANDING ‘Copy clear to land. 
Speed is coming back. 
136; 126 at this stage’ 
 ‘I’ve gone through outer marker there, that’s my cue to start 
slowing the aircraft now to the approach speed. So you saw 
me winding the airspeed there.  I previously looked at what 
speed I was aiming for at the CNI & I was just coming back 
to that speed.’ 
‘Now what I’m trying to do is to establish the frame of 
reference within that window, where the runway is, what my 
instruments are telling me, so that I can...  if you’ve been 
starring inside & when they finally look outside & that’s 
when you got to flare & land, it doesn’t give you enough time 
to adjust to a new visual environment.  So I’m trying to 
establish the visual environment again & get my eye in for 
where I’m aiming on the runway.  The last think I’m thinking 
about here, when I’m going to take off the automation. & I 
will use the FD to give me the information to give the GS 
information down to the runway, because it’s usually more 
accurate then to what my eye can tell.  So I will use that to 
help to get my aim point & I will also waiting for my speed 
to come back to select the 100 flaps, which is the normal 
landing configuration.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Reducing speed 
through 
Ref set 
mode 
panel 
Pilots seem to always 
have a reference in 
time, space on 
instrument to 
reference to for he 
next 
move/manoeuvre. So 
IDEA is to give them 
that REFERNCE 
easily available. 
30:51  ‘And disengaging, 
disconnecting 
manually.  Below 145 
(speed) that’s 100…’ 
 (There is something flashing on the top left corner of the 
PFD) ‘That’s the function of the AP. By me disconnecting 
the AP on the control wheel. It will flash for a little while & 
tell you that the AP is off. I think it’s 7 seconds or 
something.’ 
‘When you heard me say (see left)…. I was disengaging the 
AP & disconnecting the ATHR. & that’s when I said I’m fly 
manually.’ 
   Disconnecting 
manually AP 
On the 
control 
column 
 
        Looking outside 
most of the time 
  
31:01  ‘Flaps are 100’    PNF-
PF 
 PNF selected 
flap 100 
flap lever 
to 100 
 
31:04  ‘& speed checks’    PF-
PNF 
 Looked at center 
panel 
(flaps 
check? 
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landing 
gear 
down, 
engines?) 
31:14        Looked engine 
indication 
  
31:19    ‘Just glancing on the PFD there, just to make sure that 
everything is still right.  Can see that I’m relatively on GS, 
just a little bit above, actually just a little below, because it’s 
fly to.’ 
   Looking outside 
most of the time 
  
31:29  ‘MINIMUMS, 
MINUMUMS’ 
  Sharing 
information 
Auto
m-
Crew 
  Automate
d 
reminder 
 
31:31  ‘Acknowledged, 
visual. Roger’ 
 ‘That’s why we set the MINS there.  It’s telling me I’m at the 
bottom of the approach there, make a decision to land. All the 
requirement are met, the have the required visibility.  That’s 
all we need.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Crew 
acknowledged 
the voice 
reminder 
  
        Looking outside 
only 
  
31:56 TOUCHDOW
N 
‘Your controls. My 
controls’ 
 ‘It’s all is visual now. Once you’ve got over that runway you 
don’t need to bother looking inside anymore, because the last 
thing I looked at when I was over the threshold was my 
threshold speed, once I knew I was at that I could afford to 
pull the throttles back to flight idle & know that my speed 
would decay down to my touched down speed.  That’s the 
reason we have those speeds.  The rest of it is centreline & 
obviously I was a little bit all over the place there. That 
comes from familiarity with the flying heads down, that’s 
different, with the HUD You have got a big climb-dive 
marker there right in front of you & you can align it right up 
with the centreline.  Makes is a lot easier. ’ 
   Landed   
           
           
~ event can occur any time 
*event*   - it indicates start & finish of the task 
Dialog of Pilot Flying (PF) – straight text 
Dialog of Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) – italic text   
AUTOMATION VOICE – in capitals 
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ABBREVIATIONS:  
AMU – Avionics Management Unit 
AP – Autopilot  
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
PF – Pilot-Flying 
PFD – Primary Flight Display 
PNF – Pilot-Not-Flying 
T/O – Take Off 
 
NOTES: 
ACTION/ MONITORING/ PLANNING (A;M;P) – For all A;M;P need a set of details on display & a special format.  It could be different for each of AMP. 
$$$ - IDEA 
@ - THOUGHT 
 
 
TO-DO: 
1.  Need to clean-up ‘ACTIONS…’ who is commanding, who is executing it. Idea – ‘PF-PNF’ means PF commands PNF to execute the action 
2.  Need to look over again for mode change lights - when they come ON/OFF  
3.  Can look for keywords to trace… ex. ‘workload’ ex ‘I will be looking for…’, ‘calculation’, ‘mentally’. 
Think of the sequence win which the checks are made to support the checklist as well to see what is most comfortable for pilots to think in terms of comfortability for them. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
Radial? 
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ANALYSIS of information pilot IS LOOKING FOR 
 
Flight phase Pilot looking for information ‘aim 
to hit’ 
Analysis of information needed  Evidence: 
Approach phase Landing data: Threshold speed & 
approach speed per flap setting in 
REFERENCE to height & time of 
when to ‘pull a little bit of power 
off’ 
i.e.  flap setting determines the speed, but 
pilot is interested in speed 
 (04:00)  Description, like MENTAL PICTURE of what’s happening 
‘The landing data includes threshold speeds and approach speeds 
per flap setting.  So if I was with 0 (zero) flap there will an approach 
speed & a threshold speed & what I will be looking at for are those 
on finals is to try and aim to hit those speeds. The approach speed I 
will fly all the down until I get close to the threshold & then I pull a 
little bit of power off, have the speed dribble back until I hit my 
threshold speed over the threshold 350ft; & then from there I pull 
my throttles back to flight idle & speed will decay to a touch down 
speed. Those speeds are already pre-calculated in the CNI & by me 
doing it I’m checking that they are correct, if they are not correct, 
we are possibly flying slower then we are required to be for that 
weight.’ 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
TO DO: 
1. ‘MENTAL PICTURE’  
a. – shows how pilots view a particular part of the flight.  (We are visual creatures, even most effective memory techniques taught are composed of visual presentation, same refers to  
b. – looking for a specific targets to ‘hit’ 
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C-130J Observation Study 
24/10/01  13:30 
Master tape-CDcopy 3 (subject 1) 
Manual 
 
TIME 
LINE 
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OF EVENTS: 
DIALOG UNDERLYING 
PILOT’S 
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SYSTEMS 
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-TO 
 ACTION/ 
MONITORING/ 
PLANNING: 
OBJECT
S USED: 
NOTES 
03:08 TAKE-OFF 
briefing 
‘Glenfield 1 departure 
out of here runway 10; 
plate stated 4 October 
2001, no amendments; 
gradient required 
3.3%, which we can 
do; track 015 & 1TAC 
or 1000 feet, which 
ever is later, turn right, 
track 170 to intercept 
144 for Richmond 
NDB, track to 
Glenfield then as 
cleared.’ ‘Copy’ 
Get all  ‘All that is just interpreting what’s on the plate there & by 
briefing it, it’s actually putting into, right in to our minds, 
instead of always refer to it, some of it can be done from 
memory. And usually what I will do with departure, some of 
the departures would be quite long and complex. However, 
you really cannot keep all of that information in your head, so 
what you do is brief the first or you just remember two to 
three instructions, so like maintain heading 095, 1000 feet or 
1 TAC.  Next what I’m going to do is turn, right turn on 
TACAN distance.  TACAN is what we use in the military – 
Tactical Air Navigation, type of DME. 
1TAC is one DME essentially, i.e. 1 mile upwind & then 
make your turn onto 170.  They are sort of thing I remember 
& without automation you can’t do anything.  You can’t deal 
in 170.  You can’t do it, so you just got to remember it.’ 
 
 PF-
PNF 
 Looking at & 
reading from the 
departure plate 
 ‘track 015 & 1TAC or 
1000 feet, which ever 
is later,’ – 
REFERENCE to 
TIME & SPACE 
04:17 ATC T/O 
clearance 
‘Treasure 123, 
Glenfield 1 departure, 
climb & maintain 
3000, clear for T/O.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
04:23  ‘Glenfield 1, 3000 
clear for T/O, treasure 
123’.  
   PNF-
ATC 
    
04:26  ‘Copy, Glendfiled 1 
clear for T/O & 3000.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
04:30 ROLLING ‘Crew rolling for 95 
knots.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
04:42  ‘My controls.’  ‘Your 
controls’ 
PFD ‘All I’m doing is watching the runway, looking right ahead & 
also just quickly referencing in for the airspeed for our 
rotate.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
    
04:47 ROTATE ‘Rotate’    PNF     
04:53  ‘Landing gear up.’  ‘All I’m looking for there on the PFD, now my focus has 
come in inside once we are far away from the ground.   All I 
am doing is getting my attitude & heading set on the PFD, so 
 PF    REFERENCE used = 
limitation/flight 
envelope – ‘over 
Appendix 3
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I’m concentrating on putting the climb-dive marker where I 
want it.  Obviously we don’t have any reference information 
there now, so I am just looking at the reference, the pitch 
ladder. So that’s all.  How many degrees I want & I was 
looking for about 7 degrees nose up there.  That’s usually a 
good figure to remember.  As accelerating at a nice rate, but 
not to quick, so you are not going to over speed the gear or 
anything like that. The other part of my scan is looking down 
at the compass card & quickly referencing& having a look at 
the level on there as to what heading I am flying.’  
speed the landing 
gear’ 
05:10  ‘is up.’    PNF     
05:12  ‘Flaps up.’  ‘So this is just my side scan there.  Looking at the airspeed 
there, making sure I have enough airspeed there, to sacrifice 
there, we are not stalling.’ 
‘I command that as part of the take off checklist is pilot 
initiated, as oppose to the other ones which are I ask for the 
checklist, but co-pilot reads it.’ 
 PF     
05:18 Passing radar 
(sound) 
    Auto-
Crew 
    
05:21 After T/O 
checklist 
‘Flaps up. Landing 
gear up, flaps up, after 
T/O checklist.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
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05:28 Contacting 
ATC 
‘Sydney approach, 
good day, Treasure 
123, Glenfield 1 
departure, passing 
1000, climbing for 
3000.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
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05:35  ‘Treasure 123, good 
afternoon. Are you 
tracking via Glenfield 
1 departure?’ 
‘Treasure 123.’ 
   ATC-
PNF 
    
05:42  ‘TAC1, turn right 170’  ‘So in that, when I said there to myself that was just from 
memory.  That’s what I briefed before we took off.  So I 
knew ones we got to 1TAC that what I am going to do.  
That’s takes a little bit of a brain space away of trying to read 
the next step from your approach plate.’ 
      
05:43  ‘co-pilot, loadmaster, 
F-pilot.’ 
       TIME REFERENCE 
– thinking ahead 
05:48  ‘& there it is 
approaching 3000.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
05:49  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO’ 
 ‘I will just explain something here.  That might look like a 
fairly benign thing. All we are doing there just climbing & 
turning, but my workload is really increasing there, because I 
now no longer have any flight director information to tell me 
a rate.  Like the FD works out what rate I am climbing at, 
when I will need to start my level off & also when I will need 
to start my roll out from a turn.  It calculates how many 
degrees per second I am rolling at; how many feet per minute 
I am climbing at & gives me a nice solution there, so that ball 
eventually just comes down on to the horizon & smack-bang 
on my heading.  Now, I mentally having to calculate all of 
that, so what I’m looking for.  I am having a look at my rate 
of climb.  I am doing about 2500 feet/min, so 10% of your 
rate of climb is what you use to level off at for your height so 
250 feet before 3000 feet & that’s when I’ve got to start my 
level off.  And they are the things I am thinking about when I 
am doing that.  Obviously approaching about 7 degrees at the 
rate I was turning at – rate 1, is when you start your roll out.   
Ye, looks simple, but that what we do a lot of practice for 
instrument flying, doing coordination exercises, turning & 
climbing at the same time, descending & what we will do, 
give ourselves an arch to fly in & height bugs to fly in & you 
just have to keep bouncing between all of those parameters’. 
 Auto-
Crew 
   Mental calculation 
the pilot has to go 
through, when the 
automation is not ON. 
05:50  ‘Checked.’    PF-
PNF 
    
06:00  ‘17’         
06:02  ‘170’    PF-
PNF 
    
06:09  ‘Just check your height    PNF-     
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there’. ‘Ye’ PF 
06:28  ‘Treasure 123, 
continue climbing 
5000.’ 
 ‘This also has a workload on PNF, because he has to monitor 
a lot more, because he generally has a fare bit of help from a 
FD & the autopilot.  As well as doing all his normal task, he 
is constantly watching, if I haven’t bust a height, an airspeed 
or a heading or whatever, so the workload increases 
significantly for both of people.  It’s not just the pilot.’ 
 Atc-
Crew 
    
06:32  ‘5000, Treasure 123.’    PNF-
ATC 
    
06:35  ‘5000 is set.’    PNF-
PF 
    
 
06:36  ‘Copy, is checked.’    PF-
PNF 
    
06:42  ‘Leaving 3 for 5.’ 
‘Good.’ 
 ‘Really the only thing that is helping me there is got to climb 
by ATC.  Just checking that generally set the right height, 
above the altitude tape there, checking the cyan figure. That’s 
a very good design issue in the PFD is the way they put all of 
the reference number in a different colour, that they are the 
same, any reference figure is all in cyan.  So if you see a blue 
reference number anywhere, that’s it.  That’s a reference 
number.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
   Comment of use of 
Colour.  Pilot likes 
reference numbers in 
blue colour. 
07:00  ‘Approaching..’    PNF-
PF 
    
07:02  ‘I got the CDI (bar) 
coming across.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
07:05  ‘Altimeters’         
07:06  ‘Approaching 5000…         
07:07  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO.’ 
   Auto-
Crew 
    
07:07  ‘… checked.’    PNF     
07:14  ‘I can’t give you a 
heading, because I 
haven’t..’.  ‘That’s 
alright.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
07:30 Obtaining met 
conditions for 
destination 
‘Can you please give 
us terminal 
information.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
    
07:32 Receiving 
ATIS for 
Sydney 
‘Roger, Sydney 
terminal information 
Alfa, runway 07, wind 
120 degrees, 10 knots, 
 ‘My main focus now.  Once I am all straight & level, just 
focus around the flight path marker; make sure it’s around the 
horizon.  That’s it. 
That’s why I can consider all that other staff now, because 
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QNH 1022, 
temperature 15, expect 
ILS approach.’ 
my workload gone to just looking at one thing now basically.  
As long as I have that there & make sure that the acceleration 
caret of the wing are not accelerating decelerating, climbing, 
descending.’ 
‘Runway 07, that’s what I want to hear, that what we are 
expecting.’ 
 
08:10  ‘Approach plate…’ 
‘Yes go ahead, mate.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
08:11  ’07 finals course 06 
to… starting at 3000 
for finals, outer-maker 
check-height 1300, 
decision height 270, 
setting in the mids 
radar 254.  Missed 
approach I will brief if 
you need it.  No 
circling 3 knot miles 
DME south, sorry east 
of Sydney 16 Right 
north of runway 25…’ 
 ‘Just checking in the Ref set panel again the brief altitudes & 
the approach there. 
That’s runway 07 at this stage, that’s right.’ 
 PNF-
PF 
    
08:46  ‘I just hand over to 
you for 2 seconds, 
while I input my 
approach plate.’ ‘Sure’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
08:49  ‘Handing over.’ 
‘Taking over.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
 PF is locating 
approach plate 
& placing it onto 
the yoke. 
  
09:00  ‘Taking over.’ 
‘Handing over.’ 
 ‘At this stage all I am doing is just flying Glenfield 1 
departure, so all the minor navigation aid selection up there 
are still the same as what I selected before take off.  The only 
thing that will change, once we get that change of runway.  
You will see me manipulate that.’ 
      
09:19 Passing radar 
(sound) 
  ‘Just looking at the Nav Radar there, just to give myself a bit 
of orientation check.  That I am where I think I am’ 
     Pilot has a 
REFERENCE of 
himself in space & 
double checking with 
Nav Radar 
09:41 Passing radar 
(sound) 
‘I will give you Sydney 
VOR DME…’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
09:45  ‘Ok, Thanks mate.’         
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09:48  ‘428 Glenfield is in 
both NDBs.’ 
 ‘Navigation aid set up.  What PNF was doing was just putting 
the other non-directional beacon across to the Glenfield 
frequency.  Now that we were established close to Glenfield, 
there was no longer any need for PNF be tracking the 
Richmond NDB.  So he was switching that across to Sydney.  
I was just acknowledging that & at the same time there I’ve 
got my left hand of the stick & the other one pulling the 
buttons on the side to identify the navigational aids into 
Sydney, so you can hear all the Morse code coming through.’ 
 PNF-
PF 
    
 
09:51  ‘All station in bound 
Sydney, Sydney 
terminal information 
bravo is about to be 
recorded duty runway 
16R, switch now, 140 
degrees, 15 knots, 
QNH 1022.’ 
   ATC-
all 
aircraf
ts 
    
10:09  ‘Treasure 123 we will 
make you number 3 in 
the sequence, turn left 
heading 045 to 
intercept the 12 mile 
arc for 16R ILS.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
10:18 
 
 ‘Left heading 060, to 
intercept 12 mile arc 
for ILS 16R, treasure 
123.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
    
10:26  ‘060’    PNF-
PF 
    
10:28  ‘I think it was 045 was 
he or was it us?’ 
   PF-
PNF 
   Lost where they were 
just moments ago, i.e. 
heading. REFERNCE 
needed 
10:33  ‘Sydney, Treasure 
123, just confirm that 
heading was 060.’ 
 ‘PNF misheard what the ATC gave us. He gave us heading 
045, but he read, he actually initially give us 060 & then 
came back again & said left heading 045 & PNF didn’t 
respond & that’s when he call him back & said, yep turn left 
heading 045.’ 
 PNF-
ATC 
   Incident of 
misinterpreting the 
heading 
10:37  ‘Treasure 123, 
negative, Magnet 045.’ 
   ATC-
PNF 
    
10:41  ‘045, Treasure 123.’         
10:42  ‘045’  ‘And the reason I query that is because I had a look at the  PNF-     
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compass rose there & thought that 060 is gonna put us fairly 
close to the finals course there, by the time we intercept the 
12 mile arc, so I thought we really need to come further left 
there.  And that sounds reasonable to me, so I better check & 
that just worked out that it was what he said anyway.’ 
What I did there on the glare shield, the first button press I 
did, which is just a little back from there, I highlighted one of 
my pointer selections there, because I knew once the runway 
has changed I wanted to reference the VOR to give me 
tracking information & needle pointer around the compass 
rose on the bottom, but at that point in time we did not have 
the VOR selected because we had the ILS frequencies in 
there for runway 07, so I was just waiting for PNF to swope 
those aids across.  Once he did that you saw me there, you 
saw me there, I selected the VOR to give me some navigation 
information as to the 12-mile arc intercepting finals for 16R. 
Around the compass rose there Wherever the tale of the 
pointer is that’s where you are.  That’s the rule you use.  
Once you’ve got that you can actually work out heading just 
by transposing your finger onto that compass card is to where 
you want to be to intercept a distance or a radial.  That’s sort 
of stuff the aircraft can’t tell you. 
PF 
10:48  ‘And finals course RW 
16R, for 155. RAD 
ALT.’ 
        
10:54  ‘Roger’    PF     
10:55  ‘Treasure 123, report 
airspeed.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
10:59  ‘200. Treasure 123.’    PNF-
ATC 
    
 
11:01  ‘Treasure 123, if you 
could increase to 210, 
thanks.’ 
   ATC-
PNF 
    
11:04  ‘210, Treasure 123.’    PNF-
ATC 
    
11:10  ‘Copy 210 knots.’ 
‘Copied.’ ‘Turning 
045.’ ‘Copy.’ 
 ‘Just mention something to.  Just putting the power up there, 
obviously I’m watching the speed caret come up & go above 
the wing, because we want to accelerate, but as to how much 
that go before you get to 210 knots it’s something that I had 
to constantly monitor, once I got to 210 knots, then I had to 
pull power back make sure the caret was on the wing.  So it 
didn’t raise the workload a great deal, but it did a little bit. 
 PF-
PNF 
   @ TIME 
REFERENCE of the 
future, present, past - 
is already can be 
observed in the 
cockpit – speed caret, 
i.e. goes up when 
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There is nothing that really tells you after 210 knots at this 
height you need to set this power.’ 
accelerating & down 
decelerating 
11:16  ‘212 NDR MINIMUS 
radar set to 212.  
Outermarker check 
height 1295 at 4.7 I’ll 
give you localiser 
frequency when you 
are turning. 
Approaching the lead 
radial there.’ 
‘OK’ 
   PNF-PF  Selecting VOR AMU 
panel 
 
11:35  ‘Treasure 123. We saw 
you through 12 mile 
arc there, if you could 
turn left there, 
intercept the arc 
through 16R ILS’ 
   ATC-
crew 
    
11:42  ‘Turning left intercept 
12 mile arc. Treasure 
123.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
    
11:50  ‘Not by much there.’ 
‘No’ 
 ‘ATC being a little picky with this 12 mile arc.  I was at 11 
miles, the tolerance of the side of that & DME is 2 miles, so 
we were still within tolerance there, but he obviously wanted 
us right on the 12 mile arc. 
I thought I have already done it, but that’s when I selected the 
VOR. That’s the time to set the VOR.’ 
What is the 111?   
‘111 is in the IAS slot - what our obstacle clearance speed 
was… And that stays there all the time unless you change it 
or connect an Autothrottle.  That’s the only time its ever 
changes.’ 
      
12:22  ‘Sorry, the lead radial 
was there again?’ 
‘323.’ ‘323 roger.’ 
 ‘I use the tip of that needle to give me an orientation, as to 
tell me, am I getting further away from the NAV aid or closer 
to it, so that’s how I am adjusting my 12 nautical ark there.  
Because that needle gone above the line, what I am doing is 
flying away from the station to increase my distance from it.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
    
12:26  ‘It’s our final course 
there in the box there.’ 
‘Ok.  Thanks.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
12:38  ‘Ok, that’s coming up 
toward the 12milish 
arc.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
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12:42  ‘We were still within 
track 2 knots when 
they gave us there’ 
‘Ye’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
12:52  ‘Treasure 123 descent 
to 3000.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
12:54  ‘3000, left 5000. 
Treasure 123’ 
 ‘The ATC gave us descend down to 3000, which is the 
starting height from which you make the approach, so that’s 
something we were expecting to come up soon anyway.  
The ATC basically told me to maintain 12 mile arc better, so 
the workload is still on me to adjust my heading to keep that 
12 mile arc pretty much on 12 miles.’ 
 PNF-
ATC 
   Pilots have a plan of 
sequence of events – 
‘we were expecting 
to come up anyway’ 
12:58  ‘and copy. 3000, left 
5000.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
13:13  ‘ok, go across to the 
ILS, that’s fine mate.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
13:16  ‘and I will put in 
your.’ 
 ‘Now that I’m happy & established on the 12 mile arc, I don’t 
really need the tail of the needle any more & that’s why PNF 
was taking the frequency to the ILS frequency for the 
azimuth on the ILS now. 
Azimuth is that going left or right of the centreline.’ 
 PNF-
PF 
    
 
13:23 Morse code 
identification – 
radar 
navigation 
         
13:28  ‘and Altimeters.’    PNF-
PF 
    
13:30  ‘and approaching 
3000.’ ‘Good’ 
        
13:35  ’2 to 12, miles’    PNF-
PF 
    
13:37  ‘yep’         
13:40  ‘THOUSAND TO 
GO’ 
   Auto-
Crew 
    
13:40  ‘Treasure 123, you can 
cancel speed 
restriction.  You are 
cleared 16R for the 
ILS. Once established 
on finals contact tower 
120,5.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
13:47  ‘Cleared for the ILS  ‘He (ATC) cancelled the speed restriction from 210 knots, so  PNF-     
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16R. Cancel speed 
restriction. Tower 
120,5 once 
established. Treasure 
123.’ 
I can fly whatever I want to fly, where last time I decided to 
do that anyway, because we were getting close.’ 
‘So even though I’m descending you can see, the airspeed, 
the energy caret is below the wing this means we are 
decelerating.’ 
ATC 
14:05 ‘BIP-BIP’ - 
annunciation 
         
14:11  ‘We can come back to 
170 now, so we 
can…’. ‘Copied.’  
   PF-
PNF 
    
14:27  ‘Loose a bit of speed 
in a turn too so that we 
get us there later.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
14:32  ‘VOR, alright, I will 
put TACAN1 on that 
to add some distance 
there.’ ‘Yep.’ 
 ‘(Checking) that I’ve got all the right selection there, the one 
I turn on to the ILS. 
I’m checking that on the CDI bar I’ve got the ILS frequency 
selected.  So VOR is my CDI selection, pointer 1 is TACAN 
& pointer 2 is TACAN.  And again TACAN means DME, so 
that I can have a reference to the outermarker check-height, 
when I am likely to incept the glide slope.  So things I look 
for that is, just as a check I always calculate, when I am going 
to intercept my glide slope, because my style is designed to 
enter a 3-degree slope, you can calculate that every mile you 
need to be 300 feet.  So at 5 miles out I should be 1 500 feet, 
10 miles out I should be 3000 feet.  We are at 3000 feet, so 
we were going to intercept the glide slope at 10 miles.  So I 
was just referencing down to the distance there at the bottom 
of the PFD to give me an indication so as to when I was 
going to intercept the finals course in the glide slope.’ 
   Checking & 
touching the 
AMU panel 
 How  Pilots remember 
what they select as 
what in there nav 
aids? – to explore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculation of the 3 
degree slope = 300 
feet/mile (at speed of 
200knots) 
14:39  ‘And go ahead with 
the landing checklist.’ 
‘Flaps’.  ‘Below 180, 
flaps 50.’ ‘Copied.’ 
        
14:45  ‘Got the floater 
starting to come there 
now, so.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
  ?? 
floater?? 
 
14:51  ‘Flaps are 50 now. 
Landing gear.’ ‘Below 
160 landing gear 
down.’ 
 ‘So all I’m concentrating on here.  In fact there are quite a 
few things I am concentrating on here. Making sure I am 
staying level, because I can’t leave 3000 feet until I intercept 
that glide slope & I am established within tolerances for the 
approach.  The other thing I am looking for my airspeed to be 
decreasing, now so that we can get the landing gear down, 
but not keep washing the speed off.  Also I’m watching the 
     Picture in mind of a 
Pilot - FORWARD 
THINKING 
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compass card & seeing that the Course Deviation Indicator 
(CDI) which is that bar in the center of that white thing to 
intercept my correct azimuth there.  So I am watching about 3 
to 4 different things here at the moment.’ 
15:14  ‘Landing gear down. 
Three green.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
15:17  ‘Down, three greens’    PF-
PNF 
    
15:18  ‘ panel set.’    PNF     
15:20  ‘Landing checks.’    Crew     
15:23  ‘Pilot, co-pilot, load-
master.’ 
   Crew     
15:27  ‘Sydney Tower good 
day, Treasure 123. 
Established ILS finals 
on 16R, three greens.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
    
15:33  ‘Treasure 123, Good 
morning, Sydney 
Tower, continue the 
approach, reporting an 
outermarker.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
15:38  ‘Ok, Treasure 123.’         
15:40  ‘We should expect an 
intercept in about 10 
miles, there on the 
glide slope. ’ 
 ‘That’s what I was telling you before.  I calculated that in my 
head.  Pretty much as you see 10 miles click over, glide slope 
right in the center.  Ready to go.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
    
15:46  ‘Quite close in.’    PNF     
15:49  ‘And leaving 3000 for 
the minimum of 220.’ 
   PF-
PNF 
    
15:54  ‘And checked’         
15:56  ‘Beacon button is 
pulled.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
15:58  ‘Likewise.’    PF-
PNF 
    
16:10  ‘CHECK ALTITUDE’    Auto-
Crew 
    
16:13  ‘Just wind that out, 
thanks mate.’ 
 ‘That little indication you got there (across top of PFD) is, 
because we deviated more then 200 feet from the set altitude, 
which was 3000 at the time.  It was letting us know that we 
where not on the altitude that we had set.  We didn’t need to 
be, because we were on glideslope & we were cleared to 
descend.  So what we normally do, just wind that up & 
outside the window that is sets it off at, so it doesn’t keep 
 PF-
PNF 
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saying ‘Altitude, Altitude’.  It’s really annoying.’   
‘Certainly, you should, but because we all know we are 
established in the approach.  It’s one of those things that you 
do ignore it.’ 
16:20  ‘Outer maker set at 
4.7.’ 
   PNF-
PF 
    
16:26  ‘Course 95’  ‘So what I am concentrating on there now, because I don’t 
have a Flight Director.  I have to scan between the little 
glideslope indicator on the left hand side there & the CDI bar 
in the center.  And that’s what I am doing; I am just 
manipulating those now.  I am looking at my rate of descent 
on the side, which is that little white arrow that comes up & 
down.  And what I am aiming for is about 700 foot/min rate 
of descend.  And if I keep that on my air speed of 140 knots I 
know that I will stay on Glideslope.  That’s just something 
you know about the aircraft.  That’s how it performs.  And 
then if I maintain that, that’s less time that I have to scan to 
that Glideslope indicator on the side there.  And then what I 
really have to worry about is maintaining the left & right on 
the Azimuth.  As you can see that, it’s sort of goes all over 
the place. 
You can’t do as good as the computer.’ 
And also the indications you have on the PFD there are 
not as accurate as having the FD there, because it takes 
longer for your eye to pick up the movement of that bar a 
little bit of centreline rather then the circle going left or right.  
If you see that circle going left or right you almost 
immediately move left or right to capture that again, but with 
that CDI there down the bottom you have to look over the 
control column a bit.  It’s obscured.  It’s a little further away.  
Not as well annunciate, so that’s why you get a few more 
inaccuracies in your flying.  
But we also another information there.  There is a little cross, 
which sits on the top of the compass rose there & that gives 
us a tracking information.  So what’s that doing is the inertia 
navigation system going, ‘ok, we’ve got this much wind it’s 
10 knots from the left, there for we are drifting right.  So to 
maintain your track, you need to come left of your heading 
by 5 degrees & that’s what little cross tells you to do.  So 
once I centralise that bar, next thing I look for is getting that 
cross on the tip of the needle.  Once I’ve done that I know 
that bar is not going to move any more.  And that’s 
something I was letting out of my scan.  Something I‘m not 
use to doing on PFD. 
 PF-
PNF 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Display problems… 
‘the indications on the 
PFD there are not as 
accurate as the FD’  
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You’ve got to look at 3 Glideslope the middle & the cross, 
plus the Climb Dive Marker (CDM), plus the rate of descent, 
plus airspeed.  So there are about 5 or 6 things to scan there. 
‘If you had a FD there, let me count that the… it’s basically 4 
of those things will not have to scan.  So it’s a the CDI bar, 
because it gives you left & right; drift, because the INS input 
goes through FD to give you left or right.  So it will not only 
give you the information as to how to capture the CDI bar 
again, but how to maintain it centrally.  It will also give you 
the information on your Glideslope.  So that’s Glideslope, 
CDI, tracking & rate of descent will give you all in that one.  
So very nice. 
17:55  BIP, BIP, BIP…..  Right now, I am interested in getting a landing clearance, so I 
am waiting for that come through.  I am also, next thing I’m 
looking at validating the ILS by that outermarker check 
height again. And PNF briefed a little bit before, as to what 
the height, distance we were looking for, so that’s a next 
step.’ 
‘I’m looking outside trying to pick up the visual environment 
again, but mainly still just referring to those things I was 
scanning, CDI bar, Glideslope, rate of descent, Climb Dive 
marker, airspeed.’ 
‘So it’s all an internal scan on the PFD there.  I am not 
looking at anything else.’ 
‘There is an outermarker.  Yes, it gives you the height if you 
are on Glideslope at that point.  You should be at this height 
there.  I take a quick glance across at the altimeter. Once we 
are at 4.7 DME, we are directly over the outermarker there & 
if that height is high.  It means that & on Glideslope.  It 
means my altimeter is out a bit.  So I make an altimeter 
correction on my MINIMA.  So instead of it being 220, so if I 
was high on the outemarker check height by 50 feet, I would 
raise that MINIMA to 270, but if I am low on it, I don’t need 
to raise it.  So once we go through it, you will see me say, 
‘Low good to go’, that’s just general phrase we use.’ 
 Auto-
Crew 
   Pilot’s timeline 
expectations – 
‘waiting for…’ 
18:05  ‘4.7 there.’    PF-
PNF 
    
18:11  ‘4.7, 1295, Outer 
marker height 
checked.’ 
        
18:12  ‘Co-pilot is visual.’    PNF-
PF 
    
18:15  ‘And likewise, I will    PF-     
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just continue down on 
the glide slope there.’ 
‘Ok.’ 
PNF 
18:31  ’coming 21 for 116.’         
18:35  ‘And checks.’  ‘Checking my landing speed there. 
Now you can see my head starting to look out more.  Starting 
to establish the visual environment, the aspect of the runway 
& marry that up to what I am seeing on the instrumentation 
there.’ 
 PF-
PNF 
 Looking at CNI 
for a landing 
speed 
  
18:55  ‘Treasure 123, you 
could land, check your 
gear.’ 
   ATC-
Crew 
    
18:58  ‘Land, three green. 
Treasure 123.’ 
   PNF-
ATC 
    
19:00  ‘Copy, clear to land. 
The runway appear 
clear and below 145, 
flaps 100, thanks.’ 
   PF-
NF 
    
19:05  ‘117 for 107.’  
‘Checks.’ 
        
19:10  ‘Flaps 100.’  ‘Looking that the flap indicator.  There is a little flap 
indicator below the engine display there.’ 
 PNF-
PF 
    
19:23  ‘6 knots from the left.’ 
‘Roger.’ 
        
19:25  ‘8 knots from the left.’         
19:36  ‘MINIMUS, 
MINIMUS.’ 
   Auto-
Crew 
    
19:37  ‘GLIDESLOPE, GLI-
GLIDESLOPE, 
GLIDESLOPE’ 
 ‘’What happen there, I look out for a bit too long & then what 
I’ve done I flown into the edge of tolerance area the Ground 
Collision Avoidance System & what it will do, it will let you 
know that you are off your glideslope.  And that’s quite 
important because if the weather was fairly marginal there & 
we had the minimal visibility there & that was at night, there 
is a lot of optical illusion you can get & by having not so 
bright lights there, you tend to fly towards the lights & that’s 
the thing that’s build into the system, that stops you from 
doing that.  So as soon as you go out of that small tolerance 
area towards the end of the Glideslope it will let you know, 
so that you go, ‘Ups, hang on, I am flying a bit low there, 
because it’s very easy to get trapped with flying below the 
Glideslope.  You do like a little dive towards the end there.  
Ye, it’s usually an illusion with the lights.’ 
Because it was during the day, I didn’t worry about it too 
 Auto-
Crew 
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much.  I just pulled up a little bit & made the moaning go 
away.’ 
20:05 LAND   ‘Ye, all outside now.  I took my last look at the airspeed, just 
make sure I‘ve got what I want.  
There is a touch down.’ 
‘Now, all I am worried about is to keep that centreline right 
in the middle, as close to it. 
      
20:12  ‘Your controls.’ ‘My 
controls’ 
        
    ‘Definitely the value of the FD, that’s the first thing you miss, 
so having to think of those manual things; what sort of 
margins you have to anticipate – level off, turning on 
heading. That sort of thing.  Manually thinking, where you 
are with regards to navigation aids & just things like that 
increase the workload slightly on flying pilot & to a certain 
extend on the PNF; detracts a little bit from the normal 
procedures that you do.  Just increase the workload a little bit. 
Also for your personal pride I guess, your flying is not quite 
as accurate as to what it can be.  Using the automation give 
you other cues, which you are use to. 
      
    (if you can change anything … what would it be) That I 
wouldn’t really change much.  Obviously, we were in the sim 
for the second time, we’ve already seen the scenario, so we 
where expecting a few different things, that we were not at 
the time before.  We were quite comfortable with what was 
happening & I guess in that way it gives you a great 
advantage so I really thought there is not much that I would 
do differently there.  In fact I don’t think there is anything 
really I would do differently.  Everything was flown within 
tolerances.  It was completely safe & it was done using 
Standard Operating procedures.  And we trained to that 
standard, just in case we don’t have FD or we don’t have the 
automation.  We’ve got to be able to do that.  It’s part of our 
requirements, so I wouldn’t change anything, no. 
      
    ‘’The main things with flying heads down & flying with 
manual data is you begin to fixate on things.  The main thing 
to do is to tell them to do is increase your scan rate, which is 
the hard thing to do, because the only way you can do it by 
doing this sort of things.  So ye, just increase your scan rate 
around the instrumentation & the information that you’ve got.  
And remember basic techniques, because what I just did 
there, I learned on pilot’s course that what they taught me.  I 
just applied to C130J.  If I flew another type of aircraft I 
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would applying to another aircraft type, so realistically that 
standard you should be able to expect from anyone who is 
flying this type of aircraft, whether a co-pilot or a captain. 
    There is a lot of information on that PFD.  I am actually the 
other way around; I’ve got very little of EFIS time.  I’ve 
spent most of my time on quite an archaic aircraft type. I did 
250 hours on PC9s, which is an EFIS set up.  Then for about 
5 years I did not flying on EFIS aircraft.  I flew C130E, so I 
flew heads down & just visually, just like I did on this one, 
but instrumentation we had was all analog dials, everything 
was dials.  All the engines displays were dials, there was 
nothing in there that would help you.  We did have the FD.  
They were bard & they would move around like that floating 
bars, so the quality of the FD presentation was not as good as 
what they have with this. So when I came from that 
background to an aircraft that was such a great EFIS set-up as 
this.  It was information overload for the first part of 
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~ event can occur any time 
*event*   - it indicates start & finish of the task 
Dialog of Pilot Flying (PF) – straight text 
Dialog of Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) – italic text   
AUTOMATION VOICE – in capitals 
      Interesting incident 
 
ABBREVIATIONS:  
AMU – Avionics Management Unit 
AP – Autopilot  
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
CDI - Course Deviation Indicator 
INS – Inertia Navigation System 
PF – Pilot-Flying 
PFD – Primary Flight Display 
PNF – Pilot-Not-Flying 
T/O – Take Off 
 
 
